



Brazil-U.S. Relations

in the 20th and 21st Centuries



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Editors

BRAZIL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

XX AND XXI CENTURIES



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Introductory notes to a study of relations between Brazil and the USA in the 20th and 21st centuries

Sidnei J. Munhoz

Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva

This book studies relations between Brazil and the USA during the 20th century and outlines some perspectives for the start of the 21st century. Issues related to a wide variety of aspects of the relationship are addressed by bringing together a number of texts by Brazilian and American historians and political scientists. The reader will find studies relating to different historical periods on the economic, political, military, social and cultural relations of these two countries.

This topic is extremely relevant today as it is intrinsically linked to the emergence of a new world order, characterized by the relative decline of the United States as a hegemonic power, in which the effects of the 11th September attacks, the involvement of the USA in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the aggressive foreign policy implemented through the so-called Bush Doctrine have all been important. The ultraconservatism of George W. Bush's two administrations was finally rejected by the American electorate, strongly influenced by the emergence of the economic crisis whose epicenter was the USA and which spread to take on global proportions. The crisis was long-lasting and questioned the supremacy of the old centers of power within international institutions.

This context led to marked changes in the behavior of the American electorate which for the first time in its history elected a black man to be President. Barak Obama took office with the promise to put the country back on the right path, take control of the domestic crisis and contribute decisively to solving the world crisis. Furthermore, Obama promised to adopt a more

cooperative foreign policy, breaking unilateralist perspectives and looking to rebuild American hegemony by avoiding unnecessary conflicts, though at the same time equipping the USA adequately to deal with its real enemies. However, the difficulties in implementing these policies and pressure from more conservative sectors have led to the sully of Obama's image and an increase in criticisms of his government. In this context, progressives criticize his hesitancy in carrying out promised reforms while conservatives accuse the government of weakness in conducting the country's foreign policy. These tensions became clear in Obama's difficult re-election process in 2012.

In his second mandate Obama will have to address an extremely complex international situation in which challenges without facile solutions will have to be met. Europe, the USA's most important economic and political partner in the period since the Second World War and key to the development of its foreign policy, finds itself embroiled in an unprecedented crisis which threatens the stability of the Euro Zone. Furthermore, the challenges presented by China, which even in the middle of the global crisis enjoys economic growth rates of around 8%, demand flexible changes in the United States' global policy. In this scenario, the American Continent below the Rio Grande takes on renewed importance.

The latest news relating to Brazil-USA relations, as a consequence of the so-called 'Snowden Case', has certainly had a strong impact (just before President Dilma Rousseff was to visit the United States), forcing Itamaraty to issue a particularly acid note. There is no doubt that the discovery of Brasília as the only and largest e-spy center in the Americas is likely to damage bilateral relations¹ or at least provoke increased distrust. This action, described as 'Special Collective Service' causes embarrassment to Brazilian Diplomacy in relation to its neighbors, who can accuse Brasília of colluding with continental spy services. Indeed, the NSA + CIA base was, until 2002, only second to the New Delhi base in India as the largest in the world. The fact that a NSA and a CIA base operated directly from Brasília, in secret agreement with telecommunication companies and monitoring and infringing on private Brazilian emails and telephone calls, has had a great impact on Brazilian public opinion². It is also symptomatic that these operations ended - at least in

1 Brasil. Ministério das relações Exteriores. *Press Statement by the Minister Antonio Patriota on alleged spying on Brazilian citizens*. 2013. Nota 237, Brasília, July, 7. Accessed August 19, 2013. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-a-imprensa-do-ministro-antonio-patriota-sobre-denuncia-de-espionagem-contracidadados-brasileiros>.

2 See "Uma base espia em Brasília." 2013. *O Globo*, July, 8: 21

relation to information gathered on Brazilian soil - at the beginning of 2002, shortly after the serious crisis between Brasília and Washington erupted in the months after 11th September, provoked by the American attempt to initiate armed intervention in the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay) (as described in chapter...). This is particularly poignant as these operations would have had an impact on Brazil-USA cooperation in intelligence and strategic services

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The historical conditions which led to the reconfiguration of the international scenario, after the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet world broke up, must also be considered. The old East/West polarization, which was both justified and often veiled by ideological discourse, was replaced by a masked North/South conflict, a line defined by the difference in interests between rich and poor nations.

In this context, international bodies created at the end of the Second World War assumed increasing importance in defining both public and private national policies, regardless of the political-ideological tendency of particular governments. Thus, we saw the conclusion of the dismantling of 'welfare democracies' (where they existed) which had begun in the late-1970s, and, simultaneously, we saw a reduction in the role of the State in managing the economy and areas of public interest, and also in its capacity to regulate the market and private business.

In the last few years, the role Brazil has played to achieve the status of a regional power is worthy of mention. It has sought to be the mouthpiece for a bloc of nations, arguing for more acceptable parameters to govern economic relations between rich and poor countries. This has been evident both in Brazil's role in advancing the Group of 21 with the objective of consolidating and expanding the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasul), and through these two bodies lay a solid foundation to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTTA) with the USA. As this is an extremely controversial issue there are both passionate supporters and powerful critics. Taking into consideration the aforementioned points, we believe that this is an extremely opportune moment to publish a set of works which addresses this topic with due diligence. However, it should not be forgotten that Brazil cherished a similar aspiration at the end of the Second World War when it advocated for its status as a regional power to

be recognized, both by the USA and by the wider international community. Indeed, the country had aspirations to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council of the recently created United Nations. Therefore, any similarities between the scenarios and aspirations of the Brazilian state at the end of that conflict and today are worthy of consideration.

At the same time, Brazil has played an important role in the international scenario establishing partnerships with China, India and Russia. This led to the transformation of the so-called BRICS (now with an 'S' for SOUTH Africa) into a forum for exchange and consultation, with an active role on the global stage. These five countries are seen by many as the dominant economic powers of the near future. The BRICs together account for 40% of the world's population and 22% of global economic activity. It is almost certain that Brazil's relations with these countries will grow and deepen over the next years. After nearly a century during which the USA was, without doubt, Brazil's largest trade partner, this position has been taken by China. Nevertheless, there is nothing to indicate that there will be a distancing between Brazil and the USA, and in this scenario Brazil's relations with the USA and China will take on complementary characteristics; however, it is clear that the nature of the relations between the two largest countries in the Americas, in terms of their population and economies, will undergo significant changes. Understanding the scope and characteristics of these changes is a fundamental task for those interested in this field.

The arguments expounded justify this initiative; but compiling a book with such a wide scope is not an easy task. In the first place, it is worth stressing the lack of a linear pattern in the conduct of the actors involved in this intricate and complex process of readjustments in the international scenario. Consequently, it is difficult to predict the degree of change in both Brazilian and American societies and in the international scenario itself. Indeed, it should be noted, *a priori*, that relations established between the two largest nations in the American Continent - or, as some prefer to say, the two giants of the Americas - are characterized by moments of approximation, distancing, complicity, unconditional alignment, challenge, resentment, fear, admiration and rejection, only to mention some aspects.

Another difficulty of this topic is the fact that these relations play out within very different fields - the economic, the political and the cultural. Though in principle it should be possible to establish links between one field and another, this is not true for all cases. Furthermore, we should be careful to

avoid confining these relations to a geographical interpretation, treating the 'subject', Brazil or the 'subject', the United States, as homogeneous entities. In other words, the existence of tensions and diverse political projects within each society must be recognized. It has always been important to remember, principally when dealing with international relations, that this is a difficult task, as it is very easy to interpret the actions of a particular government as the actions of a whole country.

Thus, we recognize the difficulties and limitations inherent to this project. We present to the public a book which aims to provide university teachers and undergraduate and postgraduate students in the areas of History, International Relations, Political Science, Economics, Social Sciences and related areas, an analysis of relations established between Brazil and the USA in the 20th and 21st centuries. We would like to emphasize that, in addition to the academic community, the book is relevant for the business community and public administrators who, in one way or another, have links with activities in the international arena. Indeed, the book may be of interest to members of the wider community motivated to know more about the world in which they live.

We hope that this book stimulates reflections on Brazil-USA relations, a topic which despite having been addressed in notable works by a number of colleagues, deserves much more attention. In Brazilian universities, even in the Humanities, sadly, in general, very little attention has been given to studies dealing with the Americas and the USA. What should we say to students who are taking courses in other areas? This is something that needs to be emphasized. Brazil is part of the American continent, and whether we like it or not, the USA is our most important partner and often our rival and competitor. While for over a century the USA has developed a field of studies dedicated to better understanding Brazil (this is the case for all nations with whom the USA has commercial, strategic or diplomatic interests), it is evident that in Brazil little effort has been made to study the most important economic, political and military power in the continent. The Brazilian elite, in part, has dedicated itself to copying, in a mechanical way, the practices, ideas and even the culture of the USA, while failing to understand the difficulties this country is experiencing.

Understanding the USA, its people, its culture and its foreign policy, principally in relation to Latin America and Brazil, is of paramount

importance, not only to consolidate this academic field of studies but, above all, for our own defense and sovereignty.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part comprises chapters which address the topic with a broad brush and from a historical-chronological perspective. The second part consists of chapters which address more specific issues - often by means of a cross-sectional perspective - related to cooperation, resistance and emerging tensions in the relations established between the two nations.

In *'Brazil and the United States: two centuries of relations'*, Frank McCann relates in a clear and accessible way a summary of Brazil-USA relations throughout the last 200 years. For McCann, the history of relations between Brazil and the USA has been usually depicted as positive, healthy and peaceful; however, in his view, this perspective is a result of the predominance of short analyses produced in Brazil, the USA and the United Kingdom. The author believes that in these analyses the problems between the two nations are generally expressed in an isolated and fragmented way. However, when a longer perspective is taken, the scope of the problems, disputes and conflicts of interest take on more antagonistic aspects. For Frank McCann, regardless of what type of government was in power in Brazil, there were a number of unnecessary conflicts with the USA, mostly initiated in Washington. Despite the fact that there have been no wars and a certain cordiality in relations, from the Brazilian side there have always been many sources of resentment, disappointments and frustrated expectations. Since D. Pedro I Brazilian leaders have pursued the idea that the two countries can become true Nation-Friends; however, American leaders have identified a lack of political realism in this perspective, as John Foster Dulles expressed, when he said that nations do not have friends, only interests. Frank McCann's chapter aims to cast light on the subject in a realistic way, standing as a counterpoint to the perspectives predominant in the conventional historiography.

In *'The United States: Latin America's 'beacon' and 'policeman'*, Mariana Martins Villaçã explores the main interventionist projects and practices of the USA in Latin America, from the end of the 19th century to the end of the 20th century. She analyses conflicts of interest, negotiations and resistance to American penetration in the subcontinent. Villaçã stresses the ideological justifications given by the USA for its military interventions, such as the mission to be a 'beacon' for other nations, and the contradictions evident in its many activities as a 'police force' for the continent. She focuses on particular

moments of assertions or redefinitions of American foreign policy, such as the adjustments made in response to the Cuban Revolution and the various movements against American interference in the affairs of Latin American countries throughout the 1960s.

Frank McCann and Francisco Ferraz, in 'Brazilian-American Joint Operations in World War II' interpret Brazil's role in World War II as a key moment in the history of relations between Brazil and the USA. The difficult negotiations between the diplomatic and military authorities of the two countries for the exclusive supply of strategic materials, as well as the cession of air bases in the North and Northeast of Brazil, led to the increasing involvement of Brazil in the Allied campaign. When the submarines of the Axis powers attacked Brazilian ships the alliance between Brazil and the United States was cemented. However, Brazilian diplomacy envisaged something more than an indirect role in the war effort: the aim of sending an expeditionary force to fight in Europe was to secure a greater space for Brazil in the international scenario, as the preferred partner in South American politics of the powerful 'good neighbor' from North America. The authors emphasize how this alliance was formed, how some of its results fell short of Brazilian diplomatic expectations and how it contributed to a new cultural and political paradigm, both among the elite and the wider population of Brazil.

In the chapter entitled 'At the Onset of the Cold War: the USA and the repression of communism in Brazil', Sidnei J. Munhoz analyzes possible relations between the repression of communism in Brazil and the Cold War context. He looks at intrinsic issues which provoked a wave of repression, the regional context in Latin America and the role played by the USA in restricting social movements and political parties on the Left, with particular focus on communist activities. For the author, on the one hand, the international context at the end of World War II led countries in the region towards democratization of their political regimes. On the other hand, with the start of the Cold War, this brief democratic interlude ended; as soon as the national elites saw the signs of change in the international scenario, they reverted to their reactionary policies and demonstrated their habitual belligerence in dealing with social problems.

In 'Populism and Brazil-USA Relations (1945 to 1964): the dialect of alignment and autonomy', Paulo G. Vizentini analyzes the contradictions between attempts to establish an independent policy in Brazil and the policy

of almost unconditional alignment which emerged during World War II. For the author, the tensions in relations owed more to the internal needs of the country than an anti-imperialist stance on the part of its leaders. Furthermore, the conflict of interests within this process and the connection between an internal and external crisis led to the involvement of the USA in the 1964 coup.

In another chapter, 'Brazil-USA relations during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985)', the same author look at the relations between Brazil and the USA during this period. Vizentini discusses stereotypical visions, such as the Brazilian military regime being essentially subordinated to American interests. For the author, despite appearances, the implementation of a developmentist project at the start of the regime, with the aim of making the country into an important power, ended up placing the regime on a collision course with the USA. Vizentini argues that there was a greater distancing of the country from under the aegis of the USA, principally in the later military governments, while, conversely and curiously, during the so-called democratic transition process, there was an increase in the influence of the USA on Brazil. The author points out the need for a profound analysis of the development of this ongoing process.

In 'Brazil-USA relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments' Paulo Roberto de Almeida pursues an essentially historical approach in exploring the development of bilateral relations. He puts these relations in the wider context of international and regional systems, above all in their economic, commercial and financial aspects. This is because the latter half of the 1990s and the start of the new century were characterized by successive financial crises (monetary, exchange rate and banking) which violently derailed the global economy with repercussions in Brazil. After a brief re-examination of the historical pattern of bilateral relations, the chapter recounts the emergence of conflicts in the military government and in the re-democratization phase, disputes which, like today, were fundamentally based on trade disagreements, though American concerns in relation to non-proliferation were also important in this scenario of mutual hostilities. For the author, the Cardoso period ushered in unprecedented aspects to bilateral relations and good relations emerged as the norm, with conflicts being depoliticized and reduced to their proper importance so as not to contaminate cooperation in other areas. This 'new friendship', according to the author, owed a considerable amount to the personal empathy between the two

presidents, who enjoyed many informal meetings in addition to the work of official diplomatic channels. From this point of view, both of them helped to widen a relationship through aspects which were not exclusively bilateral. The relationship continued to prosper after George W. Bush's clearly more conservative and unilateral administration took office and a leader from the Left was elected in Brazil.

In the last chapter from this part of the book, Ricardo Cabral, in 'The foreign policy of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva's Government and its relations with the USA' analyses contemporary aspects of this relationship, focusing on the strategies developed by Brazilian diplomacy during the Lula administration. In addressing this issue Cabral seeks to highlight the similarities and differences in the objectives of the two nations. For the author, the foreign policy of the Lula government is characterized by pragmatism, in the way it seeks to nurture allies for each issue on the international agenda. In Cabral's judgment, this position was firmly adhered to in international negotiations, by adopting a position that questioned certain pillars that predominated in global policies but did not challenge the great powers. Thus, Brazil aimed to cement its position in the forums for international negotiations as the most important regional leader and as a representative of the so-called countries in development. For the author, President Lula adopted a more politicized foreign policy, characterized as much by change as by continuity. In terms of continuity, the author highlights the commitment to multilateralism, developmentist policy, a strong international identity, pragmatism, predictability and reliability; elements of change included introducing the issue of combating hunger to the international agenda, an intensity and determination in conducting international negotiations, heightened importance attached to relations with Africa, the Middle East and the Far East, prioritizing of the Mercosur and deepening the process of South American integration.

The second part of the book starts with Sonny Davis' chapter, entitled 'Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Twentieth Century' In this chapter special emphasis is given to topics such as the cooperation established during World War II, the military agreement signed in 1952, the emerging tensions and distancing at the start of the 1960s, the re-approximation after the Civil-Military coup of 1964 and the crisis which led to the condemnation of the military agreement during the Carter and Geisel administrations. Sonny Davis aims to show that from the middle of the 20th century military

relations between Brazil and the USA differed from those established with other Latin American countries. For the author, World War II consolidated informal ties and created expectations of mutual benefits immediately after the war. However, the start of the Cold War and the development of internal policies frustrated these expectations in both the USA and Brazil. Though Brazil was the recipient of the largest amount of American aid to the region, it fell short of what was expected by the Brazilian government. In the same way, though the Brazilian military supported the USA in the international arena, there were a number of conflicts of interest which affected both nations. Furthermore, the close military alliance made the USA a key partner in terms of the defense of the hemisphere and provided Brazil with the equipment and the conditions to assume the status of the USA's most important ally in the region. However, in the 1970s military relations between the two countries underwent two reversals and during the rest of the century, though relations remained cordial, they never returned to their previous level.

Relations between the USA and Brazil in terms of cinema are dealt with in an original way in the chapter 'From the Good Neighbor Policy to The Iron Curtain: politics and cinema in Brazil-US relations in the mid-20th century', written by Alexandre Busko Valim. Two periods are discussed in the chapter: the Good Neighbors Policy (1939-1946) and the initial moments of the Cold War (1947-1953). Two aspects are studied in both periods. First, political strategies employed in cinematographic production and the industry's reaction to regulations imposed by American government control and censure agencies. Second, how films were received in Brazil is analyzed through articles published in the press during the period, popular manifestations and the positioning of the Brazilian authorities. Valim expertly reveals how entertainment and political propaganda complemented each other when there was a need for the mobilization of public opinion; though initially these activities seemed to be autonomous. In this way, the author describes the landscape around the ability of cinema to generate diverse emotions, reactions, and political values. This is a fundamental topic for studies on political culture and, in this specific case, on the relations established between Brazil and the USA.

Cliff Welch, in 'Solidarity Forever: U.S. involvement in Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965' addresses a topic that has been little studied in Brazilian historiography: the influence of the USA in policies developed within Brazilian trade unions during the so-called populist period. The author defends the

theory of a growing American involvement in this period, as a result of its concern with communism in the region, in the context of the Cold War, and its imperial viewpoint which was expressed by the export of American values to the rest of the world. According to the author, the American political elite decided to 'teach' the Brazilians how to control labor relations, so that the communist threat would be kept at bay and productivity and social stability would be maintained. He argues that the development of this process caused the USA to make changes to its strategies throughout the period, both due to their ineffectiveness and the resistance of Brazilian leaders, and indeed workers, to this exported model. For Welch, there are three distinct phases in this process. In the first, between 1945 and 1952, strategies are adopted aimed at isolating the communists, establishing an American model of trade unionism and promoting profound institutional changes in Brazil; in the second phase, from 1952 to 1962, the USA commits itself to a policy of training and exchange between leaders; and finally, according to the author, after 1962 the United States apparently 'runs out of patience' and starts to deal with the issue directly through the military, who eventually carry out the 1964 coup.

James Green analyzes the pressure exerted by organizations linked to human rights in the USA and their role in the OAS of condemning the systematic practice of torture and the violation of human rights in Brazil and other Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s. In 'Opposing the Dictatorship in the United States: human rights and the Organization of American States' the author recalls the role played by the OAS Human Rights Commission in pressurizing Brazilian military governments to put a stop to the violence practiced by the regime, through censorship, political persecution and, principally, torture. James Green analyzes the development of this process and the difficulties in implementing sanctions against Brazil, while emphasizing the importance of these actions in convincing American public opinion of the horrific treatment meted out by the Brazilian dictatorship. At the same time, the author highlights the relationship between these condemnations and the emergence of other accusations linked to similar crimes carried out in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.

Finally, in 'Consequences for Security and Defense in Brazil-USA relations in face of the 11th September Attacks' Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva seeks to place Brazil in the context of the crisis provoked by the 11th September 2001 attacks. The author particularly focuses on relations between the USA and Brazil on the one hand, and relations between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay

on the other, in terms of the diagnosis - erroneous in the view of the author - on the part of American and Israeli intelligence services that elements of Al-Qaeda were present in the so-called Tri-Border area. The chapter seeks to show the surprise of the Brazilian authorities in face of American pressure in the region, especially in their attempt to militarize the Southern Border of the country. Similarly, the text relates a certain confusion and even chaos on the part of the Brazilian authorities in dealing with the issue of terrorism, when the actions of the Federal Police, Abin (Brazilian Intelligence Agency) and the Ministry of Defense were uncoordinated. This led to the emergence of the Cabinet of Institutional Security of the President of the Republic as the only institution able to respond efficiently to the enormous challenge presented by both terrorism and American unilateralism.

The reader should be aware that all the chapters were submitted by the authors in 2008 and 2009 and that the first Brazilian edition was published in 2010. Therefore, the chapters on the Barak Obama and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva governments and the post-11th September period were not able to include the evolution of processes which started after 2010. In the same way, it was not possible to make an analysis of the first years of the Dilma Rousseff administration.

Of course, many aspects of the relations established between Brazil and the United States are not covered in this book, as the subject is vast and complex; however, we believe that the book will contribute to a better understanding of a topic that is important both for historical knowledge and for Brazil and United States.

Part I

Brazil US relations: historical perspectives

Brazil and the United States: Two Centuries of Relations¹

Frank D. McCann

Brazil and the United States are the two giants of the Western Hemisphere in territory, population, natural resources, and industry. American visitors to Brazil have long recognized its potential. Henry M. Brackenridge, secretary of a special mission which President James Monroe sent there in 1817, observed that to weigh the two “American empires by their present importance in the scale of nations, without taking into view what they are destined to become ... would be

to compare a young giant to a full grown dwarf. As an American, I cannot but feel a kind of pride in looking forward to the lofty destinies of this new world -- “*seat where gods might dwell, Or wander with delight.*” The only empires that can be compared to Brazil, in point of magnitude, are those of China, Russia, and the United States; and although at present the least in point of population, the day will come, when it will be the greatest. [emphasis added] Brazil is, in fact, the body and the heart of South America; ... [compared to Spanish domains] it possesses great superiority in being more compact It may seem premature at this day to institute a comparison between the Brazils and our country; but the time will come when such a comparison will appear natural, and even unavoidable. ... There is ... in the ...

¹ This chapter is a modified and amplified version of “Le Brésil et les Etats-Unis: des relations complexes à l’épreuve du long terme, XIXe-XXe siècles.” 1998. In *Le Brésil et Le Monde: pour une histoire des relations internationales des puissances émergentes*, Dennis Rolland, Org., 25-57. Paris et Montréal: L Harmattan.

[Spanish colonies] now contending for independence, *an infinitely greater tendency to anarchy among the members*, than prevailed with us, with much fewer means of binding together under one common head. The is not the case with the Brazils; *it is one and indivisible* Here then, when we consider the vast capacities and resources of Brazil, it is not visionary to say, that this empire is destined to be our rival (Brackenridge 1820, 128-129).

Throughout rest of the nineteenth century as the United States took effective control of much of North America, Brazil set about securing its borders and undermining unity among its neighbors to keep them from joining together against the empire. In the early decades of the century Brazil cast a longer diplomatic shadow beyond its borders than its actual power or its shaky physical control of its vast territory, warranted. The bulk of the population appeared content to cling coast and to the immediate interior behind the coastal towns and cities. Prospectors and miners, cattle drovers and mule-teamers criss-crossed the hinterland bringing its far reaches into communication with the rest of the country. Their elaborate networks of trails formed a strong web that helped spread the Portuguese language among natives and mixed bloods, and extend the reach and awareness of the imperial government throughout the interior and thereby contribute to holding the vast country together, while the Spanish-speaking republics around it fell to pieces (Meireles 1989; Silva 1987; Davidson 1973; Hemming 1990)². In 1825, the Empire avoided war with Simon Bolivar's veteran army over the Chiquitos province to the west of Mato Grosso, but then fell into a bitter, rapidly stalemated war with Buenos Aires over the eastern bank of the Uruguay river. The new empire sowed seeds of fear of Brazilian hegemony among the South American republics. From a distance it appeared more unified internally than it actually was. The story of Brazilian unity is complex. It was not a peacefully maintained unity. Until the 1840s there were numerous regional rebellions and attempts at local rule. The society was cleaved in multiple ways that produced tensions and contradictions that generated violence. Historian Emilia Viotti da Costa captured the era thus:

Class and racial conflicts, tensions between the poor and the rich, between foreigners and natives or between blacks and whites, reluctance on the part of the traditional elites to submit themselves to the central

2 The classic studies of the Brazilian interior or frontier development are João Capistrano de Abreu (1982) and Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1975).

government, competition for power at the regional level between different segments of the elites, all these reasons mixed together were behind the uprisings that kept the imperial government on permanent alert for a period of almost twenty years after the abdication of Pedro I. (Costa 1985, 69)³

By 1850, the central government had suppressed regional separatism and the Brazil that appeared on the map grew closer to the Brazil imagined in the imperial cabinet room.

The self-image of the imperial elites had two facets: a belief in the superiority of Brazil over its neighbors, because of the unity that its monarchical institutions supposedly provided, and because of its size, presumed resources, and population "Brazil was destined to be the dominant power in South America" (Seckinger 1984, 27-28). By mid-century the leaders of neighboring countries were labeling Brazil the "Minotaur of South America", just as the United States was beginning to be called the "Colossus of the North." The rest of the world was noticing Brazil as the twentieth century dawned: France and Germany competed to train its military; the English advised its navy and sold it the two biggest dreadnoughts of the day; the Pope conferred the first Latin American cardinalate on the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro; and the United States raised its legation to embassy rank.

Former American President Theodore Roosevelt, after confronting the rigors of the Amazon, declared that there were "real pioneer settlers ... on the frontier between civilization and savagery in Brazil", who were playing the role that American "backwoodsmen", Boers in South Africa, and Canadians in the far Northwest had played in their respective countries. "On a far larger scale" the "last frontier" was in Brazil -- "a country as big as Europe or the United States" -- where the rate of development had been steadily increasing ; and , he concluded, "this increase bids fair to be constantly more rapid in the future" (Harding 1941, 257)⁴. The swift economic development after the mid-nineteen fifties that propelled it toward the so-called "miracle" years of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s, also shot the Brazilian economy into the eighth ranked position in the world. As Brackenridge had predicted, when "developed on a scale commensurate with its extraordinary extent, resources, and advantages" it would be time for comparison between

3 See (Barman 1988). For a study of Brazilian life during the Second Empire see Frédéric Mauro (1991).

4 See (Roosevelt 1919, 333-334).

the United States and Brazil to “appear natural and even unavoidable”. Even if Americans do not yet think of Brazil as “this empire ... destined to be our rival”, the areas of competitive friction between the two countries are old and steadily multiply. The friction reached such levels that a 1989 book on Brazilian-American relations for the period since 1950, by one of Brazil’s leading foreign relations historians, Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira of the Universidade de Brasília, carried the subtitle “the emerging rivalry” (Moniz Bandeira 1989). Whether this “friction” is real and dangerous only the future will tell. But J. O. de Meira Penna touched an element of truth when he wrote that the “problems in our relations with the United States are more to do with psychiatry than diplomacy”. Above all else he said that the problems have to be dealt with rationally, firmly, and objectively (Meira Penna 1967, 120)⁵.

The American government and public tend not to pay attention to countries that do not appear to threaten the United States. Brazilian leaders have deliberately sought to avoid radical, ideological solutions to national problems, in order to keep any suggestion of rivalry muted. Who could think of Brazil -- the land of samba, Carnaval, and coffee -- as a threat, especially when, for much of the twentieth century it has been an ally. As a result Americans have largely ignored it, or, perhaps worse, lumped it into that undifferentiated mass that we call Latin America. For all the contact between the two countries, it remains little known to United States citizens. North Americans cannot even remember that Brazilians speak Portuguese and not Spanish. In the 1940s, Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie supposedly said, when corrected about Brazilians speaking Spanish, that they had better learn it because everyone else in South America spoke it. Many Americans still think that way, even though more people speak Portuguese in South America than speak Spanish. Few Americans know that there are over 186 million Brazilians who make Brazil the fifth most populous country on the globe; or that Portuguese is now the 7th most commonly spoken language in the world just behind Arabic, Bengali, and Hindi, but ahead of Russian, Japanese, French and German (Steinberg 1998, 3)⁶. However, the latter two and Spanish are commonly taught in American schools while Portuguese is rare.

5 Advised that Brazil should not give the United States more than it gets from it.

6 Gives the ranking for 2005. Portuguese is spoken by 3.2% of world population as compared to 3.4 for Arabic, 2.2 for Japanese, 2.2 for French, and 2.1 for German.

Tension has been a major undercurrent in Brazilian-American relations, even before Brazil's independence. During the American-British War of 1812, which was concurrent with the war against Napoleon, the Portuguese court then resident in Rio de Janeiro (1808-21), was necessarily sympathetic to the English with whom they were allied against the French, especially in the liberation of their homeland. Their relationship, which was based on the oldest European alliance and on tight trade relations, was so intimate that a British officer acted as viceroy in Lisbon. British warships had safe harbor and good treatment in Brazil's ports. But lurking out at sea were United States vessels such as the *Constitution*, whose cannons pulverized the HMS *Java* into submission before it went to the bottom in December 1812. That sea battle encouraged the Portuguese-Brazilians to be pragmatically warmer to visiting American warships. More serious were the privateering activities of American citizens, who had few scruples about attacking Portuguese ships. There was a three-way war on the Eastern Bank of the Rio de La Plata, where the army of the newly decreed kingdom of Portugal and Brazil (1816) confronted both the forces of Buenos Aires and the irregular troops of José Artigas. This later Father of Uruguay was then fighting the other two in campaign to create a region-wide federation based on the territories of the defunct Viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata. Representatives of Artigas were extremely liberal in handing out privateering commissions in United States ports, particularly Baltimore, which sent close to thirty armed vessels to stalk prey in the south Atlantic. The disreputable people of what the Portuguese minister to Washington called, "the Algerine city of Baltimore" were worse, he declared, than the North African pirates. The privateers evaded U.S. Neutrality laws and cast aside the good name of the United States for skulduggery and renegade profits. Some two hundred Portuguese ships were taken. One can only guess at the suffering, destruction, and death that was involved in this infamous work. Secretary of State John Q. Adams thought that "Portugal had real grounds for complaint", to the extent that if the situation had been reversed and the pirates had been Portuguese, the United States would "have declared war without hesitation". The Portuguese minister was not far off in calling Americans a "most unmanageable crew" (Long 1988; Shumway 1991; Davis 1993; Silioni 1974). The government, of course, did not condone this piracy in the name of a ill-understood struggle in a far-away land -- but it seemed incapable of suppressing it.

After the Portuguese royal family fled Napoleon's invading army in late 1807, Jefferson sent it a formal welcome to the Americas. The president and

his people were resolutely opposed to monarchy. Yet, Jefferson was intrigued because for many years he had been trying to get information about Brazil, which officially had been closed to world traffic since 1591! There had been a lively contraband trade overland from the Moxos mission towns in what is now Bolivia, in the upper Amazon with the neighboring Peruvian provinces, and in the south between Rio Grande do Sul and the Banda Oriental. By sea the contraband, especially in the late eighteenth century, largely sailed under the British flag (Prado Junior 1971; Christelow 1947). The 1808 opening of the ports to foreign shipping benefitted the British above all, but it also produced a jump in United States exports. In 1824 when the now independent Empire of Pedro I sought recognition from the northern republic, the resulting policy discussions in Washington showed a strong anti-monarchical sentiment. This was mirrored by the attitudes of the imperial leadership, who feared the subversion of American ideas and possible American involvement in republican insurrections, such as the ones in Pernambuco in 1817 and, more broadly, in the northeast in 1824 (Bushnell and Macaulay 1994; Macaulay 1986; Norton 1979; Mota 1972). Brazilians thought that American attitudes regarding slavery were inconsistent. The U.S. Navy joined the British in suppressing the slave traffic from Africa, but private American citizens both ran slaves and sold ships to slavers. In 1844, John C. Calhoun, as secretary of state, urged that Brazil and the United States should stand together against the English in defense of their slave systems, because “to destroy it in either would facilitate its destruction in the other⁷.”

From the early 1840s to the mid-1860s, the American government, business interests, and press demanded the opening of the Amazon river to international traffic and commerce. Expansionist propaganda argued for American colonization of the region using slave labor. The annexation of Texas, the war of words with Great Britain over the Oregon and Maine boundaries, the conquest of Mexico, the beginnings of military operations against the Plains Indians, and the Union victory in the Civil War were forceful demonstrations of American imperialism and military power that disturbed the Brazilians. It was impossible for them not to feel threatened by the tireless activity of Lt. Matthew F. Maury of the American navy, and by his assertions that the “universal Yankee Nation” and the “go ahead” Anglo-Saxon race should replace the “imbecile and indolent” Brazilians in

7 John C. Calhoun to Henry A. Wise (US Min. to Brazil), Washington, May 25, 1844, Doc. 460 in William R. Manning (1932, 126-128).

Amazonia (Dozer 1948; Cumiford 1977; Medeiros 1938; Soares 1971). Why would Henry Clay obtain treaty rights from Peru that permitted United States navigation on the Peruvian portion of the Amazon, when those distant inland waters could not be reached unless Brazil opened its stretch of waterway, or unless the Americans intended to force passage? The Brazilians wanted to get their Amazonian boundaries demarcated and to secure the region with more settlers, before opening it to foreign ships and trade. They wanted to avoid joint discussions that could have them facing all their Amazonian neighbors and the colonial powers of England, the Netherlands, and France. American officials saw Brazil's reluctance to open the region as an indication that it intended to dominate South America economically and to obstruct Washington's desire to eliminate barriers to American exports throughout the hemisphere.

After Brazil pushed open the La Plata river system in 1852, it was more awkward for it to justify keeping Amazonia closed. When Americans inquired about obtaining concessions to run steamboat lines in the region, the crown awarded a thirty-year monopoly to the Baron of Mauá in 1853 to keep navigation in Brazilian hands. Finally, in 1867, it threw the region's main rivers open to foreign vessels just in time for the start of the rubber boom.

During the United States Civil War the Empire was neutral, but the Brazilian government showed sympathy for the Confederacy, and irritated Washington by recognizing Richmond's belligerency. The American minister at the outbreak of war in 1861 was a southerner who encouraged the idea that his region and Brazil had a similarity of interests and outlooks. Curiously the imperial family favored the north in the war, to the extent of a few of its relatives served in the Union forces. The government allowed Confederate raiders, such as the *Florida*, the *Shenandoa*, and the *Alabama* to rest and provision in its harbors. Such raiders had devastating effects on Union shipping, over 200 vessels were lost, and another 800 were sold to foreigners to protect them under safer flags. The American merchant marine never fully recovered from the damage of 1861-65. The Union officers, who pursued these dangerous Confederates, were willing to forget the niceties of international law when they had an opportunity to strike. In 1864, the frigate USS *Wachusett* deliberately rammed the *Florida*, while it was at anchor in the bay at Salvador, took its surrender, and towed it out to sea, while Brazilian warships gave chase unsuccessfully. Washington disavowed the clear violation of Brazil's sovereignty and in 1866 sent the USS *Nipsic* to Salvador to apologize

formally and to salute the imperial flag with a twenty-one gun salute. (Long 1988 and Calmon 1975)⁸

Brazilian determination to defend national interests, and perhaps its long war against Paraguay (1865-70), produced a degree of American respect. Certainly Brazilians understood the functions of power in international affairs. They developed a very pragmatic rule that war could only be waged against weaker nations; it could be conducted against Argentina, Uruguay, or Paraguay, but not against England, France, or the United States. It would be crazy to think of war with such powers; against them the fighting must be "with words, with dignified and energetic protests against the arbitrary actions of the powerful". Recognizing the reality of American power, parliamentary leaders argued that Brazil "should cultivate and develop" relations with "the great republic of Washington", because "it has an incalculable role reserved for it in the destinies of the world. ... it is a nation worthy of being imitated in many things [...]" (Cervo 1981, 92-93). Throughout all of the foregoing, aside from a few recalls of representatives, the two sides maintained an outward cordiality. That phenomena would continue to be a characteristic of their relations -- inner tension, outward calm -- which led many commentators looking at relatively short periods to misread the nature and importance of their relations.

The 1870s offered an example of how vital the role of particular individuals and leaders have been in the interactions between the two countries. In 1876, the United States caught imperial fever, as Pedro II toured from coast to coast and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes and New England, and opened the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia alongside President Ulysses S. Grant. He was the first ruling monarch to visit the republic and people turned out in throngs to see him. He was probably the most popular foreigner to visit the United States in the nineteenth century. Afterward Brazilian foreign policy seemed to shift its emphasis away from Europe and towards the United States (Harding 1941).

In November 1889, the wind, indeed, seemed to shift in that direction when the imperial government was overthrown in the midst of a cabinet crisis. What started as an armed demonstration against a cabinet ended in

8 The emperor's brother-in-law Joinville, his brother Chartres, and his nephew, the Count of Paris joined the Union army, while Joinville's son, Pierre, was a mid-shipman at Annapolis. During his 1876 visit, as Pedro II travelled down the Mississippi, he wrote: "They know around here that I was always northern (nortista), but they treat me with the same sympathy as do those of the north" (692).

coup d'état. In the previous year, government had abolished slavery without compensating owners, thereby cutting away one of the regime's props. The empire fell because it was no longer the agent of the future. The elites did not need it to protect their interests, in truth, imperial centralization ran counter to their desires for local autonomy. The republicans embraced federalism, which they saw as a defense against the regional oligarchies that used patronage and clientelism to maintain their power and positions. Over the next couple of decades, they would discover that the oligarchies easily adapted and used their accumulated power and skills to control the new governmental system. The Constitution of 1891 of the new United States of Brazil, restored autonomy to the provinces, now called states, admitting the reality that the central government did not rule at the local level, that it governed only through the provincial oligarchies. The change of regime opened a period of four-decades in which Brazilians searched for a viable alternative to the monarchy. The search involved much violence and turmoil over the next century as Brazil lurched back and forth between state autonomy and centralization. Brazil, at the end of the colonial period, had not been the unitary state that foreign observers thought it to be, but instead, a collection of locally-controlled regions that paid little more than lip-service to governments in Lisbon or Rio de Janeiro. In the things that mattered, the '*poderosos da terra*' had the last word (Barman 1988 and Souza 1969)⁹. Much of Brazilian history of the past two centuries revolves around struggles for and against the creation of the nation-state at the expense of the local "*patrias*." A knowledgeable American observer summarized the situation in 1917, "The Brazilian states are now virtually nations with elected authorities and autonomous administrations. ...These states possess their own systems of justice, public education, control foreign loans and syndicates, and in some cases maintain under the guise of police forces, virtual armies." (Cooper 1917, 82)

A brief review of the political system's oscillations will give the reader an idea of the complexity of the process. Into the 1920s, a combination of the more powerful states (São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and, to a lesser extent, Pernambuco and Bahia) dominated and managed the national government, then in 1930 a broad-based revolution shifted the trend strongly toward limiting the power of the states and heightening that of the nation, this centralizing movement reached a peak in the dictatorial *Estado Novo* in 1937-45. The national government's power and bureaucracy

9 For an analysis contemporary with these events see C. C. Andrews (1891).

grew to remarkable levels and centralization reached down into the remotest villages. The Constitution of 1946 revived state autonomy, now grafted onto the bureaucracy of centralization. After 1968, the military regime that took power in 1964, centralized everything in the renamed Federated Republic of Brazil. And with the demise of that regime in 1985, the Constitution of 1988 again restored a measure of state autonomy but in the context of a powerful, all encompassing nation-state.

Before World War II, few of the diplomats that the United States sent to Brazil understood it, fewer spoke Portuguese or knew how to make the culture work for them¹⁰. There were, of course, notable exceptions, such as Ambassadors Edwin Morgan in the 1910s and 1920s and Jefferson Caffery (1937-45). Until the 1930s there was a tremendous lacuna in historical, sociological, economic, and political analysis of Brazilian society, making it difficult for foreigners and natives to understand the stirring giant. Of course, as my notes show there were books for those who wanted to learn. Racial and religious prejudice and national arrogance limited the vision and adaptability of many a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant American. Brazilians had their own blinders; the elite assumed Americans were poorly educated because so few spoke anything but English. And, until Kennedy's election in 1960, the Brazilian definition of an American did not include Catholic; to be American was to be Protestant.

The leaders of the 1890s could not see the future and struggled to keep up with a constantly changing environment. Foreign diplomats had to move fast to keep pace. In 1912, the British ambassador perhaps spoke for all observers when he wrote that "in Brazil ... the unexpected always happens."¹¹ For the United States, the republic brought unprecedented involvement in Brazilian internal affairs. Trade was first on the agenda. In 1887 Grover Cleveland proposed a customs union between the two countries; his idea was that each would reduce duties, combine the earned revenue, and divide it equally. Dom Pedro II approved the union, but his minister of finance and Parliament opposed it. Brazil had had such a bad experience with the infamous British treaty of 1826 that forty-three years after it lapsed in 1844, they wanted no part of trade agreements with foreign powers. But Emperor Pedro, perhaps

10 See *ibid.* 7. Cooper mentioned one American diplomat who spent a year trying to get access to a prominent Brazilian, so great had been the antipathy aroused in the mind of this man by the acts and general deportment of a former [American] official.

11 Sir W. Haggard to Sir Edward Grey, Petrópolis, July 1, 1912, Confidential 10098, *Annual Report*, 1911, 8.

still harboring favorable impressions of the U.S. from his 1876 tour, pressed for a treaty. The delegates he sent to the 1889 Pan American Congress in Washington were charged to negotiate an agreement. His empire fell on November 15, 1889, but his strategy was embraced by the new republican regime. Oddly, the empire had fallen at the height of its economic success. At the end of the 1880s, the international money markets enjoyed enormous surpluses that hotly pursued investment possibilities. Brazil was awash in investment capital. Coffee and rubber exports reached record heights and contributed to large trade surpluses. While the passing of slavery is often seen as a sign of economic and social decadence, in reality it occurred as Brazil was in an economic boom. At the time investors saw the peaceful transition to free labor as an indication of Brazilian ability and stability, avoiding the violence that the other great slave states -- Haiti, Cuba, and the United States -- had experienced during emancipation. European confidence in Brazil was at a high point. Foreign capital rebuilt port facilities, laid out gas, sewer, electrical, telegraph, and street car lines. Factories appeared at a rapid rate and rail crews hammered spikes in place as new tracks spanned the land. By the decade's end Brazil had more miles of rail than any country in Latin America, and followed only India in what would come to be called the "underdeveloped" world. Of all this investment the British held about 80% and controlled 50% of foreign trade. Over all Brazil's economy was doing so well that gold flowed from London to the empire at such a rate that the British vaults were nearly bare. French, German, and Portuguese financiers followed the British lead. Between May 13, 1888 when slavery was abolished and November 15, 1889 when the emperor was overthrown and exiled, the Rio de Janeiro stock market equaled all of its trading in the previous sixty years!

The foregoing should make it obvious that the Empire did not seek a trade agreement with the United States out of necessity, but to implement a strategy of diversifying markets and revenue sources. The imperial government approached the bargaining table from a position of strength.

The sudden coup d'état caught both Europeans and Americans off guard. The London *Times* speculated that Brazil might break into "a number of separate States, united by a federal bond or merely by treaties of alliance"¹². The Rothschilds canceled the new Republic's foreign credit, while the Banque de Paris et Pays Bas halted foreign exchange advances. Foreign investors turned away from a suddenly instable appearing Brazil. A tremor went

12 London Times, 1889 (November, 18) apud (Topik 1996, 55-61).

through the royal courts of Europe for fear that the fall of the empire might inspire like movements from Portugal and Spain to Italy, Austro-Hungary and the German empire. Such fears did not make Brazil's republican ministers welcome in Europe's money marts.

The republicans picked up the negotiations with the United States from a position of weakness. They clothed themselves in as much republican symbolism and rhetoric as possible, even adopting the name United States of Brazil, to curry favor. They had staged a palace coup, not a republican revolution, the people did not rush to the barricades, but stood by in silence "astonished, surprised, without knowing what was happening" (Lobo and Carvalho 1987, 9)¹³. The republic was an object of suspicion in Monarchical Europe. The reader will recall that in Europe of 1889. France was the only republic. Meanwhile in Washington, President Benjamin Harrison, who had been breveted a brigadier general of volunteers in the civil war, was put off by Deodoro da Fonseca's assumption of titles of "provisional dictator" and "generalissimo", a salary higher than his, and making the civilian members of the cabinet honorary generals. The Brazilian regime also postponed elections, and when they were finally held, the government had severely reduced the electorate. The republicans did not dare to seek an electoral mandate from the people. This wasn't the kind of republic Washington wanted as a protege. But it did want access to its market, so Harrison held his nose and extended recognition.

He may have been repulsed but his Secretary of State James G. Blaine reportedly sent a few million dollars to Deodoro to "win the support of various military chiefs, provincial presidents, and members of the press" (Villegas 1555-1974, 700; Topik 1996, 68-69)¹⁴. Charles R. Flint, who below will star in organizing the American naval support for the threatened republican regime, who was the world's leading rubber importer and had investments in Brazilian streetcar lines, flour milling, banking, insurance, and steamships lobbied hard for recognition of the republic. The Brazilian trade negotiator, Salvador de Mendonça, spoke English fluently, had been in the United States for fifteen years, had married an American, and had business dealings with Charles Flint. Mendonça and Blaine negotiated a treaty, with Flint occasionally standing in for the Brazilian. The agreement supposedly opened their markets to each other via a lowering of tariffs. Mendonça convinced

13 Comment of republican propagandista.

14 The source was the Mexican minister to Washington.

Rio that the accord would favor northeastern sugar and would strengthen coffee sales. He went so far as to help the Americans conceal an unratified treaty with Spain that would let Puerto Rican and Cuban sugar enter the U.S., while telling the government of Brazil that its producers would have a virtual monopoly over the American sugar market. After the trade treaty was final, Blaine reportedly gave Mendonça enough money so that he was able to build a large country home in New York (Topik 1996, 75-84). Needless to say the flawed agreement, the lies that got it accepted, and the loose money did not auger well for a trusting bi-national relationship.

But the Brazilian regime did benefit from American naval support. The complicated civil war of 1893-95 that saw the rebellion of the main Brazilian naval vessels stationed at Rio become intertwined with factionalist fighting in Rio Grande do Sul, (Chasteen 1995) threatened the republic then headed by army Marshal Floriano Peixoto. The Rio Grande-Uruguay border region, which spawned the Gaúcho “federalist” rebellion against the state governor’s authoritarian rule spread across that frontier state, and was soon linked by overland trails through Santa Catarina and Paraná to São Paulo. The danger of cavalry forces coordinating with naval attacks gave the Floriano government officials severe headaches. At that time Brazil’s major cities and towns were either seaports strung along its 4000 mile plus seacoast or located on a narrow few hundred mile wide band along the shore. The lack of rapid overland connections north to south made Brazil effectively an archipelago linked by sail and steam boats. The navy was the first line of defense against foreign attack.

Historians have long believed that the United States did not actively intervene in the crisis; aside from some naval maneuvering to protect American ships unloading cargoes in Rio’s harbor. But recent research that joined the American debate over expansionism and the United States rivalry with the great powers to the internal workings of the Brazilian civil war provided a new perspective. Indeed, American involvement can now be seen as “a fatal step [for the U.S.] on the path to an imperialist foreign policy”, that would appear full-blown in the 1890s with the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, and the seizure of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. The well-connected American importer-exporter, Charles Flint, assembled and steamed to Brazil, with President Grover Cleveland’s tacit support, a twelve-ship flotilla, staffed with Annapolis-educated officers and American seamen, and armed with the latest in American naval weaponry, that secured Floriano’s

victory. Flint's personal objectives of acquiring influence and concessions, and a profitable arms deal, became the goals of Washington. Historian Steven C. Topik saw Flint and his friends as foreshadowing "the twentieth-century 'entrepreneurs' who used the U.S. state to get their way abroad."

U.S. Naval intervention in the rebellion of the Brazilian fleet at Rio has been minimized or ignored by most American historians as being of little import. Yet, William A. Williams termed it one of nine major events that served to "crystallize the agrarian and metropolitan consensus on market expansion" (Williams 1969). And Topik noted that the action at Rio was "the first time that the New [U.S.] Navy was successfully used to defend American merchant vessels and supplant the other great powers -- particularly the British." This action in Guanabara Bay "would be the prototype of future U.S. foreign policy" presaging "Gunboat Diplomacy in the age of steam and steel" (Topik 1996, 7-9). It is indeed odd, that historians, with the exceptions of Walter LaFeber, Williams, and Topik, have ignored the significance of the largest foreign assembly of American warships to that point in United States history (LaFeber 1998).

And, in 1895, President Cleveland found for Brazil in his arbitration of the Misiones border dispute with Argentina. A pleased Brazilian congress had medals struck with Cleveland's image on one side and Floriano's on the other, two towns in arbitrated areas in Santa Catarina and Amapá were baptized "Clevelandia," and the 4th of July was made a Brazilian national holiday! So Americans had some reason to think that the republic had brought the two countries closer together (Smith 1991)¹⁵. The Spanish-American War did not immediately bother Brazilians, but when its aftermath gave their American friends colonies in the Caribbean and in the Pacific, the old fears, doubts, and suspicions about the United States stirred anew. And again worries about Amazonia bubbled just below the surface.

While all of this is true, it was also true that Brazilian respect for the "Grand Republic" was based on little real knowledge. At the start of the republican era, news about affairs in North America arrived in Brazil via London newspapers. Brazilians and Americans took more interest in Europe than in each other. A contemporary American observer in Rio de Janeiro noted that Brazilians "concern themselves very little about what takes place

15 Smith said that the Flint Fleet "arrived too late to exert a direct military influence on events." (Topik 1996, 121) He sees a four step process: U.S. intervention at Rio; build-up of the New Navy; the Olney Doctrine re. Venezuela; and the Spanish-American War.

in the United States.” (Andrews 1891, 116-117) Some intellectuals, such as Eduardo Prado warned against using the United States as a model because of the brutality with which it had stripped North America of forests, wildlife, and natives in the name of republican progress. He peered into the dark side of America, with its fierce capitalism and saw no reason for Brazil to imitate the United States. The mix of indifference, fascination, respect, and repulsion became constant in Brazilian attitudes toward the northern republic (Prado 1961).¹⁶

The Blaine-Mendonça Reciprocal Trade treaty did not produce a flood of American products into the Brazilian market. It appeared that Brazilian exports of coffee and sugar did increase by 1892, but then the Manager of Trade Statistics in Washington discovered that the values in his reports were incorrect because they presented the two currencies at par value, when in fact the previously stable Brazilian paper was suffering from inflation. The recorded gains in exports were in coffee and rubber, which received no special treatment by the agreement, and whose advances were due solely to market pressures. Coffee exports jumped because coffee prices fell. Though the free list in the treaty was long, in fact Brazil had no market for many of the products, or they had to compete with more organized and established European producers. Although the treaty gave free entry to much desired machinery, an 1890 exemption list already lifted duties on such items regardless of nationality; U.S. machinery obtained no special advantage. However the main problems facing American exporters were not tariffs, but the lack of American shipping from East Coast ports to Brazil and the high cost of what did exist. Twenty European steamships a month entered the bay at Rio compared to one American vessel. The U.S. merchant marine had not recovered from its losses during the Civil War. The majority of American cargoes destined for Brazil went in European vessels (only 8.2 % of imports and 15.5% of exports traveled under the American flag). By 1900 there was no regular shipping line between the United States and Brazil. Worse, American companies lacked agents on the spot, had no Portuguese-speaking personnel and no familiarity with the difficulties related to lighterage, customs, packaging, rail transport, and marketing. Credit flowed through European banks, the first U.S. bank in Brazil would open only in 1915. But somehow despite all this fifty percent of Brazilian exports went to the northern republic (Topik 1996, 178-194).

16 The first edition in 1894 was seized by the government and suppressed. It has been reprinted numerous times since the beginning of the century.

The next decades saw Brazil adopting a stance aimed at minimizing potential United States threats to Brazilian interests. In 1903-12, the Baron of Rio Branco shaped Brazilian foreign policy into a tool of national defense and development. At the end of the 1890s, with the boom in Amazonian rubber at its peak, a somewhat shadowy Anglo-American Syndicate (including Mr. Flint's U.S. Rubber) sought to buy from Bolivia a long-term lease to the huge, and rubber-rich Acre territory in western Amazonia. Manaus rubber barons organized a Texan-style takeover of the territory, fighting a war in the jungle with Bolivia. With events in the Congo providing a worrisome example, Brazil leaders mobilized forces on the Bolivian border to head off this startling real estate deal. Once the territory was safely in Brazilian control, Foreign Minister Rio Branco bought out the syndicate, negotiated a settlement with La Paz, and signed an agreement with American Percival Farquhar to build the treaty-mandated railroad around the falls and rapids of the Madeira River above Porto Velho to allow Bolivia to ship out its raw rubber (Fifer 1972; Stokes 1974).

Farquhar's Brazil Railroad also built the strategically important line in the south that linked São Paulo with Porto Alegre, and secured large timber concessions for Portland (Me.) registered U.S. Lumber in the process. These activities contributed significantly to a serious rural rebellion in Santa Catarina's *Contestado* region that took large scale military operations to put down. The insertion of the Brazilian interior into the international economy was abrupt, painful, and violent (Carvalho 1916; Monteiro 1974; Diacon 1991; McCann 2004, 121-157)¹⁷.

Rio Branco had developed a formula that posted Brazil at the side of the United States in the great international questions of the day, in hopes that the Americans would stand by Brazil in South American disputes. It was a rule of Brazilian diplomatic procedure not to meet with more than one neighbor at a time to avoid having the Spanish-speakers gang up on the Brazilians. This rule inspired an alliance with the United States to balance being outnumbered in South American multilateral meetings. And it fostered enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism, because hemispheric unity with its accompanying legal mechanisms for preventing and containing armed conflict would reduce the chances of anti-Brazilian coalitions. By standing with the United States in its Caribbean and Central American adventures and by seeking acceptance of

17 For a contemporary account of travel on this railroad see Harry A. Franck (1921, 138-159). Franck was on the line soon after its completion.

arbitration in the settlement of disputes, Brazil sought to protect itself from similar American abuse, to convince its neighbors that the United States was allied with Brazil, and that Brazil would not threaten them militarily.

Rio Branco had the distinction of serving as chancellor under four consecutive presidents. He raised foreign relations above the political swirl and created the basis for what would be later called the Itamaraty tradition (after the name of the foreign ministry building). Not all subsequent administrations understood the tradition; some confused its tactical elements -- dependence on foreign loans and investments, Pan-Americanism, and alliance with the United States -- with its strategic substance -- the pursuit of independence, development, and prestige (Bueno 1992).

This thinking can be seen in the way Brazil dealt with its economic position. The United States was its main customer for its coffee, but England held its various "funding loan" notes (between 1883 and 1914 Brazil borrowed more than \$120 million). London banks underwrote Brazil's international commercial exchange, and by 1930 English investors had provided 53 percent of the total foreign investment in Brazil. Rio Branco and his followers tried to set temporal and physical limits to dependency by spreading it among the powers. Closer economic and political links with the United States were a hedge against the British, and later in the 1930s would facilitate a financial shift from London to New York. Rio Branco regarded diffusing dependency on foreign money markets as a temporary expedient on Brazil's journey to full independence. In the 1930s when the Vargas regime employed it in its dealings with the various powers, critics wearing ideological blinders would accuse the government with being pro-Nazi Germany and pro-fascist Italy, when all it was doing was following the advice of the great chancellor.

Despite the Itamaraty tradition, World War I had caught the country off guard. In the pre-war years Rio Branco had arranged for its officer corps to send men to train in Germany as preparation for receiving a German mission in Brazil. French influence undermined those plans, and economics, the American declaration of war, and German submarine attacks on Brazilian merchant ships carried Brazil into the war on the Allied side in 1917. Its underdevelopment, lack of shipping, and the reluctance of key military men kept its troops out of combat, which would have to wait for the next war. At the Peace Conference, President Woodrow Wilson embraced President-elect Epitácio Pessoa (1919-22), and honored him by returning him to Rio de Janeiro on a U.S. warship (Vinhosa 1990, 99-183). For a time it appeared that

Brazil and the United States would be the key Western Hemisphere players in the League of Nations, but Wilson could not convince his fellow citizens of the wisdom of membership, so Brazil joined the League as the principal voice of the Americas. Until it withdrew in 1926 in protest against Germany receiving a permanent seat on the Council, its membership provided it with coveted international status and sense of self-worth. The United States dominated the Pan American Union and so Brazil's role in the League gave it opportunities to have a greater voice in world affairs. After the next war it would also give a lot of energy to the United Nations.

In the 1930s the Vargas government juggled the wooing powers of England, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, as well as its Argentine neighbors and warring Paraguay and Bolivia. It played a pivotal position in the pre-war match up and faced conflicting pressures from Britain, the United States, and Germany. The Rothchilds, seeking to protect Brazil's ability to repay their loans, urged the buying and burning of surplus coffee to bolster its price on the world market. Washington, viscerally opposed to price supports, protested. As Brazil's gold stocks dwindled, the United States came forward with a reciprocal trade treaty that, in the Open Door tradition, would lower Brazil's tariffs on a long list of American products in exchange for the continued free entry of coffee and rubber into the United States. Whether this was blackmail or liberal free trade depended from which side of the negotiating table it was viewed. The Brazilians saw that they had to make concessions to keep what they had, while suffering declining market share, as other coffee-producing countries took advantage of most-favored-nation agreements to ship more beans to the United States. And as more American products entered Brazil its own industries would face increased competition. The agreement would give the Americans an advantage over the Europeans. The Germans proposed an exchange mechanism that allowed them to sell to each other without using, what they both lacked, gold or internationally accepted currencies. Vargas signed both agreements and traded with both countries, much to Washington's frustration. The German agreement contributed to the formation of a civilian-military alliance that increased the latter's political involvement. The military supported the accord because it provided armaments without recourse to the nation's scant gold and currency reserves, while the civilians were able to expand and diversify export markets for foodstuffs and raw materials. Washington objected that it did not increase the bullion/money reserves, which made it more difficult to pay off American bondholders and to remit profits from foreign enterprises in Brazil.

The war quickly ended German trade, but now Vargas held out alliance to wring economic, technical, and military assistance from the United States. Brazil got up from the negotiating table with financing and materials to build the Volta Redonda steel mill that became the core of import-substitution industrialization, price and market guarantees for its products, an expanded transportation network, and arms, planes, ships and military training. The United States got air and sea bases, access to natural resources important for its war industries, operational control over the Brazilian navy and air force, and the commitment of a reinforced infantry division and a fighter squadron that fought in Italy under American command. As a result Brazil came out of the war with improved airfields, ports, and railroads, and the continent's strongest armed forces. It also came out of it with a well-defined list of foreign and domestic objectives that underlay government policies into the 1970s. The war years created an atmosphere of national comradeship that heightened Brazilian expectations regarding the level of support they could expect from their American friends. Brazilians did not know that Washington suddenly stopped a research project on rubber production when the scientists discovered that they could develop a rubber tree that would be immune to the diseases that prevented rubber plantations in Amazonia. The United States was then developing synthetic rubber and did not want further natural rubber development.

The war brought Americans and Brazilians together in greater numbers than at any previous time in history. The inter-change of culture, technology, and products was profound, but mostly on the Brazilian side. Hollywood gave Americans a watered-down and whitened version of Brazil and Brazilians (even Carmen Miranda "the Brazilian Bombshell" was squeezed into pre-existing American stereotypes), but some soldiers and sailors married Brazilians thereby exposing their families to Brazilian culture. The war also brought the beginnings of Brazilian studies in American universities.

But immediately there were disappointments. Harry S Truman's succession to the presidency upon Franklin Roosevelt's death, brought people to power in Washington who did not respond to Brazilian charm or feel indebted for important, but secret contributions to victory (such as the air bases). Not only did the American ambassador play a supporting role in the drama that ended the Vargas dictatorship, but the Truman team did not insist that Brazil be awarded a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. American officials made light of Brazilian presumption, while rewarding the defeated

French and the chaotic Chinese seats. Brazil was placated with a two-year term on the council, but as the Brazilian expression goes, “it was a difficult frog (*sapo*) to swallow” (McCann 1995, 1973).

National pride was mollified somewhat by the election of former foreign minister Oswaldo Aranha as president of the General Assembly in 1947. That year too, Brazil hosted the American foreign ministers meeting in Rio de Janeiro, from which came the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), condemning aggression and calling for immediate Security Council action in cases of invasion. The pact reflected Brazilian opposition to war as an aspect of international relations. Its arbitration procedures and its collective response to aggression, altered Brazil’s military relationship with the United States by making it multilateral (Hilton 1994; Davis 1996).

During the Eurico Dutra government (1946-50), he and Harry Truman exchanged visits. It was the first time since Pedro II’s 1876 visit that a sitting Brazilian head of state had come to the United States. Dutra addressed the Congress and discussed development assistance with Truman. Joint study commissions were created to recommend projects. Brazil was to be “a pilot area to test modern methods of industrial development” (Daland 1967, 27). Military relations were also tightened, building on the wartime alliance. Large numbers of officers came to the United States to attend training schools, and American advisors helped organize the air force technical center at São José dos Campos, where the foundations for Brazil’s aircraft industry were laid. In 1949, veterans of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to Italy set up the Superior War School to bring officers and civilians to study Brazil’s economic potential, coordination of foreign policy, security needs, and combined military operations. These new schools, together with the *Instituto Rio Branco* for the training of professional diplomats, generalized the elites’ world views, raised standards of technical, military, administrative, and diplomatic professionalization. The war school and other military institutes eventually became centers of anti-government conspiracy over the next two decades (Stepan 1971).

To the chagrin of State Department officials, the dispensable ally Getúlio Vargas was re-elected and return to power in 1951, not quite so ready to follow the American lead. There would be no Brazilian troops in Korea, the blood sacrifice in Italy had not been compensated sufficiently to warrant the expenditure of more lives. Vargas favored state-led development and set out to strengthen the national steel industry and to establish federal control over oil

production. The Brazilian elites were very slow to invest their family fortunes in development schemes and foreign experts had argued that there were no great oil fields in Brazil. The Eisenhower administration strongly opposed the creation of the national oil company, *Petrobras*, as a restriction on the areas open to American investors (Wirth 1973; Smith 1969)¹⁸.

The two countries may have been naturally compatible when Brazil was predominately agricultural, but the value of its manufactured exports exceeded that of its agricultural exports in the 1970s, despite the fact that Brazil is the number-two food exporter behind the United States. An October 1990 editorial in *The New York Times* calling on the government of Fernando Collor de Mello to cut off funding for the Brazilian atomic program asserted that “neither Brazil nor Argentina faces the sort of security threats that have motivated states to acquire nuclear weapons” (Brazil 1990, A-24). The editors probably were not aware that for decades the United States has worked actively to prevent Brazil from developing any sort of atomic energy, while bargaining American wheat for Brazilian atomic ores. American leaders told Brazilians that they did not need independent atomic energy systems, because the United States would supply ‘black-box’ plants run on American-enriched Brazilian ores. It never seems to have entered the minds of American leaders that the Brazilians do not trust the United States to remain forever friendly. As one army general staff officer put it: “we do not know what your country will be like fifty or a hundred years from now. What will we do to protect ourselves, if you suddenly decide to seize Amazonia? We owe it to our nation to prepare the best defense even if we never need it”¹⁹. The 1989 American invasion of Panama, the drug operations in the Andean countries, and the war against Iraq to protect the national oil supply, raised doubts in Brazilian minds about the future uses of American military power. So the emerging rivalry has more than academic, historical interest.

The tension between the two countries was especially curious because so much of it seems to have been generated on the American side. Moreover, there has been tension regardless of the type of government ruling Brazil. Monarchical, republican, nationalist, developmentalist, left-leaning, right-wing military, and civilian-centrist governments have all had their share of problems with the United States. This is especially noticeable when set against the backdrop of the history of Brazilian foreign policy. Indeed, even

18 See: John W.F. Dulles (1970) for the aftermath of Vargas’s suicide.

19 Conversation with author, Col. JH da S., Brasilia, May 1977.

at independence in 1822, the Brazilian empire proposed an alliance that Washington rebuffed. Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1903-12) designed as the basis of Brazilian policy before World War I a close, friendly relationship with the Americans. Bradford Burns, in his study of the era, termed it “an unwritten alliance” (Burns 1966). It became a written alliance in 1942. The foreign minister that kept Brazil to a steady pro-American course in the dangerous days before and during World War II, Oswaldo Aranha, put it this way: Brazil would support the United States on the world scene (remember that the non-colonial world was considerably smaller then) in return for United States support of Brazilian hegemony in South America (McCann 1973). The military aspect of the wartime alliance was extended in a 1952 accord, which endured until 1977 when Jimmy Carter’s administration embarrassed President Ernesto Geisel by publicly criticizing Brazilian human rights abuses when Geisel was struggling inside his government to stop them. The 1952 military accord committed the United States to transfer arms and equipment, but humiliatingly gave the Americans the right to inspect their use. It also contributed to the delay in creating independent technological development. At the same time Washington pressured Germany and Brazil to drop their joint atomic energy development program. The next two decades found the countries at odds over a range of issues: atomic energy, computer technology, patent law, GATT agreement and market access, Amazonian deforestation, native peoples, and immigration²⁰.

Brazil’s return in 1985 to elected civilian leadership removed the negative image of military rule, just in time for Brazil to join in the apparent world-wide wave of democratization. Oddly, security conscious Brazilians took the American displays of military power in Panama and the Persian Gulf (and the injudicious boasting of American officers at the Army War College), as warnings that the United States could seize Amazonia in part or whole. While American officials tended to dismiss such fears as irrational, the long history of American interest in Amazonia is better known to Brazilians than to Americans, and crystallized the mix of respect, repulsion, fascination and fear with which Brazilians regard the United States. Considering the proven wealth of Amazonia in gold, diamonds, oil, rare woods and plants, it is likely to remain as an area of concern in the two nations’ relations (Zirker and Henberg 1994, 259-281; Albert 1992, 35-70; Allen 1992, 71-99 and Brooke

20 On the 1952 accord and its abrogation see Davis (1996, 132-135, 203).

1995, 3 and Brazil's, 1993, A-6)²¹. In September 1991 Brazil had one of its most skilled diplomats, Rubens Ricupero, heading the Washington embassy. He was startled to find that the Department of State viewed Latin American relations as a competition among the various republics for the affection and esteem of Washington. He declared that Brazil did not see things that way, it was not competing with Argentina, Mexico, or Chile for a place under the wings of the American eagle. If Argentina wanted to send a warship to the Arabian gulf that was the business of Buenos Aires. Brazil wanted proper and useful relations with the United States. Brazil would consider their relationship "special" to the same degree that the United States did. In other words, it would not be subservient (Moniz Bandeira 2004).

The responses of the two nations to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait contrasted their respective national interests. Brazil was an active participant in Iraqi development. Its great construction firms, such as Sergio Dourado, had built highways, Brazilian Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz had sold fleets of vehicles, and Petrobras had discovered and developed oil fields. At that moment Brazil was importing 40 % of its oil, and fully 30 % of the total was coming from Iraq (Jones 1993, 323). Its arms sales to Iraq were a vehicle to secure sufficient oil for its economy. So it was not surprising that the Brazilian military was cooperating with the Iraqis in developing rocket technologies. By the early 1980s Brazil had established itself as a major arms exporter, with its largest market being in the Middle East, which absorbed about half of its arms sales between 1977 and 1988. But by 1985-89 Iraq, by itself, was taking half of Brazil's total sales abroad. The country's dependency on the Iraqi market was made clear at the end of the Iran-Iraq war when Bagdad cut its purchases and, worse, stopped paying on the \$100 million it owed Avibrás²². Because at the same time as Brazilian government decreased its subsidies to the arms industry, Avibrás was one of several enterprises to slide into bankruptcy. By the mid-1990s the arms industry was in collapse.

21 My comments are partly based on conversations with Brazilian army officers, American diplomats and military observers in Brazil. The literature on Amazonia that mixes attention to politics, forests, natural resources, native peoples, road building, development, and military and security issues has grown at a tremendous rate.

22 In 1961 Avibrás Indústria Aeroespacial S.A.--Avibrás was established as a private firm. In 1964 Avibrás obtained the Sonda I rocket contract and thereafter was the major company involved in the development of sounding rockets (Sondas II, III, and IV). It also took a leading role in developing missiles. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Avibrás worked almost exclusively with the manufacturing of rockets and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), such as the Astros II, in addition to developing anti-tank and anti-ship missiles.

However, if the history reviewed here is any guide it is likely that Brazil will continue to emphasize the positive aspects of its long relationship with the United States. The lesson Brazilians took from the history of Portugal and applied to their own foreign relations was that if they stood in the shadow of a stronger nation, bullies would keep their distance, and the protective power would fix its gaze beyond its shadow. Over time Brazil used this approach as a silent, diplomatic weapon to maintain supremacy over Spanish America, particularly Argentina, while by being close to the United States it kept it at bay.

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The United States: Latin America's 'beacon' and 'policeman'

Mariana Martins Villaça

The first nation to have emerged within the moulds of liberal democracy in the American Continent is also the one which most strongly asserts itself over Latin America to this day. There are many contradictions which surround the history of the United States and its expansionist policies. However, these do not stand out when faced with the power of certain myths on the collective imaginary, such as that of a Nation which emerged through the 'Will of God' and was uniquely chosen by Providence to expand its power and follow its 'Manifest Destiny' - the sacred mission to civilize other nations.

In the 19th Century, the rupture with England did not resolve an important cultural and political dilemma - the definition of a national identity still markedly influenced by an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant culture. Therefore, the need to forge a national character fostered the development of a foundationalist and expansionist ideology which inherited a belief in predestination from the 17th century English Puritans, the so-called Pilgrims. The expression 'Manifest Destiny' was coined in the 19th century by a newspaper editor¹. It brought together the United States' expansionist interests with the conception

1 The editor was John L. O' Sullivan, from *The United States Magazine and Democratic Review* (Junqueira 2001).

that a democratic nation - therefore superior to other nations - had the right to civilize other peoples.

Corroborating with this mission, the 'American Myth' celebrated the promising future of the United States and the deserving 'new man', namely, the 'pioneer' who was revered because he was pure, fair, austere, hard-working, entrepreneurial and chosen by God. According to the historian Mary Anne Junqueira, the morally virtuous people of the United States believed that they should show others how to build an ideal country from ethical and moral principles, serving as a 'beacon' to the rest of the world (Junqueira 2001, 34).

Carrying the banner of the exemplary democracy, having bravely conquered its independence (1776) and firmly established itself as a prosperous nation, flag-bearer of continental democracy, the United States justified its interventions in Latin America with ideas of order and justice. The idea of a just nation - and a nation which rights wrongs - was spread in various ways across the Continent. It was endorsed by a part of United States historiography (Prado 2000, 323-324) and is frequently revived whenever appropriate: the events of *11th September* in 2001 served as a pretext for the government of the United States to declare itself the world's 'policeman' once more. Nevertheless, despite the perpetuity of this image which contributed toward the development of a linear, progressive and evolutionist notion of history, we can argue that the political activities of the United States in Latin America have always been marked by strong contradictions. In addition to the transformations and oscillations of American activity throughout history, we can identify considerable differences in political and economic projects and actions in relation to Central and South America, allowing us to question the image of a *single* American Foreign Policy which is coherent and homogeneous (Flores Pinel 1980)².

According to Maria Ligia Prado (1995), we must also consider that the relationship between the USA and Latin American countries has always been complex and involved negotiations, common interests, bargaining and power games on both sides. Frequently, the actions of the government of the United States served the aspirations of Latin American governments and elites establishing "reaction, contestation and repudiation mechanisms, alongside mechanisms for acceptance and admiration". Prado argues that

2 Flores Pinel (1980, 55-80) highlights the predominance of American geo-political interests in the case of Central America and economic interests in the case of South America.

these mechanisms are strategies - whether deliberate or not - made up of actions, discourses and symbolic elaborations (Prado 2000, 326).

Whilst not disregarding the inherent asymmetry which characterizes the power relations between the two parts, we base our views on the principle that bilateral actions and resistance have always played a significant role in the power games established between them. In this chapter, we reveal the longstanding political and economic interests and the negotiations which were identified by Steve Stern as part of a 'triangle of forces'³. Given that it is impossible to address the full range and complexity of this topic, we have chosen to trace the history of the main interventionist projects and practices by the United States in Latin America, focusing on the period between the end of the 19th century and the 1960s.

Throughout the text, we highlight the transformation of USA-Latin America relations brought about by the Cuban Revolution. We have opted to highlight this event because the 1959 revolution represented a rupture in the continental foreign policy of the United States. Its significance has already been demonstrated in a number of existing periodizations in historiography in which the Cuban Revolution always appears as one of the chronological markers defining USA-Latin America relations⁴. Thus, based on these periodizations, we review the main markers of the United States' politico-economic activity in Latin America, seeking to highlight the moments in which there were changes in strategy, such as in the case of the Cuban Revolution.

Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine: asserting Caliban's power

After its expansion westwards and the incorporation of the Mexican territories, the Caribbean and Central America were the first regions where

3 Stern proposes that inter-American relations should be thought of as a triangle of forces made up of the world system, resistance strategies and the interests of trade and the elites whose center of gravity is found in the United States. See Gilbert, 1998.

4 Pablo González Casanova suggests three main phases of American Imperialism: 1880 to 1933, 1934 to 1959, and 1960 onward (González Casanova 1986). Another author who considers the Cuban Revolution as one of the main markers is Voltaire Schilling (1984).

the United States repelled European influence and established what the authors call, somewhat euphemistically in our opinion, ‘the informal empire’ (Gilbert 1998, 92-94).⁵ The Monroe Doctrine emerged in order to justify American domination and from 1923 it came to underpin American foreign policy for Latin America. It originated from a declaration to Congress by President James Monroe in which he positioned himself against the Spanish recovery of its ex-colonies and in support of Latin America’s right to self-determination. According to Mary Anne Junqueira (2001, p. 99), the Monroe Doctrine became a ‘sort of founding declaration’ of the international role the United States claimed for itself.

American participation in the Cuban War of Independence against Spain (1895-1898) served as a springboard for Central American domination. After the mysterious explosion of an American battleship in Havana (the *Maine*) in 1898, the United States declared war on Spain, blaming it for this supposedly criminal incident. The United States defeated Spain almost effortlessly, given that the Cuban struggle had already been going on for a number of years (the first independence war took place between 1868 and 1878). The Americans ‘liberated’ the Island and began to regard it as its protectorate, together with Puerto Rico and the Philippines. With the annexation of Guam and Hawaii in the Pacific, the United States established an extensive security zone, backed by strong military bases in Cuba (*Guantánamo*) and Puerto Rico (*Roosevelt*).

These annexations were underpinned by the dissemination of the ‘Pan-Americanist Project’, which was established during the First International Conference of American States, in Washington (1889). It had great impact within intellectual circles, given that it had many supporters, with the idea being initially conceived by Simón Bolívar at the beginning of the 19th Century (Santos 2004). Enthusiasts of Pan-Americanism utterly detested their colonial past, marked by Spanish domination which they considered as being responsible for the ‘backwardness’ of Latin American nations. They proposed that the nations now being built should follow the American model⁶.

5 Term used by Ricardo Salvatore to define the United States’ expansion during the period between the end of 19th Century and the 1930s.

6 An example of an article celebrating the United States’ superiority is ‘*Nuestra América*’ (1903) by Carlos Octávio Buiñes, from Argentina, who stressed laziness, sadness and arrogance as being some of the inferior characteristics of the Hispanic and Indigenous races.

At the same time, Spain's loss of Cuba to the United States in 1898 generated a strong feeling of dissatisfaction among Spanish intellectuals who were unhappy with the downfall of their colonial empire and were committed to finding solutions to 'regenerate' their country. Maria Helena Capelato (2003) argues that these Spanish thinkers, the so-called '98 Generation' or 'regenerationists', and some Hispanic-American intellectuals formed close ties during this period and became involved in a notorious debate, motivated by anti-Americanism and the desire for progress for their countries. Some of this intellectual work became paradigmatic of a common attitude in celebrating '*hispanidad*' (Hispanic heritage), exalted because of its supposed spirituality and humanism, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon culture associated to violence and pragmatism. In one of these writings, *El triunfo de Calibán*, 1898, by the modernist writer Rubén Darío, the image of US citizens as savage and blood-thirsty dollar-hunters and barbarians was disseminated. The United States was metaphorically identified with the character of Caliban from William Shakespeare's 'The Tempest'. Caliban was the son of Sycorax and a deformed barbarian slave belonging to the powerful King Prospero. He bewitched the pure Ariel, his antithesis.

In a similar vein is *Ariel* (1900), by the Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó. It reiterates the vision of the USA as the realm of barbarity and defends the spiritual and moral nature of the Latin cultural tradition, the basis for '*hispanidad*'. This work allows us to perceive the ambiguous feelings (fascination and rejection) which permeated the experience of the United States' rapid expansion: Rodó welcomed continental integration but criticized the '*nordomania*' [northernmania] of those who admired the United States, questioning its predominant cultural values. Repercussion of this work among intellectual circles was so great that it led to 'Arielism', a line of thought associated to idealism and in opposition to the United States' 'utilitarian mercantilism' (Capelato 2003).

The 'anti-Caliban' posture grew within intellectual circles as the United States became more authoritarian toward its new 'colonies'. Cuba was unable to achieve *de facto* independence - so greatly coveted by its leader José Martí who had died during the war - and was governed by a military *junta* under the command of General Leonardo Wood. In 1901, a constitutional amendment (*Emenda Platt* proposed by Senator Orville Platt) guaranteed the United States the right to intervene in Cuban territory and affairs, under the pretext of "safeguarding Cuban independence, ensuring an appropriate government was

in place in order to protect life, property and individual liberty.” (Junqueira 2001, 102)⁷

Given Theodore Roosevelt’s expansionist strategy, his political and military activities (he was acclaimed a hero during the Spanish-American war and was President of the USA, 1901-1909) greatly contributed toward making sure that from then on the USA had control over a large part of the Caribbean. In this process, control over the Panama Canal Zone was crucial and after the negotiations that ensued, in 1903, the United States was granted concession of this region for one hundred years. After supporting Panama to become independent from Colombia by removing the latter country from negotiations, the United States invested large amounts in the construction of a strategic passage between the Atlantic and the Pacific - the Panama Canal. Its purpose was to facilitate USA trade with Asia and relations between the American East and West Coasts. At the end of this turbulent process, American control over the Panama Canal allowed the United States to greatly expand its domination over the Continent in a rite of passage which signified a change from a policy grounded on interventionism to a much more direct and global form of imperialism.

In 1904, a preventive intervention doctrine was drafted, known as the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine. It defended the right of the ‘Big Brother of the North’ to intervene in Central America whenever necessary. Its principles were similar to those expressed in the *Emenda Platt*: the USA took on the responsibility for safeguarding and watching over other nations “[...] the USA’s faithfulness to the Monroe Doctrine may force it, albeit reluctantly, in flagrant cases of inappropriate procedures or powerlessness, to take on the position of international policeman [our underscore].” (Smith 2001, 629)

Thus, Roosevelt implemented a policy across Central America based on constant and violent interventions (through the action of *marines*) which became known as *big stick* diplomacy. In addition to armed intervention, other less belligerent strategies were also employed. During the 1910s William Taft’s ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ (1910-1913) was launched. The purpose of this policy was to multiply American investments (railways, oil, electricity, land) and reduce the presence of the European nations in the Caribbean. In order to do this, massive loans were granted to meet the interests of local elites, and American bankers actively participated in controlling customs authorities.

7 Part of Article III, *Emenda Platt*. See (Junqueira 2001, 102).

In the 20th century, within the context of the *big stick diplomacy*, there were a number of military interventions in the countries that made up the 'security zone'. In addition to Cuba, Puerto Rico and Panama, there are many other examples - Nicaragua: 1912 to 1915 and 1926 to 1933; Mexico: 1914 and 1916; Haiti: 1915 to 1934; and the Dominican Republic: 1916 to 1924. Central America, with its 'Banana Republics' continued to be the main stage of American activity. This was made possible by the alliance of military forces with local powers who were desperate for economic benefits, producing real 'islands of prosperity' amidst the predominant social destitution. Prosperity came in the shape of niche production of tropical goods for export (such as those of the United Fruit Co, for example), based on transactions guaranteed by 'puppet governments' supported by military presence, whenever necessary. For example, a simple listing of successive governments in Guatemala between the 1920s and the 1980s allows us to observe the importance of the tradition of dictatorships in the region: in almost six decades there were less than eight civil presidents in Guatemala. In the same period, the situation was hardly different in El Salvador (Selser 1980).

These interventions were not welcomed in Latin America and counter-strategies were not long in coming. Maria Helena Capelato shows, for example, how subsequent to the USA's intervention in Nicaragua, the Brazilian press, including conservative-leaning papers, vehemently protested against Pan-American policy. To a large degree, reactions were due to the impact caused by explicit violence. In 1928, the United States carried out an unprecedented air raid on a mountainous region thought to be under the control of guerrilla movements headed by Augusto César Sandino, with serious consequences to the local population. It is worth remembering that after Sandino's assassination in 1934, Nicaragua went through a long period of dictatorship which lasted until 1979, under the command of Anastasio Somoza and his sons (Luís Somoza and Anastasio Somoza Debayle) who succeeded him in power.

In 1928, in protest against the United States, various representatives of Latin American countries participated in the Conference of Havana, in favor of instituting a principle of non-intervention. Discussions continued in subsequent conferences in Panama (1939), Havana (1940) and Rio de Janeiro (1942) (Capelato 2000). Negative repercussions of direct intervention, and the new conjuncture which emerged due to World War II were factors which led the United States government to perfect and diversify its strategies.

The Good Neighbor Policy: the seductive Caliban

The economic penetration of the United States into Latin America during the 1930s and 1940s permeated political interests. It was masked by an appearance of reciprocity, given that trade had always served to mediate inter-continental relations. According to Pablo González Casanova, the second period of American Imperialism, from 1934 to 1959, was marked by the consolidation of peaceful penetration through the coordination of economic and military policies, within the so-called 'Pan-American' spirit. This was reinforced by a new ideology which was denominated by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 as the 'good neighbor' policy. Its objective was apparently innocent, the 'reconstruction of America' (Tota 2000, 38) after the shock waves produced by the New York stock exchange crash.

The United States attempted to consolidate its position in Latin America via two-way negotiations, attracting nationalist governments (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina) to its area of influence and neutralizing the threat of an active alliance with Nazi-Fascism. Being aware of their bargaining power, some governments were able to make use of the favorable negotiation climate: President Lázaro Cárdenas, for example, nationalized Mexican oil reserves by setting up 'Pemex' at the end of the 1930s, challenging American economic interests.

By holding up the banner of the 'good neighbor' during the Inter-American Conference of Buenos Aires (1936), the United States defended national sovereignty in Latin America by arguing, somewhat ironically, that no country had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries and that the defense of the western hemisphere was a collective responsibility. This posture of alliance must be understood within the context of World War II, when the United States sought to disseminate a counter position to the growth in Nazi-Fascism, given that there was not much rejection of this doctrine, especially in South America (Prado 1995).

Gerson Moura and Maria Ligia Prado show that during World War II American armed interventions in Latin America were temporarily suspended due to these alliance interests (Moura 1991; Prado 1995). WWII, therefore, fostered the emergence of a new strategy: the cultural and economic

penetration of the United States, which was justified by a discourse of 'hemispheric solidarity' and put in practice by means of treaties with Latin American Governments and their industrial bourgeoisies, who were particularly interested in a policy for import substitution.

Before the war, Mexico, Cuba and Brazil were targets for this important strategy, as the following information reveals: from 1938, the United States had only six military attachés in Latin America and three were based in these three countries, in exclusive posts. However, 'solidarity' spread very quickly: the total number of military attachés reached 38 by the end of that same year, and totaled 100 by 1941 (Prado 1995, 58).

With a view to the 'integration' of Latin America, the United States made extensive use of mass media (radio, press and cinema). To consolidate the presence of the American cultural industry, in 1938 the American Republics Division was set up, with 14 offices and extensive radio broadcast capacity. Thus, between 1940 and 1946 the 'Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics' (known as the Inter-American Bureau) was established by the Roosevelt government and directed by Nelson Rockefeller. It had a large budget and it invested approximately 140 million dollars in six years. These investments were geared toward political propaganda in radio programs, magazines (Junqueira 2000) and films, with particular emphasis on the latter, because cinema was the most attractive of the 'seductive' cultural penetration mechanisms analyzed by Antonio Pedro Tota (2000).

Maria Lígia Prado argues that in Brazil the combination of Vargas' nationalism and his 'Bargaining Policies' with the United States resulted in an 'ambiguous strategy' (Prado 2000, 341)⁸ which was responsible for promoting interesting combinations and appropriations in the cultural sphere. Good examples are the 'Brazilian Hollywood Characters' of Carmen Miranda and Zé Carioca (or 'Joe' Carioca, as he was known in the USA) because they had strong ideological content. In both examples we recognize icons which refer to nationality (the yellow and green colors, exaltation of samba, pride in the beautiful Brazilian nature, in addition to values such as pleasantness, friendliness and spontaneity) combined with imperialist propaganda: Carmen is impressed by Hollywood's glamour; Joe Carioca is presented to the public as Donald Duck's *number one* fan. In these characters,

8 The term 'bargaining policy' is employed by (Moura 1991, 21-24).

Pan-Americanism was dressed in a mixture of incongruous elements: a parrot that smoked Cuban cigars, spoke English and whose tail reflected the colors of the American flag; the '*Bahiana-rumbera*' who was very white, had a Latin accent and adorned herself with bananas, whilst randomly sharing the stage with *capoeira* dancers/fighters, tap-dancers and *mariachis* in stylized tropical scenes (Garcia 2004; Pinheiro 2003).

In addition to Joe Carioca, there were other Walt Disney characters such as the 'Mexican' rooster Panchito, or Goofy's Pampean horse (Goofy was duly transformed into a Gaucho). There were also the curious documentaries, inserted as part of Walt Disney animations, which were present in *Saludos Amigos* (1942) or in *The Three Caballeros* (1944), newsreels and various other cinematographic productions offering countless representations associated to the Good Neighbor Policy.

Maria Helena Capelato argues that after WWII,

[...] two movements related to the unity of the American Continent existed side by side: on the one hand, there was an attempt to forge a Latin American identity, and on the other, the institutionalization of the Inter-American system which included the United States and also confirmed and provided legitimacy to its political leadership in the Continent. (Capelato 2000, 302)

It was through this legitimacy that Latin America was made politically 'safe'. Nevertheless, in the new context of the Cold War, it becomes less important in the agenda of American foreign policy where new targets were established: Europe (soon to be 'included' in the Marshall Plan), the Middle East and Asia.

In 1946, Churchill recognized the United States as the leader of the Western world, when President Harry Truman proposed a policy of mutual assistance in order to defend the free and Christian world (to counter the Communist threat). American democracy is celebrated to all and sundry. Thus, Leslie Bethell shows that, indirectly, the United States played a very significant role in the democratization of Latin America which occurred in the immediate post-WWII period. Bethell analyzed in detail the transformations which took place during this period, such as popular mobilizations and trade union activism, which were soon to be violently repressed (Bethell and Roxborough 1996, 24-30).

The Cold War promoted the expansion of the USA's areas of influence. Nevertheless, it was also important to maintain its influence where it already existed, thus there were speeches on 'Hemispheric Security' and 'Inter-Americanism', concepts which were institutionalized through the establishment of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - IATRA, in 1947, and the OAS - Organization of American States, in 1948.

In contrast to these 'integration' mechanisms (IATRA and OAS), where the hegemony of American interests were clearly visible, Eclac (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), set up in 1948 by the United Nations, was a space for drafting alternative projects for economic development. Through the theoretical work and research carried out by political scientists, economists and intellectuals from different countries, such as Celso Furtado, Aníbal Pinto and Aldo Ferrer, Eclac provided consultancy to Latin American governments and proposed, amongst other solutions to under-development, State-planned industrial development and import substitution.

Within the context of the so-called 'developmentism', the cultural industry played a significant role in enhancing the imaginary which surrounded *the American way of life*, disseminated by means of propaganda as the way of life 'par excellence' for Latin Americans. This lifestyle meant making use of what modern life had to offer: comfort made possible by the plentiful acquisition of consumer goods and satisfaction based on individual success, amongst other advantages offered by capitalism. In addition, the value of the family, work, an emphasis on the organization of the home and other ethical and behavioral factors were disseminated as part of the 'American style'.

The developmentist policy was not implemented without tension, because at times it clashed with the interests of the United States who always put its own economic interests first, over and above any benefits to Latin America. Examples of these tensions are the repercussions of economic measures applied by Getúlio Vargas and Juan Domingo Perón, particularly in relation to the oil trade. In Brazil and Argentina, internal and external pressures in favor of opening trade to American capital clashed with populist nationalism, as can be seen in two particularly delicate events which took place in the 1950s: the difficulties faced by Vargas when he founded Petrobrás and the negative repercussions of the agreement between Perón and Standard Oil for oil extraction in Argentina.

Furthermore, other problems affected the relationship of the United States with Latin America. It is, for example, well-known that the Brazilian government was forced to negotiate the implementation of its automobile industry with Europe - and not with its northern 'partner' - resulting in the establishment of the German firm, Volkswagen, in Brazil in 1957. The United States seemed to prefer to wash its hands from certain commitments or invest in durable assets in order to fund other regions which had not yet been reached. The peaceful surveillance of Latin America seemed to have been sufficient to protect its area of influence.

Thus, interesting economic-political games were set in motion between different groups. Whilst the United States insisted that Latin American governments should open their markets to capital, goods and services, the United Nations, via Eclac, argued for industrialization through import substitution, which required fiscal protectionism and a suitable currency exchange policy. At times, there were traces of both policies, as for example during the Juscelino Kubitschek government in Brazil. However, the co-existence of these policies occurred in such a way that it did not challenge American economic interests.

In Central America, however, 'peaceful' penetration is not the best way to describe relations with the USA during that period. The CIA organized what is considered to be its first coup d'état, the overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government in 1954, in Guatemala, after Arbenz threatened the powerful American exporting agribusiness, United Fruits Company, with land reform. Arbenz' progressive policies attracted the foreign attention of left-wing activists and sympathizers such as Ernesto Che Guevara, who was visiting Guatemala to witness the announced transformations, which were however, quickly interrupted. The Guatemalan military coup marked the beginning of an alternating cycle of violence and institutional legalism (Green and Herrera 1984, 1) in the region. Nevertheless, in post-war Central America a model of international economic integration was implemented so as to reduce the potential for revolutions in these countries. The formula which underpinned this model involved encouraging public spending and foreign capital investment while crushing socio-political manifestations. This strategy began to falter in the 1960s when economic expansion reached a certain threshold. Social contradictions worsened and the Cuban case thus represented undeniable evidence of political defeat.

Caliban against the ‘bearded men’: new strategies for Latin America

In 1959, the Cuban revolution set new standards of ‘possible revolutions’ within the context of the Third World. It greatly impacted on social thinking⁹ when, somewhat romantically, it promoted the belief in voluntarism through revolutionary struggle. This very particular process, which resulted in the overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista government, gave origin to the myth that in Cuba twelve men (the guerrillas who had started the Sierra Maestra combat) had managed to start a Revolution¹⁰. Furthermore, it was orchestrated without being steered by a communist party or a defined ideological project, it was rapidly embraced by the Cuban population and it gained the sympathy of a wide international audience (through interviews with Che and Fidel, photographs, documentaries, statements for the radio and TV). The Cuban Revolution injected hope among the Latin American left that a movement brought about by bringing together various political groups could be achieved, gaining popular support, without the need to wait for the right conditions as various Communist Parties advocated. Up to that time, left-wing organizations had been guided by the Soviet Communist Party, which after its 20th Congress in 1956, advocated the use of political struggle via legal means and carrying out *reforms* where revolutions were not possible.

‘Guevarism’ as a theory contributed to the enhancement of the value of guerrilla warfare (in particular rural guerrillas) as a strategy, driven by the Cuban example. It was disseminated by the work of Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, which years later would be further enhanced by ‘foco’ theory developed by the French philosopher Régis Debray (presented in his work entitled *Revolution in the Revolution* in 1966). Furthermore, Fidel Castro’s constant media exposure, trips and famous speeches contributed to an optimistic impression of the achievements of the new government¹¹.

9 The impact of the Cuban Revolution as a factor which transformed ideas, behavior, symbols and other elements of the imaginary is analyzed by Guerra (1992).

10 Bethell views the dissemination of this myth as tragic. He argues that it encouraged elitism and guerrilla warfare utopia on the left, corroborating toward a number of ‘crushing defeats’. (Bethell and Roxborough 1996, 312-313).

11 Fidel travelled considerably after the Revolution. On 15/4/59 he travelled to the United States invited by the American Association of Newspaper Editors. He then took part in the

It is worth remembering that it was precisely during one of his first trips, the one he made to Brazil, that Fidel Castro witnessed (in May 1959) President Juscelino Kubitschek propose to the American President, Eisenhower, a project entitled OPA (Pan-American Operation) in which the American government would provide assistance for the economic development of Latin America. The Brazilian proposal did not achieve immediate results, but it was certainly an inspiration to the 'Alliance for Progress' launched by Kennedy in 1961.

The specificities of the Cuban revolutionary process were studied by a number of researchers (Sader 1992; Bandeira 1998; Miskulin 2003)¹². The Brazilian sociologist Florestan Fernandes shows us how much the 1959 revolution was the result of the aborted independence process (Fernandes 1979). This is because, despite being liberated from Spain in 1898, the brutal intervention of the United States in Cuba, via the *Emenda Platt* (1901 to 1934), fostered the continuity of the emancipatory and nationalist struggle which had been dragging on since the mid-19th century. The 'Ten-year War' (1868-1878), the '*Guerra Chica*' [Little War] (1895-1898), the struggles against the dictators Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista, who were aligned with American interests, nurtured nationalist ideals and anti-American feelings which were the foundations of this revolutionary process. They were responsible for the support given by a large part of the population, and even sectors of the bourgeoisie, to the Revolution headed by the 'bearded men' - the guerrillas of the *Movimiento 26 de Julio*, between 1956 and 1959.

American investment in Cuba started in the 19th century and during the 1950s it became dominant. American control was felt in all sectors of the Cuban economy, particularly agriculture which was based on a very modern system of production. After January 1959, the 'revolutionary government' put in place measures which affected the interests of large industrial and agricultural groups such as United Fruit Co., oil refineries (Texaco, Esso) and other American companies. The government acted through interventions and expropriations based on Land Reform Legislation (17/05/59).

The United States retaliated through economic measures - cuts in sugar purchases and the suspension of credit to Cuban banks - and political

21 Nations Conference, in Buenos Aires, where he called for Latin American unity as a way out of economic under-development.

12 An excellent analysis of intellectual debates and controversies in the Cuban press is found in Miskulin (2003), revealing the specificities of this political process and its impact on culture.

strategies. From 1959, counter-revolutionary armed groups started to act in the Escambray region, funded by the CIA. These groups were supposedly trained by the same team who had played a part in the downfall of the Jacobo Arbenz government in 1954, in Guatemala, which now served as a support base for these operations, as well as for the air raids on Cuban sugar mills and Havana.

In 1960, there were great repercussions in Cuba, in relation to an episode similar to that which occurred with the *Maine* during the Spanish-American War: the criminal explosion of a French cargo ship *La Coubre* which was bringing arms and ammunitions from Belgium to Cuba. The government was quick to blame the United States for this action. This incident was followed by a wave of nationalizations during the second half of the 1960s, across all sectors of the economy, which led the United States to declare the first embargo against Cuba (19/10/60), reducing trade relations to the sale of medication and food.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken the following year (03/01/61), and the new president-elect, John Kennedy, maintained the economic embargo. These measures led Che Guevara, who was then Minister of Finances, to close deals with socialist countries in order to sustain Cuba's projects for diversifying agriculture and industrialization (Pericás 2004). The United States quickly reacted to this approximation, despite the fact that it denied this in its official discourse, as we will see.

Kennedy's policies were thus marked by significant contradictions. He claimed that the United States had not invaded Cuba and would not intervene in its internal affairs. However, the day after this declaration, there were air attacks on the main Cuban airports. During the funeral ceremony for the victims of the air raids, Fidel Castro declared that the Cuban regime would be guided by socialism.

The disparities between President Kennedy's declarations and the USA's activities would become more evident the following day, 17/04/61, when Playa Girón was attacked (the largest attack against the Cuban government) and 1500 counter-revolutionary soldiers landed on Cuban soil. The speed with which the *Exército Rebelde* (Rebel Army) and the *Milícias Revolucionárias* (Revolutionary Militias) reacted led to a rapid victory after sixty-two hours of combat. It was celebrated by Fidel as the first victory against American imperialism in the American Continent. The American defeat in Playa Girón

led to a change in its political strategy which prioritized Cuba's isolation in the Continent and involved drafting a new project to 'protect' Latin America from the communist threat. Isolation was also furthered at the economic level: on 25/04/61 the United States declared a total embargo against Cuba.

In addition to isolation, the 7th OAS Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs - which took place between the 16th and 28th August 1960 in San José, Costa Rica - condemned communist penetration in the Continent and the USSR's economic assistance to Cuba. This condemnation was justified by the argument that extra-continental intervention threatened the American Continent's security and solidarity. Fidel Castro's response to the 'San José Declaration' was the '1st Havana Declaration' in which he called on all Cuban citizens to take up arms to defend Cuba and socialism.

Thus, the United States employed diplomatic measures and intensified its actions, loans and investments in Latin America in response to the Cuban Revolution and the 'evil' ideological effects of its dissemination. The Kennedy government, taking on board the French experience of the Algerian War, launched a new strategy based on studies which sought to identify the 'morphology of revolutions' (Flores Pinel 1980, 66). This strategy presupposed the existence of an *internal enemy* against whom it was necessary to employ 'preventive counter-revolution' tactics (Fernandes 1979) through the activities of the Armed Forces. This preventive policy, also known as 'counter-insurgency', included anti-guerrilla training for Latin American Armed Forces at the so-called School of the Americas (1961), with headquarters in Panama. Whilst its objective was to technically enhance the capacity of Latin American officers and provide them with guidance for resolutely combating the 'communists', another institution, known as the Chicago School, became a crucial reference in the training of Latin American economic teams.

Measures which presupposed the availability of capital and the implementation of social projects sought to simultaneously gain the support of both national elites and the population, given that the American diagnosis for Latin America highlighted two serious issues as potential drivers of revolution: the lack of representative democracy and the high level of poverty. Thus, the liberal economic agenda encouraged Latin American governments to conduct privatization and there were various economic 'sponsoring' measures, strategies which had already been put in practice by Eisenhower's Pan-American policy. This policy was approved by the US Congress on 8/9/60

and 500 million dollars in aid were allocated to Latin America. This was further reinforced on 21/03/61 when John F. Kennedy launched the so-called Alliance for Progress. Its objective was to foster economic development plans and programs produced by Latin American governments aiming to reduce the problems caused by 'backwardness', such as poor income distribution, thus preventing revolutions breaking out.

Fernando Flores argues that the Alliance for Progress was the most ambitious project of American imperialism, as it set out a large number of reforms (such as price stabilization, fiscal reforms and the elimination of inflation). Nevertheless, given the unstable political scenario which predominated in Latin America, these measures had little effect (with the exception of cases in Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica). According to Flores, they depended on policies which supported the 'Alliance' and its capacity to neutralize opposition from the right, unhappy with reforms, as well as protests from the left, critical of the counter-revolutionary nature of the project (Flores Pinel 1980).

In January 1962, Cuba was expelled from the OAS, during the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este (Uruguay). The United States received the support of the other member-states to approve a resolution by allocating 1bn dollars through the Alliance for Progress. All Latin American countries present broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, except for Mexico, despite a number of abstentions during the vote on Cuba's expulsion from the OAS. In retaliation, on 04/02/62 Fidel announced the 'Second Declaration of Havana', an anti-imperialist document which also criticized the actions of Latin American bourgeoisies, encouraging the people of the continent to take up arms. In this document, the Cuban government defined the bases of its policies for *Latin American solidarity*, which from then on would be disseminated both politically and culturally.

In October of the same year the so-called 'Missile Crisis' occurred, the most significant Cold War event to take place in the American Continent. Despite apparent 'peaceful coexistence', the USSR government installed missiles in Cuba in retaliation to the presence of American missiles in Turkey and in response to Fidel Castro's requests. He alleged they were necessary to defend Cuba (Ayerbe 2004). The Soviet operation, which should have been secret, was very easily discovered by the United States, given that approximately 6000 Russians landed in Cuba, brought in 20 ships. The United States government, with OAS support, imposed a naval blockade on Cuba. In face of an

imminent war between the two powers, with the potential for nuclear weapon deployment, tense negotiations between Kennedy and Krushchev began. At the end of negotiations an agreement was signed, though Fidel Castro did not take part, and Soviet missiles were removed from Cuban territory. This agreement, which ensured that the USA would not mount military attacks on Cuba, took place without the actual participation of the Cuban government. They were hoping to condition the removal of missiles to the United States expulsion from the military base in Guantánamo and the repealing of the embargo. Fidel's exclusion from negotiations provoked political tensions between Cuba and the USSR, exacerbating existing divergences regarding the internationalist conception of the revolution as defended by the Cuban government in terms of guaranteeing its network of political support across Latin America.

After the missile crisis, USA-USSR political tensions began to ease off, a process which became known as the 'détente' (1969-1979), characterized by the establishment of agreements to restrict nuclear weapons and tests¹³. In the 1960s, the Cuban experience was one of the reasons the United States government made large sums of money available via military assistance programs, implemented by Kennedy and the then American Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara. Their purpose was to assist Latin American Armed Forces to conduct the 'fight against subversion' in order to guarantee 'internal security' in their countries. Thus, the United States reiterated an old disposition, in place since the 1940s, via the 'National Security Doctrine' (NSD). Claims were made about the existence of communist agents and 'subversive' elements infiltrated within all institutions of Latin American societies and it was the role of the military to find and combat them. To prevent the spread of subversion, it was suggested that the military should take control of the government in order to 'save' their countries and put them back on the capitalist track.

Using 'conspiracy theory' as a device, the NSD synthesized the anti-communist sentiment during the Cold War and showed the military the path to be followed: to fight against all and every internal enemy, whether 'terrorists commanded by the USSR', 'Cuban agents', or anonymous 'subversives'. These were all victims of a policy based on suspicion, within a so-called *rationale of suspicion*.¹⁴

13 On 'détente' see (McCormick 1989, 167-190).

14 Term used by Magalhães (1997, 203-220), see (Fico 2001).

In 1963, after Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson launched an even more aggressive anti-communist foreign policy. The line of policy pursued continued to receive the support of Latin American elites and sectors of society interested in ensuring political stability and benefitting from economic relations with 'Uncle Sam'. However, it met with greater resistance due to the radicalization of left-wing movements. Thus, Johnson's government strengthened its strategy in Latin America to encourage coups, to the detriment of the 'reforms' it had advocated in the Alliance for Progress project. Between March 1962 and June 1966 there were nine coup d'états in the Continent with the cooperation of the United States: Peru and Argentina (1962); Guatemala, Ecuador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic (1963); Brazil and Bolivia (1964); and, once again, Argentina (1966). Throughout the Nixon government and during the following decade, the policy of coups continued, with the inclusion of other countries: Bolivia (1971), and Uruguay and Chile (1973) (Capelato 2000, 309). The notorious Condor Operation emerged within this context. It was a partnership agreement introduced in 1975 between the military dictatorships in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia in order to exchange information on 'subversive' activities. This operation relied on the support of Condortel, a secret communication network which advised on joint activities deployed by these dictatorships, with the assistance of IAD intelligence (Inter-American Agency for Development) (Cezar Mariano 1998; Santos 1998).

Foreign capital inflow, repression and militarism were the hallmarks of many of these regimes, which were also characterized by swift presidential successions. The so-called 'merry-go-round of generals' in Argentina is a good example. Argentina had fifteen presidents between 1930 and 1976, eleven were military men and only two of those elected, both from the Armed Forces, were able to complete their mandate.

In response to this state of affairs, focuses of political resistance proliferated in civil society, providing us with an insight into a 'confrontation strategy' (Prado 2000, 374). Throughout the 1960s, many significant armed struggle movements emerged in Latin America: the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua; the guerrillas in Guatemala and in Tucuman in Argentina (1961); Farc in Colombia (1963); MIR in Peru (1965); *Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio* (14th June Revolutionary Movement) in the Dominican Republic; the Tupamaros (National Liberation Movement) in Uruguay (1968); the ALN (National Liberation Action) and the *Movimento*

Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (8th October Revolutionary Movement) in Brazil (1967 and 1968, respectively), amongst many other urban and rural guerrilla movements.

In the 1960s many of these organizations were inspired or encouraged by the Cuban government which proclaimed to be the '*el primer territorio libre de América*' [the first free territory in the Americas]. The first official project for 'exporting' the revolution came to the fore in January 1966, during the 'Tricontinental' meeting which took place in Havana. Its objective was to create a revolutionary International in the Third World, which was to be called Ospaaal - Organization for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Approximately 400 representatives of left-wing movements and parties took part. However, as a result of ideological and strategic differences, no agreement was reached to make the Cuban project viable.

A new attempt was made in August 1967, when the conference for setting up Olas - the Organization for Latin American Solidarity - took place. This event was much smaller (there were approximately 30 delegations) and there was greater selection on the part of the Cuban government. It prioritized movements which identified themselves with 'guevarismo', such as the Brazilian National Liberation Action (ALN), whose representative was Carlos Mariguella. Olas' banners were those which had been synthesized by Che Guevara in his 'Message to the Tricontinental' (Che Guevara 1967 In Lowy 1999): armed struggle (especially through rural guerrilla warfare), anti-imperialism and the internationalism of the socialist revolution. Cuba's willingness to lead movements in Latin America displeased the USSR and it gradually abandoned the country during the 1970s, after the worsening of its economic difficulties and increased dependency on the Socialist Bloc.

A new revolutionary 'wind' emerged in Chile and had no connection with 'guevarismo'. In 1970, the presidential victory of Salvador Allende, a candidate for Unidad Popular [Popular Unity], an organization which argued for a model of transition toward socialism by using the means available within the democratic regime, opened new utopian doors to the Latin American left. The guerrilla movements fell into disfavor with the apparent success of the so-called 'Chilean way', which meant that hope was now directed to what seemed to be an alternative to existing socialist regimes. However, this enthusiasm would not last long. The difficulties Allende found in carrying through the reforms he announced (such as nationalizations, educational

reform, controlling profit remittances), the impossibility of conciliating the interests of various sectors and political organizations through 'peaceful negotiation', in addition to the violent actions which were perpetrated against his government (boycott from the business sectors, sabotage, anti-communist campaigns) shortened an experiment which seemed promising. The coup headed by General Augusto Pinochet with the CIA's support resulted in the tragic death of Allende and the end of the Chilean dream, thus one of the most blood-thirsty Latin American military dictatorships was established (Verdugo 2001).

From the mid-1970s, during Jimmy Carter's government (1977-80), there was an interregnum in the United States' policy for supporting coups and military governments in Latin America. The adoption of a new foreign policy posture was related to the economic and political crisis which affected the United States at the beginning of the decade, forcing it to reduce the scope of its strategies. Within the context of the USA's defeat in Vietnam, the oil crisis (1973) and the Watergate scandal which led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon (1974), sectors of American society began to question the harsh consequences of their country's policies. Furthermore, debates about human rights and authoritarianism became part of the international agenda.

In this new scenario, the government of the United States resumed relations with China and promoted closer ties between Israel and Egypt. It also began to advocate a gradual and controlled transition to democracy in Latin America. Central America was also included in this search for formulas for conducting a careful 'modernization' of authoritarian regimes with a view to democratization. The Carter government saw this area as a safe place for its interests and investments. However, some countries which were chosen as targets for democratization became the stage for strong popular movements (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala). Maira (1980) sought to explain why Carter's democratizing policies failed in Central America. This author showed that they totally underestimated the existence of popular pressures, the political strength of extreme right organizations (visible during the Guatemalan elections in 1978) and the capacity of left-wing organizations for mobilization (such as in Nicaragua and El Salvador).

Thus, Maira argues that this 'calculation error' benefited the empowerment of left-wing movements, such as the one headed by the FMLN (the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation) in El Salvador, after a disastrous presidential campaign in 1977, and the Sandinista Revolution in

Nicaragua (1979), responsible for overthrowing the dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. These events, together with other political disappointments for the United States, such as the failure of democratic succession in Honduras in 1978 which surprisingly occurred within the United States' closest area of influence and led to a re-assessment of American foreign policy. Containing 'disorder' was conducted through hard-hitting strategies, such as intensive support to counter-revolutionaries (the anti-Sandinista guerrilla movement) assisted by a well-equipped military base in Honduras, economic embargos and funding provided to death squads (the paramilitaries in El Salvador).

Amongst these insurgency movements, the Sandinista Revolution had an enormous impact on the United States. Nicaragua, which up to that moment had been its faithful ally in Central America, was now patently becoming a threat to regional stability and there was potential for cooperation between Sandinista guerrillas and the FMLN. Furthermore, the tireless Sandinista struggle to overthrow the dictatorship before 1979 and its struggle to remain in office in the 1980s and implement its program of reforms counted on the solidarity of various Latin American and European governments (Tirado 1985). The profile of a revolution which called itself 'social' - different from both the Cuban and the Chilean revolution as it incorporated the bourgeoisie and defended plurality (because it was a front and not a party), a mixed economy (it did not reject capitalism) and direct democracy (Invernizzi 1985) - also helped to capture the sympathy of various governments, press organizations and other institutions. This state of affairs forced the United States to employ indirect strategies of attack instead of open military intervention.

The FSLN - the Sandinista Front for National Liberation - emerged in 1962 under the impact of the Cuban Revolution and gained enormous popular support during the 1970s. This support increased after the assassination of the liberal journalist Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in 1978, resulting in a new wave of revolts in the main cities. With the fall of Somoza Debayle the following year, a coalition government was formed with a Sandinista majority and headed by Daniel Ortega. A series of reforms were launched (nationalizations, land reforms, the organization of cooperatives, etc.) with a view to the economic recovery of the country. Opposition to these reforms from liberals and other sectors of society, in addition to intermittent fighting against the *contras*, the guerrilla groups supported by the United States, hindered economic stability, consequently contributing to the rise to power of liberal-conservative leaning parties. After a decade of heavy military and economic confrontations, the

Sandinistas left government in 1990, with the election of Violeta Chamorro, who was more liberal than her predecessors and who was seen with better eyes by the United States.

Social debilitation, lack of resources, the systematic destruction of the Nicaraguan economy and the slow political victory over the Sandinistas were the achievements of the strategy employed by President Ronald Reagan (1980-88), Carter's successor (Carothers 1991). In the war against the Nicaraguan 'bad example', the USA attacked agricultural cooperatives, planted mines in the country's ports, implemented economic embargos and other strategies which caused immeasurable damage to the population. Noam Chomsky went as far as saying that what had taken place in Central America during the 1980s could only be described as a slaughter (Chomsky 1996¹⁵).

Reverberating to the echo of the slogan 'America is back', Latin America was once again under the impact of the bellicose nature of the policies of the United States, despite the fact that the Middle East was now the main focus of its foreign policy. The American government pressured various countries who were in the eye of the foreign media, such as Brazil and Argentina, to gradually and safely bring military dictatorships (no longer convenient within the new global context) to an end. At the same time, the Americans were still capable of carrying out extremely violent actions such as the invasion of Grenada in 1983. This action culminated in the assassination of President Maurice Bishop who had put together a left-wing alliance in his government and had close relations with Cuba. This intervention and the struggle against Cuban troops who came to the support of the Grenada government seemed to act as a 'warning' that the United States would react very strongly to any armed threat to its 'national security'.

At the same time, the economic crisis in Mexico (1982) which then spread to various countries in the continent contributed toward increasing the economic and political 'vulnerability' of Latin America. This was the context in which the Malvinas/Falklands War took place (April to June 1982), after the invasion by Argentine troops of these islands which were within Argentine territory but occupied by the British since 1833. This war meant explicitly breaking the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - IATRA, given that the United States government, ignoring the letter of the Treaty, washed their hands of the situation and did not support the Argentine

15 See: (Lowenthal 1991, 231-236; McCormick 1989, 220-221).

military in defending their alleged territory. Indeed, the USA positively sided with the United Kingdom, contributing to a favorable outcome for the UK and the resignation of the Argentine President, General Leopoldo Galtieri (Meyer 2004). On the one hand, this posture revealed the unilateralism of the political commitment which IATRA apparently established. On the other hand, it fostered closer ties between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay in search of support which had been denied by the United States. Closer political and economic ties between Latin American countries became increasingly necessary during the following decade.

Caliban always on the alert: the doctrine of national insecurity

From the 1990s, USA strategies toward Latin America have been based on policies of economic stability (financial control of inflation) and political stability (supporting representative conservative democracies). In face of the creation of FTAA, the establishment of the Mercosur became indispensable, with the signing of the Asunción Treaty between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. The Latin American common market was the result of a drawn out process of negotiations between its member-states and it still acts very cautiously, particularly with regard to political matters.

However, the apparent 'lull' in USA-Latin America relations was broken because of actions such as the Plan Colombia, which foresaw the involvement of various countries (such as Brazil and Peru) in neutralizing the Colombian guerrilla movement and drug-trafficking, and due to impasses provoked by the government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela which has attracted considerable international attention. The former is seen as a type of old style 'coercion' which saw the light of day during anti-communist campaigns: the United States puts pressure on Latin American countries to employ their own resources to 'solve' a criminal and political issue which interferes in the financial affairs of the United States. The Chávez factor is now one of the main sources of tension between the USA and Latin America and there remain many unresolved questions. This political process is on-going after a troubled start: Hugo Chávez attempted a coup d'état, he was then elected president

with popular support, having resisted an attempted coup by his opponents. Chávez managed to institutionalize his reformist policies, although effective results - political, economic and social - require careful analysis.

According to Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, an expert in international relations, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 represented the consolidation of a new preventive warfare strategy for Latin America, marked by the current lack of differentiation between notions of internal security and external defense. This strategy is justified by what could be called a 'national insecurity doctrine', which emerged due to the proliferation of 'new threats' such as international terrorism, drug-trafficking and tyrannical governments in the possession of weapons of mass destruction (Tokatlian 2004). According to Tokatlian, the new condition of insecurity requires a more flexible strategy which would prevent drastic and violent actions from taking place in Latin America. Tokatlian demonstrates that, however, after September 11th, the American government began to consider two distinct areas in relation to its vital interests. The first is the so-called Caribbean Basin (Caribbean Islands, Panama, Central America and Mexico) which together with Canada make up the external defense perimeter of the United States and therefore is seen as an extension of its internal security. The other region stretches from Colombia to Argentina and despite being within a less important geo-political region, deserves attention because, according to the USA government, it is the site of two danger zones (Tokatlian 2004), the border between Colombia and Venezuela controlled by drug-traffickers and the Tri-Border region between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay which is considered a potential funding base for Islamic fundamentalism. Tokatlian argues that the actual space controlled by the United States has been extended. The USA's old 'Mare Nostrum' (the Caribbean Basin) has grown to include the largest South American oil triangle (Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador).

Given this very clear expansionist posture and the facility with which enemies, threats or 'dangers' are thrown into the category of 'current targets', it is difficult to gauge the true flexibility of the American strategy, as alleged by the author. Furthermore, as we have shown, the intermittent resurgence of variations of the Monroe Doctrine (Chomsky 1996) does not allow us to ignore the 'Big Brother of the North'.

However, we note that regardless of strategies, there are various examples which show that political, social and economic conflicts and insurrections have fortunately always been factors which complicate any recipe for domination.

For example, within the United States' so-called 'internal security' zone, Cuba (though under a deplorable authoritarian regime) continues to reveal the failures of American hegemony. Despite the current fragile situation Cuba finds itself in (economically impoverished, de-militarized, divided on the issue of regime continuity, among other serious problems) after the bankruptcy of the socialist bloc, the United States has not 'lowered its guard' in relation to its punitive foreign policy. Furthermore, it is significant that the old military base in Guantánamo, within Cuban territory, continues to be under American possession, holding foreign prisoners.

By focusing on USA strategies toward Latin America through time and following the innumerable transformations and oscillations in American foreign policy, it is inevitable that we observe many policies which remain in place or have been re-introduced. The re-election of President George W. Bush and the propaganda of the need for a 'war against evil' disseminated by the press, amongst other factors, reveal that the strategies employed by recent American foreign policy recover and renew the old mission propagated by its doctrine of 'Manifest Destiny'. While its condition as the world's 'beacon' has always been and remains strongly contested, even though so many of the 20th century's paradigms and utopias are in crisis, the USA continues to act as the world's policeman with the approval of a significant part of American society. This role and the complex relations the USA has with Latin American countries and other nations which are the target of its 'civilizing mission' are part of a contemporary history which is difficult to apprehend without judging each episode on its own merits. Instead of categorically interpreting the present or venturing a prognosis about the future, we prefer to leave these questions open in expectation of further research.

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Brazilian-American Joint Operations in World War II

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World War II produced great change in Brazil. Its war effort improved its port facilities, left it with new modern airfields from Belém to Rio de Janeiro, as well as refurbished railroads, stimulated manufacturing, agriculture, and mining, and a burgeoning steel complex. Its army, air force, and navy had gained combat experience and the latest equipment. Its foreign stature had reached new heights and its leaders foresaw an ever greater role in world politics. The war era laid the foundations upon which Brazil's remarkable development in the next half century took place.

In 1945, its then 40,000,000 people had many reasons to be proud of their country's contributions to the Allied victory. Brazil hosted, at Natal, the largest United States air base outside its own territory, and, at Recife, the U.S. Fourth Fleet; and it tied its economy to the American war machine, sent its navy in pursuit of German U-Boats and provided an expeditionary force and a fighter squadron on the Italian front. It allowed the construction of the air bases before it broke relations with the Axis at the Rio conference in January 1942, and the army lost personnel, equipment, and families before Brazil entered the war officially in August of that year.

Brazil chose the allied cause, even as it worked to obtain the greatest benefits from both Brazil's status during the war was different from that of its neighbors and its leaders then and since have expected the great powers

to understand that. They have often been disappointed when the powers, especially the United States, did not accord proper recognition. Policy makers in foreign capitals, in particular Washington, have frequently been puzzled by, what they considered to be Brazilians' pretensions. Their perplexity was perhaps feigned at times, because such recognition was not in harmony with their own policy objectives, but it is likely that often they were, like the world at large, ignorant of the history of Brazil's wartime roles.

The Brazilian leadership prior to the war had linked national development and security with international trade and finance, and that they were concerned not to endanger the country, but that internationally they saw themselves naturally on the side of the liberal powers, particularly the United States. Further there was agreement among key leaders that the dangers that afflicted the world also offered opportunities. Factions among the leadership developed as the world crisis deepened and opinions differed as to which side offered the most with the least danger. For some observers the internal debates took on ideological coloring that muddled their analyses.

Pre-War Struggle for Brazilian Markets, Resources, and Support

The failure of the world economy after the Wall Street Crash of 1929 led to intense competition among Britain, the United States, and Germany over access to Brazil's market and resources. This rivalry was especially important for the latter two countries, which had limited avenues into the vast colonial areas of Africa and Asia. The United States turned to Latin America using the famous Good Neighbor Policy and its companion reciprocal trade treaties as vehicles to increase commerce in order to stimulate the stagnated national economy. Germany's vehicle to achieve the same end was the compensation mark (*Aski*) system, a bi-lateral, blocked account arrangement that shut out third parties. Shortly after Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed the trade treaty (Feb.1935) with the Vargas government, the Brazilians made an agreement with Berlin to trade in the *Aski* system as well.

Washington's desire for liberal trade policies based on purchases in hard currencies was not matched in Rio de Janeiro or Berlin because both lacked

such currencies. Brazil needed its scant hard currency reserve to support the *Mil-réis* (*Cruzeiro* replaced it in 1942), pay off foreign bond holders, remit the profits of foreign companies, and finance purchases in the United States and other countries. To obtain dollars, for example, the Brazilians looked to the United States as the principal market for their coffee, which in the 1930s was facing growing competition from Central American, Colombian, and Venezuelan shippers. That was why Germany was so appealing; there Brazil could enlarge its exports and buy manufactures without spending hard currencies. The *Aski* system allowed the Germans to offer lower prices than their American or British competitors, indeed the prices were more favorable than those listed in Reichmarks. In 1938 Brazilian importers of German goods paid *Aski* mark prices that were 24 percent less than those in Reichmarks. In addition, Germans bought Brazilian cotton, wool, and fruits such as oranges, which the Americans did not want. And because Brazilian and American cotton competed directly in the German market, indeed American losses reportedly had reached \$20 million in 1935, (Hilton 1975, 140) the Brazilians believed that the Roosevelt administration's pleas for open trade were not as detached as the Americans professed.

The heart of the American-German conflict over the Brazilian market was that Brazil's *Aski*-based sales obligated it to buy German products that competed with American ones. In effect Brazilian competition cut into American cotton sales to Germany, while the *Aski*-system reduced American sales to Brazil. This aspect of the situation worried the Brazilians as well. By the mid-1930s, the Vargas government had greatly weakened Britain's long-time financial dominance over the economy and was attempting to create an economic relationship with the United States that would give the Brazilian economy access to American loans, investments, and markets while minimizing American influence. However, having enfeebled John Bull's hold, the Brazilians were anxious to avoid Uncle Sam's grip, and they did not want to give the Germans undue influence over their trade policies. Their idea was simple and direct, by multiplying the number of players they would increase their ability to maneuver among them. By expanding their markets and sources of supply the economy would be less dependent on a particular power and the political system would be less vulnerable to foreign penetration. They wanted to trade wherever possible, on whatever terms were agreeable; they were less troubled about trade mechanisms than about finding markets and selling goods. Their objective was economic independence, which they

saw as necessary to maintain political autonomy and to further economic development.

The Vargas government's skillful, clever and nationalist maneuvering built the foundation of today's robust industrial park. Back then, few thought that Brazil would become the eighth-ranked industrial economy in the world. The 1935-1945 period provided opportunities for Brazil to make great strides forward, and its leaders seized the chances with hard-headed determination. The tendency toward trade diversification, which so characterized Brazil's foreign trade in the 1990s, had its origins in the 1930s. Then, as now, it was a common-sense way of minimizing risky dependence. It was and is better to have more than one buyer and more than one supplier.

The difficulty for historians, of course, is that Nazi Germany was a major actor in this story and dealings with the Reich raise suspicions of sympathy and partisanship. Particularly because in November 1937, Vargas ended the constitutional, elected government that he had headed since 1934, and replaced it with the dictatorial *Estado Novo*. American diplomats and intelligence agents saw the street parades of the fascist-like, green-shirted *Integralistas* (although not related to the government and suppressed in March 1938), and the open admiration for the Germany army of the Brazilian officers who backed the dictatorship, as signs of Nazi influence. Truly, trade does not take place in an ideological vacuum, but it is well to recall that the United States government and American businesses were working hard to expand their own access to the German market.

In the twentieth century the Brazilian market has been important to Germany under all of its regimes -- imperial, Weimer, Nazi, occupied, two Germanys, and finally, reunified. In 1938, Brazil was the biggest non-European consumer of German products and ranked ninth among Germany's trading partners overall. And Brazil's relations with Germany have been qualitatively different than its relations with the United States because, like its North American partner, it received a large German immigration in the nineteenth century, which gave Germany an influential base from which to operate. The Americans lacked a similar base in Brazil; immigration from the United States having consisted of a few families of disgruntled Confederates.

With half a century of hindsight it is obvious that Germany=s trade was bolstering its preparations for war, but it should be equally obvious that Brazil=s leaders had no more idea than anyone else that Germany would soon

unleash the greatest war in history. The point is that until the war none of the future allies abstained from trade and other dealings with the Third Reich.¹

While Brazilian importers bought a wide-variety of products in Germany in 1938-1940, they could not do so rapidly enough to maintain a balanced exchange. Extensive German purchasing stimulated certain sectors of the economy, but caused the Bank of Brazil to amass a huge cache of *ASKI* marks. It was a delicate situation. In mid-1938 the bank found itself holding an access of 30 million *aski* marks and unofficially stopped authorizing exports against the *aski* account and insisted that Germany pay for cotton in hard currencies. The Germans threatened to buy elsewhere. If Berlin fulfilled its threat the producers of cotton, coffee, cacao, tobacco, rubber, wool, woods, tropical fruits, hides, butter, and iron ore would be seriously hurt. A few examples from 1938 will show the importance of Germany's trade to the Brazilian economy. Where coffee was Brazil's principal export to the United States, cotton was the leader in its trade with Germany. Germany imported 1,211,182 bales of raw cotton, of which 466,364 landed from Brazil, 200,170 from the United States, 136,953 from Egypt, and 407,695 from various other sources. And because the cotton lobby kept Brazilian fibers out of the American market, the Brazilian government was quite happy to see sales to Germany increase. Brazil sold Germany 41 percent (91,789,700 kilos) of the 197,419,700 kilos of coffee that it imported and Berlin was promising to reduce Colombia's and Venezuela's quotas. In cacao, Germany was Brazil's third-ranked market after the United States and the United Kingdom; it took 10,599 tons of the total 127,887 tons shipped abroad, thereby exciting exporters about this new market. In 1938, as well, 14 percent of Germany's tobacco came from Brazil. And rubber and wool producers were particularly interested in that market. Although wild rubber production was declining, of the 8,819 ton yield, fully 6,715 tons or 77 percent, went to the Reich. These figures had enormous importance for the weak Amazonian economy. Similarly wool producers had been pleased to sell Germany 88 percent of their 1936 shipments and 97 percent of their 1937 ones. When the percentage dipped to 40 in 1938 they were naturally alarmed. The Vargas government necessarily had to pay more attention to its citizens' interests than to the complaints of the United States about unfair trading practices. It gave into German desires to continue the *Aski* trade. Fortunately

1 It should be observed that highly detailed reports from the Brazilian embassy in Berlin located in the Arquivo Histórico do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Itamaraty Palace, Rio de Janeiro (AHMRE) are a largely untapped source on Germany before and during the early years of the war. They are especially useful because the Brazilian diplomats felt less directly threatened by the Nazi regime than did their European and American counterparts.

the trade pattern during 1938 had allowed the Brazilians to reduce their surplus of *Aski* marks to about 5,000,000. Trade between the two countries continued to be based on the system until the war brought it to an end.²

Washington provided credits to finance exports to Brazil without increasing Brazilian exports to the United States. American quotas for coffee and cacao, and exclusion of cotton, did not permit expansion, while Germany's system encouraged continuous expansion of Brazilian exports. The Brazilians interpreted American policies as intended to hold back the Brazilian economy. The United States sold more than it bought, demanded dealing in hard currencies, and extended loans and credits that could be used only for purchases in the American market. While it was not helping Brazil earn hard currencies, the Roosevelt administration protested that Brazil was not paying on its hard-currency bond issues and debts. The policy conflict was heightened by Washington's objections to Brazil's arms purchases in Germany made with mixed hard-currency and *Aski* marks. American refusal to sell arms because of congressional prohibitions against exporting them was difficult for the Brazilian military, then intent on modernization, to understand. In the mid-1930s Brazilian intelligence estimates pointed to the United States as a possible security threat, so American objections to purchases in Germany and refusal to sell aroused suspicion as well as irritation. [Moreover, the military was fearful of Argentine intentions and nervous that after Paraguay's mobilization for the Chaco War (1932-35) with Bolivia it could use its 77,000 man army to seek a more favorable definition of its boundary with Mato Grosso]. In addition officers worried about Nazi organizations among German immigrants in the southern states. As a result top military leaders were intimately involved in shaping trade policy. The

2 There is detailed documentation on the *Aski* trade in the AHMRE: see Carlos Alberto Gonçalves (2d Secretary), Memo: "O Intercâmbio de Alemanha com o Brasil," in Themistocles da Graça Aranha (Counselor of Embassy), Berlin, April 27, 1939, #152; Gonçalves, Memo: "O Cacao na Alemanha," in Graça Aranha, Berlin, August 9, 1939, #282; Gonçalves, Memo: "A Borracha no Mercado Alemão," in Graça Aranha, Berlin, June 20, 1939, #210; Gonçalves, Memo: "A Lã na Alemanha," in Cyro de Freitas Valle (Ambassador), Berlin, Sept. 9, 1939, #197, AHMRE. Typical of American views are those in Jefferson Caffery (U.S. Ambassador to Brazil), Rio, May 6, 1938, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1938*, V, 344-347; the importance that the Germans attached to trade can be seen in U.S. Dept. of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, V (Washington: GPO, 1949-), 863-864, 874-875, 880-882, 886-889, 891-893. (Hereafter *DGFP*) The Brazilian position was stated by Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha in Aranha to Sumner Welles, Rio, September 14, 1938, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha (AOA), Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação Histórica Contemporânea (CPDOC), Rio. McCann analyzed these issues more extensively in *A Aliança Brasil – Estados Unidos, 1937-1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1995), 148-175.

military also supported the idea of securing foreign assistance to develop a steel industry as the basis for future industrialization and independent arms production.

The United States did not apply strong economic pressures on Brazil to end the *Aski* trade. It was personally embarrassing for Secretary of State Cordell Hull to have the largest country in the Good Neighborhood undermining the reciprocal trade treaty system around which he had molded Washington's foreign policy. The State Department contented itself with hearing Brazilian leaders' constant protestations of loyalty to Pan American ideals and refrained from the strong actions necessary to bring the Brazilians to heel. The Americans accepted rhetoric over action because they wished to preserve the facade of a successful Good Neighbor policy, even though Brazil's participation in the *Aski* system was effectively a rejection of the principles of that policy.

As early as November 1938, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Mario de Pimentel Brandão advised Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha that "we have to decide: the United States or Germany."³ But Vargas saw Washington's worries about Germany and its desire to maintain a facade of Pan American unity and Germany's need for raw materials and markets as windfall sources of new leverage that he used to expand trade, obtain arms and assistance in building the Volta Redonda steel complex, all the while maintaining an internal political balance among the social, economic, and military groups supporting his *Estado Novo*. His government's policy was to avoid placing all of its eggs in one basket until it absolutely had to, so that, in the words of American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, it could "squeeze the maximum out of the United States on the one hand and the Fascist powers on the other."⁴

Brazilian trade with Germany flourished until the outbreak of hostilities and thereafter was shut off by the British naval blockade. As German armies triumphed in Europe, Berlin offered to increase its purchases in Brazil *after the war* from a pre-war annual average of 170 million Reichmarks to 300 million Reichmarks. It promised arms, railroad equipment, and a steel mill.⁵

3 Mario de Pimentel Brandão to Oswaldo Aranha, Washington, (November, 8), 1938, AOA, CPDOC.

4 Jefferson Caffery to Cordell Hull, Rio, April 22, 1939, 832.00/1255, RG59, National Archives (NA) Washington.

5 Auswärtiges Amt to Kurt Prüfer, Berlin, (July 10), 1940, *DGFP*, D, X, 177-178.

Everything depended on the outcome of the war and on Germany's postwar intentions. As conquest added new millions to Germany's economic sphere its importance as a post-war trading partner increased. But what if victory also brought Germany a colonial empire in tropical Africa that might one day supply the cacao, coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, rubber, woods, etc. that it now obtained in Brazil? German analysts predicted that eventually trade with Brazil would "undergo certain changes and a contraction." The Nazi government intended to invite German immigrants living in Brazil to move to the new colonies.⁶

From his post in Berlin, Brazilian Ambassador Cyro de Freitas Valle warned that the Reich's plans called for global spheres of influence based on "Europe for Berlin, the Americas for Washington and Oriental Asia for Tokyo." Russia would be the counter-balance to the United States.⁷ He thought that it would be better for the Germans to concentrate on winning the war rather than spinning such schemes, but it surely raised the question of where Brazil fitted into such a post-war world order. If a victorious Third Reich planned to leave Brazil in the American sphere of influence would not the South American republic's leaders be wise to solidify ties with the United States?

The Brazilians intelligently carried on simultaneous negotiations with Berlin and Washington seeking the best support for their plans to construct an industrial infrastructure. It is enough to say here that in September 1940, the Roosevelt administration came up with a funding package that did the trick (McCann 1995, 147-174; 1979, 59-76). Washington, not Berlin, provided the wherewithal to build the Volta Redonda steel mill which was both symbol and substance of Brazil's industrial coming of age (Wirth 1969).

Brazil's Path to Military Involvement

American willingness to commit financial, technical, and physical backing for Brazil's industrialization derived from more than concern over German

6 *DGFP*, D, IX, 499-501.

7 Cyro de Freitas Valle. 1940 AHMRE, Berlin, no. 238, (July 3).

trade proposals. Throughout 1940 Washington had grown steadily more alarmed at the European situation. With the fall of France, it took seriously the possibility that if Britain collapsed, Germany might launch an attack on the Western Hemisphere. Berlin did not have such plans but in mid-1940 anything seemed conceivable, and it was perhaps best to imagine the worst. In late May, reports of a pro-Nazi coup plot in Argentina and a British report of a possible German move against Brazil galvanized Washington. Roosevelt ordered the army to plan operation *Pot of Gold* that would rush a 100,000 man force to secure points from Belém to Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian army was decidedly cool to the idea of letting American troops into the country, and *Pot of Gold* did not go beyond the planning stage, but continuing conversations over the next two years led to permitting American naval and air bases.

Interestingly enough, though the steel mill agreement was crucial to close Brazilian-American ties, four days before the agreement was signed in Washington, on September 26, 1940, the Vargas government decided that in case of German aggression it would place all of Brazil's resources on the American side. And because it could not supply arms immediately, Washington showed its good will, and concern for its budding ally, by convincing the British to allow German arms destined for Brazil to pass through their naval blockade (McCann 1995a, 170-173).

The steel mill agreement linked Brazil irrevocably to the United States and firmed its attitudes toward Germany. The Brazilian government ended talks with Germany about post-war trade, tightened controls on German-subsidized newspapers, and allowed Pan-American Airways to fly overland from Belém to Rio de Janeiro, thereby shortening the trip from Miami from five to two days. As the two countries literally moved closer together, the United States now took up the Rio government's 1939 offer of bases in the northeast, including on Fernando de Noronha island.

Tied to the question of bases was that of civilian airlines. From late 1938 onward the American government worried about the possibility of Axis military bases being set up in the western hemisphere. Today we are more familiar with the limitations of air transport and with the difficulties of maintaining distant bases, but in the 1930s the sudden spurt of developments in aviation made the idea of Axis bases seem possible. After all were not a number of the private airlines in Latin America, including Brazil, the creation of German pilots and capital? Three government-controlled airlines linked Brazil to Europe: Lufthansa, the Italian Lati, and Air France. The latter

built the first landing strips at Natal and Salvador. Pan-American Airways connected Brazil to the United States via a coastal seaplane route. Lufthansa fully owned the oldest Brazilian airline Condor and held influential interest in Varig and Vasp. Pan-Am's subsidiary, Panair do Brasil, flew a number of internal routes and acted as a feeder for the parent's international flights. The outbreak of hostilities forced Lufthansa to end its operations and the fall of France in 1940 eliminated Air France. Lati filled the transoceanic gap, while inside Brazil Condor expanded its flights using German pilots and receiving equipment from blockade runners. Washington wanted German influence eliminated from Varig, Vasp, and Condor and offered inducements of aircraft, financial credits, and technical assistance. In the second half of 1941 Varig and Vasp fired its German personnel. But Condor was more of a problem. The Vargas government and its military aviation officials regarded Condor as a pioneer that had opened valuable routes through the vast interior and were unwilling to agree to American demands that it be grounded because of its German ties. Only after Brazil entered the war in August 1942 did the government act to liquidate Condor's financial links to Lufthansa. Reorganized as *Serviços Aéreos Cruzeiro do Sul*, the United States removed it from the black list (McCann 1968, 35-40).

As for a grand-scale aerial attack or invasion, the hemisphere's one accessible point seemed to be the northeastern tip of Brazil, which was closer to French West Africa than to the nearest of the Antilles. The region was undefended, beyond the range of American aircraft in the Caribbean, and inaccessible by land to the Brazilian forces concentrated in the south. In November 1940, to secure the Brazilian bulge the United States Army negotiated a secret agreement with Pan-American Airways to build two chains of airfields from North America to the northeast. In January 1941, Vargas gave verbal authority for Panair do Brasil to undertake Airport Development Program (ADP) construction at points such as Belem, Fortaleza, Natal, Recife, Maceió, and Salvador. However, because important military figures as yet were unwilling to throw themselves into the arms of the Americans, he delayed issuing a formal decree until July 1941. During that six-month period General Erwin Rommel's tanks were sweeping across North Africa, and Natal became key to the supply of the beleaguered British forces. In mid-1941, Pan-Am set up a dummy corporation, Atlantic Airways Ltd., to ferry aircraft to the British. Because both the United States and Brazil were still neutral, American air corps pilots could not fly outside the country, and Brazil could not allow belligerent crews to man the planes through its airspace. As it was, the first

flight of ten aircraft involved some embarrassment for Brazilian neutrality because their registry was changed to British before they reached Brazil, and the planes carried American pilots and British navigators familiarizing themselves with the route. If the Brazilians had not cooperated it is very possible that the United States would have occupied the area forcibly, as the drawing up of the earlier *Pot of Gold* plan would suggest. Not surprisingly, Brazilian leaders were reluctant to allow large numbers of American troops to garrison the airfields. Eventually such problems were amicably resolved, and the huge Parnamirim field at Natal became the focal point in the allied air transport system that ran west then north through Belém and the Guyanas, across the Caribbean to Miami, and east over the Atlantic via Ascension Island and across Africa to the China-Burma-India theater. As traffic intensified so too did Brazilian willingness to give the Americans more control over the bases.

Without Natal serving as the “trampoline to victory” the Allied supply problems of 1942 and 1943 might have been insurmountable. If Vargas and the Brazilian military had not cooperated the United States might have used force, which would have likely caused serious and prolonged fighting in Brazil and would have certainly shattered Pan American unity. So Brazilian cooperation was important to the allied victory. Considering Brazil’s contribution to the war effort, it is well to recall that six months before Pearl Harbor and fourteen months before Brazil was in the war, the ADP fields were part of the allied supply system and the anti-submarine campaign (McCann 1995a, 175-194).⁸

Parallel with the airbase development, the U. S. Navy’s South Atlantic Force (in March 1943 raised to the Fourth Fleet) under Vice-Admiral Jonas H. Ingram began operating in Brazilian waters in late 1941 after Pearl Harbor. The Germans responded to the above activities and to Brazil’s break in diplomatic relations at the Rio Conference in January 1942, with submarine attacks on Brazilian merchant ships. In February and March, four vessels went down off the coast of the United States. Nearly the entire Brazilian commercial fleet was circulating between Brazil and the northern republic. Vargas demanded that the United States provide naval convoys and arms for his merchantmen

8 Readers will find interesting a contemporary account William A. M. Burden. 1943. *The Struggle for Airways in Latin America*. New York: Council On Foreign Relations and the U.S. Army’s official history, Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild. 1960. *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army. Researchers will want to consult the manuscript “Official History of the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command,” in the army’s Center for Military History in Washington.

or he would embargo them. He took that drastic step in April 1942, but later that month he met with Admiral Ingram to discuss protection for Brazilian vessels. He so liked and trusted Ingram that, calling him his "Sea Lord," he made him his secret naval advisor, and opened all ports, repair facilities, and airfields to the American navy, and ordered Brazilian air and naval forces to operate according to Ingram's recommendations. The American admiral was thereafter responsible for Brazil's seaward defenses.

This arrangement was in the old tradition of American naval commanders, who in the last century had often worked out their own basing and operations. It was negotiated without the prior knowledge of other officials on either side. With the army generals giving top priority to defense in the south along the Argentine border, Vargas acted to forestall Axis naval attacks. This secret pact between the two men did more to protect Brazil and to solidify military cooperation than any other action of the two governments. Vargas' "Sea Lord" sent the president reports and used his direct line to him to request his intervention in various situations. Thereby the U.S. Navy had a level of access to the Brazilian president that the U.S. Army did not have.

In May 1942 the German navy stepped up its submarine campaign and four more Brazilian vessels went to the bottom. On June 16, Hitler ordered a submarine blitz against Brazil, believing that its cooperation with the United States indicated that it was not neutral but in a state of war. Ten submarines left French ports for the South Atlantic. The ensuing campaign saw the tally of sunken Brazilian vessels increase. As the ships went down public demonstrations in favor of the allies became frequent.

Meanwhile, resistance against going farther with the United States also stepped up. Unfortunately, on May 1 Vargas was seriously injured in an automobile accident, suffering a broken jaw and a dislocated hip. Pro-Axis agitators whispered that he was no longer capable of governing. In May a military-political agreement with the United States established a secret alliance, but with Vargas in bed little was done to fulfill its commitments. After losing two of its ships to German torpedoes, Mexico declared war, increasing the pressure on Brazil, which at that point had lost eight ships. In late June German forces poured into the Soviet Union, emboldening the pro-Axis elements to claim that the Reich's military was invincible. A plot to depose Vargas developed among high-ranking officers, who warned him not to identify himself any closer with the Americans. This was counteracted

with changes in the command of the Rio police and by American response to Brazilian losses.

The United States by this time was counting on the Lend-Lease⁹ program to keep the Brazilians happy with shipments of arms and equipment, but because of the German submarines it was having difficulty delivering the goods. Ultimately, Lend-Lease would help turn Brazil into the principal military power of South America, but in 1942 it was a problem of getting started. The three-way relationship among Brazil, Argentina, and the United States was also a worry. The Brazilians wanted a total commitment from Washington to stand with them if Argentina attacked; the Americans were willing to support Brazil only if such aggression was “sympathetic to, or instigated by, the Axis powers.”¹⁰ The Roosevelt administration wanted to tighten its friendship with Brazil without completely alienating Argentina. In 1943 their positions would be reversed. The Americans frequently had difficulty understanding Brazilian fears of a possible Argentine attack. They seemed unaware that American intelligence reports had been saying for a couple of decades that this was a basic Brazilian security worry. Perhaps such reports did not get read by the correct people?

By mid-August 1942, the ten German U-boats went into action against coastal shipping, attacking in quick succession six vessels off Sergipe and Bahia. In five days the Germans cut maritime communications with the northeast, and succeeded in doing what diplomacy had been able to do only superficially, namely uniting Brazil against them. One ship, the Baependi went down with two-hundred and fifty soldiers and seven officers, along with two artillery batteries and other equipment. The army cried for revenge. Another vessel filled with pilgrims sank en route to a Eucharistic Congress in São Paulo. The patient Brazilians erupted in a wave of revulsion, as city after city saw anti-Axis demonstrations and violence. Roosevelt sent submarine chasers for the Brazilian navy and instructed the embassy to buy unexportable surpluses of coffee, cacao, and Brazil nuts. In the streets Brazilians burned

9 Lend Lease was an American Government Program conceived to help Great Britain (it was later extended to other Allied nations (USSR, China, Free France, Brazil), obtain war materials. The program was enacted on March 11, 1941 and remained in force until August 1945. It allowed the acquisition of weapons, equipment and military supplies through purchase, transfer, exchange or lease to any country that the president considered vital to the defense of the United States. The cost was originally estimated at \$ 7 billion, but by the end of the war it had reached \$ 50,226,845,387. Cf: Langer and Gleason, 1953: 419-422

10 Sumner Welles (Under-Secretary of State) to Norman Armour (U.S. Ambassador to Argentina), Washington, July 7, 1942, 832.20/418, RG-59, NA.

Axis flags and chanted “We want war!” On August 22, the president’s cabinet approved a declaration saying that a state of war existed with the Axis.

The decision for war rallied domestic opponents around the Vargas regime, put pressure on the neighboring countries to reconsider their own positions, and further weakened ties to Europe and tightened them with the United States. Prior to August 1942, Brazil had gone well beyond benevolent neutrality in favor of the United States. As noted above, before the Japanese attack had forced the Americans into the conflict, Brazil had helped the United States Navy to replenish its warships, had cooperated in the anti-submarine campaign, and had allowed construction of military air bases and the flight of war planes through its air space. It is incorrect to say that unwarranted German aggression compelled Brazil to become a belligerent. Vargas’ policies were unfolding to their logical conclusion. Brazil had embarked on the path to war when Vargas permitted the Airport Development Program to start construction. Recall that he gave oral permission on January 19, 1941, nine days before approving the break in relations with the Axis.¹¹ However, weighing domestic doubts about, and resistance to joining the allies, if the Germans had not attacked it is possible that Brazil would have delayed action and might well have experienced political turbulence akin to that which afflicted Argentina. The attack stimulated public support for mobilization, and for unreserved alignment with the Allies to the point of sending troops to Europe.

In early September 1942, the degree of Brazilian commitment was indicated when Vargas gave American Admiral Ingram full authority over Brazilian navy and air forces, and complete responsibility for the defense of the long Brazilian coastline. As naval historian Samuel E. Morison declared Brazil’s entry into the war was “an event of great importance in naval history.” Without Brazilian participation it would have been impossible to shut the “Atlantic Narrows” to Axis blockade-runners (Morison 1964, 376)¹². The

11 Cauby C. Araujo, the general counsel and later president of Panair do Brasil, carried on these negotiations and organized the construction program. Details came from an interview with him in Rio, Oct. 4, 1965. For description of the session at the Jan. 1942 Rio Conference at which Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha announced the break see *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio), Jan.29, 1942; and for the speech see the Brazilian “Green Book”: Ministerio das Relações Exteriores. 1944. *O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*. 2 vols. Rio de Janeiro: MRE. Aranha later discussed the situation in his letter to Sumner Welles, Vargem Alegre, May 24, 1945, AOA, CPDOC. For a fuller discussion see my *A Aliança Brasil – Estados Unidos, 184-185*, 205-206.

12 For the Brazilian navy see Dino Willy Cozza (1994, 64-66); Campbell (1994, 71-77). Campbell provides a listing and data on the ships sunk.

Brazilian confidence in the American navy did not extend to the American army. Brazilian naval officers had served on American warships in World War I and since the early 1920s the United States had a naval mission working with the Brazilian navy. The Brazilian army had sent officers to train in Germany from 1906 to 1912 and had hosted a French military mission from 1919 to 1939. Only in the mid-1930s had it begun to develop links with its American counterpart in the limited areas of coastal artillery and health services. Moreover, the army had come apart in the Revolution of 1930 and was not a well-trained and equipped force in 1942. Indeed, in the strategic region from Belém to Salvador it then had only 18,600 troops with a scant fifty-two guns larger than .30 calibers. So it was slow to allow the American army to expand its ferrying activities or establish headquarters on their soil. Much to its chagrin the American army was able to do both things only by navigating in Admiral Ingram's diplomatic wake. By the end of the year, the United States army had located its South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command at Natal and the United States Armed Forces, South Atlantic, at Recife, where Ingram's Fourth U.S. Fleet was also based.¹³

Some American officials, such as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, could not believe that Vargas was serious about giving Ingram operational command of Brazil's coastal defense forces. Ingram had to threaten to resign to convince the secretary that it was not some sort of Brazilian trick.¹⁴ The American and Brazilian leaders looked at military cooperation differently. Once committed to the war, the Brazilians wanted respect even while recognizing that theirs was the weaker side of the relationship. The Americans tended to think that no self-respecting country would place its forces under foreign command. Likely Vargas would not have taken such a step if he had understood American attitudes better. He knew that Brazil was weak, but in the manner of a "patron," he believed that the weak should seek the shadow of the strong, and that the strong had a duty to protect the weak. Probably too, he knew that his army had not yet drawn up its war plans and that it was about to enter a type of warfare that its officers had only read about.¹⁵ Vargas understood that

13 For troop strength and contemporary discussion see "Official History of the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command" (in Center for Military History, Washington), Part II, IV, 82; General Eurico G. Dutra (Minister of War) to Ministers of State, Rio, Sept. (n.d.) 1942, AGV, CPDOC.

14 U.S. Navy, "Commander South Atlantic Force, United States Naval Administration in World War II." Copy in U.S. Navy Library, Washington. The author of this was historian Charles Nowell, then in navy service, who was later at the University of Illinois.

15 On the war plans see Chief of Staff General Pedro de Góes Monteiro's account in Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe* (Coutinho 1956, 382-384).

the Americans would levy a price for their protection but, because it was in the national interest of the United States to have Brazil securely at its side, he believed that he could keep the accounts relatively balanced. Even as he placed Brazil's defense in American hands, he put pressure on Washington to keep the work on the Volta Redonda steel mill moving forward.¹⁶ He did not let the war distract him from the basic goals of industrializing the country and of arming the military.

Brazilian Wartime Economy

The war brought an almost immediate improvement in Brazil's international trade status. Even though cut off from most of continental Europe, its exports elsewhere rose dramatically. An increasingly favorable balance of trade gave Brazil large hard currency reserves for the first time since the Great Depression. Its 1942 exports were valued about \$388,000,000, giving it a surplus of \$148,000,000, more than double the 1941 figure. At the end of 1942 it held gold reserves of \$121,000,000 compared to \$40,000,000 in 1939. Its textile factories especially were finding ready customers in Argentina and South Africa. Various sectors of the economy responded to the stimulus of domestic demand caused by the sudden inability to import foreign manufactures. The American publication *Business Week* proclaimed that "... there is no question but what Brazil has the biggest potential of any nation in Latin America." The war benefitted Brazil financially and at the same time increased the political clout of industrial workers and their unions. Vargas used the onset of war to broaden popular support for the regime, promising better protection for workers. Almost inconspicuously, government authorities began using *Estado Nacional* in place of *Estado Novo*.¹⁷

16 Alzira Vargas to Carlos Martins (Brazilian ambassador to the U.S.), Rio, Sept. 28, 1942, AGV, CPDOC. She told him that "O Patrão" said to tell the Americans that "the steel mill can not stop." It was "essential for Brazil."

17 "Brazilian Trends", *The Inter-American Monthly*, II, No. 7 (July 1943), 43-44; "Brazil -- A 20-Year Boost" 1942, *Business Week* (November 18), 18; Vargas speech entitled "O Primeiro Lustrado do Estado Nacional", 1942 (November 10), in Getúlio Vargas 1938-47, *A Nova Política do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), IX, 311-317; Jefferson Caffery, 1942 (U.S. Ambassador to Brazil), Rio, (November 6), 832.00/4314, RG-59, NA.

When Brazil entered the war, it was an economic dependency of the allies. Of the \$2,242,200,000 foreign investment, the British held 48 percent, the Americans 25 percent, the Canadians 18 percent, and a mix of others 9 percent. Foreigners controlled street car lines, electric power, coal and oil importation, much of the flour milling, all of cement production, many of the tugs and barges in Rio's harbor, and telegraphic communications with the rest of the world. A British company had owned the sewers of the older parts of Rio since 1857. Many of the movie theaters in big cities were owned by Paramount, R.K.O., and Twentieth Century-Fox, who actively discouraged development of the national cinema industry. Newspapers received subsidies from foreign embassies, the news wire services were foreign -- Associated Press, United Press, Reuters, and the German Trans-Oceanic -- and all newsprint was imported. The air force's aircraft came from abroad, as did the army's heavy weapons, equipment, and 50 percent of expendable ordnance. Moreover, because a high proportion of inter-state commerce traveled by sea, rather than overland, the economy was overly exposed to potential collapse due to well-aimed torpedoes.¹⁸

The war highlighted Brazil's dependency on foreign investments, imports, and markets, but it also offered a unique occasion to construct an infrastructure that would allow nationally-controlled economic development. With Europe occupied by Nazi legions and Britain weakened, Brazil was more dependent on the United States. No longer able to juggle European and American interests it now bargained comprehensively with Washington. Clearly this potentially threatened national sovereignty, but Brazil had the distinct advantage that the United States desperately needed certain Brazilian products and the strategically important air and naval bases. Brazil was then the sole source, for example, of quartz crystals used in military communications equipment. The American war factories also needed Brazilian iron ore, rubber, chrome, manganese, nickel, bauxite, tungsten, industrial diamonds, and thorium-rich monazite sands (this last used in atomic energy research). The Brazilians, therefore, held some important cards and their president was a good poker player. They negotiated guaranteed price agreements with the United States that for the first time assured Brazil of a consistent return on its exports. Moreover, Washington wanted to reduce Brazilian dependency on American goods because its

18 U.S. War Department, "Survey of the Rio de Janeiro Region of Brazil," (S 30-772), Aug. 6, 1942, Vol I; "Survey of the Parana Region of Brazil," (S 30-770), June 6, 1941, Vol. I.

factories were straining to supply the allied forces and it required its overburdened shipping for other missions. It encouraged import substitution and the improving of internal transportation. The war was an opportunity for Brazil to move toward development, and, until 1944, the United States had the motivation to assist.

One of the results of this scenario was the late 1942 American Technical Mission, headed by Morris Llewellyn Cooke, a respected New Deal administrator, and composed of a chemical engineer, an economist, an industrial relations specialist, a geologist, a lawyer, and fuel, power, metallurgical, transportation, and production technicians. These experts worked with a highly talented and well-connected Brazilian team to draw up a comprehensive set of recommendations that sought to satisfy both the immediate demands of wartime and long-range growth with a carefully drawn development program that employed electrical power, light metals, and the airplane to substitute coal, steel, heavy industry, and railroads. The joint report made proposals related to such diverse subjects as cargo planes and gliders, land transportation, fuel, petroleum, electric energy, textiles, paper, mining, metallurgy, the chemical industry, commercial associations, food production, markets and prices, education, translation of books into Portuguese, industrial financing and sources of credit, manufacture of electrical equipment, economic mobilization, and regional development planning. The Cooke Mission's work, combined with the activities of the Rubber Reserve Company in Amazonia, the Basic Economy Program to improve food supply, health and sanitation in the northeast, and the wide-ranging projects of Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs created a revolution of rising expectations that caused Brazilians to think that the oft-predicted era of future greatness was about to dawn. An example of the startling proposals that came out of the wartime emergency was one to build an elaborate system of canals, railroads, and highways through the interior of South America linking the Orinoco, Amazonian, and Rio de La Plata river systems. Once the Allies had neutralized the submarine threat in the Atlantic the idea was filed in the archives. United States officials stimulated the belief that industrialization, electrification, increased trade, housing, and education would be among the immediate consequences of allied victory. Post-war relations would be soured by the rapid decline of American interest in such expensive

ventures in peacetime (MORRIS, 1944)¹⁹. But even if all the dreams did not become real, the wartime centralized planning set a powerful example that influenced post-war economic development efforts.

The wartime economic boom was somewhat limited geographically to the south-central region, with the greatest impacts being felt in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The urban working class expanded apace with the increase in factories. In 1945 about 2,000,000 could be classified as urban workers (about 15 percent) out of the approximately 14,000,000 salaried employees in the 40,000,000 plus population. Two decades before manufacturing had been limited largely to textiles and food and beverage processing. By 1945, some 70,000 small and medium-sized factories, employed more than 50 percent (1,100,000) of urban workers, who were producing, in addition to textiles, food, and drink, metal goods, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cement, tires, and assembled vehicles. The growing government agencies employed a considerable number of white-collar workers. But the bulk of the working population, two-thirds of it, was still found in rural areas in agriculture, stock raising, and collection of rubber, nuts, and *herva mate*²⁰. As industrialization stepped up its pace after the war it would cause a huge rural to urban migration that would make Brazil a half-century later a highly urbanized country.

Brazil's War Aims

By late 1942, Brazil was securely in the American camp and its army officers were talking about committing combat troops. Oddly, after having been pursued since 1938, the Brazilians now found that the cadence and direction of the dance had shifted, they now had to hurry after the Americans, whose concern for Brazil declined as the Germans were driven back across North Africa. At the start of 1942 northeast Brazil had stood

19 Morris Cooke and João Alberto Lins de Barros to F.D. Roosevelt and G. Vargas, n.p., Dec. 1, 1942, Cooke Papers, 0283; Basic Economy Report, 1942-43, Box 1, OF 4512; on the interior canal system see Berent Friele to Cooke, n.p., Nov.28, 1942, Cooke Papers, 0283, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL), Hyde Park, N.Y

20 For a discussion of these changes and their effects on politics see Bethell (1992, 40-41).

on the front lines, but as 1943 opened it was a rear area trampoline that bounced personnel and supplies to where the action was. Brazil's leaders saw that in order to benefit from the war the country could not content itself with providing raw materials, pass-through bases, and diplomatic support, Brazil had to make the blood sacrifice. It also had to clarify its objectives so that it could better coordinate the multiple agencies that were working with the allies.

The architect of the alliance with the United States, Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha, penned an analysis of Brazil's international situation for President Vargas on the eve of his secret meeting with President Roosevelt at Natal on January 28, 1943. This statement is one of the most important documents in the history of Brazil. Aranha advised his old friend that the traditional policy of "supporting the United States in the world in exchange for its support in South America," should be maintained "until the victory of American arms in the war and until the victory and consolidation of American ideals in the peace." The United States would lead the world when peace was restored and it would be a grave error for Brazil not to be at its side. Both nations were "cosmic and universal," with continental and global futures. Aranha knew that Brazil was yet "a weak country economically and militarily," but its natural growth, or post-war migration, would give it the capital and population that would make it "inevitably one of the great economic and political powers of the world." He advised against frightening badly needed American and British capital with overly nationalistic economic policies.

Brazilians should, he wrote, accept the difficult war economy without restraint, so that by "ceding in war" they would "gain in peacetime" reciprocal arrangements of mutual benefit. Postwar economic policies should seek liberalization of international trade, the deepening of American collaboration with the "Vargas program" of industrialization, and the free movement of capital and immigrants to Brazil. He urged intimate contact between the two countries and continuous exchanges of views at the ministerial level. They should prepare the military for combat, because "this preparation by itself, without our being called to battle, will be counted as one or more victories at the peace table." Brazil should adhere to the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration, and it should join the United Nations study committees, and seek a place in the allied supreme military councils.

Brazil should also be attentive to the future of European colonies and mandates, especially Portuguese ones and the Guyanas. If the Portuguese empire collapsed, Brazil should demand Washington's backing for the "defense of a patrimony that is hereditarily Brazilian." All European colonies in the Western Hemisphere should either be given independence or absorbed by neighboring states. Brazil must play a key role in this process. It should particularly express its interest in French Guiana because of its importance for the security of the Amazon region. And given Africa's relevance for Brazilian security, Brazil should demand a voice in the future of the continent.

He ended with eleven policy objectives that Brazil should pursue:

- 1) a better position in world politics;
- 2) consolidation of its superiority in South America;
- 3) a more secure and intimate cooperation with the United States;
- 4) greater influence over Portugal and its possessions;
- 5) development of maritime power;
- 6) development of air power;
- 7) development of heavy industries;
- 8) creation of war industries;
- 9) creation of industries -- agricultural, extractive, and light mineral -- complementary to those of the United States and essential for world reconstruction;
- 10) expansion of Brazil's railways and highways for economic and strategic purposes;
- 11) exploration for essential combustible fuels.

This list reads like a summary of Brazilian foreign and domestic policy of the next decades. Aranha was aware that close collaboration with the United States could be dangerous, but, as he commented to Minister of War General Eurico Dutra, Brazil was at the mercy of more powerful nations and unless it had a mighty ally "the future of Brazil will be everyone's, except the Brazilians"²¹.

21 Aranha to Vargas, Rio, Jan.25, 1943; Aranha to Dutra, Rio, Aug.11, 1943, AOA, CPDOC.

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force

At the Natal meeting Roosevelt encouraged the idea of Brazil committing troops telling Vargas that he wanted him with him at the peace table. If Brazil sent its soldiers to fight it could legitimately claim a larger role in postwar restructuring of the world. After the first war, in which it was an ally but without a combat role, it played a minor part at the conference, and although active in the League of Nations, it had resigned in frustration at not obtaining a permanent council seat in 1926. In addition to international reasons Vargas likely thought that distracting the army with a foreign campaign would give him some political space in which to develop a populist base with which to preserve the gains of the freshly labeled *Estado Nacional*. The dictatorship's opponents quickly regarded a combat role as guarantee that the regime would not outlast the war. They asserted that Brazilians could not fight against tyranny overseas and return to live under it at home.

Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha saw the war and an expeditionary force as a way to expand Brazil's historic cooperation with the United States into "a true alliance of destinies." That policy of cooperation had been, Aranha noted, "a source of security" for Brazil, that by giving the United States assurance of Brazil's support in international questions, Brazil could "count on them in [South] American ones." The FEB would, in his view, convince the Americans that Brazil was committed to an alliance "materially, morally, and militarily." The alliance was his strategy for gaining United States assistance in Brazilian industrialization, which he saw as "the first defense against external and internal danger." He argued that the FEB was the start of a wider collaboration involving Brazil's total military reorganization. Moreover, he did not believe that they could restrict themselves solely to an expeditionary force if they wanted to insure American involvement in other Brazilian military matters, such as development of the navy and air force, and defense of Southern Brazil. Looking ahead, he believed that Brazil would have to keep its forces mobilized for sometime after the peace to help maintain the post-war order. In a cabinet meeting he asserted that they should work to convince the Americans that "having chosen the road to follow and our

companions for the journey we will not alter our course or hesitate in our steps”²²

For some Brazilian officers, especially the Escola Militar graduates of the Class of 1917, committing troops would vindicate their not having fought in World War I, it would also revenge the deaths of friends and colleagues killed in Axis submarine attacks, and, perhaps more importantly, it would increase the army’s and air force’s effective strength and ability to deal with various contingencies. Among the latter were the strong United States military and naval bases in Northeast Brazil, which the Brazilians wanted to insure that the Americans would vacate after the war; the German immigrant populations in Southern Brazil, which they wanted to be able to control; and, the ever present fear of Argentina, which was then under a military regime. But the army was not about to ship overseas and trust that all would be well at home or on the frontiers. Its leaders were particularly concerned about Argentina. In July 1943, Minister of War Dutra declared that whatever number of troops went abroad, he wanted an equivalent force left in Brazil “to guarantee sovereignty and the maintenance of order and tranquility here.” Clearly, the home front had to be secure, but to achieve that objective Brazilian leaders would have to pry sufficient weapons from the Americans, who then were struggling to arm their own troops and to produce arms for the allies. The Brazilian government decided that it would have to send troops to the battlefields.

Washington favored the idea because if the largest Latin American country fought with the Allies it would enhance the image of the United States as leader of the hemisphere. The Roosevelt administration also hoped that it would make Brazil a pro-American bulwark in South America. Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw Brazil as a counterweight to Argentina. Both the Brazilians and the Americans adroitly played on the other’s worries about Argentina to bolster their policy goals. But, of course, the closer Brazil and the United States became, the more nervous grew the Argentines (Newton 1992, 299)²³.

22 Oswaldo Aranha to Eurico Dutra (Minister of War), Rio, Aug. 11, 1943, AOA, CPDOC. He wrote this to Dutra who was visiting the U.S. to negotiate details of the FEB. He admitted that such a close alliance carried dangers potentially incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty and interests, but that it was the course with the fewest risks and greatest security. It was a lesser evil and they would have to be constantly vigilant to avoid pitfalls.

23 He notes that the U.S. “artfully generated” the Argentine “alarms of war with Brazil” which were increasing in “frequency and intensity” in 1943. For Brazilian views of Argentina see Frank (1979, 45-60).

Some American army leaders were reluctant to accept the Brazilian offer of troops. Their willingness to accommodate the Brazilians was in direct proportion to what they wanted from them. By the end of 1942 the army had its Brazilian air bases and related supply lines through them to North Africa, so why worry about the Brazilians? A debate took place in American military and diplomatic circles over the merits of accepting or deflecting Brazilian desires. Earlier in 1942 the two governments considered a Brazilian occupation of French and Dutch Guiana and, at Natal (Jan. 1943) Roosevelt suggested to Vargas that Brazil replace Portugal's troops in the Azores and Madeira so that the Portuguese could reinforce their home defenses. Nothing came of these talks, but after the Natal Conference, it was not if Brazil would fight, but where? In mid-April 1943, the Brazilian military representative in Washington, General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, told Chief of Staff George Marshall that Brazil wanted to form a three or four division expeditionary Corps, and in May the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the idea (McCann 1995a, 349-353).

It is important to emphasize that the expeditionary force was a Brazilian idea, that it resulted from a calculated policy of the Vargas government and not from an American policy to draw Brazil directly into the fighting.

Organization and Commitment of the Expeditionary Force

There was some difference of opinion between the Brazilians and Americans over which troops should be used to form the expeditionary force. The American military, and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, which had been set up to coordinate military relations, thought it logical to use the units in the Northeast, but the Brazilians looked at the 15,000 American personnel at bases in that region and thought differently. Minister Dutra wanted to build three regional training camps to prepare three divisions simultaneously, thereby creating valuable facilities for the postwar era. But the United States could not provide the weapons and equipment necessary to outfit three camps, that is to say, 50 percent of the equipment for three divisions. Moreover, because neither Brazil nor the United States had

enough ships to carry even one full division all at once, the Pentagon came up with the idea of providing 50 percent of a division's equipment for training, which would be left behind for the training of each successive division. They would all be armed and equipped in the Theater of Operations.

Just before he visited the United States in August 1943, Minister of War Dutra, who wanted to command the planned corps, sounded out various generals as to their interest in leading one of the divisions. General João Baptista Mascarenhas de Moraes, who had commanded the northeastern military region (the 7th) from June 1940 to January 1943, responded immediately while the others hesitated. Eventually two other division commanders were designated and preparations begun, but the plans were not carried out, and the force was fixed at one division (Mattos 1983, 89-90)²⁴.

The Brazilian army of 1943 did not have standing divisions ready for intensified training and transportation, but rather was organized in static geographic regional commands which presided over dispersed regimental-sized units. These in turn were quartered in barracks that often had scant room to receive additional mobilized troops, and little space for training of the sort the American army was then receiving. Moreover, most of the barracks were in urban areas. And because the troops were mainly drafted from the locality, to form a division from one region would place a politically unacceptable sacrifice on that region. So the unwillingness to use northeastern units was related to more than worry about the American presence.

To form the expeditionary division, units were called in from across the map of Brazil. On the negative side this meant that these units were not accustomed to working together. On the positive side, planners argued that since the army had been trained and organized on a French model since 1919, it would be easier to shift to an American model if the division was composed of units which had no previous joint experience. Adaption would be faster.

Oddly, instead of using the coming combat experience to enhance the professionalization of a maximum number of regular junior officers, the army called up a considerable number of reserve officers, many of whom were professional men in civilian life. Of the 870 infantry line officers in the force at least 302 were reservists. It is not clear whether this was a political decision or a purely administrative one. But it does seem that there were not enough

24 Meira Mattos comments to McCann, Rio, December 1991. The other two divisions were to be led by Generals Newton Cavalcanti and Heitor Borges.

junior officers to staff the expeditionary force. Fortunately for historians, a group of reservists produced one of the most useful books on the expeditionary force (Arruda et al., 1949)²⁵. Later in Italy, referring to the shortage of military school graduates and to the professional deficiencies of the reserve officers, Mascarenhas requested, as late as April 1945, to commission sixty infantry sergeants to serve as platoon leaders²⁶.

There was also considerable difficulty filling the ranks of the designated units. Lacking military police units the army took in policemen from São Paulo's *Força Pública*, it created signal units with men from electric and telephone companies, and it organized a nursing detachment by public recruitment of interested women (Portocarrero 1994, 59-63). The fact that draftees were being sent overseas persuaded many to escape service, but since the draft was imposed in 1916, the army always had large numbers who evaded duty. For example, in the 7th Military Region in northeast Brazil, while Mascarenhas was commander, the 1941 call up of 7898 men had an evasion rate of 48.9 percent, and of those who did present themselves fully 41 percent were medically unfit. Indeed, this was an improvement, the previous year the evasion rate had been 68 percent! Among the 3434 volunteers in that region, 2201 or 64 percent were found fit for service. These figures were fairly typical of the national experience. The rejection rate for medical and health reasons was high for both draftees and active duty troops. In forming one of the later echelons, 18,000 soldiers in regular units were examined to obtain 6,000 men. In the case of the fourth echelon, the 10,000 active-duty soldiers examined netted only 4,500 physically fit for embarkation. I have discussed elsewhere in more detail the recruitment and medical examinations, suffice to say here that it was the nation's poor health that stalled the mobilization. In January 1945, General Ralph Wooten observed that the Brazilian army was "near the bottom of the barrel" in finding combat personnel and that

25 On the number of reservists see McCann (1995, p. 289), note 33.

26 J. B. Mascarenhas to E. Dutra, Cifrado # 33-G.1, 7 Apr.1945, Cifrados FEB, de 15/9/44 a 5/7/45, 433.40,"1944/1945", MG665c, CDOC-EX, Brasília. He saw the FEB's prestige at stake. The Americans too were concerned about junior officers. Mascarenhas's report as commander of the 7th Military Region indicated a shortage of lieutenants (165 authorized, but 123 on duty = 46 shortfall), Mascarenhas, "Relatorio...7RM, 1941" (Recife, 12 Feb 1942), 25 in CDOC-EX, Brasília. General Ralph Wooten, who played a large role in relations with the Brazilians, called General Dutra's attention "to the lack of leadership in the lower officer and non-commissioned officer grades" suggesting various remedies. MG Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan 1945, "Resume of Situation in this Theater," OPD 336 Latin American Section IV, Cases 80-93, RG 165, Modern Military Branch, NA.

it was “a mistake to expect any additional assistance from Brazil in this respect” (McCann 1995, 290-292)²⁷

The training functioned on multiple levels. Brazilian officers had been sent to the United States for courses since 1938, mostly in coast artillery and aviation. Indeed, in early 1941, well before Pearl Harbor, Brazil was sending groups of officers for training in a variety of specialties. The pace continued to accelerate to the point where by the end of 1944 somewhat over 1000 Brazilian military personnel had gone to the United States. The American army created a special Brazilian course at its Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that enrolled 259 officers, the largest contingent of any one foreign nation to pass through its classrooms. The school commandant said that the Brazilians, who had already completed their own three-year general staff course, “knew more than most of his instructors”²⁸.

The troops sent to Italy in five echelons eventually totaled 25,334. In July 1944 the first echelon arrived in Naples. After some delays with equipment and training, on September 15, the 6th Infantry Regiment and support troops, under Brigadier General Euclides Zenobio da Costa, went into the line of the Fourth Corps of the U.S. Fifth Army. Army commander, Mark Clark, decided on this partial commitment because he needed to beef up the Fourth Corps that had dwindled to barely the level of a reinforced division because of units being detached for the Seventh Army’s invasion of southern France in July. Fifth Army had lost seven divisions to the French operation, so the Brazilians’ arrival at that moment was opportune. The American Fifth and

27 For the recruitment data on the 7th Military Region see João B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, “Relatório apresentado ao Exmo. Sr. General de Divisão Ministro de Guerra pelo General de Brigada João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes Comandante da 7a. Região Militar, Ano de 1941” (Recife, 12 Fevereiro de 1942), CDEX-Brasília, 32-34. On FEB selection see Lt.Col. Carlos Paiva Gonçalves, *Seleção Médica do Pessoal da FEB, Histórico, Funcionamento e Dados Estatísticos* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1951), 67-142. For American reports see MG Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan 1945, “Resume of Situation in this Theater,” OPD 336 Latin American (Sec.IV) Cases 80-93; and Col. Charles B.B.Bubb to Commanding General MTOUSA (Mediterranean Theater), Rio, 6 Dec 1944, “Medical Report on the Fourth Echelon of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,” OPD336.2 Brazil (Sec IV), RG165, MMB, NA.

28 Gen. Eurico Dutra to Col. Edwin L. Sibert, Rio, 8 Jan 1941, 2257 K18/247; and Col. Edwin L. Sibert to ACS G2, Rio, 18 Mar. 1941, No.2650, “Student Officers from Brazil to US Service Schools,” 2257 K18/306, RG165, WD, GS, MID, NA. McCann, *A Aliança Brasil – Estados Unidos*, 278-279, n.18. By comparison the Chinese sent 249 officers to Ft. Leavenworth, the British 208, the Venezuelans 73, the Mexicans 60, and the Argentines 31. Command and General Staff School commander General Truesdell’s comment about quality of Brazilian officers was reported by Major General J.G.Ord in a speech to the staff of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, August 11, 1944, BDC 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), NA.

British Eighth Armies were readying a drive on the German's Gothic Line in an attempt to reach the Po Valley and Bologna before Christmas. The Fifth Army's three corps (from west to east: U.S. Fourth, U.S. Second, and British Twelfth) were to attack with the Second Corps as spearhead and the Fourth immobilizing and harassing the Germans before it. Clark thought that this would give the Brazilians a relatively smooth introduction to combat.

It is interesting to note the different reactions of the Brazilians and the Americans to the subsequent action. The Brazilians moved along nicely pursuing retreating German units from September 16 to October 30, when they suffered a sudden counterattack that they held back for about ten hours until they ran short of ammunition and were forced to fall back. From the American records we can see that this was perceived as a normal combat occurrence, but the accounts published by Brazilian officers are full of finger-pointing and acrimony. On the scene Mascarenhas blamed and reprimanded the troops for their lack of caution and fleeing before a "demoralized enemy." Of course, he was anxious that they do well, and he was still a bit inexperienced himself in the nature of this war. They had done about as well as anyone could have under the circumstances. The U.S. 92d Division which replaced them, when they moved over to the Reno Valley, was likewise unable to drive the Germans from the ridge line that they held for the next five months²⁹.

Performance of the Expeditionary Force

The expeditionary force's (FEB from here on) role was a tactical one, the bulk of its combat experience was at the regimental level. The division's combat diary is largely a summary of patrol actions; as was the case for Fifth Army generally in the autumn and winter of 1944-45. The Brazilians

29 Entries for 30-31 October 1944, Combat Diary, Report 1/Inf.Div. BEF, Center of Military History, Washington; José Alfio Piason, "Alguns Erros Fundamentais Observados na FEB," *Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva*, 103-107. Piason was a subcommander of one of the companies involved (3d Co. 1/6 IR). Mascarenhas, *Memórias*, I, 183-188. On a aerial observer's report of German build up prior to the action see Elber de Mello Henriques, *A FEB Doze Anos Depois* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Biblioteca do Exército, 1959), 72-74. The most balanced account is Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco. 1960. *O Brasil na II Grande Guerra*, 206-214. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército.

recognized this, they did not claim that their role or its impact was strategic. Although with age a few veterans have made that assertion. In his memoirs the division's chief of staff, Floriano de Lima Brayner, observed that at "no time did the FEB engage in strategic level operations" (BRAYNER, 1968, p. 234). And after the war, to symbolize the level of the role they had played, the army erected a monument to the FEB lieutenants at the *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one division could have played anything but a tactical role in the campaign in northern Italy.

This point has been lost sight of by some observers, such as journalist William Waack, whose *As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados e inimigos* (Waack 1985)³⁰, seems based on the premise that the Brazilians claimed a greater importance for the FEB than they actually did. He contrasts some German veterans' lack of knowledge and remembrance of the Brazilian force and the sharp criticism of American liaison and inspection reports with the "grandiloquence" of Brazilian narratives on the FEB.

The principal German division facing the Brazilians had a large number of very young and rather old soldiers, and was commanded by officers who had served long years and had survived the rigors of the Russian front. Some of these men may have been worn out, but most were veterans who had immeasurably more combat experience than the Brazilians. Indeed, the FEB sailed from Brazil with most of its troops untrained. The officers were startled by the intense training program that the Americans insisted upon.

The literature on the FEB makes much of its struggle to take an elevation called "Monte Castello" during the winter of 1944-45. In combat everything is a matter of perspective and scale. The front for an army commander is measured in miles, for a corps commander it is narrowed to a mountain ridge, for a division commander the focus is a hill, for a company commander the objective is part of the slope, for platoon leaders it is a matter of certain pillboxes and gun positions, and for the soldier it is the few feet and inches ahead of him. Each one experiences a different battle. The Italian campaign was brutal because the allies had to fight continuously uphill to dislodge the Germans from commanding elevations. When the FEB reached division strength in

30 The underlying tone of the book questions the importance of the FEB. It is interesting that the Germans took it seriously enough to broadcast a daily radio program called "*Hora Auriverde*" over Radio Victoria from near Como, Italy, that used two Brazilian nationals as commentators -- Margarida Hirschmann and Emilio Baldino who were tried and given jail sentences after the war. Daniels to Secretary of State, Rio, Dec. 9, 1946, 832.203/12-946, RG 59, NA.

November it took its place with the U.S. Fourth Corps in the mountains north of Florence and west of Bologna. The Fifth Army's objective was to break through the German's so-called Gothic Line and descend into the Po Valley to take Bologna. Fourth Corps confronted an imposing mountain ridge known as Mt. Belvedere - Mt. Torraccia from which German artillery and mortars could harass traffic on the west to east highway #64 that cuts its narrow way through the mountains from Pistoia to Bologna. It is difficult to imagine driving defenders from such place. Just beyond the spa-town of Porretta Terme the mountains open into a huge basin flanked by low elevations on its right and left, and blocked by the suddenly rising Belvedere-Torraccia to the front. On its left the ridge is a sheer rock wall that appears smooth from a distance, to the right the ridge becomes jagged and broken, with a road winding upward around it off in the direction of Montese, a key point before descent into the Po Valley. The American 92d "Black Buffalo" Division and then the 10th Mountain Division faced Belvedere. The FEB confronted a hill that juts out below the top of Torraccia. From that hill the Germans could rake the lower slopes to the west (left) from well-prepared positions. That hill, which German maps labeled simply "101/19", was what local people called Monte Castello. Walking up it today is hardly even tiring, but going up it under artillery, machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire would be suicidal. Monte Castello held the Brazilians at bay in four assaults -- November 24, 25, 29, December 12 -- before falling to them on February 21. They spent four out of their nine months of combat under its guns. The German defenders admired their stubbornness. After the failed December 12th assault, in which the Brazilians suffered 145 casualties, compared with a German loss of 5 killed and 13 wounded, a German captain told a captured FEB lieutenant: "Frankly, you Brazilians are either crazy or very brave. I never saw anyone advance against machine-guns and well-defended positions with such disregard for life You are devils".³¹ Though the elevation itself pales beside its neighbors, it became symbolic of the FEB's combat ability and in a bigger sense of Brazil's coming of age as a country to be taken seriously. The Rio newspaper, *A Manhã*, editorialized that "The young Brazilians who implanted the Brazilian banner on its summit will conquer for Brazil the place that it merits in the world of tomorrow".³²

31 Emílio Varoli, "Aventuras de um prisioneiro na Alemanha Nazista," in *Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva Sobre a F.E.B.* 447. This contemporary participant account is at variance with Waack's report that German veterans in the 1980s did not recall fighting Brazilians. Unhappily the pertinent German army records reportedly were destroyed in a postwar fire.

32 *A Manhã* (Rio de Janeiro), Feb. 27, 1945. McCann visited the battle site in late Feb. 1994.

Monte Castello was and is a minor elevation lost amidst some of the most rugged terrain in Italy. It does not show up on large-scale maps of Italy and one has to search out local hiking maps to find it. It was not labeled clearly on American battle maps, and likely the German defenders did not even know its name. In fact, in the FEB war diary, the first mention of that name was the day of its capture February 21. It would be surprising if anyone besides the Brazilians remembered the name. Naturally they gave more importance to the names of the terrain that they captured than did either the defending Germans or the Americans concerned with the broader front. The American liaison detachment diarist commented that “this feature had been the objective of two previous Brazilian attacks, in which they suffered considerable casualties, its capture was a distinct loss to the enemy, since it deprived him of his last good observation” point in the area (Waack 1985, 90-93).³³

After the war the Brazilian veterans and the Brazilian army made much of Monte Castello. For them the battle had great symbolic importance. Their part in the capture of Belvedere-Castello convinced the Brazilians that they were up to the task that they had taken on. The fact is that the FEB and the U.S. 10th Mountain Division were effective in the joint operation which drove the Germans off important elevations that allowed the Allied spring offensive to move forward. If either of the two divisions had failed that major offensive would have been delayed.³⁴ Relations between the Brazilian troops and the Americans were sometimes tense. It was awkward for the Brazilians to be totally dependent on the American forces for training, clothing, arms, equipment, and food. The American emphasis on training, training, and more training, even of front line personnel, bemused the Brazilians. It was a clash between two cultures, one that so believed in education that its army’s

33 Waack concluded that because German veterans he interviewed decades later did not remember a Monte Castello that it must have been insignificant; FEB Combat Diary, 35 entry for 21 February 1945 in “Report on the 1st Infantry Division Brazilian Expeditionary Forces in the Italian Campaign from 16 July 1944 to the Cessation of Hostilities in May 1945,” 301 (BEF)-033, NA. The name appears in the volumes of the official U. S. Army in World War II. It is rarely noted on large-scale maps of Italy, but it does appear on hike maps of the region. McCann and his wife Diane were led to the hill by local people who knew it as “Monte Castello”.

34 It may be worth noting that this was the 10th Mountain Division’s “first major engagement with the enemy.” “Fourth Corps History,” 512. In May 1994, Brig.Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, and General de Divisão Sérgio Ruschel Bergamaschi, director of cultural matters, Brazilian Army, led a joint American-Brazilian “Staff Ride” to retrace the side-by-side campaigning of the 10th Mountain and the FEB; see Sérgio Gomes Pereira, “Ação conjunta 1º DIE (BR) / 10a Div MTH (EUA), *Revista do Exército Brasileiro*, Vol.131, No.3 (Jul/Set 1994), 54-56.

terminology was drawn from the language of the school house,³⁵ and the other that left most of its people unschooled. The outcome was a successful example of coalition warfare, which always requires determined effort and understanding to blend national styles into a winning combination. But the FEB went beyond the standard idea of coalition warfare because of its total integration into the American army. It was not a colonial unit, as were the British Indian ones, or a Commonwealth military, such as Canadian, New Zealander, or South African, nor a Free “this or that,” such as the Polish or French contingents. It was a division from an army of an independent, sovereign state that voluntarily placed its men and women under United States command. The connection could not have been tighter and still have preserved the FEB’s integrity of command and its Brazilian identity. It never lost either.

The FEB completed all the missions confided to it and compared favorably with the American divisions of Fourth Corps. Unfortunately, the heavy symbolism of Monte Castello obscured the FEB’s victory at Montese on April 16, in which it took the town after a four-day grueling battle suffering 426 casualties (Mello 1954). In the next days it fought to a standstill the German 148th Division and Fascist Italian Monte Rosa, San Marco, and Italia Divisions, which surrendered to General Mascarenhas on April 29-30. In a matter of days the Brazilians trapped and took the surrender of 2 generals, 800 officers, and 14,700 troops. The 148th was the only intact German division to surrender on that front.³⁶ Although they had little preparation and served under foreign command, against a combat experienced enemy, the “Smoking Cobras,” as the FEB was nicknamed, had shown, as one of their songs put it, the “fiber of the Brazilian army” and the “*grandeza de nossa gente*” [greatness of our people].³⁷

American leaders wanted the FEB to stay in Europe as part of the occupation forces, but Brazilian military and civilian leaders rejected that role. Unhappily, over American objections, the Brazilian government decided

35 For a valuable discussion of the “school of the soldier,” see Fussell (1989, 52-65).

36 The Brazilians completed this feat on their own and with considerable pride waited until the surrender was complete and the prisoners under guard before calling the American headquarters. Gen. Mascarenhas ordered his men : “Only after the Germans are here we will inform the Americans.” Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, *Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1981), 368. Gen. Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias commanded the FEB artillery.

37 On the songs of the Febianos see McCann (1995, 339, 341); and recording *20 Anos Depois: Expedicionários em Ritmos*, Chantecler Records, São Paulo, release CMG 2397, 1965.

to disband the FEB upon return to Brazil. The American military had hoped that the division would be kept together to form the nucleus for a complete reformation of the Brazilian army. FEB veterans would slowly introduce the lessons of the war into the General Staff School and Military School curricula. But the chance to use the FEB experience to project Brazilian influence on the post-war world order was lost. Those making the rapid decisions in late 1945 that led to the FEB's demise, could not know how quickly the United States would demobilize, or how quickly the alliance with the Soviet Union would collapse. Perhaps if Brazil had maintained occupation troops in Europe and a standing cadre of combat-hardened troops at home it would have had a different post-war international position.

The shared experience between Brazilians and Americans on the combat front and its consequences

The joint participation in the war and the need to transform the Brazilian army - which had been based on French military doctrines - into an organization and doctrine molded on the American model led to extended relations between Brazilian and United States personnel. This relationship had previously been restricted to diplomatic staff and now involved soldiers and officers who would fight together against the Axis forces. This contact resulted in the construction of mutual images of each other which were to have a crucial importance during subsequent decades, both from a military and a political point of view.

Direct contact first occurred in 1939 with an increase in the number of Brazilian officers sent on training courses in American military establishments and, subsequently in 1944, when American instructors were sent to Brazil in order to adapt units to American combat doctrines and styles of organization. The first assessments of these contacts were frustrating for both sides. Most of the instructors were young officers with no experience of combat and few were fluent in Portuguese. Brazilian officers had to hastily translate manuals on the use of weapons and combat tactics. Furthermore, relations between

the two military commands deteriorated when weapons, which had been promised for training, did not arrive in the right quantity, with detrimental consequences (McCann 1995, 285 and Arruda et al. 1949, 165-167). Most Brazilian troops only handled their partners' weapons and equipment for the first time once they were already in Italy. Some American reports were no less critical: Brazilian officers and soldiers did not value the training and physical preparation and the facilities of the Brazilian barracks did not provide a propitious environment for training (Waack 1985, 31).

In May 1944, a small group of Brazilian officers was sent to the Theater of Operations in the Mediterranean to provide the Brazilian military with information about the Theater of Operations where the Brazilian Expeditionary Forces (FEB) would be deployed and to provide details regarding the preparation for the expedition to the American Command. Whereas the Brazilian military were surprised about the actual scale of the war, the Americans seemed disappointed with their future partners' lack of preparation in supplying information about their own expedition forces. Contact between the forces was occasional and peppered by mutual prejudice, instead of being a fruitful, shared experience. It was only when FEB echelons boarded American transport ships that Brazilian soldiers and officers finally had full contact with the American military organization.

The size of the transport ships and the meticulously organized life on board impressed members of the expedition. On American ships the rules were rigorous and the Brazilian military promptly adjusted themselves to them. Brazilian soldiers impressed themselves in how rigorously they complied with the cleanliness and schedules on board. Delays and the non-compliance of regulations were considered to be a natural part of Brazilian barracks life. They became aware of a different type of discipline which was less externalized and more geared towards solving the practical problems of daily living and safeguarding the lives of over 5,000 men on board.

Once in Italy, other surprises awaited members of the expedition. As soon as they arrived, officers discovered that from then on they would be eating the same food, in the same place and using the same utensils as common soldiers. This would have been unthinkable in a Brazilian military unit (Soares 1985, 31-34; Arruda et al. 1949, 322-323, 326-327; Maximiano 2004, 113-114). Similarly, rules regarding the salutation of superiors were more relaxed. Salutes only occurred within particular contexts (Arruda et al. 1949, 367-368).

Another difference with regard to the relationship between soldiers and officers in Brazil had to do with clothing, particularly in the cold of the Apennine winter. Clothes were distributed according to the needs of combatants on the front and not according to hierarchy (Soares 1985, 149-153; Maximiano 2004, 112).

These practices developed through contact with the American army and the reality of warfare, however they did not imply any disrespect to the hierarchy or make the army less war-like. They revealed a more democratic army model, made up of citizen-soldiers who were aware that a higher hierarchical position was a consequence of individual merit and could only be made use of in service. On the other hand, in the Brazilian model many officers saw their hierarchical superiority as immanent and therefore something which permeated all social relations, both inside and outside the barracks.

These differentiated social relations were noticed by the soldiers who were able to make a comparison between the army they were fighting with - the "FEB Army" - and the army they left behind in Brazil, the "Caxias Army". The (negative) identification of this latter type of army, with its Patron, revealed a perception which was different from the intentions military authorities had when they decided to make Caxias the Army's Patron and its main role model. If, for the regular officers, the image of Caxias was part of their own sense of military honor, for most of the soldiers, the way in which Caxias and his virtues were venerated turned him into a caricature in day-to-day barracks' life, rather than a role model (Arruda et al. 1949, 336-337 and Castro 2003).

Everything about military life was compared, from daily life in the barracks to levels of hygiene, from human relations between subordinates and superiors to the importance given to material/territorial losses in contrast to the loss of human lives (Salum 1996, 109; Udihara 2002, 56, 80-81, 176; Maximiano 2004, 85-86).³⁸

38 A motto attributed to the American military structure and employed by the "FEB" was: "Um homem só se consegue em vinte anos. "To make a man it takes twenty years. Uma máquina em vinte minutos. A machine takes twenty minutes. Estraguem-se as máquinas, poupem-se os homens". The machines can be destroyed, let us take care of men". Alguns expedicionários comparavam esta prioridade nos homens com a fixação com a economia do material registrada no dia-a-dia do exército "de Caxias". Some members of the expedition compared the American prioritization of men with the "Caxias" army's habitual obsession with safeguarding equipment. Cf. Andrade, Espírito da FEB e Espírito "do Caxias", in *Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva sobre a FEB*, 323; Lauro Sawaya. Interview, in Alfredo

However, comparisons were misleading. Brazilian soldiers were unaware that, before the war, the American military structure had also been very authoritarian and not at all “democratic”. The United States Armed Forces was “democratized” when millions of civilians, in their role as citizen-soldiers joined the army. This resulted in pressing for social relations which were more in line with those experienced in civilian life, resulting in the “humanization” of the army. In order for rules of combat to become operational, there had to be conciliation between hierarchical rigidity and the “civilian” character of most soldiers, resulting in a system based on rules and practices which were distinct from those of most regular armies. The American army became more than an example, it became a partner of the Brazilian army in changing the extreme rigidity of its barracks. For the Brazilians, however, the transformations in army relations were so substantial that a negative comparison with the American model was inevitable (Stouffer 1949, 54; Maximiano, 2004, 114).

Nevertheless, there were limits to these comparisons. The “FEB army” did not become “Americanized”. The abundant American material resources that had been placed at the disposal of the FEB, from weapons and equipment to uniforms, food and sanitary products did not turn Brazilian soldiers into unconditional admirers of everything American. They were Brazilian and represented their country and at times they were disturbed by the shock between social cultures and the image of their “subordination” to American interests.

This perception first manifested itself when they were training in Italy and the Brazilian troops (which at the time had been reduced to the 6th infantry regiment and a few small units of other regiments) received a visit from General Mark Clark. During the joint training of marches and orders, most members of the Brazilian expedition refused to sing the lyrics of “God Save America” in Portuguese. Soldiers believed that this song clearly praised ‘North Americans’ and not ‘South Americans’. It led to a certain malaise. Nevertheless, as soldiers may have been threatened with punishment, no problems occurred on the day of the visit of the American General (Schneiderman 1986, 79-80; Udihara 2002, 89-90).

Oscar Salum, *Zé Carioca vai à guerra*, (São Paulo: Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado em História, 1996), 109 e segs; Massaki Udihara, *Um médico brasileiro no front: O diário de Massaki Udihara na II Guerra Mundial*, (São Paulo: Hacker Editores; Narrativa Um; Imprensa Oficial do Estado; Museu Histórico da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil, 2002), 56, 80-81, 176; Maximiano, *Trincheiras da memória*, 85-86.

Another point of conflict was the American emphasis on training. It was natural for soldiers, wherever they come from, to complain of the severities of the preparations for real combat. But complaints were also made by a number of Brazilian officers, particularly regular officers, who considered the amount of training unnecessary, particularly when troops were already engaged in combat (Udihara 2002, 83-84; 93; 102-103; Arruda et al. 1949, 101-102, 181,364). During combat, assessments were initially very critical, particularly in relation to leadership and safety procedures, flaws that could be considered normal for inexperienced troops, even American troops. As Brazilian expedition members gained experience, mistakes and criticism considerably decreased (McCann 1993, 274-279)³⁹.

The Brazilians also believed that the Americans had their own flaws. The segregation of blacks into separate divisions was noticed, which led expedition members to make positive comparisons with the “FEB army” in this respect. The 92nd American Division was made up exclusively of black soldiers but commanded by white officers. This unit was considered by their own officer-commanders as a problematic unit, with low levels of combat motivation. There were also frequent tensions between black soldiers and white officers, particularly those who came from the southern states of the United States (Maximiano and Oliveira 2001, 155-182)⁴⁰. While for many Brazilian expedition members there was a contradiction between living under the dictatorship of the *Estado Novo* and fighting for democracy, this was temporarily overshadowed by the fact that the same country which offered themselves as an example of new social relations was capable of sending thousands of black soldiers to fight and even die for their motherland, whilst at the same time, systematically segregating them both during and after the war.

Conversely, the FEB was effectively the only army unit that was racially integrated throughout World War II. There were, of course, records of racist episodes, but these incidents were never the result of structural and systemic discrimination, as in the case of the American

39 Criticisms of the behavior of officers and soldiers of partners of other nationalities can be found in the archives of any Armed Force. Researchers experienced in Military History tend to be cautious about reciprocal images. This was missing from the book written by the journalist William Waack, when he revealed with a certain amount of sensationalism “the image that American allies and German enemies” had about Brazilian expedition members. A critique of this work is found in Frank McCann.

40 Despite language barriers, there was frequent contact between the Brazilians in the FEB and soldiers in the “colored” division. See, Schnaiderman (1986, p. 59).

forces. Indeed, the FEB was neither more nor less racist than Brazilian society as a whole. Brazilian fighters reproduced the racial relations of the society they represented. They believed, like the rest of the Brazilian population, that they lived in a “racial democracy” which did not put black, white or mixed-race people against one another. Furthermore, the camaraderie which occurred as a result of their mutual dependence during missions helped to mitigate any persistent traces of racism. Expedition members saw themselves as immune to the American segregated racism (Maximiano and Oliveira 2001, 162-172).

Based on these beliefs, some Brazilian mission members felt somewhat morally superior in relation to their German enemies and American allies. These feelings provided Brazilian combatants with a better image of themselves.

The “FEB army”, therefore, represented not only a different experience in their military lives, but a different military culture in which the citizen-soldier had his own worth and deserved respect.

Thus, two readings were predominant among expedition members in relation to this clash of mentalities. In the first, predominant among soldiers, social relations as experienced by both soldiers and officers in the Allied armies, in particular within the “FEB army”, were associated with American material opulence. In the statements of mission members, it was common to come across the view that democratic relations between the different citizen-soldiers in Italy worked because the Americans were wealthy, developed and more “cultured”. By contrast, when Brazilian mission members returned to their country, they would return to the “army of Caxias” with its problems, flaws and its notorious Disciplinary Regulation.

Nevertheless even the “Caxias’ Army” was changed. After the war, the Brazilian military structure adopted American standards, in relation to its organization, armaments and doctrines. The military agreements between both countries during the war and the courses taken regularly by thousands of Brazilian officers in military establishments in the United States contributed towards this (Davis 1996, 58-64; 86-88; McCann 1995, 199; McCann 1980, 234). The other view, common among a group of officers after their experience of the American warfare structure, was that it represented a salutary example of national organization. They believed that by adopting national organization methods acquired alongside their American colleagues, and by establishing a military and social doctrine that could simultaneously comprise a project

for politically strengthening the armed forces and be an alternative to the Populism and nationalism which they criticized, they could lift Brazil out of its secular lethargy.

After returning to Brazil, officers sought to apply the lessons they learned with their American allies in Italy. Internally, the adoption of Cold War standards fitted perfectly with the repression of communism, which was already well-established. The novelty was in establishing a common project, combining strategic concerns of national security whilst adapting Brazilian politics to the ideals of a capitalist society based on free initiative and open to foreign capital. The creation of Brazil's War College (*Escola Superior de Guerra*, ESG) - a government institution bringing together high-ranking military officers and civil servants to debate and develop the Doctrine of National Security, was the concrete result of the expectations awakened by the FEB experience among officers such as Cordeiro de Farias, Castelo Branco, Jurandir Mamede, Lyra Tavares and Meira Mattos.⁴¹ They were protagonists in various political struggles which were taking place at the time, both inside and outside the barracks. The actions of the "Democratic Crusade" during the Military Club elections in the 1950s, the attempts to prevent Juscelino Kubistchek taking office in 1955 and the crisis which occurred following Jânio Quadros' resignation in 1961 were some of the political conflicts which involved the active participation of the aforementioned military officers. When the military coup of April 1964 was successfully executed, the rest of the country was able to verify something which careful observers had already apprehended: the officers that took power had in common the fact that they belonged to both the FEB and the ESG and they also had strong associations with the entrepreneurial world (Ferraz 1997, 153-184; Dreifuss 1981, 369; Barros 1978; Stepan 1975; Oliveira 1980).⁴²

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the FEB as a whole can be identified with the military group which took power or that the ideals of the ESG and FEB converged. The fact that a select group of FEB officers played a crucial role in the military-entrepreneurial movement does not mean that all expedition members, or even most, shared the same beliefs and attitudes. The FEB and the military institution as a whole should not be treated as

41 More details of this Project can be found in Francisco César Alves Ferraz (1997), particularly in the chapter "O Impacto da FEB" (131-150).

42 Some researchers have put into context the "role" played by the *Escola Superior de Guerra* in forming elites, in bringing about the coup that overthrew President João Goulart and in the administration of the military regime: Cf. Miyamoto (1998); Ferraz (1997, 153-190); Davis (1996). *A Brotherhood of Arms. Brazil-United States military relations, 1945-1977*. Colorado: University Press of Colorado.

homogeneous segments. There were all sorts of political opinions among FEB “civilian” expedition members: ‘integralists’, true conservatives, liberals and even communist activists. The vast majority of the expedition members, however, held conservative positions and issues of national politics did not concern them (Ferraz 2003, 320-328).

The joint action of Brazilians and Americans as “brothers in arms” produced, at least among a group of FEB officers, a model of a national development political project that was neither populist nor averse to foreign capital. In this model, the active participation of an entire generation of military officers was not only welcomed but desired: order and progress, security and development. In the words of the FEB Artillery commander, General Cordeiro de Farias, the impact of Brazilians and Americans participating alongside each other was such that “we returned to Brazil searching for a model of government that might bring together rational order, planning and finances. We could not find this model in Brazil at this stage, but we decided to look for a way of finding it in the long-term” (Stepan 1975, 178)⁴³ “Yankee imperialism” mistrust was mitigated by closer ties during the war. Another former FEB officer summed up this change of posture, “During the war, the United States had to give us everything: food, clothes, equipment. After the war, we were less fearful of Yankee imperialism than other officers, because we saw the United States actually helping us without wanting anything in return” (Stepan 1975, 176).⁴⁴

After the war, the Brazilian Army and Brazil would never be the same again.

Conclusion

Brazil took an active part in World War II as a supplier of strategic raw materials, as the site of important air and naval bases, as a skilful supporter

43 Interview with General Cordeiro de Farias.

44 Interview with General Edson de Figueiredo, In: Stepan, *Militares na política*, 176; American officers who had direct contact with their Brazilian counterparts observed that the dislike some Brazilian officers felt for American doctrines, personnel and resources was the result of the strong influence of European missions in Brazil and the placements these officers had had in Europe. McCann (1980, p. 234).

of the United States in Pan American conferences and as a contributor of naval units, a combat fighter squadron and a 25,000 strong infantry division. It lost 1,889 soldiers and sailors, 31 merchant vessels, 3 warships, and 22 fighter aircraft. It came out of the war with modernized armed forces thanks to having received 70 percent of all United States Lend-Lease equipment sent to Latin America.

Zé Carioca, Walt Disney's dapper parrot, who was Hollywood's cartoon characterization of Joe Brazilian, taught Donald Duck how to samba in the film *Three Cabelleros*, but the Americans, like Donald, could not quite catch the beat. So with the restoration of peace, instead of the wartime alliance heralding an era of two national destinies bound together for mutual benefit, as Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha had dreamed, the Cold War turned Americans in other directions and left Brazilians with a vague sense of having been exploited. Brazil's rejection of further overseas military operations in the Korean and Vietnam wars was partly related to a national perception that the United States did not fully appreciate its contribution in World War II.

Nevertheless, the war changed Brazil. The wartime air and naval bases were turned into civilian airfields and port facilities, the joint operations set new standards for military education and training, and the experiences abroad that the thousands of veterans brought back began a process of modernizing the nation's mentality. Industrialization, spurred by the building of the Volta Redonda steel mill, propelled Brazil from the age of the bull-cart to that of the internal combustion engine within a single generation. Without infrastructure, experience, import-substitution processes, and transfer of know-how acquired during the war it is difficult to imagine how Brazil would have been today.⁴⁵ It may not really matter if the rest of the world knows about the role of Brazil in World War II, but the Brazilian people are pleased it played a part because they are legitimately proud of their multiple contributions to allied victory.

45 The changes included such common things as ice cream. The popular *Kibon* ice cream products appeared on the market in 1942. An American company (Cia. U.S. Harkson do Brasil) fled Japanese occupied China and set itself up in Brazil. "Ice Cream in Brazil," 1942. *Business Week*, (November 21):24.

Abbreviations used in the notes

ACS	Army Chief of Staff
AGV	Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC
AHMRE	Arquivo Histórico do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro
AOA	Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC
CDOC-EX	Centro de Documentação do Exército, Brasília
CPDOC	Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro
DGFP	Documents on German Foreign Policy
FDRL	Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
FEB(BEF)	Força Expedicionária Brasileira
GS	General Staff
MID	Military Intelligence Division
MMB	Modern Military Branch
NA	National Archives, Washington
OPD	Operations Plans Division, U.S. Department of War
RG	Record Group

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At the Onset of the Cold War: the USA and the repression of communism in Brazil¹

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Introduction

At the end of World War II, Latin America went through a rapid process of transformation which affected the political structure of most governments in the region. In Brazil, in October 1945, after a decade and a half in power, Getúlio Vargas was deposed by the very same military men who had instigated the coup that established the *Estado Novo* [New State] dictatorship (Moura 1991). His successor, General Eurico Caspar Dutra, was elected after the most widespread electoral process the country had seen. Approximately four times more voters participated in this presidential election than the preceding one. The scale of this progress, when compared to the preceding election, is clear both in terms of population growth and in terms of the ratio of voters to

1 This text was concluded in 2008 and does not therefore incorporate literature I have been acquainted with subsequently.

2 The author wishes to thank Faperj [State of Rio de Janeiro Foundation for Research Support] for the grant received for carrying out his post-doctorate research at the *Laboratório de Estudos do Tempo Presente*, UFRJ (2001-2002), which made it possible to initiate this research. He would also like to thank CNPq [Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development] for its Productivity Grant in Research from March of 2007 which was fundamental to the successful concluding of this project.

the size of the population. Despite discrepancies in the data, while in 1930 only approximately 10% of the adult population voted, in December 1945 35% went to the ballot box, a total of 7.5 million voters of which 50% were women (Levine 2001). In addition to the demographic growth which occurred during this period, it is interesting to highlight elements of Constitutional Law n. 9, which directly amended articles of the 1937 Constitution concerning future electoral processes. It is particularly worth noting the inclusion of people over eighteen years of age, of both sexes, and the restitution of the right to vote to armed forces officers (Bethell 1992 and Gawryszewski 1996).

A comparison can be made with Argentina which, after a long and turbulent process, elected Juan Domingo Perón as president in 1946. The direct intervention of the American Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Spruille Braden, in the campaign against Perón's candidacy, provoked serious tensions in the relations between the two countries. Braden's interference in the process of constitutional normalization in Argentina should not be seen as an isolated act in Latin America. The pressure of American diplomacy was a constant factor in the continent. Furthermore, when these pressures did not achieve the desired results, the actions of the United States became more aggressive, as in the planning of the coup that deposed the Guatemalan government in 1954 as well as the many other American interventions throughout the 20th century. Perón faced pressure and called on the Argentine people to choose "between Braden's pig or Perón, the patriot" (LaFeber 1994, 488). When the ballot box confirmed Perón's election, the United States viewed it as a humiliating defeat. Between 1946 and 1947, Perón imposed on his country the hegemony of the forces supporting him. Working-class movements acting independently from the government were severely repressed and suffered a number of setbacks (Rapoport 1992). In this way he attained his objective of subordinating trade union organizations to Peronism. Similarly, it is worth noting that amendments to the 1949 Argentine Constitution ratified the political rights of women and incorporated citizens of the national territory. These measures increased the number of voters to 8,623,640, of which 4,225,467 were women. Indeed, the support of women was important for the restoration of the constitutional process in 1946 and crucial in sustaining the Peronist regime for more than a decade in a country marked by a history of military coups (Zabaleta 2000).

A more detailed analysis of the process in question would require a discussion of the specificities of each Latin American country, encompassing

a wide range of demands from an economic, political and social point of view. Consequent conflicts particularly brought to the fore both the organization and strengthening of trade unions, the political activism of workers linked to the Communist Party and nationalistic objectives which were opposed, to a greater or lesser extent, to American capital. This sometimes led to establishing political pacts for defending common interests.

Nevertheless, our aim in this chapter is to focus on the debate concerning the political configuration of these new governments and the institutional re-organization in the period immediately after World War II. This was the period when anti-communist policies and practices were implemented. Beyond the specificities mentioned above, a similar pattern can be observed across the region which could be broadly expressed as follows: under the influence of the end of the war and the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Europe, the regimes in Latin America moved towards formal democracy.

In this respect, it is worth noting the specificities of each Latin America country, particularly those factors associated to the interests of the national bourgeoisies and the armed forces, as well as the relation of international capital to their respective development projects. Many countries had formal democracies, albeit restricted, including Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay and Chile; others such as Mexico had a one-party system, though with a significant social base and a number of mechanisms for democratic participation (Bethell and Roxborough 1992 and Munhoz 2002).

According to Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, there were two distinct phases during this period in Latin America. In the first phase, between 1944 and 1946, with some chronological variations, there was a tendency towards social democratization and a change in direction of regimes towards the left, albeit ephemeral, with nationalistic inclinations and the strengthening of left-wing organizations and workers' militancy. However, between 1945 and 1947 there were signs of a reversal in this process. With the honorable exception of Guatemala, where the democratic system lasted till 1954, it is possible to argue that by 1948 the dream of rapid democratization across the continent had been buried (Bethell and Roxborough 1992)³. According to Peter H. Smith, it could be said that even by generous classification criteria only four democratic regimes remained in Latin America by the end of 1954: in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and Brazil (Smith 1996, 130).

³ See the same authors: *The impact of the Cold War in Latin America* (1994).

The United States and control of Latin America in the period immediately after World War II

As a result of the rupture in the alliance which defeated the Axis forces during World War II and the emergence of conflicts which led to the Cold War, the United States hastened the process of forging regional alliances. Within this historical context, the United States claimed there was a pressing need to combat Soviet expansionism and, at the same time, prevent the proliferation of communist ideas.

The Doctrine of Containment, developed by Kennan, argued that the greatest Soviet threat lay in its capacity for ideological attraction within western countries, and not in a military invasion. From a practical point of view, this strategy provided the United States with a justification for intervention in various regions of the world where its interests were at stake (Munhoz 2004, 193-194). Thus, the concept was consolidated that problems which were merely regional, in any area of the globe, could be considered as a threat to their security (Leffler 1992, 1-15). To better understand this issue, it is worth considering the meaning of National Security within the context of American diplomacy. For Washington policymakers, American national security was thought about in terms of the correlation of powers. Power was defined in terms of controlling resources, industrial infrastructure and external bases. Thus, the security of a country resided in its economic and technological superiority over potential adversaries. In this way, the concept of American National Security meant that any event or change taking place in any region of the world could be considered a threat.

In this context, Latin America was the first experience of a post-World War II regional alliance. It is quite reasonable to argue that the ambiguity of USA-Latin America relations during this period could have accelerated this process. In other words, at the end of the war, the overriding concern for the Washington administration was European reconstruction and the establishment of global institutions that would spread the American model of capitalist development. As a result, the remainder of the American continent,

below Rio Grande, took second place. Nevertheless, it was necessary to ensure control of the region and as a response to this need the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), also known as the Rio Treaty, was signed at the Conference of Rio de Janeiro in 1947.

Note that amongst IATRA objectives was the development of a defense system for the continent which restricted the interference of non-American powers in the region⁴. Thus, considering the initial context of the Cold War and the leadership role of the United States, the political meaning of the treaty at that specific historical moment is perfectly clear. In January 1948, at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American Senate, John Foster Dulles, a member of the Republican Party and an advisor to Secretary of State George Marshall, argued for the creation of a regional pact of Western European countries in the same mold as IATRA⁵. According to the Republican Senator Arthur Vanderberg, IATRA fully followed the principles of the Monroe Doctrine (Gilderhus 2000, 120). Some authors see the treaty as the development of a model which served as reference for American foreign policy, also serving as a matrix to other pacts (Connel-Smith 1977, 226) and, particularly, for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1949. Similarly, we highlight the message sent on 5th March of that year by the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, informing the American Department of State that the *New York Herald Tribune* reported that France had accepted the Rio de Janeiro Treaty as the best model for the development of an alliance pact in Western Europe. According to the report, added the Brazilian diplomat, Belgium also seemed to be moving in this direction⁶. Gaddis Smith argues that the United States' global policy was an attempt to both reflect its domestic policies and at the same time transform American policies for the Continent into global strategies. For example, the Truman Doctrine turned the Monroe Doctrine into global policy (Smith 1994, 56). The approval of IATRA and the subsequent creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) meant that these organizations became important instruments of USA hegemony in the American continent. The economic, military and political might of the United States meant that they could impose their decisions on the continent. They founded their actions on the decision-

4 Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (AHI)- File 389/ 1 /31 - Tratado Interamericano de Assistência Recíproca e Ata Final.

5 Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (AHI). File on the Brazilian Embassy in Washington 51-3-5 Cartas Telegramas. 900.1 (22). CT- 41.

6 AHI - Brazilian Embassy in Washington 51-3-5 Cartas Telegramas. CT – 178.

making organizations created at the time, thus conferring on the implementation of American foreign policy the appearance of a common objective.

In the immediate post-war period, the enemy was no longer represented by the old authoritarian regimes with fascist tendencies, but by reformist governments or social movements which could press for social and political reforms leading to a reduction of the United States' capacity to intervene in the Continent. Thus, policies were established for containing movements which might have been a threat to the *status quo* and, as result, to the interests of the elites in the United States. Nevertheless, it is wrong to think that the move towards authoritarianism in the continent derived solely from a project of containment orchestrated by the United States. In Brazil, we can observe the strong influence of the United States in the process of democratization which took place at the end of World War II and a rapid return of the Brazilian elites to their authoritarian roots, as it became clear that the world was undergoing a process of democratic retrocession. Thus, it is important to note that the closing of the political process in Brazil which occurred during the Dutra government had both internal and external roots.

As indicated above, the construction of an enemy of global dimensions, spread by the specter of communism, became an important objective of Washington's foreign policy and thus justified its direct interventions in various parts of the planet. Once Truman took office, the Good Neighbor Policy was abandoned and the Monroe Doctrine was taken up and adapted to new times and the needs of the country. During the Truman government, these needs were defined by the concept of national security and the perception of a threat to the security of the country (Gilderhus 2000, 120).

In the conference of Bogota, the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, had talks with the heads of various delegations, including Brazil, to discuss the measures to be adopted in order to combat communism in the Western Hemisphere⁷. As a result, partly because of these negotiations and partly because of anticommunism deeply rooted in the governments of the region, a statement was approved during this conference condemning communism⁸.

Another factor which may have contributed to the approval of this measure were the disturbances that took place in Bogota whilst the event

7 AHI- Brazilian Embassy in Washington. File 51-3-5 Cartas Telegramas. 962. IX, CT 274. Cf. *Aspectos da campanha anticomunista liderada pelos Estados Unidos*. OESP, São Paulo, 06 abr. 1948. p.1.

8 AHI - Brazilian Embassy in Washington. File 51-3-5, Cartas Telegramas, 962. IX, CT 353.

was taking place. The most important liberal Colombian leader, Jorge Eliezer Gaitán, was assassinated and conflicts immediately broke out throughout the Colombian capital. As a result, there were talks about suspending or transferring the event. However, the American Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, argued that this would be a political defeat in the face of communism and decided to continue with the event. Colombian authorities and members of the American delegation attributed the disturbances to communist actions aimed at discrediting the Conference of Bogota. However, there is very strong evidence that incidents had in reality been provoked by a feeling of revolt against Gaitán's murder and that the communists had not been the perpetrators of the *Bogotazzo* (as the disturbances became known), although they might have taken advantage of the situation. This was the analysis of the American Ambassador in Bogota, Willard L. Beaulac, when he declared that he believed the reaction in Colombia had been spontaneous and *en masse*, but that the communists may have taken advantage of the situation (Connel-Smith 1977, 234).

In 1948, with the creation of the OAS during the Bogota conference, strategies for the defense of the continent were consolidated. The organization served to expand American control over the countries of the continent and, at the same time, strengthen its hegemony over the so-called Western Hemisphere (Arms 1994, 234). During World War II, the United States spent approximately 450 million dollars in the region, in the form of lend lease. Of these resources, a little over three quarters were destined for Brazil, which was the United States' closest partner and played the largest part during the World War (Davis 1996, 14-15).

The American Government thought of Latin America as a sort of reserve to be kept under strict control. After the War, the focus of attention of American policy was Europe, as previously indicated, and as a result Latin American demands for the creation of a continental Marshall Plan were ignored. In Bogota, General George C. Marshall, expressing the position of his government, stated that there were no resources available to act on both fronts and that there had always been a 'Marshall Plan' for Latin America. He further argued for the need to recognize the differences between Europe, which had been devastated during the war, and Latin America. At the same time, Marshall demanded close vigilance of the communist threat (Arms 1994, 446-447). It is also important to note that shortly before the Conference of Rio de Janeiro, Truman had been very clear in this respect. According to

him, a plan had already been in place in the Western Hemisphere for over a century, the Monroe Doctrine (Connel-Smith 1977, 229).

As result of this strategy, in 1950 Latin America was the only region of the world that did not have an aid program from the United States, with the exception of Point Four, a technical assistance program initiated in 1949. Furthermore, it must also be observed that between 1945 and 1952 Latin America as a whole received less economic support than Belgium and Luxemburg (Bethell and Roxborough 1992, 22). A clear example of the role Latin America was expected to play in this context was the approval of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, in 1949, worth approximately 1.3 billion dollars, where not a single cent was allocated to Latin America (Smith 1996, 148).

During the Conference of Bogota 500 million dollars of investments were announced for Latin America, mainly to finance import and export activities. This fell well below regional demands⁹. Comparing this amount with what was invested in the Reconstruction Plan for Europe reveals the meager importance attached to the region in the period immediately after the war. The official figures indicate that 13.3 billion dollars were allocated to Europe via the Marshall Plan. There are disputes as to the actual amount allocated with some authors mentioning 17 billion dollars.

The OAS Charter was approved, and in clause 15 expressly forbid the intervention of any nation in the internal or external affairs of other nations. This clause, which demonstrated the fear of unilateral American action, was objected to by the Washington delegation, though it was finally approved (LaFeber 1994, 487-491). Fear of a possible intervention by the United States in the region had already been expressed during the Conference of Chapultepec, in 1945 (Green 1971, 187).

In practice, means and devices were developed to justify action which contravened the letter of the treaty, as in the case of the military coup in Guatemala in 1954, and the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, in 1961. Moreover, in the following decades there were dozens of secret operations which disrespected the sovereignty of Latin American nations.

9 AHI- Washington File 51-3-5. Cartas Telegramas. - 962. IX. CT 304. Conferência de Bogotá. 500 milhões para a América Latina. *Notas e informações. OESP.* São Paulo, 04 abr.1948. p. 3.

Brazil in the Inter-American context at the end of World War II

As the war came to a close and as the scales clearly tipped towards the allied forces, there was a global movement in the direction of institutionally reordering the regimes in power. Brazil was also involved in this process. Getúlio Vargas, from the middle of 1944, gave clear signals that the country would head decisively in the direction of democracy, ceding to pressures from the nations of the world that would soon steer the destinies of the world.

The Brazilian dictator noted the emergence of a new world order tied to the American model, and thus initiated a process of ‘opening’ which sought to, on the one hand, extend his social base by bringing together a range of political forces, and on the other, meet the demands of the new emerging order. Thus, Vargas believed that Brazil could play a significant role in assisting the process of reorganization in terms of creating a new world order. This was a crucial moment for the country.

Brazil needed foreign capital to speed up its industrialization process. Within this context, from September 1944, Vargas indicated that the country would initiate its process of democratization by announcing elections at the end of the war. In line with the new political context, censorship of the press was abolished. In April, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established¹⁰. In the same month, political prisoners were granted amnesty, via Decree-Law 7.474. However, military officers and public servants benefitted by this legislation were not allowed to return to their former positions (Segatto et al. 1982, 75). Brazil was undergoing a period of social effervescence. Former political prisoners began to play an important role in efforts to turn Brazil into a democracy. In May, the government announced presidential and congressional elections for December of that year. On 10 November, the definitive registration of the PCB – Brazilian Communist Party – was approved by Resolution n. 324/1945 of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

¹⁰ Negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries started in January, 1944. Segatto et al. (1982, 70).

This transitional political process was turbulent, as sectors of the opposition suspected that Vargas had no intention to relinquish power and was planning a coup (Hilton 1987, 101-116). These fears were fed by Vargas himself, who on a number of occasions had adopted very ambiguous positions. The liberal opposition was conservative, fearful of structural changes and suspicious of potential social reforms. In this context Vargas encouraged popular mobilization around particular banners. Thus, the dictator sought to keep popular movement under control and shore up his political base.

It was within this scenario that the *queremista* movement emerged, defending a Constituent Assembly and the permanence of Getúlio Vargas in power. The *queremistas* believed that a Constituent Assembly should precede presidential elections to prevent a new government making use of authoritarian legislation borne out of the 'exceptional' *Estado Novo*. The opposition believed that the president was behind this movement and that his purpose was to create the conditions to delay elections and, therefore, prolong the dictatorship. The presence of members of the government in the movement served to corroborate this thesis. However, it must be noted that Vargas kept his distance from the *queremista* movement. The communists were divided in their support of Vargas: the CNOP group (National Commission for Provisional Organization), under Prestes' leadership, supported Vargas, whilst the Committee for Action (CA) declared open warfare against the dictator. Prestes was even accused of having negotiated his release from prison in exchange for supporting the Dictator. Later, in a speech he made after his release, Prestes claimed that Vargas' exit could lead the country into civil war and that the ensuing chaos would bring new hope to fascists and reactionary groups (Chilcote 1982, 95). The growth of *queremismo* reached mass proportions. This led the United States to believe that in Brazil the government was orchestrating a strategy to keep Vargas in power. There were two concerns in relation to what could happen in Brazil at that historical moment. On the one hand, there was a fear that Vargas could, with increasing popular support and counting on communist assistance, establish a national-populist dictatorship. This could also carry the danger of possible Soviet penetration in Brazil. On the other hand, there was a fear of a military coup followed by an approximation to Argentina and strengthening of a Peronist bloc against the United States (Bethell and Roxborough 1992, 52-53).

American pressure to end the dictatorship started moderately, but it gained in strength and ended up provoking a diplomatic crisis. On 29th September an incident occurred during a formal lunch organized by the Journalists' Union, when the Ambassador of the United States, Adolf Berle Jr., made a speech

arguing for the democratization of the country and criticized any alterations to the ongoing electoral process. Berle's position was an expression of the changes in American policy. The Americans were worried about the potential establishment of a nationalist bloc that could act against American interests in the region. It should be noted that Berle's speech took place a few days after his contact with Spruille Braden, who after the Argentine crisis, returned to Washington, via Brazil, before taking up the position of Under-Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Green 1971, 234-235).

In the months following the end of World War II, the hope that the country would receive preferential treatment by the United States - a notion kept alive by the Brazilian administration - gradually eroded away. In the same way, in the years that followed, Brazil's dream of performing the role of regional power also melted away. Expectations had been nurtured because of the role played by the country during the world war.

Brazil was the main partner of the Allies in South America. Furthermore, it can be seen that, since 1943, the country had unconditionally allied itself with the United States and adopted a policy of facilitating American penetration, culminating in a process of 'Americanization'. According to Frank McCann, the more Brazil yielded to American wishes, the more it seemed to lose respect. Thus, when the United States decided that Brazil had become an unconditional ally, it was much less prone to concede to its demands (McCann 1979).

The Dutra Government and the strangled democracy

Expectations of Brazil's democratization suffered serious setbacks from the first moments of the Dutra government. In order to control social movements which had been undergoing a widespread process of expansion since the end of the Vargas dictatorship, the elected government started an intensive process of socio-political repression in its first months in power.

Dutra was never a democrat, quite the contrary; he harbored enormous sympathies for Hitler's regime. He had even received a special award by the

German government in 1939 when the Brazilian army acquired large amounts of warfare equipment from Germany¹¹. However, he quickly adapted himself to the new reality when Vargas abandoned his policy of oscillation and broke off relations with Germany.

The international scenario was changing quickly. Conflicts involving the USA and the USSR were growing worse day by day. As a result, the dreaded enemy was no longer fascism, but communism. In its wake, there was a global surge which set back democratization in countries which had been under dictatorial regimes up to that time. This was reflected across Latin America, including Brazil. As soon as signals of change in the American posture and its objective to contain the Soviet presence within their area of influence became clear, the Dutra government found reasons to embark on a process of intense repression.

In Brazil social struggles intensified during 1946. In the first six months of his term there were more than 70 medium to large-scale strikes, mobilizing some of the better organized trade unions in the country such as the port, textile, banking, electricity and metal workers unions, which resulted in over 100,000 people laying down their tools (Bethell and Roxborough 1992, 56-57). In the large urban centers, the constant increases in prices provoked a rise in inflation which led to the emergence of a movement against the high cost of living. Within this context, the streets in a number of principle Brazilian cities staged demonstrations in which workers protested in diverse ways against rising costs, demanding better salaries and the resolution of serious housing and transport issues.

Dutra, from the beginning of his government, looked for institutional and legal mechanisms to repress left-wing organizations, trade unions and popular movements. In this respect, I disagree with Moisés Vinhas who argues that between 1945 and 1947 people in the country experienced an intense period of exercising their democratic freedoms. Vinhas also argues that the situation started to change in 1947 as a result of the new tendencies in international politics. I believe that since the first signs of change in the international scenario, the Dutra government started to use authoritarian mechanisms to contain the process towards democratization in the country and to restrict the influence of left-wing groups (Vinhas 1982, 93-94). Thus, on 2nd March 1946, the National Constituent Assembly approved the maintenance of the

11 Cf. Dennis, (1949, 2B).

text of the authoritarian 1937 Constitution until the promulgation of the new Constitution.

On 15th March, in an effort to maintain its authoritarian grip, the government promulgated Decree-Law n. 9.070, based on the *Estado Novo* Constitution, and set up mechanisms to repress the right to strike. The authoritarianism imbued in the decree meant, in practice, the prohibition of strikes, affecting the most important unions in the country. However, the working class, particularly in the large urban centers, kept up their mobilizations and confrontations against employers and the government (Munhoz 2002, 41-59; 48-52). From the inception of its struggle for legality at the end of the Vargas dictatorship, the PCB had adopted a more conservative approach and preached cooperation between the working class and the bourgeoisie, aiming to stimulate an increase in productivity and promote the conditions for competition between national and foreign companies.

This approach was adopted by other Latin American communist parties (Chilcote 1982, 103-104). Prestes went as far as claiming that it was preferable to tighten belts and be hungry rather than strike and cause unrest, because unrest and disturbances in that particular historical period would only assist fascism¹². Despite this attitude repression against the party steadily increased. Within this context, some sectors of the working class, disappointed with this position, detached themselves from the Communist Party, which often clashed with their immediate interests of fighting for better salaries and improving living standards.

The strategy of the PCB was long-term and, to a large extent, the product of an analysis of the international political context. At the end of World War II, the USSR, broken by the German war machine but at the same time strengthened by its victory over the invaders, and having received widespread recognition for the role it played during the war, sought an agreement with capitalist powers to provide their country with time and the conditions for reconstruction. In other words, for the Soviet Union, this was a time for reconstructing the 'Home of Socialism' and, if necessary (as in fact occurred in Greece and Northern Italy, to cite two examples), it was willing to sacrifice the interests of the proletariat in other regions of the world. Within this

12 Prestes speech during a rally which took place on 26th November 1945 in: Vinhas (1982, p. 92). Vinhas (1982, 92).

historical scenario, the period between 1944 and 1946 saw efforts to find new forms of socialism in Eastern Europe¹³.

Ever since Prestes left prison, in the dying days of the Vargas government, he understood that in order for the party to fulfill its mission it would have to adopt the banner of 'order and peace'. According to him, with the victory over Nazism, the world had entered into a new phase and it was necessary to steer the nation towards progress:

This is our current and most urgent task. In order for it to be achieved, in an orderly and peaceful fashion, we need a stronger union of all our people: patriots, democrats and progressives of all classes. Against such a wide-ranging union, there will only be a small reactionary and fascist minority who still hopes to arrest the democratic avalanche through coup d'états and civil wars. However, if we unite: progressive workers and employers, democratic peasants and farmers, intellectuals and militants, we can beat them and steer our nation towards progress and save our people from the physical destruction, cultural backwardness and moral decay which threatens us. (Moraes 1982, 105-106)

By the middle of 1945 Prestes believed that the old structure was collapsing and that the process of democratization was irreversible. All this was a result of the euphoria which permeated progressive sectors of society in face of the transformations underway. However, over subsequent years, signs of the twilight of the democratic spring made themselves felt in the most diverse regions of the globe. In Greece the communists were massacred by English bombings, whilst Stalin remained silent awaiting a possible agreement with the Anglo-Americans; in Italy and France the communists were expelled from government; in Eastern Europe there was a brutal aggravation of the situation, where 'new forms of socialism' succumbed to the Soviet model and the region fell under intense repression. These events were also felt in Brazil. The country was experiencing a paradox: it had undergone a gradual process of opening democratic spaces at the end of dictatorship and now saw the rapid hardening of what, in theory, should have been a democratic system.

In government, apart from concerns about the growing organization of the working class, there was growing apprehension regarding the continuous mobilization of public servants and an increase in communist influences

13 Discussion on this topic can be found in: Spriano (1987).

within this sector. As a result, in May 1946, repressive measures were adopted in order to contain disturbances and exercise greater control over the public sector. However, even before this period, public servants with ties to the PCB were being repressed.

Moreover, on 23rd May 1946, a demonstration organized by the PCB at Largo da Carioca square, in Rio de Janeiro, was heavily repressed. Police action led to the death of Zélia Magalhães, dozens of people were injured and fifty arrests were made (Segatto et al. 1982, 82).

The Unified Workers' Movement (MUT), set up in April 1945 by important communist leaders, had been suffering repression since the beginning of the Dutra government. In May 1946 they were no longer allowed to operate and intervention was ordered in organizations linked to it. MUT's trade union elections were suspended. Dozens of their leaders were arrested.

According to some authors, the country was under a "white state of siege" (Bethell 1992, 58). After tough repression of the trade union movement, the government, believing to be in control of the situation, allowed the National Congress of Workers to take place on 11th September in São Januário (the Vasco of Gama football club stadium), in Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, as each union could be represented by two delegates, one nominated by the management and a second chosen during the general assembly, an informal alliance between independents and communists guaranteed the latter control of the process. Generally speaking, this grouping defended the basic principles which had guided MUT's creation. Amongst its objectives, the following stood out: trade union autonomy, unrestricted right to strike, creation of a confederation of workers and its affiliation to the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

On 21st September, about 200 of the 1500 participants left the congress alleging that it was under communist control. Despite the split, the event continued and approved the creation of the Confederation of Brazilian Workers (CTB). The government never recognized the legality of the CTB and the Constitution promulgated in September embodied the spirit of the labor legislation established during the *Estado Novo*, restricting trade union autonomy, free negotiation, the unrestricted right to strike and other banners of the trade unionist movement (Bethell 1992, 58-60).

The repressive process which started in 1946 became more virulent during the following year. The policy of repression not only affected the PCB, but

other left-wing groupings, trade union organizations and social movements which became the focus of governmental coercion. Even the conservative opposition was affected by the regime's repressive rage.

The UDN party - [National Democratic Union] - frequently reported violations of their constitutional rights and repression of its members and party manifestations. In January 1947, the party chairman contacted the press regarding a number of violent acts and political persecution against the party and asked their municipal offices to report incidents¹⁴. On 9th January a UDN federal deputy, José Augusto, reported persecutions against members of the party in the state of Rio Grande do Norte. Some days later the same deputy accused President Dutra of colluding with the scenario of violence which reigned in his state¹⁵. A week later, the Electoral Tribunal of Paraíba advised the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that it had received reports of violence against UDN members¹⁶.

Coercion against social movements was also on the increase. In mid-January, a rally organized by the *União Sindical*, a trade union, in Rio de Janeiro, was prevented from taking place by the police¹⁷. At the same time, a student demonstration was dispersed at the Largo São Francisco square, in São Paulo¹⁸. Thus, different forms of manifestations by the organized sectors of civil society were curtailed on a daily basis, clearly violating the constitution enshrined in the *Magna Carta* of September 1946. At the same time, from the beginning of 1946, a process was being drafted to make the PCB illegal. Segatto argues that by March 1946, a document from the American Embassy in Brazil reported receiving information that a decree was being drafted to make the PCB illegal. It further related that preparations were underway to arrest the leaders of the party as soon as the decree was signed. Moreover, on 23rd March, federal deputies Barreto Pinto and Himalaia Virgulino requested that the TSE annul the PCB's registration¹⁹.

14 Reclamações contra violências policiais. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 04 (January): 8.

15 Novo Protesto contra violências no Rio Grande do Norte. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 09 (January): 3. Cf. Carnificina ao norte. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 11 (January).

16 Graves ocorrências na Paraíba e em Alagoas. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 16 (January): 5.

17 Comício sindical dissolvido pela polícia. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 16 (January).

18 Protesto de Estudantes. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 17 (January): 3.

19 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Processo 411/412. Distrito Federal. Cancelamento do registro do Partido Comunista do Brasil. Requerentes: Honorato Himalaya Vergolino and Edmundo Barreto Pinto. 07 May 1947 session. Cf. Segatto et al. (1982, 57-58).

The argument used to annul the PCB's registration was founded on a description of the party as an international organization, subjected to the interests of a foreign power, the Soviet Union, and thus, in the case of war with the USSR, the communists would take sides against Brazil. It also claimed that the PCB was anti-Brazilian and their activities were harmful to the country, instigating class war, fomenting strikes and other manifestations to create an environment of confusion and unrest and, finally, install a totalitarian dictatorship in Brazil. According to Leôncio Basbaum, at the beginning of 1947 the PCB was accused in Congress of receiving money from Moscow, and consequently, a committee was set up to investigate the Party's accounts. Its headquarters in Rua da Glória were visited by a police officer who was received by the party's treasurer (Basbaum himself). Basbaum said that nothing amiss was found with the accounts, but the police saw a copy of the Party's statute on the table and noticed that this version diverged from the one legally registered, which according to Basbaum, only served to formally comply with the requirements of the electoral tribunal. Again according to Basbaum, this was used as a pretext to make the PCB illegal (Basbaum 1976, 202).

Prestes recalled these events by stating that the campaign against the legality of the party emerged in a debate at the Association of Public Servants of Rio de Janeiro [*Associação de Funcionários Públicos do Rio de Janeiro*], in March 1946. At the time, according to Prestes, they had asked him what the PCB's position would be if Brazil went to war with the Soviet Union. The communist party leader, Prestes, replied that he would condemn it as a criminal act and condemn any government that might lead its people into an imperialist war. According to Prestes, that is how the story was construed that he had categorically stated that he would be on the Soviet Union's side. A similar question had been posed by Juracy Magalhães, also in March 1946, and the reply given by Prestes was that the communists would be against the war (Moraes 1982, 115-166).

On 15th April, the Communist Youth was suspended for a period of six months (Brazil 1947a)²⁰. On 7th May, the PCB was made illegal by having its registration annulled by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)²¹. The

20 Cf. Suspensão do funcionamento da União da Juventude Comunista. 1947, *OESP*. São Paulo, 16 (April): 3; O fechamento da Juventude Comunista. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 18 (April): 3.

21 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Cancelamento do registro do PCB. Resolução no 1.841, do TSE (7 maio 1947); O TSE decidiu por 3 votos contra 2 cancelar o registro do PC. 1947. *OESP*.

communists, who had just come out of illegality, received widespread and legitimate popular support. Its grassroots organizations had grown rapidly across the country and their various publications in the most important state capitals and other medium-sized and large cities attracted an enviable number of readers. The party had been well supported at the polls in the 1945 and 1947 elections, winning approximately 10% of the votes for President of the Republic. It also managed to elect a senator and obtain a significant presence in the state and municipal legislative bodies of the main Brazilian cities, as well as representatives in the Federal Chamber of Deputies.

This considerable growth in popular support for the PCB was reflected in the numbers of new party members and the growing number of activists who contacted the party in the different regions of the country. At the time, the party claimed to have 200,000 members, making it the largest communist party in Latin America. It may be that this figure is an overestimation. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the party grew enormously in terms of membership. Bethell makes reference to 180,000 and Prestes, in an interview during the 1980s, claimed that the party had over 150,000 activists (Chilcote 1982, 102).

The cancellation of the Communist Party's registration also generated protests by conservative sectors of society. The *Correio da Manhã* newspaper argued that on the date of the anniversary of the United Nations' victory against 'Nazi-fascism', Brazil, which had also been part of this victory, was heading in a strange direction. According to the newspaper,

[...] democracy decided to mutilate itself, excluding from its core a political party which has so far been recognized as legitimate and legal. As from yesterday, our democratic system is no longer intact, because any gesture of exclusion or intolerance against a strand of public opinion, organized as a party, is a blow against the system itself.²²

The paper also believed that the voting which took place at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, where the annulation had been decided by three votes to two, reflected perplexity and indecision in face of a matter which was much more political in nature than judicial. Subsequently, as if anticipating what

São Paulo, 08 (May): 3-5; O julgamento do processo de fechamento do PC. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 08 (May): 3 - 5.

22 A situação Brasileira. 1947. *Correio da Manhã*. Rio de Janeiro, 08 (May): 4.

was to come, the newspaper signaled potential future problems which could further aggravate the situation, leading to a blurring of the lines between legality and illegality, order and disorder in the country.

The Communist Party has seats both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate: there are no constitutional devices which authorize the cancellation of their mandates. The Communist Party has a number of publications: and the government cannot back (citation) an action to close them down.²³

The decision of the TSE to close the PCB down had been expected. A memorandum from the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, sent to the Chargé d'Affaires on 25th April, reported on the preparations to annul the Communist Party's registration and a possible intervention in São Paulo. The American diplomat recommended caution in this matter, since it could merely be alarmist gossip, but he was found to be well-informed, when he indicated that the votes in the Supreme Tribunal would be 3 to 2 or 4 to 2 against the communists. On 7th May a telegram informed the Department of State that the decision was expected that same day and that the government was prepared for potential disturbances²⁴

The votes of three judges had been known for a few days. The opinions of the three judges who voted in favor of the annulment circulated in the corridors of government. The President himself had pledged to approve the measure. Furthermore, '*O Estado de S. Paulo*', an afternoon paper which reached the streets at 3pm, announced the results before the judges had reached a final verdict²⁵.

There were many criticisms of the PCB both in the '*O Estado de S. Paulo*' and in the '*Correio da Manhã*', but at the same time, they argued for the right of

23 A situação Brasileira. 1947. *Correio da Manhã*. Rio de Janeiro, 08 (May): 4.

24 DESPATCH SECRET 2201. American Embassy (Rio de Janeiro) to Department of State. May, 2, 1947. (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 11, frames 26-30) Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; Incoming Telegram. Department of State. Rio de Janeiro Embassy. May, 7, 1947, (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 11, frames 30-39), Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Digital Archive at CDO/LabTempo. Comcap-Complexo de Centrais de Apoio à Pesquisa da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, Brazil, hereinafter referred to as CDO/LabTempo(UEM).

25 O TSE decidiu por 3 votos contra 2 cancelar o registro do PC. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 08 (May): 3, 5.

the party to exist. The decision to make the PCB illegal received the support of more reactionary sectors of society, but it was also criticized by a wide range of forces, from left to right. Even die-hard anti-communists such as Carlos Lacerda vehemently condemned the measure and suggested caution so that the mandates of communist parliamentarians would not be annulled. He also warned that measures which might restrict the freedom of the press should not be tolerated (Lacerda 1947, 2).

Opinions diverge as to the influence of the American government in the decision to annul the PCB registration. On the one hand, in 1948, Truman argued against making the Communist Party illegal in the United States, alleging that (in the USA) there existed repressive laws 'against people who attempted to depose the government'. Moreover, he argued that making a political party illegal was against 'American' principles.²⁶

Intense discussions were held on this topic in the United States at the time. Important political personalities in the country, such as Harold Stassen, argued that the United States should invite members of the United Nations to act collectively against the communist threat. For him, communist organizations should be made illegal²⁷. Moreover, the Mundt project, approved by Congress and vetoed by Truman, established rigorous control over communist organizations. Subsequently, Senator Pat McCarran put forward a new draft bill in which he drew on many of the proposals in Mundt. The project was approved, Truman vetoed it, but his veto was overridden by Congress. The McCarran draft bill became the Internal Security Act which established the right of the Department of State to prevent the entrance into the country or allow for the deportation of any foreigners linked to organizations which were suspected of being communist. Furthermore, the Internal Security Act criminalized disturbances. It set up tough mechanisms for controlling spying and foresaw the construction of concentration camps to detain those suspected of subversion. It is important to recall that McCarran had put forward a legislative amendment in 1947 that allowed the government to fire public servants accused of belonging to the Communist Party (McCarran 1984, 386-387).²⁸ On the other hand, the number of Latin American countries that

26 AHI. File 51-3-5. 600.1 (22). Carta Telegrama da Embaixada do Brasil em Washington, endereçada ao Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 14 May 1948.

27 AHI- Embaixada do Brasil. Washington. Pasta 51-3-5. Cartas Telegramas. 600.1 (22). CT 357.

28 AHI. Embaixada do Brasil. Washington. Pasta 51-3-5, CT 02/06/1948. Public papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on the Republican Position on

made communist parties illegal in 1947 and subsequent years corroborates the theory that there was co-coordinated action in this regard and that the United States held control over this matter.

Meanwhile, on the same date on which the PCB was made illegal, the Confederation of Brazilian Workers (CTB), the Trade Unions and similar organizations were suspended for six months (Brazil 1947b)²⁹. These organizations were accused of being controlled by communists and acting as co-optation bodies which sought to de-stabilize the *status quo*.

The decree which divested the management from these institutions also established governing boards, nominated by the Ministry of Work, in every trade union which had financially contributed to the suspended organizations or which were affiliated to them (Brazil 1947b and Gawryszewski 2002, 43 and Bandeira 1978, 311-312 and Chilcote 1982, 101).

Based on this decree, on the same day, 14 trade unions suffered governmental intervention. During the following days, dozens of organizations were violently repressed and their leaders were arrested. There were a total of 143 interventions, representing 15.15% of all trade union organizations recognized by the government (Chilcote 1982, 100-101).³⁰

The PCB appealed to the Supreme Federal Tribunal (SFT), requesting that the decision to make it illegal be revoked as they believed the measure to be unconstitutional. Luís Carlos Prestes sent a telegram to regional party offices asking them to accept the decision until the appeal had been decided upon by the STF³¹. As repression intensified, the PCB started to attack the President of the Republic directly and demand his resignation.

Immigration. October 20, 1952. Available at: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2266&st=immigration&stl>; The President's News Conference of September 7, 1950. <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=867&st=&stl>; Letter to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, on the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. May 12, 1951. <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=316&st=Letter+to+the+Chairman&stl>. Accessed on 20 April 2008.

29 O funcionamento da Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 08 (May): 5. Cf. Incoming Telegram. Rio de Janeiro Embassy. May, 8, 1947. (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 11, frame 40) Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Digital Archive at CDO/LabTempo.(UEM).

30 O funcionamento da Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 08 (May): 5; Segatto et al. (1982) (mentions the intervention of 400 union members up to the end of the Dutra government).

31 O momento Político. A telegram from Senator Luis Carlos Prestes to PCB entities. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 08 (May): 5.

This was proposed by Maurício Grabois in the Chamber of Deputies. There are divergences as to how this occurred. According to Basbaum, he made a melancholic speech, in a funereal tone, whilst federal deputies on the government's side smiled to themselves. Basbaum also recalls that nobody replied to the speech, not even to defend the President (Segatto et al. 1982, 88 and Basbaum 1976, 203). However, American diplomatic documents indicate that Grabois was interrupted in his speech by the President of the Chamber on a point of order. The document also stated that the speech was printed in full and distributed by the '*Tribuna Popular*'³². The '*Correio da Manhã*', one of the few press organizations which defended PCB's right of existence, heavily criticized the radicalization of the PCB³³. On May 16th Prestes made a speech in the Senate demanding Dutra's resignation. On the same day, federal deputy, Alfonso de Carvalho, presented a proposal to annul the mandates of communist members of congress. The proposal was turned into a draft bill by Deputy Ivo de Aquino, a member of the PSD party.

As soon as the PCB was made illegal, many of its regional headquarters were searched, documents were confiscated and activists were mistreated, attacked or arrested. Prestes recalled that approximately 600 party cells were closed in Rio; 361 cells, 22 district offices and 102 committees in São Paulo; and 123 committees in Porto Alegre (Moraes 1982, 118). These figures may have been somewhat exaggerated, however repression was intense and affected all regions of the country. Through their own publication, '*Tribuna Popular*', the communists accused the Brazilian government of following American orders to make the PCB illegal³⁴.

In July 1947 the government sent a draft bill to the Federal Deputy Chamber restricting public freedoms. It advocated censorship of the press and attacked the stability of both public and private sectors workers. The

32 Communist Manifesto vigorously attacks President Dutra in connection with closing of Communist Party. American Embassy. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May 20, 1947. Restricted no. 2311 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 11, frames 114-117) Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, Digital Archive at CDO/LabTempo.(UEM).

33 American Embassy. Rio de Janeiro. Despatch 2291. May, 18, 1947. (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 11, frames 90-95) Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Digital Archive at CDO/LabTempo.(UEM).

34 Department of State. Incoming Telegram. From Rio Embassy. May, 17, 1947. (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 11, frames 96-97) Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Digital Archive at CDO/LabTempo.(UEM).

original bill was so authoritarian that the conservative paper '*O Estado de São Paulo*' described it as a 'blow against the constitution'. The paper also described the bill as fascist³⁵. The '*Correio da Manhã*' and other newspapers also criticized the measure.

In 1948, the PCB's Central Committee published the '*Manifesto de Janeiro*' [January Manifesto]. It criticized the policies of the Party when it was legal. In the document the PCB considered that it had adopted a policy of "[...] systematic containment of the struggles of the proletarian masses in the name of cooperation between workers and employers and an alliance with the 'progressive bourgeoisie'. It also paid little attention to the struggles of rural workers against large land owners." (Segatto et al. 1982, 94)

From this moment onwards the party sought to develop a policy of infiltrating other parties whilst maintaining a clandestine party structure. Many activists were arrested, others went underground, but the party continued to influence national life in one way or another.

The PCB, despite operating in illegality, continued to produce daily and weekly publications, in addition to other periodicals. The party organized the 'Fight for Peace' campaign in Brazil, under the guidance of Cominform. 'Fight for Peace' occurred within the context of the Cold War and aimed to bring about mass mobilization in different regions of the globe. It attacked the nuclear arms race and held the imperialist actions of the United States responsible for the conflict.

In 1951, during the second Vargas government, the PCB played a key role in the campaign against Brazil's participation in the Korean War. In the following year, the party moved to prevent the Brazil-United States Military Agreement. Meanwhile, it actively participated in the '*O Petróleo é Nosso*' [It's our oil] campaign. The PCB also played a part in organizing the '*Greve dos 300 mil*', a large strike that took place in the city of São Paulo in 1953. According to José Álvaro Moisés, the strike was punctuated by spontaneous actions and there was a willingness to provide continuity to the movement; however the organizers of the strike, who were PCB activists, decided to negotiate an agreement which resulted in a partial victory, though at the same time it was below the expectations the leaders themselves had espoused (Moises 1978, 93-94).

35 Golpe na Constituição. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 23 (July): 5. Cf. A nova lei de segurança. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 24 (July): 5.

This was one of the largest strikes in Brazilian history. The party also organized the struggle against the high cost of living, involving thousands of demonstrators in the main urban centers of the country. During the 1950s, the PCB played an important role in organizing the struggles of rural workers. Amongst the main events in which the communists were significantly involved were the Trombas and Formoso movements, in the state of Goiás, which took place between the 1940s and 1960s, and that of Porecatu, in the state of Paraná between 1947 and 1951³⁶. Moreover, the communists promoted the creation of many rural trade unions. Nevertheless, it would never become the party of masses that it showed signs of becoming between 1945 and 1947.

Repression and control of social movements

Even multipartisan events, such as the one on 22nd August 1947 to commemorate the fifth anniversary of Brazil going to war, were broken up by the police. In this case, police forces went as far as firing into the crowd³⁷. A demonstration to commemorate the first anniversary of the new Constitution, organized by the *Liga de Defesa Nacional* [National Defense League]³⁸, took place on 18th September in Vale do Anhangabaú, in the center of São Paulo. Many members of congress were present, as well as many government representatives. Nevertheless, it was violently crushed by the police when a speaker criticized the new National Security legislation³⁹. At the end of October, communist deputies were arrested in Alagoas, accused of attempting to release prisoners by armed force. The daily paper '*Diário do Povo*', which belonged to the UDN party, wrote an article criticizing the case and their

36 For a detailed study of the conflicts in Porecatu, see.: Priori (2000).

37 Dissolvido violentamente um comício no Rio. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 23 (August): 2.

38 The *Liga de Defesa Nacional* was a legal and patriotic organization founded by Olavo Bilac and other nationalists; however, the PCB maintained friendly relations with this organization. (Chilcote 1982, 89).

39 Comemoração do primeiro aniversário da constituição. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 19 (September): 5.
Cf. Oliveira, R. C. de. 1947. Como se comemorou a Constituição. *OESP*. São Paulo, 20 (September): 3.

offices were invaded by the police, printing workers were detained and issues of the paper were confiscated⁴⁰.

Repression against communist activists intensified as debates concerning the draft bill to annul the mandate of Communist Party members of congress gained momentum. Sectors of the population became increasingly involved through organized demonstrations, the collection of signatures and other activities. In November 1947 a number of communist activists were arrested for distributing leaflets in Rio de Janeiro⁴¹. On the 23rd of the same month, a demonstration to commemorate the victory of the mayor of the town of Santo André, elected by the *Partido Social Trabalhista* [Social Labor Party], and to protest against the draft bill proposing the annulment of the mandates of communist parliamentarians, was not allowed to take place. The following day, another demonstration against the annulment, which occurred in the city of Santos, was brutally repressed by the police. This led to many protests by communists in the state legislative assembly when members reported that they had also been beaten up and their parliamentary immunity had not been respected⁴².

A similar occurrence took place in São Paulo on the following day, 26th November, when communist activists, led by two of their members of congress, Roque Trevisan and Lourival Vilar, set up a table in Praça Patriarca square to collect signatures against the annulment of mandates of members of congress belonging to the PCB. This time, they were arbitrarily detained and remained incommunicado for a number of hours. State Deputy Lourival Vilar spoke at the Legislative Assembly claiming that the chief of police refused to provide any identification and that when he, the deputy, recalled the Constitution, the officer said that he was not aware of any constitution⁴³. There were some manifestations in support of communists at the Assembly by various members, including the UDN leadership, who denounced the fact that Article 12 of the State Constitution had been disrespected. Meanwhile, members of the PRP party defended repression and accused the members

40 Violências em Alagoas. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 28 (October): 3.

41 Prisão de comunistas no Rio. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 09 (November).

42 Comícios dissolvidos pela polícia no interior. Violentamente impedida, em Santos, uma manifestação de protesto contra a cassação de mandatos - Proibida uma passeata em Santo André - Também em Campos foi interrompido um 'meeting' de elementos comunista. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 25 (November): 3. Brutalidades cometidas pela polícia em Santos. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 27 (November): 4.

43 Agitação e debates sobre a prisão de dois deputados comunistas. Como se verificou a prisão. Violentos ataques aos comunistas. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 28 (November): 4.

of the assembly who had been arrested of causing unrest. The PSD (Social Democratic Party) was the main party affected by annulation, since it would see its numbers in Congress increase, taking up communist places. During the previous elections, the party had entered into a coalition with the Communist Party

At the same time, a demonstration against the annulation of the communist mandates which occurred outside Nove de Julho Palace, seat of São Paulo's government, was broken up by the police. The UDN's Executive Commission approved a motion condemning the action of the police and held them responsible for disruptions and aggression against citizens who were demonstrating in an orderly fashion and in accordance to the law⁴⁴. In December, the *Polícia de Ordem Política e Social* [Social and Political Police Force] prohibited a public demonstration by city councilors, members of the PST Party⁴⁵.

Hoping to gain support for actions of repression and social control, the Minister for Work met the main trade union leaders who sided with the government on 25th November. Members of governing bodies imposed on some trade unions by the Government were present, together with other trade union leaders. At the meeting they discussed the expulsion of communists from these organizations, as well as debating the setting up of anticommunist activities⁴⁶.

It is worth noting that the government's strategy was not only based on police repression, but also on the co-opting of leaders, to counterbalance the discrimination and exclusion of undesirable members in certain trade unions. As a result, unions under intervention or which were anti-communist started to exclude from their membership those who were accused of being communists. A report in the '*O Estado de S. Paulo*' stated that in November 1947 the Steelworkers' Union removed approximately 900 communists from its membership⁴⁷.

44 Graves acontecimentos desenrolados em frente ao Palácio Nove de Julho. Digno protesto da UDN contra as desordens e violências praticadas pelos agentes do governo do Estado. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 03 (December): 4.

45 Negada permissão para a realização de novos comícios. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 03 (December): 4.

46 Direção das Entidades. Examinada a questão em seus diversos aspectos, na reunião de dirigentes de sindicatos, ontem promovida pelo ministro do trabalho - os trabalhadores e as comemorações anti-comunistas de amanhã. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 26 (November): 16.

47 Os Comunistas nos sindicatos trabalhistas. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 07 (November): p. 4.

In July 1947, the Committee on Constitution and Justice at the Federal Chamber of Deputies assessed a proposal to set up a Committee on Antidemocratic Activities (apparently inspired by the USA's Committee on Un-American Activities). However, the proposal was considered to be unconstitutional⁴⁸.

The repression against communists continued throughout General Dutra's mandate. When Prestes came to consider repression during this period, he said that by the end of the Dutra government, 55 militants involved in party campaigns had died, though he did not provide any details of these events (Moraes 1982, 120). The intensity of repression led some authors to claim that during this period there was an anti-communist crusade taking place in the country (Davis 1996, 55).

Newspapers constantly reported on repression against communist activists. Members of Congress who had their mandates cancelled became the target of an anti-communist witch hunt. Among various examples, we could cite the case of the disappearance of former deputy Jose Sanches Segura, detained in Jundiá. Through *habeas corpus*, it became known that Segura was no longer held in São Paulo. Information on his whereabouts was totally misleading and it took many days before the family received notice from the authorities on his whereabouts⁴⁹. On 31st March 1948, former communist members of Congress were arrested once again. This time, it was the turn of Nilton Caires de Brito, Mario Schemberg and Celestino dos Santos. They were arrested because they disseminated a manifesto denouncing political repression in São Paulo. They had been accused of violating Article 1 of Decree-Law n.8.186 of 19th October 1945, in relation to national security. Issues of '*O Popular*' where the manifesto was published were confiscated⁵⁰. The former Federal Deputy, Maurício Grabois, one of the main leaders of PCB, was arrested together with another 60 activists at the beginning of April, accused of organizing a rural uprising⁵¹.

The governor of São Paulo, Ademar de Barros, elected with the support of the communists, became their main opponent. Ademar de Barros acted furiously against his former allies. He hoped to become known as the

48 Inconstitucional o projeto criando a Comissão de Atividades Antidemocráticas. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 02 (July): 3.

49 Ignorado o paradeiro de um ex-deputado. 1948. *OESP*. 06 (March): 3.

50 Prisão de ex-deputados e dirigentes comunistas. 1948. *OESP*. 01 (April): 3.

51 See. CT 309 - AHI File on the Brazilian Embassy in Washington 51-3-5.

communists' number one enemy and hence gain the trust of the Federal Government⁵². At the same time, anti-communist sectors of the working class denounced communist action as being dangerous for the country⁵³.

Repression against the communist press⁵⁴

Returning once again to the annulation process of the PCB registration, after the decision on 7th May 1947 repression immediately came down hard on the entire communist press. In May itself, '*Voz do Povo*' (from Maceió) and '*Jornal do Povo*' (from João Pessoa) were closed.⁵⁵

On 21st October 1947, the headquarters of '*Tribuna Popular*' was plundered. In a speech at the São Paulo Legislative Assembly, State Deputy Caio Prado Jr., protested against the attitude of the police, who when informed of the incident did nothing to prevent the destruction and damage to installations, despite the fact that their central headquarters were but a few meters away. Newspapers reported a number of cases in which the police did nothing to stop damage being done to newspaper installations. They were even sometimes accused of facilitating the action of these groups, which were apparently linked to the repressive apparatus⁵⁶. According to Caio Prado Jr., members of the public who attempted to stop looters were attacked by police officers⁵⁷. As a result of this event, the communists organized a para-military group to protect the '*Tribuna*' headquarters. At the beginning of December the police invaded their headquarters and arrested more than ten activists, accused of carrying weapons and organizing 'shock troops'⁵⁸. Following this

52 Em São Paulo. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 6 (March): 3.

53 Manifesto Anticomunista aos comerciários. 1948. *OESP*, São Paulo, 24 (March): 18; Proclamação do Sindicato dos Comerciários à nação. 1948. *OESP*, São Paulo, 31 (March): 2.

54 This part of the text was taken from an article by Munhoz (2002, p. 41-60) with extensive alterations

55 Suspensão de Jornais. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 15 (May): 3.

56 Cf. A covardia não constrói. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 26 (October): 3. O *Correio da Manhã* published a protest note against the police action. Cf. Segatto et al. (1982, 89).

57 Empastelamento da Tribuna Popular. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 23 (October).

58 Diligências nas oficinas da Tribuna Popular. 1947. *OESP*. São Paulo, 02 (December): 20.

episode, the newspaper was no longer allowed to circulate. Its publishers started disseminating another newspaper, '*Imprensa Popular*', which also had its editions of 30th and 31st December 1947 and 1st January 1948 confiscated. On 8th January, immediately after the mandates of communist members of Congress were cancelled, the Minister for Justice signed a decree suspending the newspaper. When the police arrived to comply with this order, there was a confrontation with workers at the newspaper offices. Many were wounded and 25 people were arrested. This had repercussions in Congress, where a motion repudiating police repression was signed by Alfonso Arinos, Hermes Lima, Jaci Figueiredo, Monteiro de Castro, Café Filho, Gurgel do Amaral, Nelson Carneiro and other members of Congress⁵⁹.

On 31st January the edition of '*Hoje*' (São Paulo) was confiscated - this time under the accusation of 'using offensive language towards the authorities and inciting an uprising of society'. For '*O Estado de S. Paulo*', the actions of the Department of Social and Political Order were, once again, a blow against freedom of the press. The edition of '*Hoje*' was confiscated for having reported on the actions of the police against the printers in order to confiscate a leaflet called 'Zé Brazil', by Monteiro Lobato, entitled "Police raid offices of Atualidades Ltda."⁶⁰

On 3rd February, at dawn, the headquarters of '*Hoje*' were breached again. The chief of police claimed that there was resistance. About thirty people were arrested⁶¹. On the 15th the Minister for Justice suspended the '*Tribuna Popular*' for a period of six months⁶². On the 27th, '*Hoje*' was again suspended, again for six months. The penalty applied was based on Article 4, Decree-Law 431 of 1938, relating to crimes against national security. The paper also mentions the arrest of staff members and the vote of Judge Azevedo Marques - in favor of the *habeas corpus* requested for those arrested - who stated that the decree-law drawn on clashed head-on with the constitution in force⁶³. On 6th March the '*Tribuna Popular*' was again suspended for fifteen days, accused of 'carrying out a propaganda war'⁶⁴. On 3rd March, the newspaper '*Notícias de Hoje*' (the successor to *Hoje*) was suspended for fifteen days. The police had been confiscating copies of the paper for days and maintained close surveillance

59 Suspendo a Imprensa Popular. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 09 (January): 3.

60 Atentado à liberdade de imprensa. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 01 (February)

61 Atacada pela polícia a folha comunista "Hoje". 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 04 (February)

62 Suspensa a 'Tribuna Popular'. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 17 (February): 3.

63 Suspendo por seis meses o jornal. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 28 (February): 3.

64 A suspensão do jornal "Hoje". 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 07 (February): 3.

of the organization's printing offices⁶⁵. On the 4th, copies of '*O Popular*', launched to substitute '*Notícias de Hoje*', were also confiscated. In addition, the periodical '*O Trabalho*', which was distributed in the city of Sorocaba and was printed in the same offices, also had its circulation banned⁶⁶. Once again, '*O Estado de S. Paulo*' strongly criticized the Ministry for Justice and the police for disrespecting the law and for the atrocities committed. From the dates presented above we can observe violations of freedom of information and an abusive amount of force used in applying, if not arbitrary, then at least dubious legal measures. Osório Borba, in an article published by '*O Estado de S. Paulo*', stated:

[...] The police fired shots at the printing offices, broke the doors of the building down, and after controlling those who were desperately trying to resist, immobilized them, brutally beating them and dragging them through the streets, as if they were not human beings, but a herd of animals flogged by their cruel owners [...]. (Borba 1948, p. 3)

The press reported dozens of arbitrary cases, mistreatment and torture suffered by arrested activists. On 24th February 1948, for example, '*O Estado de S. Paulo*' reported the arrest of former communist federal deputy, Gervásio Gomes de Azevedo. According to the paper, the former deputy was brutally beaten, left without food and submitted to torture. Findings of legal experts indicated that the prisoner had a number of marks left by beatings to his body⁶⁷. On that same day, the paper also reported on the arbitrary arrest of Holda Malanconi, member of the State Commission of the Brazilian Socialist Party. The report highlighted that the party activist, from an organization that was legally registered, was followed by the police for several days⁶⁸.

Repression during the Dutra government reached many different social sectors. According to Gawryszewski, Dutra continued strategies developed during the *Estado Novo*, to control cultural manifestations such as carnival. In 1949, the *União Geral das Escolas de Samba do Brasil*, [Association of Samba schools] was set up and led by an army major. Gawryszewski also

65 Suspensão o Jornal Notícias de Hoje. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 04 (March): 3.

66 Novo jornal impedido de circular. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 05 (March): 3.

67 As sevícias sofridas por um ex-deputado comunista. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 24 (February): 3.

68 Pedido de 'Habeas Corpus' em favor de um membro do Partido Socialista. 1948. *OESP*. São Paulo, 24 (February): 3.

argued that censorship was applied to songs before they were transmitted by the broadcasting system, through the Censorship Service for Public Entertainment (Gawryszewski 2002, 43-44).

Despite all the repression the communists did not give in and party activists together with members of other political forces set up PPP - the Popular Progressist Party, in 1949⁶⁹. However, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal denied the request for registration of the new party on the grounds that it was in reality a communist organization⁷⁰. There were on the government side, at the time, those who went as far as conceiving a project for cancelling the right to vote of citizens who had been members of the extinct PCB⁷¹. However, as this measure violated constitutional rights it was soon abandoned.

Brazil is not alone: shared repression

The repressive process which took place in Brazil was not an isolated case. Similar to how the United States had supported and promoted authoritarian regimes to abandon power in Latin America between approximately 1944 and 1946, after this period it started to support a number of anti-democratic groups in seizing power. The United States hoped to eliminate the influence of communist parties. Similarly, they also supported State control over the working-class movement and the exclusion of the Soviet Union's influence on the Hemisphere (Smith 1996, 131). The Communist Party was made illegal in Brazil on 7th May 1947, in Chile in April of that same year and in Costa Rica in July 1948. The mandates of communist members of Congress were cancelled

69 In 1947, authorization for the registration of the *Partido Constitucionalista Brasileiro*, [Brazilian Constitutionalist Party] had already been denied. It was also a successor of the PCB. See Chilcote (1982, 100); note 26.

70 See Document 576 of American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, July 6, 1949 to Department of State. (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1492, roll 13, frames 0187). Records of The Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Brazil. 1945-1949. Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Digital Archive at CDO/LabTempo. (UEM).

71 Cassação dos títulos dos eleitores comunistas. 1948. *Correio Paulistano*. São Paulo, 09 (November). Seria levantado o cadastro eleitoral e far-se-ia o confronto com o fichário do extinto PC.B., em poder da polícia. *Correio Paulistano*. 01 nov.1948. FGV-CPDOC Arquivo Getúlio Vargas (A.G.V.). rolo 10, fotograma 187. quadrantes 3 - 4.

in Chile in 1947 and in Brazil in January 1948. During this year a total of eight countries made communist parties illegal. By 1956, communists had been excluded from the electoral process and removed from public service in fourteen of the twenty countries in the region. Their press and propaganda had also been restricted or made illegal (Smith 1996, 132). Moreover, the United States also attempted to influence the Latin American working-class movements 'through' members of the diplomatic corps and particularly the *American Federation of Labor*. This is corroborated by a document sent by the Brazilian embassy in Moscow, addressed to the Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs⁷².

Brazil and Chile broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1947, Colombia in 1948, Venezuela and Cuba in 1952 and Guatemala in 1954, after the military coup organized by the CIA (Smith 1996, 131-139). The breakdown in relations between Brazil and the USSR was provoked, from the Brazilian stance, by accusations made in the Soviet press against President Dutra. However, document analyses reveal a more turbulent process (Brazil 1947c)⁷³. There were tensions between the two countries from the onset of diplomatic relations. Brazilian diplomats complained of the precariousness of their diplomatic quarters and the lack of reciprocity in relation to the treatment Soviets received in Rio de Janeiro. They also complained about the constant surveillance the Embassy was subjected to. Moreover, an incident occurred when the Second Secretary of the Embassy, Soares de Pinna, was detained in the hotel where the Brazilian representation functioned provisionally. He was accused of drunkenness and civil disturbance on the night of 26th December 1946. The Brazilian Embassy protested as the Brazilian Diplomat was physically tied up by Soviet authorities. As if it were not enough, the Soviets demanded Brazil pay for material damages, apparently caused by Pinna. The Brazilian Embassy, on the other hand, claimed that the incident had been planned by agents of the Soviet police. They argued that the hotel was run as a department of the KGB and the Secretary had been subjected to violence. The Soviets demanded that Soares de Pinna leave the country immediately⁷⁴. These

72 AHI, 35/4/14. Brazilian Embassy. Moscow, 02/09/1946. See also chapter in this book on 'Solidarity forever: U.S. involvement in Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965. written by Cliff WELCH.

73 See other diplomatic documents in the correspondence sent by the Brazilian Embassy in Moscow to Itamaraty. AHI, Files 34/4/14 to 34/4/17.

74 AHI- 35-4-16. EMBAIXADA DO BRASIL. Moscou. DP/DP/3. Arquivo correspondência especial. Telegrama-embaixada. 04 a 06/01/1947. Confidencial. Secretário Soares de

events increased the existing animosity between the two countries, particularly as the press widely covered the case. Subsequently, the closing down of the PCB and repression against communists in Brazil contributed to deterioration in relations. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the pragmatism adopted by the Soviet Union in their relations with other countries, including the United States and Great Britain, does not corroborate the theory of associating repression of communism in Brazil with the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Another factor to consider was the Soviet position against Brazil's incorporation to the UN Security Council. To simply believe that relations with the Soviet Union broke down because of attacks on the Brazilian President by the Soviet press only scratches the surface of the relationship. It must be taken into account that, if it is true (and it is) that the Soviet press showed no respect to the Brazilian President, it is also the case that many Brazilian authorities referred to the Soviet government in similar terms. In light of this, it must be concluded that the breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union on the part of the Brazilian government is linked to disagreements within the context of the Cold War.

According to what has been expounded here, it is clear that there is a relationship between the political repression which took place in Brazil during the period researched and strategies associated to the Cold War developed by the United States and their allies. In summary, it is possible to argue that during the Dutra Government the country underwent a process of retrocession in relation to the political opening which had been initiated at the end of the Vargas dictatorship. It is also possible to verify the development of an anti-communist crusade which had its roots both within and outside Brazil. Furthermore, it is also possible to conclude that the unconditional alignment of the country to the United States reduced its capacity for negotiation. This meant the end to expectations of preferential treatment by the United States and to acquiring the status of a regional power. During the second Vargas government, there were attempts to address these tensions, in searching for an intermediate line of action, where the alliance with the United States was renegotiated whilst demands were made for its support of Brazil's economic development. This is a subject for another paper.

Pinna (sete telegramas); DCO/DPO/12. Arquivo da correspondência especial. Telegrama-Embaixada. 24/01/1947. Confidencial. Violação de correspondência.

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Populism and Brazil-USA Relations (1945 to 1964): the dialectic of alignment and autonomy

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

Ever since the *Bradford Burns Unwritten Alliance* at the beginning of the 20th century, the relationship between Brazil and the United States evolved continuously, despite a few oscillations just before the start of World War II. However, in the second half of the 20th century, industrialization, which was first introduced during the Vargas period, meant that bilateral relations became strained. The internal policies of the Vargas' populist regime, based on a nationalistic discourse, roused tensions. His policies were more closely related to the development of capitalism in Brazil (such as the nationalization of public services) than to any particular anti-imperialist strategy. Evolving urbanization and industrialization led to a policy of substituting imported goods and this affected the complementary nature of the economic interaction between both countries.

This process was marked by ups and downs, given that some socio-political sectors were favorable to aligning with the United States. During the Dutra (1946-51) and Café Filho (1954-55) governments, and the first half of the Juscelino Kubitschek - JK - (1956-58) government, the country pursued this policy. Brazil sought autonomy from Washington and new spaces for inserting itself internationally outside the continent during the

Vargas government (1951-54), the second half of the JK government (the Pan-American Operation of 1958-61) and during the period in which both Quadros and Goulart (1961-64) pursued the so-called Independent Foreign Policy. The close association between internal and external aspects of the crisis which emerged between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s resulted in American involvement in the military coup which occurred on 31st March, 1964, bringing the populist cycle to a close.

Dutra's Automatic Alignment (1946-1951)

Three months after Vargas' fall, General Eurico Gaspar Dutra took office as president-elect. He had been one of the leaders of the *Estado Novo* and a sympathizer of the Axis states, but became a faithful ally to Washington, discontinuing Vargas' policy of bargaining and autonomy. This seismic change resulted in new correlations of forces, both internally and externally. It was the beginning of the Cold War and a new world order which profoundly affected Brazil's possibilities of establishing itself internationally.

At the end of World War II, American hegemony allowed it to set up a new international order, the Pax Americana. Economically, this hegemony was based on the principles of the Bretton Woods Conference (1944), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and politically on the United Nations (UN). The United States held political, military, economic, strategic and diplomatic power over this system and they also enjoyed a monopoly over the atomic bomb. On the other hand, the USSR was a vulnerable nation, although it had gained prestige during the war and by the fact that its armies were present in Eastern Europe.

Despite Soviet fragility, the Cold War emerged as an American strategy for strengthening the capitalist bloc and containing the expansion of left-wing and nationalistic forces represented by the USSR. The Cold War was triggered by the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. In July, the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe further consolidated the division of the world, East and West of Yalta. This marked the beginning of the conflict between American capitalism and

Soviet socialism. The main focus of the dispute between both powers was Europe and Asia.

In Brazil, the Dutra government strictly aligned itself to the American strategy. Raul Fernandes' role in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave it a conservative and subservient tone, despite unequivocal signs from the United States that it was more interested in acting globally than regionally. Latin America had been "abandoned" by the United States. The American role was limited to stimulating countries to eliminate currency exchange barriers and controls, so as to allow private capital easy access into these markets. For example, during the second half of 1945 and in 1946, the *Export and Import Bank* (ExImbank) provided credit to Europe to the tune of US\$ 1.9 billion, while Latin America was granted only US\$ 140 million (Malan 1984, 63).

So why did Brazilian diplomacy align itself to the United States? Dutra's government believed that Brazil was a far more important ally for the United States than it really was. This was due to Brazil's active support of Washington during World War II and its automatic alignment during the Cold War. The Brazilian conservatives then in power expected to maintain special relations with the American government. This was further elucidated within the ideological foundations of the Brazilian War College (ESG), created in 1948, modelling itself on the American *National War College*. The ESG based its conceptions on the dual policy of security and development, arguing that Brazil needed an economic capitalist project linked to international structures.

Brazilian diplomacy aligned itself automatically to the American position within international organizations. Sometimes, it even exceeded American conservatism. An example would be the breaking of diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1947 and decreeing the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) illegal in the same year as part of the government's hardening of its anti-communist policies. In addition to political and diplomatic subservience, Brazil increased trade liberalization, reduced the cost of Brazilian raw materials and loosened its control over strategic resources such as oil. In return, the United States decided to focus on developing the Inter-American system.

In August 1947 the Inter-American Conference for Continental Peace was held in Petrópolis, resulting in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA). The IATRA was a military agreement in which Latin American countries and the United States agreed to support other signatory countries when threatened by any external armed force. This led the way to

the adoption of measures against “other forms of aggression” to the Security Zone. As well as the United States and Latin America, other countries included Canada, the European colonies in the Caribbean, Greenland and vast areas of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

Both Truman and Marshall were present at the closing session of the Conference and they received a request from Dutra for economic-financial assistance. Their response was very enlightening: Marshall suggested that the Brazilian government should prioritize internal resources to set up the necessary conditions for attracting American private capital. They agreed to create the Brazil-USA Commission in order to study and draft a development program, headed by John Abbink, on the American side, and Otávio Gouvêa de Bulhões, on the Brazilian side.

Whilst the Commission, which became known as the Abbink-Bulhões Commission, was in place, the United States sought to avoid any concrete action, restricting themselves to analyses and suggestions. The Abbink report only repeated the liberal recommendations already noted above. The increase in the price of coffee from 1948-49 onwards improved foreign accounts to a certain degree, giving the impression that something concrete had been achieved through American cooperation, though in practice this had not been the case.

The establishment of IATRA led to the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Bogotá during the 9th Inter-American Conference in 1948. Whilst IATRA was a military agreement, the objective of the OAS, with headquarters in Washington, was to establish political links between the signatories of the pact. The OAS institutionalized policies based on the Monroe Doctrine and was a valuable tool used by American diplomacy to control the political scenarios of the countries in the continent.

Two principles of its Constitutional Charter are elucidating and had serious repercussions: the principle of priority which stated that regional disputes fell within its remit and not the UN's; and the principle of incompatibility, according to which no member-states could deviate from the “democratic model” in force in the West and in the continent (Fenwick 1965). In political terms, the first principle condemned the region to a degree of international isolation, whereas the second provided legitimacy to the United States' actions against any reformist and/or nationalistic changes to the *status quo*, excepting, of course, “purifying and friendly” dictatorships.

Nevertheless, not all regional organizations were tools of American diplomacy. In 1948, CEPAL – the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean – was created, a United Nations agency with headquarters in Santiago, Chile. The United States sought, from the beginning, to block the creation of CEPAL. It had been a demand of Latin American countries. CEPAL became in effect an education instrument which greatly influenced a whole generation of politicians and economists, and argued for the development of Latin American countries and against the liberal orthodoxy defended by the United States.

During the Dutra government, Brazil only managed to obtain very small concessions from its bilateral relations with the United States as recompense for automatic alignment. It was not difficult to notice the climate of frustration in Brazil and other Latin American countries. Nevertheless, the situation was worse in the Brazilian case, because it expected greater advantages. Along with the aggravation of the internal economic crisis, this had political repercussions, namely the polarization of the debate between the *Entreguistas*¹, close to the Dutra doctrine, and the Nationalists, led by Getúlio Vargas, who argued for re-establishing the project of autonomous development initiated during his first government in the 1930s. Vargas also called for the redefinition of bilateral relations.

A New Nationalistic Bargain: the Second Vargas Government (1951-54)

Vargas was victorious in the elections and took office for a second time. This meant not only a break with the diplomacy pursued by President Dutra, but a return to the policies of import substitution, with a view to modernizing the country by means of nationalistic bargaining with the United States, which Vargas had successfully conducted during his first government. Despite difficulties both in the internal and external scenario which resulted in this

1 Entreguistas – from the Portuguese “entregar” – to give in, or to deliver something to someone.

project not being entirely successful and which culminated in the crisis that led to his suicide in 1954, Vargas also initiated a new foreign policy process.

As mentioned above, the focus of the new bargain was once again the United States, given that this country continued to play a crucial role in Brazilian diplomacy and provided potential for industrial development. Generally speaking, foreign policy was seen as essential to the project of autonomy and the government promoted the expansion of its missions abroad and strengthened those already established, both in industrialized countries and International Organizations, in particular the Economic Commissions. Terms such as the defence of national interests, collective resolutions, uniform principles and multilateral instruments became commonplace and revealed a concern in drafting multilateral relations instead of a policy of unilateral alignment.

In order to downplay the country's dependency, foreign policy meant bargaining Brazil's strategic support for Washington in exchange for economic cooperation and development assistance. This attitude proved to be very problematic, once American diplomacy was guided by economic internationalism.

Moreover, Latin America was considered to be a reasonably safe region. It was not seen as an arena of dispute in the Cold War and this meant that Washington largely disregarded its demands. Distance between the countries accentuated further in light of developments in Europe and Asia during 1949-1950: the division of Germany, with the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Democratic Republic of Germany (DRG), the advancement of the Eastern European popular democracies, the Chinese Revolution, the explosion of the first Soviet bomb and the Korean War. These events, in addition to the American transition of power from Truman to General Eisenhower, a republican and conservative, meant that the United States hardened its position against nationalistic and autonomous actions. Within this scenario, there was no space for manoeuvring as there had been during the 1930s.

The main point of disagreement between Rio de Janeiro and Washington was the economy. However, it is interesting to observe the double dealing on the part of Vargas. In spite of his nationalistic and populist rhetoric and foreign expansion, expressed in the process of multilateral international relations which troubled the White House, Vargas appointed as Minister of

Foreign Affairs someone who was pro-American and committed to foreign economic interests to occupy this position, João Neves. He had been president of Ultragás S.A., a subsidiary of Standard Oil. Vargas alternated between an independent and adversarial discourse, and a conciliatory discourse. At times he simply accepted American demands, often secretly. The question of the Brazil-USA Commission, the remittance of profits, not sending troops to Korea and the Military Agreement are examples of this dynamics symbolizing both autonomy and adherence.

In strategic terms, Brazilian support of the United States was far more real than its rhetoric at International Conferences led us to believe. In 1951, Brazil subscribed without reservation to the American position on the revision of the Peace Treaty with Italy, by signing the Peace Treaty with Japan and establishing relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (Brazil 1951). In 1952 Vargas ratified Washington's policy with regards to the non-repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. In relation to the first manifestations of anti-colonial struggles in the African and Asian continents, Vargas once again aligned himself with the West. In the case of relations with Latin America, the situation was more complex, but not substantially different, as we will see.

Diplomatic bargaining was strongly expressed in Brazil's role in the Brazil-USA Mixed Commission on Economic Development. Brazil requested the establishment of this commission which was set up in December 1950, during the North Korean War. Similar to the organization that preceded it, the Commission carried out a diagnosis of the Brazilian economy and produced recommendations to overcome infrastructure bottlenecks which prevented development and industrialization, focusing in particular on the transport and energy sectors. Funding for these projects would be partly provided by foreign resources from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the ExImbank. The Brazilian National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) was set up in May 1952 to manage these funds.

However, for the American government, investing in Brazilian infrastructure was not considered attractive, given that there were restrictions to priority American interests such as profit remittance controlled by the Brazilian government. Moreover, the Vargas government's nationalistic posture and discourse were considered a risk factor. In accordance to its bargaining concept, the Vargas government would have to counterbalance

restrictions on remittance of profits with some gesture of good will. 1952 was marked by these oscillations – whereas the government set up the BNDE, complained about irregular remittance of profits abroad and refused to send troops to Korea, it did sign the Brazil-USA Military Agreement.

The Military Agreement project was sent to the Brazilian government in December 1951, via the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. A month later, Vargas was still publicly broaching the subject of strategic minerals within a nationalistic perspective and set up the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq). Nevertheless, the signing of the Military Agreement, which directly involved the issue of strategic minerals, signalled a subservient attitude.

The Military Agreement was drafted without the presence of the Ministry of War (which resulted in the resignation of Minister Estilac Leal and subsequently to roused tensions within the Military Club) and the CNPq. It provided for the supply of American weapons and warfare equipment to the Brazilian army. In return, Brazil promised to export monazite sand, uranium and other strategic minerals to the United States at market price. It was approved on 30th April 1953, amid great controversy.

The issue of nuclear development was already at an impasse when Vargas came to power. On 15th January 1951 therefore, law n.1.310 was passed. It established a state monopoly and severely restricted exportation of radioactive minerals. This was unacceptable, both to the United States and the United Kingdom, who controlled the technology but had no direct access to raw materials. Both the CNPq and the Armed Forces were favorable to Brazil acquiring know-how in the field of nuclear energy, without being subjected to any country.

Despite these concessions, bilateral relations gradually deteriorated. Reasons for this were both internal and external. At an internal level we can highlight the growing economic crisis and popular mobilization, the government's loss of support, the polarization of politics revealing the contradictions of populism, developments in relation to the question of oil, the growth and advance of anti-Vargas forces and the isolation of the president and his closest circle.

Externally, the election of the American Republican president Eisenhower, as already mentioned, did not favour autonomy amid growing global tension during the Cold War. Therefore, Vargas' hopes to negotiate directly,

government to government, became an empty promise. The Eisenhower government promptly extinguished the Brazil-USA Mixed Commission, as there were conflicts regarding the creation of Petrobrás in 1953 (*"Petróleo é Nosso"* [Our Oil] Campaign). Moreover, the United States were particularly unhappy about the direction of internal politics, characterized by an increase in social struggles and nationalistic ideas. Pressure from Washington was both direct and indirect. Eisenhower complained about the presence of communists in the Brazilian government. He emphasized the issue of settling the payment of trade arrears and only released 100 million of the 250 million US dollars Truman had promised. Furthermore, this money was only released in order to pay trade arrears.

Given this difficult state of affairs, Vargas did not conduct a 'U-turn' or change in external and internal policies, instead he advanced his policies along the same lines in an attempt to provide legitimacy to his government and have more chips in his hand when bargaining with the United States. Vargas invested in other nationalistic measures - he created Eletrobrás and the *Plano de Valorização da Amazônia* [Valorization Plan for the Amazon Region]. Furthermore, in order to deal with exchange rate issues, the government adopted multiple tariffs and introduced foreign currency auctions. At a diplomatic level, he sought to expand Brazil's autonomy and its international projection, particularly in the Third World. He did this by raising the profile of the diplomatic discourse on issues such as development, foreign trade and placing more value on multilateral spaces such as the UN, OAS and CEPAL.

In relation to Latin America the tone of the discourse also changed. It emphasised American indifference and the importance of greater regional interchange, both commercial and political, to promote development. Here, we observe a closer approximation to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia (treaties relating to exploiting Bolivian oil by mixed companies and the construction of the Corumbá-Santa Cruz de la Sierra railway).

Furthermore, Brazil sought to expand its diplomacy globally aiming to open new markets and attract foreign capital, targeting greater proximity to Western and Eastern Europe. The opening towards the socialist bloc brought Vargas limited economic and political results. His approximation to other Southern Cone countries had much greater and significant consequences. Closer relations ensued during a particularly critical period for Vargas when the United States and internal civil and military opposition were tightening the net around the government.

This observation does not, of course, alter the fact that Brazil's attitude towards the United States oscillated. In August 1953, Admiral Álvaro Alberto travelled to the US to seek support for the Brazilian nuclear program. American refusal led Vargas and CNPq to authorize a trip of Brazilian technicians to Western Germany in order to purchase ultracentrifuge machines. These ended up being seized in Germany by allied occupation authorities under the orders of the American High Commissioner. At the same time, Brazil agreed to exchange with the United States 10,000 tonnes of strategic minerals for 100,000 tonnes of wheat, without receiving any specific compensation regarding the nuclear debacle.

A week before Vargas' suicide, the American ambassador met Vice-President Café Filho to officially invite him to visit the United States. The president, isolated and under immense pressure, committed suicide on 24th August 1954, leaving a written testament to the nation. The results of this political act and the popular understanding of what was denounced as "foreign interests" were immediate. The following day crowds came out on the streets expressing a mixture of distress and anger. The anti-imperialist tone of his testament was not enough to prevent a foreign policy which, from that very same day up until the Juscelino Kubitschek government, became wholly aligned to the United States.

Despite oscillations and the lack of resounding success, some novel elements and strategies in Vargas' diplomacy laid the foundations for a real qualitative jump during the following decade. In attempting to break with its traditional alliance, Brazil sought to attract the attention of the United States and negotiate its realignment in order to provide a new basis for the country's development. Foreign policy did not seek to end dependency, but to alter its profile.

From Realignment to Negotiations (1954-61): Café Filho and JK

After Vargas' death, Café Filho took power, returning to Dutra's policy of realignment and internationally linked capitalism, in accordance to

ESG's concepts. This phase was followed by the first half of the Juscelino Kubitschek (JK) government, whose national-developmentism is also closely associated with international capitalism. However, the situation became much more complex during JK's government. Between 1954 and 1958, foreign policy was characterized by a clear retrocession in relation to Brazil's autonomy and active bargaining with the United States.

The period between Vargas' suicide and JK's inauguration on 31st January 1956 was clearly conservative. Relations with the United States (and the nomination of Raul Fernandes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) left no doubts as to the diplomatic profile of the new government. There were various concessions in the economic (changes in the remittance of profits and import laws), strategic and political fields and in particular in relation to lobbying of Petrobrás by American companies and interference in the nuclear agenda.

This resulted in the signing of the Joint Cooperation Program for the Recognition of Uranium Resources in Brazil, on 3rd August 1955. This document was part of a wider nuclear agreement which essentially implied a preferential relationship with the United States, conceived in accordance to American wishes and involving the exchange of monazite for wheat². In diplomatic terms, the Vargas era's attempts at multilateralism were abandoned.

On 3rd October 1955, JK was elected president, representing the PSD-PTB coalition (with João Goulart as vice-president) in a tense political climate. Like Café Filho, at the beginning of his government, JK followed a policy of realignment with the United States. He promoted associated developmentist policies (1956-1958) which subsequently developed into new attempts at bargaining and multilateralism (1958-1961). This change was borne out of a necessary process of adaptation, within an internal and external context of transformations.

The main change within the global landscape was the emergence of nationalism and neutralism in the wake of African and Asian de-colonization and the problems in the Middle East, such as the Suez crisis. There was also the development of the concept of the Third World and actions related to it (launched at the Conference of Bandung, in 1955). In addition, there was the economic recovery of the United States' allies, such as Western Europe and Asia (Japan), who started to be seen as potential competitors in relation to the American hegemonic position. Indeed, Western Europe was taking its first

2 Details about the nuclear issue in Bandeira (1978, 367-72); Távora (1958).

steps towards regional integration. Another aspect was the strengthening of the USSR and its Eastern Bloc, due to escalating technological competition (strategic parity in terms of weapons and the space race) and the intensification of disputes to conquer new independent territories.

Together, these factors pointed towards the blurring of global bipolarity and the development of a multilateral scenario. Multilateralism was the result of the growth in the number and quality of actors and was also followed by a more prominent role for the multilateral international organizations. During the JK government these opportunities were already present, but they were not fully exploited. Multilateralism and Brazilian foreign policy processes only came together in the following decade, the 1960s, directly affecting bilateral relations.

Internally, JK was subjected to various sources of pressure. Class conflicts became extremely exacerbated. Vargas' development project was substituted by a developmentist and modernizing discourse which claimed that Brazil would advance "50 years in 5", based on the National Development Plan or Target Plan. This Plan contained 30 goals divided into 5 sectors, in order of priority: energy, transport, primary industries, education and foodstuffs. Strategically, these were conceived in close association to foreign capital and automatic alignment with the United States.

Soon after being elected, Kubitschek headed for the United States and Europe. His political agenda was to attract foreign capital to implement his Target Plan so as to reverse the drop in exports which had occurred at the beginning of the 1950s. His success in raising capital, obtaining technology and attracting foreign firms to establish themselves in Brazil was not only due to the model of development sought and the stimulus provided by Brazilian legislation, but also because of the incipient competition between the United States and European countries. Thus, the first large automobile assembly plant to be established in Brazil was the German Volkswagen, followed by American companies. However, despite initial rapid expansion in the first half of his government, during the period that ensued, from 1957 to 1960, Brazil once again faced a drop in exports and economic stagnation which impacted both on JK's external and internal agenda.

In strictly diplomatic terms, Brazil under JK was closely aligned to the Western bloc up to 1958. Vargas' bargaining policies were abandoned, together with any policies which vaguely suggested autonomy or which acted

as a tool for economic development, where only cooperation with the United States was emphasized. The Atoms for Peace Treaty came into force and, despite a few contrary reactions, Brazil continued to export strategic minerals. More controversial and significant was the establishment, in Fernando de Noronha, of an American base for tracking rockets in exchange for military equipment (many already obsolete) worth US\$ 100 million. The adjustment and the establishment of the American base caused great controversy, leading to a widespread reaction on the part of nationalists.

It was only in mid-1958, as previously mentioned, that internal and external factors led JK to resume a foreign policy based on active bargaining with the United States, together with a nationalist diplomatic discourse. Causes for this change in policy were the end of the 1956-57 “developmentist miracle”, foreign capital pressure, the radicalization of the internal debate, increasing Latin American socio-political antagonism, the Cuban Revolution and growing global multilateralism.

Kubitschek’s change in foreign policy culminated in the inauguration of the Pan-American Operation – OPA, in 1958. OPA was launched during a period when relations between the United States and Latin America had reached a nadir. Eisenhower was in his second term of office and he advanced his policies for subordinating the region. At the same time, Latin America was undergoing a profound economic crisis which led to the radicalization of populism, nationalisms and anti-Americanism.

In light of this situation, in May 1958, the American government decided to send Vice-President Richard Nixon to the inauguration of Argentina’s President Frondizi, taking the opportunity to visit a number of South American countries. Nixon became the target of violent anti-American protests in Lima and Caracas. Thus, Latin America’s growing dissatisfaction became very clear to Washington. Moreover, the United States now had to face the Soviet Union’s active foreign policy in the Third World and its global and strategic strengthening. This new turn in international relations resulted in an incipient competition between the Kremlin and the White House in Latin America.

JK attempted to gain from this situation by creating the OPA. The OPA was launched when Kubitschek sent a letter to Eisenhower on 28th May 1958, in which he expressed his concern with the economic and political crisis in the continent. He broached the subject of Brazil’s international role and

highlighted the importance of their bilateral partnership in order to face these challenges. JK also mentioned the need for Latin American unity and the importance of development for regional stability as a preventive measure in face of the growing crisis, highlighting the importance of American aid and the need to correct the deterioration of exchange agreements.

The United States reacted coldly, though Kubitschek's appeal had not been totally ignored. In August 1958, the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, met with Kubitschek. Initially, the United States' position was simply to jointly condemn communism, an ideology rejected by JK. Thus, the United States accepted the creation of a continental financial entity (the Inter-American Development Bank - IADB). The concept of a regional common market was also drafted, the Latin American Free Trade Association – LAFTA. Brazil also managed to obtain some loans from Eximbank and other private banks. In September, the “21 commission” was established as part of the OAS Council with a view to discussing and implementing OPA measures within this organization. There was therefore a certain climate of euphoria.

Although the most visible OPA objective was to place Brazil in a better position in relation to its alliance with the United States, results went beyond this remit, given the lack of real American concessions and in face of growing internal tensions and the economic crisis. This led to its demise in 1959. Using a nationalist rhetoric JK broke with the IMF and his diplomacy turned towards attempting to draft effective multilateralism, a return to Vargas' policies. The aim was to find alternative markets for Brazil's surplus in raw materials and to acquire technology and industrial products, as well as to negotiate more effectively with the United States, in areas which were particularly sensitive to American interests. The president argued (as Vargas had done before him) that if the United States did not provide support to Brazilian foreign trade and did not invest in the country, Brazil would be obliged to look for solutions elsewhere.

The Americans were concerned by this attitude, particularly the fact that the Brazilian government once again sought a closer relationship with the East. The Cuban Revolution, also in 1959, roused tensions further. It confirmed Vargas' argument, further developed by Kubitschek in the OPA, that “poverty generated subversion” and that “development is the best antidote against communist penetration”. However, American behavior did not easily

lend itself to furthering JK's bargaining policy. The response towards Cuba and towards any autonomous policy was a hardening of attitudes.

In relation to Cuba, Brazil, of course, did not dare to go directly against the American position, which ended up being endorsed during the 6th and 7th Meetings of the Continent's Foreign Ministers. However, Brazil did not support the United States in its resolutions against Castro. It also approached other regional partners, such as Canada and Argentina, in an attempt to minimize the negative aspects of Eisenhower's diplomacy. Similarly, the creation of LAFTA (Treaty of Montevideo 1960), did not accurately reflect Brazil's expectations and needs, though it was a positive step.

Nevertheless, JK did not manage to move forward and the situation worsened with the spiralling of the crisis and the campaign for his succession, which resulted in instability. The candidate on behalf of the UDN³, Jânio Quadros, openly attacked JK's economic and domestic policies, as well as some of the government's foreign policies, thus preempting his international agenda. He argued for strengthening links with the USSR and defended Cuba's autonomy and sovereignty. He also believed in closer ties with Western Europe. That is, distancing the country from and becoming autonomous from the United States.

In February 1960, Eisenhower visited Brasília, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and had talks with Kubitschek. The United States attempted to contain the effects of the Cuban Revolution. The American government offered better conditions in negotiations with the IMF which JK accepted. The Declaration of Brasília granted a few economic concessions to Latin America. On the other hand, the White House carried out its plan to support the Cuban invasion by anti-Castro groups.

At the same time, tensions escalated both in rural and urban areas. Furthermore, the takeover and nationalization of foreign companies directly affected American interests (and resulted in extra pressure). Leonel Brizola, the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and João Goulart, candidate for the position of vice-president, triggered a controversy during the final days of JK's government by denouncing the lack of investment on the part of American companies in Brazil. They argued that this negatively affected national development and resulted in the non-resolution of infrastructure

3 UDN – União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union)

bottlenecks. These and other bilateral tensions continued during the Quadros-Goulart period, affecting Brazil-USA relations.

The Rupture of a Special Alliance: Multilateralism of the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy (1961-64)

a) Jânio Quadros and the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy (IFP) (1961)

During Jânio Quadro's short and tumultuous administration (less than seven months), bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States went through significant transformations, given the changes in Brazil's International Relations which resulted in the drafting of the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP). This policy was not entirely innovative, because it was conceived as a continuation and an extension of Vargas and Kubitschek's nationalist and developmentist bargaining foreign policy.

Quadros' IFP was based on a set of joined up principles and its scope went beyond the region, it opened global possibilities for Brazil and placed foreign policy at the heart of national life. Among the reasons for the qualitative jump promoted by Quadros and his foreign minister, Alfonso Arinos, were the new profile of Brazilian society, the seriousness of the internal socio-economic crisis, difficulties relating to Brazil's economy abroad, the accelerated speed at which changes were occurring, both globally and regionally, and a degradation in the special alliance with the United States.

The Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy prioritized a direct association between the external sector and national development, resulting in the need to reach new markets and technologies, seeking to re-position Brazil within the new world order. It was based on expanding the spaces for global manoeuvres and activities which resulted from multilateralism, and in raising the profile of the Third World and the potential for neutral bargaining negotiations,

in face of the indifference of the developed world, in particular that of the United States.

In order to make this possible Quadros reformed Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Office) and extended relations with China and Eastern Europe. In the continent - abandoned by the United States, the hegemonic power - populist nationalism intensified and social antagonism increased. There was also the Cuban Revolution, whose reforms went against American interests and reverberated positively in political sectors within Latin America. Moreover, it is important to highlight the emergence of John Kennedy's reformism which also had regional impacts.

The Democrat John F Kennedy came to power almost at the same time as Jânio Quadros and created enormous expectations across the continent, as the two Eisenhower Republican mandates - characterized by "indifference" - came to a close. In his inauguration, the incoming president announced a plan to assist economic development and to support limited social reforms - the Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) - to counteract the Cuban Revolution,

ALPRO was launched in March 1961, during an extraordinary meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, part of the OAS, at the Conference of Punta del Este (5-17 August 1961). ALPRO somewhat recovered the original principles of OPA. However, there is no doubt that the change in the American posture only occurred due to the success and reverberations of the Cuban Revolution. For this reason the Alliance was ironically called the "Castro Plan". It envisaged an investment of approximately US\$ 20 billion within ten years. There were other criticisms of the project and, in Latin America, it led to more disappointment than success. For the left, it simply represented a new type of intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, while for the right, the plan did not provide a real solution to local problems (lack of investment, deterioration of the currency exchange terms or development aid).

1961 also saw the implementation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) with the ratification of the Montevideo Treaty by the Congress of Signatory States - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. However, these measures were insufficient and, to a large extent, Latin American markets and products competed with each other.

In relation to Cuba, Brazil condemned the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion which was initiated by Eisenhower. In a controversial and unusual attitude, Jânio Quadros decorated Che Guevara with the Order of the Southern Cross on 19th August, 1961. Both the Brazilian military and the United States reacted negatively. The substitution of the then American Ambassador in Brazil, Cabot, by Lincoln Gordon on August 24th, was therefore significant and signalled the hardening of American foreign policy.

b) The Goulart Government and IFP's Final Crisis (1961-64)

In an attempt to recoup the political initiative, Quadros resigned, but he was not successful in re-gaining power, triggering a process of uninterrupted crisis. The Soviet news agency, Tass, and Fidel Castro declared their support for Quadros, whilst the defeated American candidate Richard Nixon argued for military intervention in Brazil. This led to increased tensions within Brazilian politics. After the American failure in Cuba, the United States feared social radicalization in Brazil, a country the Americans considered strategic within the continent. João Goulart's rise to power brought new tensions to the bilateral relationship.

The first phase of the Goulart government was under a parliamentary regime, as the president focused on regaining his powers as president under a presidential system. From 1963 onwards, amid growing opposition and chaos, Goulart struggled to hold on to the power now in his hands, culminating in his deposition through a military coup, in 1964.

Throughout this period San Tiago Dantas and Araújo Castro headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they sought to continue Quadros' Independent Foreign Policy which resulted in changes to Brazil-USA bilateral relations and the fall of his government. During Dantas' tenure, given the pressure of the economic crisis, he pursued IFP principles such as global diplomacy with an emphasis on trade. Brazil signalled its intentions to develop relations with the socialist bloc, in addition to existing relationships. This did not please the Americans. Similarly, tensions remained in relation to the Cuban crisis and neutralist bargaining became impossible since the United States were not prepared to negotiate at all.

In January, during the 8th Meeting of the Continent's Foreign Ministers, in Punta del Este, between 22nd and 31st January 1962, renewed tensions

surfaced between Brazil and the United States, due to the fact that Dantas refused to support Cuba's expulsion from the OAS. He proposed to counteract this expulsion and find a resolution within the framework of international law. This led to conflicts with both the American Department of State and the Brazilian right. Washington manifested its concerns in relation to possible social upheaval in Brazil, which would have been rather more serious than the Cuban Revolution.

The case based on international law was linked to trying to prevent further military intervention and political pressure on the part of the United States. Despite Brazil's position, the United States effectively managed to approve the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Board with the support of smaller Latin American States. It also condemned the adoption of Marxism-Leninism by countries in the region and the suspension of trade and weapons trafficking with Cuba⁴.

However, the United States was not wholly victorious. The main countries in the continent made it clear that they did not agree with Washington's position. The meeting endorsed the legitimacy of principles for accelerating development and social reform in a manner that was officially different from "communism". Furthermore, non-intervention and self-determination principles were also endorsed as part of the Continent's code of conduct. The anti-communist aspect which the United States had coveted suffered significant alterations.

Furthermore, Washington's dissatisfaction soon intensified for other reasons. Two weeks after the closing of the Punta del Este Conference, the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul expropriated the telephone services in the state belonging to subsidiaries of the American company, ITT. There was an immediate reaction. The Department of State demanded immediate financial compensation, and considered the value arbitrated as insufficient. Lincoln Gordon, the American Ambassador, met San Tiago Dantas and was told that Brizola's expropriations did not reflect the Federal Government's attitude. However, the trade sector, together with American politicians, argued for cutting all public aid to Brazil. New expropriations ensued, resulting in the intensification of the crisis.

Goulart, together with his Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance and the Armed Forces visited the United States between 3rd and 9th April 1962 in order

4 See also: O Brasil em Punta del Este (Ata Final). In Goulart (1962, 7-27).

to revert deteriorating Brasilia-Washington relations and, above all, to calm American investors. The Brazilian president held talks with Kennedy, finally issuing a joint official communiqué, the purpose of which was to reaffirm the fact that relations were normal.

Internally the crisis was escalating. This led to a return to the presidential system after the fall of the parliamentary cabinet led by Tancredo Neves in 1963. Abroad, the IFP increasingly provoked reaction. There were attacks by the extreme right and the situation also deteriorated in the north-east due to actions by the peasant leagues. Brazilian society became polarized between those who feared the left-wing stance of the government and those who wanted to expand (grassroots) social reforms. This state of affairs led Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to believe that Brazil had “moved to the left”.

The CIA intensified their actions within Brazil and supported entrepreneurs, politicians and members of the armed forces in opposing the government. The opposition created organizations such as the Institute of Social Studies and Research (IPES) and the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (IBAD). These organizations became close to ESG and received American aid and support from Brazilian and multinational companies. They collected information, conducted studies and, politically, they rallied against government activities⁵. They funded right-wing candidacies and IBAD also stimulated the establishment of political movements, trade unions, women’s leagues and even agricultural associations in the north-east, in order to counteract their left-wing and nationalist opponents.

At the same time, the left advanced. Brizola was elected to the Chamber of Deputies with more votes than any other candidate, whilst Miguel Arraes became governor of the state of Pernambuco. Meanwhile, conservatives gained strategic states, namely Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro), São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. In 1962 the Cuban missile crisis erupted, which had an extremely negative impact on Brazil’s Independent Foreign Policy. Despite this radical state of affairs Brazil still attempted to keep to its diplomatic principles, though it was obliged to concede on certain aspects.

Under strong pressure, after a meeting in which Lincoln Gordon delivered a letter from President Kennedy, Goulart declared that Brazil would support the United States if the Cuban crisis reached its utmost consequences. The missile crisis negatively affected Brazilian diplomacy when it was forced to

5 Cf. details in Dreifuss (1981) and Bandeira (1978).

back the American claim that the Cuban crisis was linked to external threats and the invasion of the continent. It became increasingly difficult to support the principle of non-intervention. However, the outcome was worse than the crisis itself, that is, renewed aggression by the United States. In short, all these factors resulted in increasing the distance between Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy and Washington's diplomacy.

In December 1962, the American president sent his brother and Minister of Justice, Robert Kennedy, to Brazil during a period in which the country was on the receiving end of robust criticism in the United States. Kennedy complained that American resources were not being adequately spent and he expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that Brazil was trading with socialist countries. He also discussed the issue of trade arrears, the Cuban crisis and expropriations. His visit was marked by an arrogant tone designed to force Brazil to toe the line of the new American strategy.

The ministerial reform which occurred in June 1963 attempted to address this unfavorable state of affairs. It also established a three-year plan. Evandro Cavalcanti Lins e Silva, a legal academic linked to the Goulart government, was nominated as Foreign Minister. The new Head of Foreign Affairs kept his position for a period of only two months, from 19th June to 20th August and sought to make the Brazilian IFP "less radical". At the end of June, Goulart and Kennedy met briefly in the Vatican, during Pope Paul VI's installation ceremony, with no positive outcomes.

The crisis deepened, leading the government to a new reform in August. Araújo Castro took over the Department of Foreign Affairs. He emphasized the development discourse in an attempt to establish closer ties with the United States and pursue the concept of the continent's joint security strategy. During the General Debate of the 28th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1963, Castro advanced his theories in a clear and mature way, during his famous speech 'Disarmament, De-colonialization and Development (the 3 Ds)'. Nevertheless, tensions remained high.

Internally, the Goulart government's position worsened. The United States played a part at various levels in the escalation of conflicts which led to the government's downfall. The impossibility of conducting the Three-Year Plan and the absence of any policies to address the financial situation in accordance to the United States' wishes meant that Washington started to think of Goulart's government as a "lost cause" and prepared to support its

deposition. In April 1963, the influential American magazine *U.S. News and World Report* published a long article predicting a number of successive military coups in Latin America. It highlighted the Brazilian situation, in which the Armed Forces enjoyed strong influence over national politics. According to the magazine, coups would take place because of fear of communism and other types of extremisms, such as the radicalization of populist regimes. In Brazil, conflicts continued between the American Ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, and Brizola, now a federal deputy.

It should be noted that the American government was purposively closing off Brazil's external possibilities via the international funding institutions. Within this context, Roberto Campos' attitude was revealing: in September 1963 he resigned as Brazilian Ambassador in Washington. The cut or drastic reduction of funding to the Brazilian federal government revealed itself to be another very important facet. Kennedy had conditioned the re-scheduling of the Brazilian external debt to an agreement with AMFORP on expropriations. This meant that the United States started to make direct agreements with "efficiently managed" Brazilian states and municipalities without the need to consult the Brazilian Federal Government. That is, the Americans made direct agreements with those states and municipalities controlled by their conservative "friends". This broke the Federal Government's monopoly over foreign affairs and revealed the difficult position in which the Goulart government found itself. In face of such a serious and challenging precedent, the Brazilian government reacted timidly.

Ideological suspicion and the need to safeguard relations with the United States meant that Goulart's actions were weak. In August, after a number of complaints which had been widely documented and much hesitation, Goulart suspended both IBAD and ADEP for three months, alleging electoral corruption. Moreover, the American Department of State demanded that the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Itamaraty, issue them with an increasing number of entry visas. Personnel linked to the CIA or special military groups, such as the Green Berets, entered the country together with members of religious groups, members of the Peace Corps and businessmen. They generally went to the northeast of the country (Bandeira 1978, 449). During this period, there were constant reports about the setting up of right-wing paramilitary groups and arms depots, particularly in the states governed by Goulart's conservative opponents, for example Lacerda, Governor of the

state of Guanabara (now Rio de Janeiro). This scandalous state of affairs led the American Ambassador to issue official denials regarding American intervention.

Meanwhile, people like Colonel Vernon Walters (military attaché at the American Embassy) and Dan Mitrione, who were openly associated to the CIA, intensified their activities, together with the Brazilian right. Through National Security Council reports the government became aware of the actions of these military groups and other activities such as the smuggling of weapons and the establishment of paramilitary groups. Goulart did not investigate these problems in depth because they would certainly have meant disrupting or perhaps even breaking the relationship with Washington. Effectively, the hesitation on the part of the government resulted in the conspirators becoming more daring. Social polarization and the undeniable infiltration of instigators led to serious incidents such as the sergeants' revolt, where the government found itself facing drastic choices⁶.

At the end of November, Kennedy was assassinated in the United States, which resulted in tougher measures in both American domestic and foreign policies, now under the administration of Vice-President Lyndon Johnson. ALPRO was slowly deactivated, there was a rapid escalation in the situation in Vietnam and, above all, Latin American policy was based on the radicalization of Washington. Examples are the 1964 coup in Brazil and the intervention in the Dominican Republic the following year.

In Brazil, preparations for toppling Goulart intensified. The strategy of groups opposing Goulart planned the uprising of the state governors Magalhães Pinto, in Minas Gerais, Carlos Lacerda, in Guanabara and Ademar de Barros, in São Paulo, as well as the rebellion of military units.

Vernon Walters and the Brazilian instigators of the coup considered a civil war of between 4 to 6 months inevitable. They thought that Goulart would resist, supported by the so-called 5th Army (pro-Goulart political forces such as the CGT⁷, PUA⁸, the peasants' leagues, the National Union of Students, some governors, mass organizations and trade unions).

6 On the involvement of parties in bringing down Goulart, see: Carone (1985); Bandeira (1978); Dreifuss (1981); Skidmore (1976); Parker (1977); Correa (1977). On the crisis of populism, see: Ianni (1974); Bandeira (1978).

7 General Confederation of Workers

8 Pacto de Unidade e Ação

Brazilian foreign policy oscillated between conciliatory compromise and restricted and delayed reaction. Of much graver consequence was the role of government agencies, in the absence of higher orders. For example, the revalidation of the 1952 Military Agreement with the United States was carried out by Itamaraty, disregarding presidential authority. Goulart had been avoiding a decision on this matter, alleging that it required ratification by the Congress. General Castello Branco asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to get the agreement revalidated.

There were, nevertheless, a few last expressions of the IFP, when Brazil participated in the Conference of Developing Countries in Geneva, in March 1964. Months later, this Conference underpinned the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Brazil played a significant role in the preparations for UNCTAD and in establishing the Group of 77. The Brazilian diplomatic position was marked by the idea of transforming international economic structures and of a single united front of peripheral nations for development. Meanwhile, the Goulart government was coming to an end.

As already observed, the American offensive was intensified and, in Brazil, preparations for the Coup were progressing rapidly. The massive demonstration which took place on 13th March (in which Goulart announced his determination to carry on with his structural reforms), the sergeants' revolt and the response of the right, "the Family and God for Freedom Protest March", were the signals which triggered the Coup. The Governor of the State of Minas Gerais, Magalhães Pinto, established a pseudo multi-partisan ministry. He invited Alfonso Arinos to become his Foreign Minister. The purpose of these legalist refinements were to obtain recognition for a state of war and receive American support in armaments and troops.

On the 31st March the coup forces marched through Minas Gerais. The government hesitated and on 1st April, the movement unfolded. There was practically no resistance. Goulart fled to the south of the country, and subsequently into Uruguay without resigning, opting to "avoid spilt blood" in the defence of his mandate. Congress quickly acted by swearing in Federal Deputy Ranieri Mazzili as president whilst Goulart was still in the country and, of course, had not resigned. Washington's recognition of the new government was also carried out hastily.

With the end of the Goulart government, the Brazilian experiment of multilateral action and a more independent role from the United States also came to a close. The Independent Foreign Policy was rejected as not being in line with the Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Brazilian Foreign Affairs became 'parochial' once more, restricted to the continent and aligned 'in a privileged way' with the United States. Foreign Policy returned to the model pursued during the Dutra Government, reducing Brazil's multilateral relationships and breaking with Cuba.

Conclusion

In this analysis, the Brazil-USA bilateral relationship during the period between 1945 and 1964 was marked by oscillations between alignment (automatism *vs.* pragmatism) and internal transformations and crises in the country. Until the International Foreign Policy was drafted, in the first half of the 20th century, the predominant tendency within Brazilian foreign policy was to place the country within the context of the American continent, in which the main line of action was its relationship with the United States. This is not solely related to Brazil's dependency on the United States, but to the fact that Brazilian foreign policy focused on closer relations with Washington, within the context of an "unwritten alliance", conceived during Rio Branco's administration. This dependency continued beyond this period, but its chief purpose no longer continued to be an attempt to achieving privileged ties with the United States.

Thus, this vertical unilateral North-South relationship continued to be the basic characteristic of Brazil's foreign policy, though it also included a horizontal multilateral South-South and a diagonal South-East approach. Within the context of its international relations, the problem was that the United States was experiencing a crisis in its hegemony, but was still dominant and capable of tough reaction. Thus, the United States reacted both against Brazilian nationalist bargaining stances and its Independent Foreign Policy, because they reinforced the erosion of American hegemony.

In any case, Brazil became "too big" to continue to be aligned with the United States without receiving any compensation. Ironically, if Brazil

initiated its search for autonomy (or, at least, bargaining its dependency) from Washington during the populist period, this process was completed during the military regime. This was not an anti-imperialist phenomenon, but it represented the outcome of an essential contradiction - the coming of age of a large peripheral country (not geographically located near the “fevered borders of the Cold War”) into the industrial age. It is also worth noting that during this stage, nationalism had both an internal and a foreign dimension, resulting in contamination of foreign policy by the domestic discourse, turning the relationship with the American hegemonic power more complex.

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Brazil-USA relations during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985)

Paulo Fagundes Visentini¹

Brazil-USA relations while the Military Regime was in force have led to a series of stereotypical interpretations. The main one is that the dictatorship was essentially a subordinate ally of this hegemonic power. However, apart from certain semblances in the initial period of the regime, it is clear that the military's project for power, which included a developmentist element, ended up on a clash course with the "big brother" from the north. This process was also due to the fact that Itamaraty [the Brazilian Foreign Office] had gradually taken on the role of defining and managing foreign policy, a tendency which was facilitated by changes in the global scenario, particularly during the 1970s.

The USA was directly and indirectly involved in how the coup which ousted President Goulart came about. The military regime introduced a change in direction in relation to populist nationalism which was evident, above all, during the military regime's first government, that of Castello Branco (1964-67). This led many analysts to establish a mechanical relationship between the domestic conservative policy and a foreign policy which was seen as subservient and pro-American. However, as neoliberalism was eventually to demonstrate, during subsequent governments of the

1 Amaro Grassi, funded by IC, contributed to data collection for this paper.

Military Regime (1967-1985) the notion of a national project of development and a search for international autonomy survived, aimed at building a medium-sized industrial power. In foreign policy, this positive action was carried out by Itamaraty with a considerable degree of maneuverability and autonomy.

Castelo Branco (1964-1967)

On 2nd April 1964 the Deputy and President of the Deputy Chamber, took over the Presidency, while the Supreme Command of the Revolution (made up of the commanders of the three arms of the military) enacted Institutional Act n.1, giving the government powers to abolish the main institutions of the country, eliminating “subversive populism” from the political scene. The purged Congress elected one of the coup’s leaders as President, General Humberto Castelo Branco (recently appointed to Supreme Commander), and he took office on the 15th April. Castelo Branco promised a quick return to democratic normality and presented a “*revolução redentora*” [Restorative Revolution] platform: social order and peace (elimination of the “communist threat”), the fight against corruption and a return to growth by encouraging private capital.

Over the next months, a “coup within a coup” took place, as the Armed Forces consolidated their power, marginalizing traditional civil leaders and governing with the support of technocrats. Liberal economists and pro-Americans such as Otávio Gouveia de Bulhões and Roberto Campos (nicknamed by the nationalists as Bob Fields) were put in charge of the ministries of Finance and Planning, respectively. One of the first measures of the new government was to repeal the Legislation on the Control of Remittance of Profits and push through a package of economic-financial measures to contain inflation and the budgetary deficit - pay and credit tightening, public spending cuts, currency devaluation and a reduction in the issuing of money. At the same time ministers from the economic area reached an agreement with the USA to compensate companies taken over by the Goulart government, as well as passing a law to safeguard foreign investments and companies.

Though the IMF considered the measures to be “gradualist”, the American government immediately came to the aid of the Brazilian military, releasing hundreds of millions of dollars which had been blocked during Goulart’s presidency. At the start of 1965 the IMF and the World Bank released funds and there was a modest influx of new investments. Consequently the financial situation was stabilized, although within a strongly recessive scenario. Together with the banning of the political parties, the trade unions and the popular movements, this led to a recovery of confidence in Brazil on the part of the international financial community

In the diplomatic area, the Castelo Branco government oversaw a complete turnaround, abandoning a ‘Third-Worldist’ outlook, multilateralism and the global positioning of the Independent Foreign Policy, and returning to an automatic alliance with the USA and a bilateral and hemispheric diplomatic position. The characteristic geopolitics of the Cold War lay behind this regressive move, as theorized by the *Escola Superior de Guerra* [Brazil’s War College], with its discourse centered on ideological borders and the communist threat. In exchange for its subordination to Washington and abandoning its developmentalist diplomacy, Brazil hoped to receive economic support. As proof of its loyalty Brazil broke off relations with Cuba in May 1964, in a highly significant symbolic gesture, demonstrating that the country had eliminated all “leftist” traces from its foreign policy.

This situation, which Amado Cervo called “a step out of the chain”, was merely a readjustment of direction rather than a complete rupture. Brazil seemed to be interested in demonstrating its stability in order to recover the confidence of foreign capital. However, a certain degree of autonomy was preserved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to be one of the main protagonists in what could be called the national project. Itamaraty was the only institution not to be purged by external Inquiry Commissions. Even the MFA put the most highly regarded diplomats from the previous period at arms length and took up a less politicized approach. The Regime had a tolerant stance towards these diplomats, perceiving them as “the military in civilian clothes”. In this way the MFA preserved its autonomy and came to occupy the position of the “prince’s advisor”. Thus, the foreign policy of the Regime gradually became similar to that of the Independent Foreign Policy.

The principle characteristic of foreign policy, as shown, was realignment with the USA. Brazilian support, evident in both bilateral and multilateral arenas and at a global and regional level, intensified the political and economic

relationship between the two nations. However, Castelo Branco never spoke explicitly about an inevitable alignment, despite his subordination to the USA and his acquiescence to their demands. The government's project meant Brazil abandoned its aspiration to enjoy the status of a world power, as its national interests were less important than the unity of the western hemisphere. Nevertheless, Brazil did maintain a certain amount of autonomy.

In its relations with the continent Brazil decided on two lines of action. First, eliminate conflicts with the USA in order to work together in terms of market, capital and technology, and second, express international relations within this scheme (Cervo and Bueno, 1992). Along these lines, a number of positions can be identified: the break with Cuba, a distancing from the People's Republic of China, support for the establishment of a Multinational Peace Force working under the aegis of the OAS, participation in the intervention in the Dominican Republic, the American request for Brazilian troops to be sent to Vietnam (which was not accepted by the Brazilian government), internal economic and political "cleansing", the wide-ranging 'opening' and encouragement of foreign capital, and finally, the establishment of a diplomatic stance based on the anti-left National Security policy and the ideological parameters of the East-West conflict. These positions recalled the policies of Foreign Minister, Raul Fernandes, during the Dutra and Café Filho governments, when favoring the USA was seen as a dignified position and held up the hope of receiving something in exchange.

Juracy Magalhães, when he was ambassador in Washington, delivered his infamous phrase that "what is good for the USA is good for Brazil", though he later had to explain that this did not imply "an unconditional adherence to that country, as the opposite was equally true" (Magalhães 1971, 275). The Brazilian government hoped to receive investments and loans, financial and technical assistance, a more amenable pricing structure for its products, the opening up of the American market and regional withdrawal of transnational headquarters in favor of establishing Brazilian subsidiaries.

In the strategic-political field, there were expectations that an economic environment favorable to foreign capital would be established and vertical subordination would be accepted, within a scenario where the centre-periphery system was to be subdivided into regional poles, hence reducing costs for the American hegemony: Brazil would take on the status of a regional sub-leader. However, what this scheme did not take into account was that the more Brazil collaborated the less necessary it was to pay for this collaboration, making it

possible to divert attention and resources to other more problematical areas. The lack of American support weakened the Castelo camp within the Regime, leading to its replacement in the next government by a national-authoritarian line.

Costa e Silva (1967-1969)

In January 1967 a new Constitution was promulgated, which incorporated the measures implemented by the government, centralized political and administrative structures and changed the name of the country from the *United States of Brazil* to the *Federative Republic of Brazil*. At the same time a Press Law and a National Security Law were passed, institutionalizing the coercive measures. The lack of a substantial reaction against the coup, the economic recession and the exclusion/subordination of the civil perpetrators of the coup resulted in significant internal differences within the first military government which, in turn, were reflected in the choice of the future president. The bourgeoisie segments which depended on the internal market or who suffered from the competition of the transnational companies favored by the Castelo government expressed their discontentment through business entities, such as the National Federation of Industries. The hard-line nationalist military soon joined them. The nomination of Costa e Silva was a response to these demands.

Hélio Beltrão and Delfim Neto, nominated respectively as the Ministers of Planning and Finances, loosened monetarist policy and financial tightening, re-embarking on an economic developmentalist path, which led to GDP growth of 9.3% in 1968. The Strategic Programme of Development established interest rate control and favored the heavy industry and energy sectors. The role of the State was consolidated, coordinating the macroeconomic plan and creating state companies in strategic sectors which were of no interest to foreign or national private capital. Curiously, the Military Regime, one of the objectives of which was to reverse the statism of national-populism, ended up making use of these same mechanisms in a far more radical way.

International relations also underwent a profound break in relation to the previous government, clashing head on with Washington. The Diplomacy of

Prosperity, conducted by Magalhães Pinto the Minister for Foreign Affairs and based on autonomy and development, was very close to the Independent Foreign Policy, though it lacked any social reforming reference. Within this vision the international scenario was perceived from a North-South and Third World prism (as opposed to Western), strengthening alliances through UNCTAD and the recently created Group of 77, an economic version of the Non-Aligned States. Similarly, Brazil rejoined and deepened its contacts with the socialist bloc.

Both the discourse and the diplomatic stances of Costa e Silva resulted in profound disagreements with the USA, demonstrating clear signs of difference from the previous government. New expressions started to define Brazil-USA relations, particularly from 1967 onwards: emerging rivalry, the missing relationship, managed conflict, contradictory systems in their world visions, supply and demand.

The main differences were the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, restrictions on the importation of soluble café and textiles, the International Cocoa Agreement, greater Brazilian participation in bilateral freight and Brazil's share in the redistribution of sugar quotas. The rumors concerning the internationalization of the Amazon were another issue, started in the previous government and denied by Costa e Silva. Indeed, the USA signaled that it could intervene in Latin America without the agreement of all members of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA).

In response to autonomous diplomatic actions such as not sending troops to Vietnam and contact with countries such as France in order to purchase equipment, the USA considerably reduced military assistance to Brazil in 1968. From that point assistance was limited to a training programme while arms sales were suspended. Brazil's new autonomous posture in foreign and domestic affairs was viewed with concern.

This profile of USA relations with Brazil and Latin America was an isolationist inflection in American foreign policy amidst the pressures of Vietnam. Though he did not share this view, the Nixon presidency faced internal pressures which reduced his capacity to take action in the region. Among the few initiatives which Nixon implemented, the loan agreement of 1968 stands out, according to which the USA would lend 75 million dollars for the stabilization programme, under the aegis of the Alliance for Progress via USAID. In 1969 the Rockefeller Mission instigated in Brazil an intensive

programme of contacts with authorities and representatives from the private sector, building on local initiatives undertaken by Ambassador Elbrick, with the objective of increasing USA involvement in development.

In practice, these American initiatives represented a policy of positive incentives and veiled threats, a way of influencing both the Brazilian economy and its diplomacy. Within this scenario Costa e Silva, despite the tensions, managed to maintain reasonably good relations with the USA in general terms, although some distancing occurred (Cervo and Bueno 1992).

Médici (1969-1974)

Costa e Silva left government for health reasons and a Military Junta took his place for two months, made up of hard-liners. In this period, the Junta annulled the mandate of the vice-president (making it impossible for him to take office), passed a new and tougher National Security Law, introducing the death penalty, and initiated a further cleansing of the Armed Forces. This was clearly a palace coup which gave rise to the *anos de chumbo* (lead years). The Junta nominated General Emílio Garrastazu Médici (head of the National Intelligence Service (SNI)) as President and he was sworn into office on 30th October by a mutilated Congress which had recently been re-opened

Repressive and ostensibly pro-American, while at the same time developmentalist in its aim to construct a project of *Brasil Potência* (Brazil Power), the Médici government was a contradictory and complex phenomenon. The *National Interest Diplomacy* of Foreign Minister Mário Gibson Barboza demonstrated clear differences from the actions of Costa e Silva. Third World solidarity and politicized discourse were abandoned in the name of pragmatism as areas of disagreement with the USA were prioritized in order to establish a satisfactory relationship. Even so, foreign policy continued to denounce the paralysis of world power and persevered with its ambitious objective of placing Brazil in the First World. Similarly, criticism of international financial and trade structures and a refusal to sign the NPT were maintained and the project of technological enhancement and development of Brazil's national arms industry was advanced. Furthermore,

ties with other capitalist centers, such as Japan and Europe, were developed in order to optimize investments and technology coming into the country.

How was it possible to conciliate these two lines, autonomy and bilateral stability? Brazil's internal political problems (the combat of guerrilla warfare) engendered a certain solidarity on the part of the White House, at a time when left-wing governments were in power in Chile and Peru, while Argentina and Uruguay were undergoing internal political conflicts bordering on Civil War. In this way, Brazil was seen as a necessary ally in order to stabilize the region, particularly at a time when the Nixon doctrine favored a degree of disengagement on the part of the USA, and the transferral of specific tasks to potential regional allies (Iran, Israel, Brazil, South Africa, amongst others).

Brazil fulfilled the role that Washington anticipated by providing support for the coups in Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia. Therefore, an international space existed in order to construct a project involving a regional medium-sized power and a highly favorable Latin American conjuncture. Médici sought the middle ground between the stances of the previous two governments as he attempted to mitigate any atmosphere of conflict. However, profound questions remained to be resolved. The *Milagre* (Miracle) propaganda fuelled the idea of parity in relations with the USA making disagreements inevitable, particularly in view of a reduction of shared economic interests.

One of the issues that provoked tension with the USA was the unilateral decree issued by Brazil in 1970, increasing its Territorial Waters from 12 to 200 nautical miles. Though the issue did not directly fall within bilateral concerns, as it was a decision concerning the extent of Brazil's waters, the initiative was primarily motivated by political-diplomatic positioning rather than economic concerns, reinforcing the posture and discourse of *Brasil Potência* (Brazil, a World Power) as a way of providing a sovereign legitimacy to the regime. There was also pressure over the nuclear question, textile and shoe exports, as well as the trade and strategic issues mentioned.

In 1971, Médici visited the USA, hoping to gain recognition for the international status of Brazil, so as to avoid the country being subsumed into a uniform policy for Latin America. However, the most important motive for the trip was economic problems, mainly the question of trade. The trade imbalance, favorable to Brazil, forced Itamaraty to attempt to reach a direct understanding with the USA, which was threatening to impose compensatory duties on Brazilian products. The most important consequence of the trip

was the comment made by Nixon, who supported the authoritarian regime, “we know that where Brazil goes, the rest of the Latin American continent will follow”. This declaration aggravated Brazil’s position in Latin America where it was seen as sub-imperialist. In the words of Foreign Minister Gibson Barboza it was “a true kiss of death” (Barboza 1992).

In relation to political repression, bilateral relations were restored after a period when American help had been suspended as a way of pressurizing the Costa e Silva government. Assistance recommenced and the Nixon government became a strong ally of Médici, bolstered by the intensification of violence and the coming to power of left-wing governments in other Latin American countries (Skidmore 1988).

In this context, Brazil turned to renegotiating the terms of its dependence, initiating a *pragmatic dialogue* with the USA. By rejecting any sense of being a satellite or of an inevitable alignment, relations flowed in a natural and stable way, though tensions remained. Despite the intense exchange of visits from 1970 to 1973 between Brazilian and American authorities, there were few practical results of political, scientific, technological, commercial and strategic cooperation. However, this dynamics would come to an end with the subsequent government, that of Geisel, and the end of the Nixon administration amidst the Watergate crisis and the election of Carter in 1976.

Geisel (1974-1979)

General Ernesto Geisel, president of Petrobrás and Chief of the Military Staff during Castelo Branco’s government, was nominated as successor to Médici and took office as President on 15th March 1974, after defeating in Congress the “anti-candidate”, Ulisses Guimarães, from the MDB [Brazilian Democracy Movement]. The new government meant a return to power of those in sympathy with Castelo, above all because General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the group’s ideological and strategic champion, secured the post of Chief of Staff. The main project was moving forward the political ‘opening’ process.

The 1973 oil crisis directly affected the national development project which was being sustained by cheap energy and the securing of credits and

technology from abroad, linked to an emphasis on road transport to the benefit of transnational manufacturers. Despite the fact that Geisel had inherited a GDP of US\$133 billion, the Miracle had resulted in structural problems such as an annual inflation of 18.7% and an external debt of US\$12.5 billion, in addition to a reduction in exports of national products and in the shrinking of the domestic market.

Therefore, the new economic team, in the form of Mario Henrique Simonsen in the Ministry of Finances and João Paulo dos Reis Velloso in Planning, needed to urgently develop alternative strategies. The 2nd National Development Plan (NDP), launched in September 1974, sought to extend the process of industrialization through import substitution, with the aim of making Brazil self-sufficient in basic supplies and, if possible, in energy. The government decided to diversify its energy sources by launching an ambitious program of building hydroelectric plants and nuclear reactors, as well as increasing oil exploration (by means of risk contracts with foreign companies) and alcohol production to be used as automotive fuel (Pro-Alcohol Project). Furthermore, the development of technological capacity in the burgeoning areas of IT and petrochemicals was intensified, based on state initiatives. Indeed, the state clearly became the largest productive agent and provided the conditions for an economic reaction.

The economic reaction resulted in a significant change in Brazil's foreign relations. Initially, the diplomatic initiative of Foreign Minister Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, called *Pragmatismo Responsável e Ecumênico* [Universal and Responsible Pragmatism], intensified relations with Arab countries, with the aim of securing the supply of oil, as well as increasing trade with socialist countries, establishing in 1974 diplomatic relations with the Popular Republic of China, and developing its policy in relation to Africa. In relation to other capitalist powers, in view of the unsatisfactory relationship with the USA, Brazil looked to alternatives in Western Europe and Japan, establishing strategic cooperation which went far beyond the traditional bargaining policy. When the White House refused to collaborate with the Brazilian nuclear project, the president did not delay in signing a Nuclear Agreement with West Germany. It is also worth noting the advancement in the space program (rockets and satellites) linked to cooperation with Popular China.

Throughout the Geisel-Azeredo period Brazil-USA relations developed in a quite different way from the Médici period as the White House stood in outright opposition to this agenda. Low impact conflicts were replaced by

serious disagreements in the political and economic areas. In the economic arena the central dispute was the same as ever - related to Brazil's efforts to increase sales of manufactured goods to the USA and the disinterest of the Americans in reforming the financial and trade system. However, this was not the main point of disagreement, this lay in two related political questions: nuclear technology and human rights. In addition, Brazil's abstention when the OAS voted to introduce sanctions against Cuba and the UN vote in favor of a resolution condemning racism, including Zionism - a decision linked to Brazil's preferential commercial ties with Arab countries, even the most radical ones - worsened relations.

In practice, the nuclear question had been present since the Vargas era, but it only became a priority after 1964, in face of the energy needs of the national development project and the potential exhaustion of water resources. Both Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva brought this issue to their agendas. Continuing to increase Brazilian actions in this area, Médici pushed the issue to the fore through the creation of Nuclebrás, mapping out a plan which took into account future energy needs and planning for the construction of hydroelectric plants, the Plano 90 [Plan 90] and the Angra I project. Despite its dependence on the USA, Brazil maintained a policy of technological collaboration with Europe and the Middle East, as well as with a number of Latin American countries. Among these exchanges, West Germany was clearly the most important and replaced Washington as Brazil's main partner. Despite the fact that Brazil received reactors from Westinghouse (Bandeira 1994) in 1974, the USA Commission for Atomic Energy vetoed the supply of fuel.

This veto was in line with the new non-proliferation posture of the American government, but its economic and political consequences for the USA were more negative than positive, as it disrupted business expansion in this area. Not being able to count on the Americans, countries looked for alternatives. It is within this scenario that the Brazil-Germany Agreement came about, as the European country was also seeking to increase its autonomy from the USA (guaranteeing access to uranium mines and providing new markets for German products).

In terms of the Agreement, negotiations were conducted entirely in secret until February 1975. At the end of this month, the German ambassador in Washington informed the Director of the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency of its negotiations with Brazil. In April, the State Department sent four

envoys to Bonn to try to dissuade the Germans from pursuing the Agreement, but they were unsuccessful. In May, the German Foreign Ministry announced that the two countries had arrived at an agreement to supply eight nuclear reactors. This was confirmed by Itamaraty.

The Nuclear Agreement was signed on 27th June 1975 and comprised two documents: the Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation for peaceful uses and the Protocol of Industrial Cooperation. The latter was the most important as it put in place a number of projects to be carried out by Nuclebrás, including technology transfer. The validity of the agreement was subject to ensuring IAEA that the equipment was not going to be used in nuclear weapons or explosives.

The reaction of the USA was notable given the relative increase in Brazil's power in this field and the Americans loss of market control in this technology - the Agreement could serve as a template for others and trigger competition between developing countries.

During the Ford-Kissinger administration pressure was exerted in a very careful and cordial way. The government still saw Brazil as a necessary and preferential ally in Latin America. In February 1976, Brazil and the USA signed a Memorandum of Understanding which established bilateral consultative meetings across a range of issues. It was a preferential channel of communication, but the Memorandum had much more symbolic significance than actually providing any concrete results, and it did not secure a solution to the nuclear question which worsened with the arrival in power of the Democrat, Jimmy Carter. During his term of office this question was linked to the issue of human rights, with pressure being applied on Brazil.

It seemed that Carter did not take into account the changes which had taken place in the nuclear products market. He acted as if non-proliferation was the task of the Americans. Carter had already criticized the Nuclear Agreement in his (presidential) campaign. Once elected, he began to make aggressive declarations against the Agreement. After just ten days in power he sent his vice-president, Walter Mondale, to Bonn to negotiate a possible suspension of the Agreement with Helmut Schmidt. The Assistant Secretary, Warren Christopher, was sent to Brasília. The Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, proposed in a press conference a moratorium on the Agreement.

The Brazilian government responded through the press that there was absolutely no possibility of suspending the Agreement. This posture generated internal dividends for the Geisel administration, uniting the government and the opposition. However, West Germany was the target of greater pressure. The Agreement provoked the most serious crisis between the USA and Germany since the Second World War. Germany stood firm against the pressure, claiming that it had not violated the non-proliferation directives. However, at a certain moment, the German government seemed to hesitate, accepting the idea of creating multinational centers for the supply of enriched fuel. Brazil reacted by saying that any modification to the terms of the Agreement would result in its complete cancellation (Camargo and Vasquez 1988).

At the end of 1976 negotiations between Bonn and Washington took a turn for the better. However, at the end of March 1977, Carter exerted pressure on the Chase Manhattan Bank and Eximbank to suspend all loans negotiated with Brazil and froze the supply of enriched uranium to the RFA [German Republic]. Their demands were either to terminate the Agreement or introduce safeguards and exclude the plant from enriching uranium and reprocessing fuel.

Nevertheless, the USA government ended up tolerating the Nuclear Agreement as long as Germany accepted new multilateral instruments which encouraged non-proliferation. In June 1977 the German government announced the cessation in exports of reprocessing technology. However, the Agreement was not affected as it was the final transfer of a complete cycle to a Third World country. Six months later, Geisel visited West Germany, the first Head of State to do so. On this occasion a number of complementary accords to the Agreement were signed (Brasil 1977, 80).

A few days later Carter sanctioned the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which allowed for the suspension at any time of the supply of enriched uranium to countries that did not comply with Washington's directives. This law was proposed by American Congress members in 1975 precisely because of the Brazil-Germany Agreement. The legislation was a serious threat both to Germany and France as they were dependent on enriched American uranium.

It is necessary to digress here to see exactly how the issue of human rights was addressed within the Nuclear Agreement. The issue of human rights came to the fore when Carter took office in January 1977. The

contrast in this area between the actions of Carter on the one hand and Nixon and Ford on the other was huge. The latter were tolerant in relation to this issue and Nixon made it clear on a number of occasions that "certain practices" were necessary to control "subversion". Carter's real objective was to loudly denounce violations against the human rights of Soviet dissidents. His credibility, however, required that the official discourse had to be universalized, embracing all authoritarian governments, even those of countries which were "friends". These initiatives were an attempt by the USA government to recover its international prestige after defeat in the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal.

In relation to Brazil, the USA government was opportunistic in associating reports of human rights violations to the Nuclear Agreement. These reports were used as way of pressurizing Brazil to terminate or revise the Agreement. In 1976 the American Congress passed a law which required the Department of State to present an annual report on human rights covering 82 countries which received military or security assistance, including Brazil. The first report on Brazil appeared at the beginning of 1977, criticizing the country's performance based on Amnesty International documents, amongst others, and made mention of illegal arrests, the suspension of political rights, censorship of the press and pressure exerted on the Church (Skidmore 1988). This report was delivered to Itamaraty. The document, which was supposed to be confidential, was published in the *Estado de São Paulo* newspaper. Geisel reacted promptly. He returned the report and the Foreign Minister Azeredo denounced this interference as inadmissible, rejecting any assistance which might be linked to internal affairs. This was the most serious disagreement between Brazil and the USA. The government even began to study alternatives in case of military or trade retaliations (Camargo and Vasquez 1988). Within a few days the Brazilian government had announced the cancellation of the 1952 Military Agreement with the USA.

The importance of the dispute was reflected in the postponing of Carter's visit, initially scheduled for November 1977 (it took place in March 1978). Carter sent the First Lady, Rosalyn Carter, in his place in June 1977 and she became involved in the issue. The dispute reignited in September 1977 when Geisel cancelled four more military agreements. The approach of the Brazilian government was to steer around the problem without provoking further controversy. The sectors involved were aware

that pressure on human rights issues sought to affect the nuclear question. However, at the same time, the government was also aware that this issue could provoke domestic problems as it implicated the repressive actions of the Armed Forces.

By the end of 1977 the conditions necessary to return to an understanding were gradually established. In March 1978, when Carter visited Brazil, controversial issues were addressed with the utmost discretion. Carter claimed that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act did not apply to either Brazil or the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the United States continued to insist on guarantees and the issue was only resolved in 1981 (Bandeira 1989). Sectors linked to the government understood this change of attitude as evidence that Brazil was becoming a large power and that the USA feared losing an important ally. However, Carter's position related to domestic problems rather than any actual change in position in face of this issue, and in the next election he was replaced by Reagan who would represent new difficulties for Brazilian diplomacy.

Figueiredo (1979-1985)

General João Baptista Figueiredo was sworn into office as president on 15th March 1979, facing increasing pressure from the opposition, intense social mobilization, reactions from the Right and the aggravation of the economic crisis and the international situation. The main objective of the new government was continuity and the conclusion of the re-democratization process, closing the military cycle. The "opening president" was advised by General Golbery as Chief of Staff until 1981. Amidst an ambiguous discourse and advances and setbacks, he sought to implement his program in a set of circumstances which had begun with difficulties and would deteriorate further.

The global scenario became extremely negative for Brazil with the second oil crisis (due to the revolution in Iran and the war with Iraq), the scientific-technological revolution which widened the distance between advanced capitalist and developing countries, and the end of the *détente* in 1979. Having overcome the Vietnam syndrome, Ronald Reagan ushered a vigorous

American reaction into the system with the new Cold War. In economic terms, Reagan put forward a neoliberal agenda and in 1981 he introduced a massive rise in interest rates, the aim of which was to increase the external debt of countries from the South. In this way the debt crisis was an instrument to exert pressure, a deadly blow to the developmentist project of nations such as Brazil.

Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro's Foreign Policy, Universalism, maintained strong continuity with Pragmatism. Defining the country as part of the Third World, Brazilian diplomacy continued to act in international forums converging with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, denouncing international economic and political structures. With the gradual submission of Western Europe and Japan to the new economic and diplomatic-strategic position of the Reagan administration, cooperation with these countries witnessed a significant reduction. A similar reduction took place in relation to the African axis, though in the Middle East the Brazilian presence was maintained, as were relations with China. Relations between medium-sized powers from the periphery consolidated South-South cooperation. Relations were symmetrical and did not entail either subordination or hegemony, providing a greater scope for diplomacy. Furthermore, difficulties on a global level meant South America occupied an increasingly valuable space for Brazil, enhancing economic-political cooperation with closer ties with Argentina at its core

Increasing export difficulties, a fall in the influx of foreign capital and an increase in foreign debt payments resulted in a severe recession during 1982-1983, as well as an increase in inflation, leaving Brazil little choice but to declare a moratorium. Delfim Neto, who was back in charge of the economy, conducted difficult negotiations with the IMF. This organization imposed an even tougher recessive program on Brazil in order to clean up its public finances and facilitate new loans. The 'opening' process ensued within this scenario. The Amnesty Law was signed in 1979 and party reform abolished the Arena and MDB political parties, clearing the way for the creation of new parties.

As we have seen, bilateral tensions evident during Carter's administration worsened under Reagan. Under the Republican Presidency traditional areas of conflict intensified (human rights, trade and the non-transfer of sensitive technologies) and other areas of conflict related to the new global American strategy and its consequences on Latin America emerged: the fight against

terrorism, the emphasis on military solutions, financial pressures on the South, hostility towards the autonomy of medium-sized nations and new ambiguities concerning the nuclear question.

This hardening in relation to Latin America during the Reagan administration was not an isolated stance, but an attempt at global repositioning after the retrocession of the previous administration. This new repositioning saw the Third World both as a board game to be played against the Soviets and as a supplier of strategic and energy resources. Though secondary to USA interests in relation to Europe and Asia, Reagan's foreign policy saw Latin America as a kind of testing ground to contain what was perceived as Soviet expansion in Central America and the Caribbean. There were interventions in these regions. There were also attempts to reduce the scope for action of medium-sized powers such as Brazil. Brazil did not support the American political-military interventions in the area despite their anti-communist nature, due to its internal 'opening' process and diplomatic emphasis on non-intervention.

Though the Brazilian government avoided radical positions, conflict could not be avoided on the issue of the South Atlantic, a serious point of disagreement: from the American point of view, the region represented increasing political-strategic importance within the logic of the Cold War, while the Brazilian perspective was related to its political-commercial relations with the African continent, leading to demands for the de-militarization of the region. Discussions became exacerbated by the Falklands (Malvinas) War which exposed the failure of the interamerican system of defense, as established by IATRA. In this way the Brazilian position on de-militarization of the South Atlantic was reinforced.

In 1981, under the auspices of bilateral relations, the American Vice-President, George Bush, and his Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Enders, visited Brazil. Amid difficult talks and in order to resist a supposed Soviet-Cuban intervention in Central America, the Caribbean and southern Africa, the Americans attempted to convince the Brazilian authorities to join up to a process of militarizing the South Atlantic in a pact with the military regime in Argentina and South Africa. In addition, they sought to secure the outright condemnation of Brazil to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the State of Emergency in Poland. In exchange, Washington promised a closer bilateral relationship: greater investments, the suspension of some barriers to Brazilian exports and a guarantee of the supply of nuclear fuel.

Some of these agreements came to pass: the penalty imposed retroactively relating to the purchase of enriched uranium for Angra I was cancelled; Brazil obtained permission to approach Urenco, the nuclear consortium comprising Germany, the United Kingdom and Holland; and the USA accepted new subsidies for Brazilian exports, resulting in only five products continuing to pay compensatory duties. At the same time, Bush and Enders backed up these concessions with an endorsement of the military regime's management of the country's 'opening', stating that disagreements and human rights issues no longer figured in their bilateral agenda. However, these concessions were not sufficient for Brazil.

President Figueiredo visited the USA between 12th and 14th May 1982, ostensibly to undergo a heart examination, though he held talks with Ronald Reagan. The discussions concerned the situation in the Falklands (Malvinas). Though differences of opinion remained, there was a consensus that the war should not deteriorate into a more serious conflict. Figueiredo defended Argentina against the sanctions approved by Washington. In response to Brazil's antagonistic positions with regard to financial and diplomatic matters, the Reagan administration threatened to cut Brazilian access to credits from the World Bank and the InterAmerican Bank of Development, and remove Brazil from the Generalized System of Preferences (a legal instrument which reduced the effects of American protectionist legislation). It also decided to reduce its sugar imports quota by 50%.

Though the Reagan administration prioritized military-strategic matters, American trade policy, flexible and pragmatic as it was, did not accept certain aspects of Brazilian trade policy (support for pioneer industries through protection of the domestic market and the promotion of exports of manufactured goods by means of incentives and subsidies). It is worth emphasizing that the debt crisis meant Brazil had to generate trade surpluses in order to keep up its payments, something that was viewed with concern.

Brazilian subsidies and protectionism were the main points of conflict. While Brazil followed GATT's guidance, the USA insisted on bilateral relations, in the hope of achieving greater concessions and the opening up of the Brazilian market. In 1982 the trade war reached its apex: bilateral relations were dominated by arguments, threats and accusations in a confrontation only comparable to 1977 when President Geisel terminated the military agreements. Dialogue reached an impasse, with Reagan blocking coffee exports in an attempt to abolish incentives. In this context

Delfim Neto was forced to reduce incentives to zero until April 1983, during which period Brazilian trade was subjected to retaliatory measures. At the heart of the matter was their dispute for other markets.

Despite these problems, Washington demonstrated concern about the Brazilian crisis and the risk of it deteriorating to a tense state of affairs similar to Argentina and Mexico. From 1982 onwards the USA sought to substitute what had virtually become a 'dialogue between deaf people' with more constructive negotiations. During his visit to Brazil, Reagan presented Washington's demands - Brazil should adhere to interest rates of 10% (at the time 8.5%) and open up its markets. Indeed, President Reagan sought to demonstrate, in concrete terms, his interest in starting a new dialogue. During his visit, working groups were set up to increase bilateral cooperation in five key areas: economic-financial, industrial-military, nuclear, scientific-technological and spacial. At the same time, the USA government announced an emergency loan in order to resolve Brazil's urgent liquidity problems. It is worth pointing out that, at this time, the USA held a contrary position towards an increase in IMF quotas.

Similar to previous initiatives, the cooperation groups were only partly successful. In 1984 the two governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding which foresaw the transfer of cutting-edge military technology, and in 1985 Brazil adhered to the interamerican system of military telecommunications implemented by the USA. On the other hand, there was a distancing in military relations. In face of this growing disconnection, diplomatic efforts on both sides sought to set relations on a better course.

In 1983 Brazil and the USA reached an agreement on a new mechanism to guide their relations, based on their common interests across a number of fields: economics, finance, nuclear energy, science and technology, cosmic space and industrial-military cooperation. In October, during a visit by George Shultz to Brazil, Saraiva Guerreiro persisted in trying to secure agreements which had never got off the paper, in the economic-financial, industrial-military, space, nuclear and scientific-technological fields. Only nuclear cooperation was on the table. Nevertheless, obstacles prevented the supply of uranium to the Angra I nuclear plant, despite the fact that there were fewer pressures than in the Geisel era, indeed, there were even those who defended a resumption of military cooperation with the USA. Cooperation in the IT area became more likely. However, in 1984,

conflicts of interest which still separated the two countries were evident: there were practically no concrete results from the working groups set up on Reagan's visit, they were restricted to vague declarations of intent. Sensitive issues were not addressed.

In this context, the words of Ambassador Saraiva are salient: "we have maintained good relations with the USA, which is proper, as it is the greatest power and economy in the world, principle source, in our case, of funding and investments, of science and technology. However, we should not illude ourselves that we are able to make the American government sensitive to our particular needs [...]" (Guerreiro 1992, 52). In fact, during the Figueiredo government, the final administration of the military regime, bilateral relations were essentially characterized by conflict.

Conclusion

Brazil's relations with the USA went far beyond the relationship between two national States. Apart from official bilateral relations and economic ties - particularly as a result of transnational companies and American capital - a segment of the Brazilian elite closely identifies with their "big brother" from the North, with significant ideological-political connotations. Furthermore, Brazil is located in an area where Washington directly imposes its hegemony, the Western hemisphere, that is, the Americas. Indeed, disagreements which initiated during the populist period hardened during the military regime, to the surprise of many analysts. Brazilian development, from a certain point onwards, could not have been pursued under the protective wings of the USA.

If, for internal reasons, and to a lesser degree external, the first military government relied on interdependence (instead of the Independent Foreign Policy), perhaps this was merely another tactical measure or, simply, contradictory with the conservative modernization process as set out by the civil-military group which took power by means of a coup in 1964. Though the economic miracle model had been accepted by the USA and until 1973 a certain degree of strategic cooperation had been maintained, particularly in relation to South America, there were already signs of a progressive distancing between the two countries.

The transformations described here generated both the motivation and the possibility of setting out an autonomous diplomatic posture towards the USA. Though a new autonomist discourse had been initiated in the Costa e Silva government and the Médici government had moved towards a discreet distancing, it was during the eleven years of the Geisel and Figueiredo governments that Brazil developed a global diplomatic stance with strong autonomous characteristics. However, the economic, social and political paradigm of the Regime comprised profound contradictions which limited its scope. Therefore, while Brazil advanced considerably at a global political level, it was not capable of maintaining this progress, leading to an ambiguous situation which has still not been resolved.

The 'opening' at the end of the Military Regime and the subsequent Sarney and Collor governments brought mixed results and, ironically, facilitated the strengthening of American mechanisms of influence over Brazil. A detailed comparative study of domestic and foreign policy would be beneficial, particularly in relation to the recent historical developments experienced by Brazil, where the passage of time shows that not everything is exactly as it seems.

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Brazil-USA relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments

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The historical patterns of the relationship: from ‘special relation’ to indifference

From the long-term view of the 20th Century, bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States were characterized by different positions and attitudes. The governments of these countries held different postures during the various stages of a relationship going back to the period prior to Brazil's independence. Attitudes oscillated between closer ties and indifference, mistrust and military alliance, as well as cooperation and competition. Socially and economically the relationship gradually intensified, above all in the areas of culture and private investments, as Brazil increasingly became part of international flows of goods, services, know-how, and capital.

The United States – as the most important continental power throughout this period and as the main global power since the end of World War II – participated in all of Brazil's important diplomatic moves in the 20th century. It has also played a significant part in Brazil's foreign interaction

in economic, scientific, cultural and technological areas over the last half a century. These relations were (and still are) marked by clear asymmetry in economic, technological and military terms, despite the fact that Brazil sought to introduce greater political equilibrium at a diplomatic level, based on reciprocity and equality of treatment. These are difficult objectives to attain (even by more advanced countries) in view of the clear difference in strategic potential and power between the United States and other countries. The United States also held a unilateral position in its foreign policy, turning any search for bilateral parity into a largely rhetorical exercise.

The Old Brazilian Republic (1889-1930) introduced alternative foreign policy principles such as Pan-Americanism. During the Imperial period Brazil had remained relatively isolated from the other republics in the Continent. At first, bilateral relations started off on a good footing as the Brazilian Republic asserted its position: due to European intervention in the 'revolt of the *Armada*', the United States came to the rescue of the new regime against the monarchist tendencies of opposition groups. In relation to trade, success is first recorded by the signing of the 1891 trade agreement, guaranteeing the American market access to coffee and sugar under favorable terms in return for lower Brazilian tariffs on American manufactured goods and flour. This agreement did not last long. In 1895 the 'McKinley tariff', introduced under protectionist pressure from sectorial lobbies, put an end to preferential regimes which had been previously negotiated.

The development gap between both countries was already in evidence by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. It was at the end of the former that the first attempts at continental trade integration were conducted, under American stewardship. From 1902 onwards, the Baron of Rio Branco pursued a policy of closer ties with the United States. His diplomacy was based on balance of power (competing with Argentina for regional hegemony). Soon afterwards, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Its objective was to justify the policing role which the United States wanted to impose on their immediate geographic region (the Caribbean and Central America) by means of armed intervention. Over the next few years and decades, Brazil and Argentina competed for the privilege of having a 'special relationship' with the United States. However, this relationship always proved to be illusory. Expectations in South America were of achieving 'standards of civilization', which however the United States and European powers intended to keep exclusively for themselves.

For the remaining period of the Old Republic, bilateral relations were distant. This was, however, the period of gradual global hegemonic substitution in financial and investment terms. The United States became exporters of capital, including to Brazil, where the dollar took over the pound as the main exchange currency. American bankers participated in the financial scheme to support coffee (1906), an example of an anti-cyclical policy to address the crisis in demand. The policy of retaining stocks to hold up the external price of coffee was met with disdain by importers and consumer groups in the United States, resulting in judicial actions by American prosecutors against the official Brazilian policy, on grounds of anti-competitive practices.

The so-called 'Bachelor Republic', as the First Brazilian Republic was also known, sought to make Brazil part of the 'concert of nations', through its involvement in the War and its subsequent experience in the League of Nations, which proved to be one of the main disappointments in the history of Brazilian diplomacy. The United States sponsored the emergence of the League of Nations, though it remained outside, whilst Brazil left the organization in 1926. The country faced an external attitude of disdain and arrogance on the part of the powerful European nations and the United States, which later came to be known as benign neglect. The Roosevelt period - which largely coincided with the Vargas era - partly modified the isolationist posture of his predecessors, seeking a new relationship with Latin American neighbors. However, this is also a period of economic crisis, when markets were closed and the international balance of power was broken. The United States emerged as the incontestable military power of the Post-World War II period and Brazil's decisions to participate in the war efforts and align itself ideologically at the start of the Cold War proved to be correct.

The Bretton Woods Conference (1944) saw Brazil participating in the construction of a new world economic order based on American-type principles of liberalism. The 'American option' during the bipolar period did not prevent Brazil from pursuing a diplomacy of 'development'. Despite the 'national security' doctrine, Pan-Americanism justified the efforts of Brazilian diplomacy in 'exploring' the possibility of a co-operation charter with the United States, the main continental and western power. It is within the framework of bargaining policies and focused economic interests that Brazil undertakes its first regional multilateral initiative, the Pan-American Operation, proposed by the Kubitschek Government in 1958 which led to the

creation of the Inter-American Development Bank and subsequently to the Alliance for Progress.

The Independent Foreign Policy, conducted during the turbulent Jânio Quadros-João Goulart years, was a rare period of innovation within a diplomatic *continuum* dominated by the East-West conflict. The impact of the Cuban revolution and the de-colonization process brought neutralism and non-alignment to the fore of the international scenario. This was also a period of tough competition between the two superpowers based on both their technological predominance and political influence over the young independent nations. It is not surprising, therefore, that Brazilian diplomacy started to rethink its fundamental footing and review its lines of action, in particular with regard to its traditional support to Portuguese colonialism in Africa and its refusal to conduct economic relations and trade with socialist countries. During the Cold War, the preferential alliance with the United States is conceived more in terms of negotiating economic advantages than any geo-political chess game.

This ambiguous position does not last long, as in 1964 there is a return to alignment. Brazil's repositioning within the 'ideological global conflict' was akin to paying a 'toll' for American support in the military coup against the populist regime, rather than a process of ideological re-conversion on the part of Brazilian diplomacy. At any rate, there is a short period of 'political realignment' in which Brazil strictly adheres to the official canons of Pan-Americanism, as defined by Washington. Within a few months Brazil breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba and puts its relationship with other socialist states on hold. It also participates in the 'inter-American' armed intervention in the Dominican Republic political crisis: the United States took sides in the civil war and Brazil backed Washington's position. Similarly, there is a 'reversal of expectations' in the short-term regarding the country's multilateral policies, disappointing a new generation of diplomats trained, a few years earlier, under Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy.

In economic terms, a return to more orthodox forms of economic policy management allows for the question of the Brazilian foreign debt to be seen in a better light, both at a bilateral level and in multilateral forums such as the Club de Paris and international funding institutions, such as the IMF. By way of an example, the only joint Bretton Woods organizations assembly to take place in Brazil, occurred in Rio de Janeiro during the first military period,

in 1967. At the time, a new liquidity was negotiated by the international financial system, the IMF's 'Special Drawing Rights'.

However, this initial position, favorable to a more 'traditional' type of foreign policy or the blind acceptance of diplomatic rules based on 'unconditional alignment' to the ideas of Brazil's main western partner, was falling out of favor, even within the military regime which supported the doctrine of national security. In short, attitudes manifested during the first post-war years and immediately after the 1964 military movement were rapidly substituted by more pragmatic practices.

The emergence of conflicts in the military government and re-democratization

From 1967 onwards, Brazil undergoes a phase of 'ideological revision' in which it pursues technological autonomy. The 'contemplative' attitude towards the United States gives way to a professional diplomacy, concerned with adapting its instruments for action to a changing world and conceived to attain the national objective of economic development, by means of a more sustained growth. Despite conflicts with the United States, a 'diplomacy of development' is conducted, based on the pursuit of technological autonomy, including in nuclear terms, and on reassertion marked by both internal and external government action.

Trade conflicts start to occur, initially as a result of existing sectorial protectionism in the United States, above all in relation to access to the American market for Brazilian competitive products such as footwear and soluble coffee. Under the pretext that Brazilian production was benefiting from subsidies, the United States deployed a number of measures in defense of its domestic production, in particular anti-dumping. Conflicts spilled over into politics and security strategy when Brazil, in a defiant gesture, refused to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), negotiated exclusively by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and considered by Brazilian diplomacy to be discriminatory. The

issue of Brazilian access to nuclear materials and equipment was looked at in detail. In theory, its purpose was to fuel electricity plants, but potentially they could also provide the foundations for a military program. Shortly afterwards, the Americans put considerable pressure on both Germany and Brazil over the 1975 bilateral nuclear cooperation treaty implemented between the two countries. The agreement foresaw wide-ranging bilateral nuclear cooperation (although with IAEA safeguards), allowing for the supply of equipment for eight civil plants and uranium enrichment technology.

The Carter government's human rights activism (in a period when the military regime still carried out tough repression measures against left-wing movements) led, in 1977, to the termination of the 1952 military assistance agreement, allegedly due to interference in the country's 'internal affairs'. Bilateral relations perhaps reached their lowest point in decades, with the aggravation of conflicts due to political differences at a multilateral level, further adding to an already difficult agenda of trade disagreements. At international forums the United States were usually isolated on most UN resolution votes, particularly in relation to the 'new international economic order' or the Palestine question.

In spite of significant economic growth, Brazil had clear economic and financial weaknesses, since it was unable to eliminate constraints related to the balance of payments which had historically marked its development process. Following the 1973 and 1979 oil crises and the external debt crisis in 1982, policy disagreements between Brazil and the United States increased. The Brazilian position was perceived by the Americans as being excessively 'third-worldist' (intensification of trade relations with radical Arab countries such as Libya and Iraq, 'anti-Zionist' voting in the UN, coordinating a political solution for the issue of debt with other debtors, and so on), and the country continued in its pursuit of technological autonomy, above all, in the nuclear and space sectors.

The most important elements of Brazil's international position during re-democratization, which started in 1985, were a process of seeking international autonomy and reasserting itself as a regional power, starting with sub-regional integration in the Mercosur and the building of an economic space in South America. The central component of the US-Brazil relationship during this period was, however, the question of Brazil's external financing, affecting the country's economic and diplomatic plans. The most significant conflicts

occurred in the diplomatic sphere, given that external financial dependency obliged the Brazilian economic team to adopt a more conciliatory posture towards the United States.

Nevertheless, agreements to arrive at a significant fiscal adjustment within the molds demanded by the IMF proved to be difficult, given the exposure of American banks and internal difficulties in Brazil. After the external debt crises at the beginning of the decade, Brazil spent most of the 1980s negotiating temporary funding programs with the IMF and experiencing difficulties in renewing its short-term credit facilities and the commercial loans contracted during the previous decade.

American banks had been irresponsible when granting loans on top of loans to governments of developing countries, including Brazil, one of the largest borrowers in the financial market until the [1982] debt crisis. Banks now expected the American government and the IMF to guarantee interest payments by debtor countries. From 1987 onwards Brazil was unable to meet foreign payment commitments to creditor banks. As reserves were very low, in February, the Sarney government had to implement a unilateral moratorium on external commercial debts.

The effects of the moratorium were so negative for the financial health of Brazil that the new Finance Minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira (April-December 1987), sought to renegotiate with creditors a debt securitization plan. On 25th September 1987, even before being submitted to the creditors, the plan was discussed with the Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, who described it as a 'non-starter'. The scheme, which was rather innovative for the time, involved the exchange of old debts for bonds – 'securitization' - with longer maturity and interest rates compatible with Brazil's debt payment capacity. At the time, this proposal was not taken seriously by creditors, mostly from the United States, due to the costs of the exchange operation, which would obviously involve a partial write-off of the main loan and the cancelling of arrears. However, it would eventually end up becoming part of the formula for discounts in the face value of old sovereign debt securities and their exchange for new securities - a process which became identified with the name of the new Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady.

The agreement between Brazil and commercial creditors took months to negotiate and was drafted according to the spirit of the Brady Plan. It was signed in November 1993, under the aegis of the then Brazilian Finance

Minister, Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Brazil's main foreign debt negotiator, Pedro Malan, who became president of the Brazilian Central Bank. Elected in the first round of the General Election in October 1994, mainly due to the success of the Real Stability Plan, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso began his administration the following January, with an enormous challenge in foreign policy: to control the effects of the Mexican crisis, in December of that year, and to ensure exchange rate stability, one of the foundations of the economic transition, whilst at the same time dismantling indexation mechanisms and facilitating the entry of foreign capital. During a period of great financial market instability, relations with the United States were crucial to ensure the positive performance of the macroeconomic stabilization process, founded upon an exchange rates anchor and adequate dollar reserves.

New elements in the Cardoso era: a good relationship as the norm

The Cardoso government initiated its bilateral relationship by taking advantage of the 'positive inheritance' triggered by the opening of the economy and the trade liberalization process, started by Fernando Collor de Mello's government (1990-92) and given some continuity during Itamar Franco's administration (1992-94). Other important elements which ensured good relations with the United States were Brazil's more open stance in relation to security issues – amongst these the nuclear dossier - as well as a more cooperative posture in regional and multilateral economic and trade forums.

The global context was marked the GATT multilateral trade negotiations known as the Uruguay Round, concluded in 1993. It was this round which institutionalized the multilateral trade system by setting up the World Trade Organization (WTO). In midst of demands (and strong pressure) on the part of developed countries, led by the United States, for greater opening of trade, investment and copyright protection, the Brazilian government, from Collor onwards, decided to change its strongly protectionist and anti-patent posture, which had been pursued since the pre-military regime up to re-

democratization period. Interventionist policies in the industrial, trade and technological sectors (for example, the 1984 Information Technology Law) had led to a number of conflicts with the United States' government who, at various times, threatened Brazil with trade reprisals (due to the lack of pharmaceutical patents, for example, or the existence of a market reserve for IT), and the extensive use of trade defense mechanisms (abusive and arbitrary anti-dumping regulations).

As a senator, Fernando Henrique Cardoso supported trade liberalization improvements introduced by the Collor government (such as tariff 'reduction' reforms, from 1990 to 1993, concomitant to the establishment of Mercosur's common external tariff), as well as changes in both the industrial (end of IT Law) and technological sectors (decision to substitute the old 1971 patent legislation, by a new industrial property instrument, much more liberal than its predecessor). Indeed, changes in patent legislation complied with decisions negotiated in the Uruguay Round.

In relation to the financial sector, senator FH Cardoso, who had been made Finance Minister during the Itamar Franco government (after a short period in the Brazilian Foreign Office, Itamaraty), presided over the final stages of the 'normalization' of relations with multilateral financial institutions (IMF, IBRD), creditor countries' coordination bodies (Club de Paris) and commercial banks (the London Club). Under Pedro Malan's co-ordination, at the time negotiator of the Brazilian foreign debt (subsequently becoming president of the Brazilian Central Bank, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was moved to the Ministry of Finances), a number of agreements were signed with the above mentioned partners. This contributed towards placing Brazil once again on course for receiving foreign investments and opened the way to a new phase of global bonds issued in international financial markets.

The regional environment was marked by progress in relation to sub-regional trade liberalization agreements, either of a bilateral (Brazil-Argentina integration agreements, USA-Canada Free Trade agreement at the end of the 1980s) or plurilateral nature (partial bilateral agreements within the Latin American Integration Association framework), as well as the building of custom unions such as the Mercosur and the Andean Community, free-trade zones (such as NAFTA), or continental level agreements (such as the proposed 'Enterprise for the Americas' Initiative, launched by President Bush Senior, and the 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' - FTAA, a project established by president Clinton in December 1994).

At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil moved relatively quickly in terms of liberalization, but subsequently went through a static period, or a strategic break that practically lasted the entirety of President Cardoso's two terms in office, contradicting charges of neoliberalism. Internally, during the 1990s, Brazil progressed both in terms of macroeconomic stability – as was made clear by the success of the Real Plan, implemented under the direct initiative and orders of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then Minister for Finances, and subsequently as president – and in terms of human and civil rights, particularly the consolidation of the democratic system. All these factors were significant in setting a new basis for bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States, despite the fact that there were no major changes in the American policy for Latin America throughout this entire period. In fact, in spite of innovative proposals in international trade – such as the continental proposal for a free trade area, which seemed to be an 'opening' strategy for large American companies to gain access to Latin American markets – American regional concerns remained focused on combating drug trafficking and organized crime, controlling illegal immigration and the political instability of some regimes resulting in problems of governability and affecting the social fabric of society. Furthermore, there was also the question of the Castro dictatorship and the impact of Miami-based Cuban refugees on American politics.

The initial phases of Cardoso's government coincided, therefore, with an improvement in the institutional and political life in Brazil. The country's newly acquired economic stability and internal and external regulatory frameworks contributed to taking bilateral relations to a new level. In his position as president-elect, Fernando Henrique Cardoso had travelled to the United States as part of President Itamar Franco's delegation, participating in the Miami summit in December 1994 which set out the negotiation basis for a continental free-trade agreement. The new president had already formed personal relationships with some members of the Clinton administration whilst at Itamaraty (September 1992 to May 1993), but above all, as Minister of Finance (position he held until April 1994), when he oversaw the normalization of Brazil's foreign financial relations through contacts with Washington-based institutions such as the IMF/IBRD and the American Treasury, as well as the Wall Street business community in New York.

What was innovative about Cardoso's foreign policy in general, and more specifically its bilateral relations with the United States, was, firstly, a

greater empathy and enormous knowledge as a whole of foreign relations at a regional level, including a very good understanding of how the American establishment worked. He had lived in that country for a number of months (as visiting professor at Berkeley during the 1970s) and as an academic he returned many times, often feted as one of the authors of the 'dependency theory' (which was in fact read more extensively in the United States than in Latin America itself). Secondly, he continued his policies of opening Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Ministry) to academic input and business strategies, work he initiated when he headed the Ministry between 1992 and 1993. For example, he established a business council to discuss the final format of agreements arising from the Uruguay Round. This opening contrasted with Itamaraty's relative isolation, evident in foreign policy as a whole, in relation to inputs from civil society or even from other spheres of government. Thirdly, he had his own personal style of foreign policy, based on what he called 'presidential diplomacy'. He made many trips abroad, directly participating in numerous international events and forging close personal relationships with the most important leaders of Brazil's traditional and not-so-traditional partner countries (such as India, China, Russia and, above all, in South America).

Brazil-United States relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso-Clinton period

Although the elements described above formed the basis for Brazil's relationship with the United States during the Cardoso era, the bilateral agenda was still marked by a certain residual tension: trade disagreements were latent (usually because of arbitrary American anti-dumping), the Brazilian Congress had not yet concluded the process for approving a new industrial property legislation - the protection of intellectual property was still one of the most significant sources of disputes in bilateral relations. Furthermore, the American government's defense department still had doubts over Brazil's position in relation to issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and the employment of sensitive or dual-use technologies. More importantly,

distinct projects seemed to be leading to an unavoidable head-on strategic collision. From the American point of view, there was the FTAA where Latin American countries should accede to the original NAFTA projects, and from the Brazilian perspective, there was ALCSA which would be the result of a network of progressive association treaties of other countries to the Mercosur.

However, during the eight years between 1995 and 2002, there was a notable change in the reciprocal treatment between the continent's largest countries. Improvement in diplomatic relations was reflected, or nurtured by, the personal relationship between Fernando Henrique Cardoso and William J. Clinton. This was probably the innovative or differentiating factor in bilateral relations, unprecedented in all previous periods of diplomacy between the two countries. It should be noted that the good relationship between both Heads of State did not limit itself to topics of the bilateral agenda. They agreed on a wide range of subjects and benefitted from meetings attended by both men as representatives of political groupings inspired by or identified with social democratic and progressive movements, within the framework of the so-called 'Third Way'. Together with the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and other European socialist leaders, these meetings promoted reciprocal affection and personal understanding. This was probably a decisive factor in American support during the 1998 financial crisis which threatened to drag Brazil down.

Cardoso's first visit to Washington as president took place in April 1995, when Clinton conspicuously opened the conversation, albeit in a paternalist manner, by directly offering cooperation: 'Dear Fernando, tell me what the U.S.A. can do for Brazil'. Their friendship was consolidated during Clinton's visit to Brazil, in 1997. Cardoso returned to the United States in June 1998, when official White House meetings were followed by an 'intimate' visit to the presidential residence at Camp David. This new relationship emerged from similar political visions in both countries (valuing democracy, human rights, social development and a conception of the economy with a positive stance on globalization), but also due to a considerable amount of personal contact consolidated over time, through various bilateral meetings and on the occasion of multilateral and plurilateral conferences (such as that of Third Way supporters).

From 1995 and for the next three years, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government carried out constitutional and infra-constitutional changes which significantly improved the business environment for multinationals in

Brazil: a number of constitutional amendments were approved resulting not only in the end of various state monopolies and sectors of the market limited to national companies, but also the end of discrimination against foreign owned Brazilian companies. There were also amendments to the patent legislation. Similarly, Cardoso's receptive attitude towards globalization was reflected in the process of privatization, with great opportunities offered to foreign investors in the bidding processes of various public companies, in the areas of telecommunications and electricity in particular.

This was also a period marked by a new cycle of crises which became closely associated with the era of financial globalization. Mexico was the first country to be hit in December 1994; for strictly domestic reasons, nevertheless, capital flight could not be dissociated from the process of dollarization of its public debt. Brazil resisted the first wave of crises that affected Asian countries in 1997, but was finally struck by the Russian moratorium declared in August 1998. Negotiations for a preventive financial package with the IMF received the decisive support of the United States, majorly backed by President Clinton, who made almost 5 billion dollars of American money available in an operation involving a sum of over 41 billion dollars. Successive stand-by agreements and adjustment programs with the FMI continued throughout Cardoso's second term (1999-2002), always with support from the United States. Following the first IMF package, Brazil changed its exchange regime in January 1999, abandoning the system of moving rates in a band adopted after the Mexican crisis.

With regard to trade, the bilateral balance recorded a gradual reduction in the Brazilian surplus during the 1990-94 period, transformed into a sharp deficit in the next four years. In fact, Brazil was one of the few countries in the world with which the United States managed to retain a surplus during the second half of the 1990s - of hundreds of billions of dollars. At the end of this period, the United States also emerged as Brazil's main trade partner (around 25% of the total), surpassing European Union countries which in previous years managed to concentrate almost a third of Brazil's foreign trade.

During official reciprocal visits and in informal meetings involving Cardoso and Clinton, the two presidents espoused similar views and exchanged ideas with rare sincerity. Aside from the national interest of both countries, the mutual affection both men felt for each other had positive repercussions on a number of items on the official agenda (such as the previously mentioned IMF assistance package and safeguard agreements for the use of the Brazilian

space base of Alcantara, a matter viewed with great caution by the American security sector).

The American president sincerely wished that Brazil would play a more prominent role in both regional and world scenarios. This posture was very much welcomed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso who was, nevertheless, fully aware of Brazil's strategic and structural limitations. President Clinton believed that Brazil could play a more prominent role in problems such as that of Colombia, but his Brazilian counterpart had to take into account the relative lack of resources in Brazil, as well as other foreign policy priorities. The maintenance of Mercosur, in face of challenges from FTAA, was one of them. There was also the importance given to the relationship with Argentina, a factor which complicated Brazil's intention to hold a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Their direct relationship explains, for example, why President Clinton 'defended' the idea of the Mercosur inside his own administration, to the point of arguing against FTAA's negotiators, such as trade representative Charlene Barshevsky. During a ministerial meeting in Belo Horizonte, in 1997, she argued that sub-regional projects should be subsumed to FTAA, or perhaps to NAFTA. Brazil opposed this concept with the idea of building blocks - a position which was finally approved in the final declaration. A new aspect of the bilateral relationship, not only in relation to FTAA (whose coordination during the final stages was to be co-conducted by both countries), was that the United States started 'to listen' to Brazil in different areas of interest (not exclusively in bilateral matters). This had occurred very rarely in previous periods.

The stability brought about by the Real Plan and the 1995-98 constitutional reforms which opened the economy to foreign investment allowed for even closer ties with the United States. With regards to business, for example, direct American investments in Brazil went from US\$ 18.9 billion in 1994 to around US\$ 38 billion in 1998, that is, over 50% of all direct American investments in South America (part of the Opposition accused the government of 'de-nationalizing' the country). Brazil ranked fifth in the list of countries receiving direct American investments, below Germany and above Japan. Part of these investments went to privatization auctions open to foreign participation in the areas of infrastructure (such as telecommunications and energy), but an increasing amount was also invested in industry and services sectors.

Despite closer business ties, it was not possible to negotiate an agreement with the United States to prevent double taxation (there were technical issues related to establishing sources of income) and no agreements were possible for promoting and guaranteeing investments (this was due to political opposition in Brazil to the clause regulating the investor-State relationship and also because of the extension of the coverage to be granted). Nonetheless, during this period it was possible to observe less inhibition on the part of Brazilian businesses in dealing with their American partners. This may have been either because they were more exposed to greater access to the international trade environment, an achievement of the Brazilian economy during this period, or directly as a result of Brazilian investments in the United States itself (for example, this was the case of the steel industry, citric fruit production in Florida or the fact that jets for regional flights became the most important item in Brazilian exports to the United States).

Brazil's acquired credibility at international level and in relation to the United States was also related by another important factor: changes in attitude regarding nuclear and sensitive technologies. Indeed, during the Sarney-Alfonsín period (1985-1990) and subsequently throughout the Collor and Menem (1990-92) administrations this new posture saw the first measures implemented in order to 'build trust' with Argentina (the establishment of the Tlatelolco Treaty and quadripartite safeguards involving the IAEA and a bi-national agency, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of nuclear material).

However, it was President Cardoso who took the decision to break a taboo of great political, diplomatic, legal and strategic significance for Brazil which had lasted almost three decades: the country finally agreed to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (1968). Refusal had been reiterated on many previous occasions, above all by Itamaraty, based on conceptual arguments - the clearly unequal and discriminatory nature of the Treaty, contrary to the sovereign equality of nations a view Brazil held at least since the second Hague Peace Conference (1907). Before the Constitution of 1988 it was theoretically possible to develop nuclear power for military purposes, but that possibility ended with the new Charter.

Brazil's position in relation to dual or sensitive technologies was perceived by powerful nations as being obscure and fuelled a long period of political and diplomatic distrust, which consequently led to a lack of access to certain technologies, having a negative impact on, for example, the Brazilian space

program. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil subscribed to the procedures associated to the export of sensitive materials as established by the Missile Technology Control Regime - MTCR – which preoccupied the United States. Therefore, when Brazil adhered to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty – NPT in 1996, some of the most important political obstacles in the difficult relationship between the two countries were removed.

Developments were so favorable that the United States, despite much reluctance on the part of its security community, signed an agreement with Brazil for technological safeguards to be used at the Alcantara base for launching satellites and equipment containing American technology. Brazil was the *demandeur* in this case and resistance was overcome through direct contact between Presidents Cardoso and Clinton. Reluctance on the part of some sectors of the American administration was still generally motivated by concerns about security and non-proliferation although commercial considerations were also likely to have played a part.

The agreement on Alcantara was signed in April 2000 and was heavily criticized in the Brazilian Congress because of the negative impact it may have had in terms of Brazilian access to cutting edge technology in the space sector. There were other objections of a political and economic nature, since its main objective was not technological transfer, but rather its control. The new Lula government decided, in May 2003, to withdraw the draft agreement from Congress.

Brazil and the new American administration of George W. Bush

Fears of changes in the bilateral relationship as Clinton stepped down and George W. Bush, a conservative republican, was elected in November of 2000, were not confirmed in practice, despite the fact that there was no longer a personal relationship between the presidents. Indeed, one of the characteristics of this new phase was that Brazil began to be recognized as important, despite localized disputes and regardless of ideology or political positions held by respective heads of state. The pragmatic vision of this interaction became

clear during the first meeting between President Cardoso and the newly elected President of the United States, George W. Bush, in February 2001. The meeting was very successful and took place in April just before the 3rd Summit of the Americas, in Quebec. During this conference Brazil and the United States continued to espouse well-known differences of opinion and approaches about how to develop FTAA. Final negotiations occurred between 2003 and 2005, though the first meeting took place in November 2002, when both Brazil and the United States held the co-presidency.

During the Quebec Summit, a general understanding between the two countries was achieved on the terms for a reciprocal opening and a generalized cut in tariffs across the continent. The summit also agreed that the final date for negotiations was to be January 2005 and the following December would see the gradual setting up of FTAA. During that Conference in Québec, President Cardoso, who had so far resisted American pressures for anticipating the FTAA timetable (for obvious electoral reasons on the part of President Bush), put forward in very clear and explanatory terms the conditions and requirements in order for FTAA to be acceptable to Brazil. He wanted real tariff cuts and no barriers in sectors in which Brazil was competitive (such as agribusiness), as well as a reduction in abusive domestic support to these same sectors (subsidies to domestic production and export) and defensive trade measures (the arbitrary application of anti-dumping, for example).

Small differences of style between the two leaders did not disrupt the bilateral relationship, particularly in relation to the economy. This was especially salient considering the continuous deterioration of the situation in Argentina and its financial, commercial and exchange rate repercussions. The aid package signed by Brazil and the IMF in the middle of 2001 (with the support of the new Treasury) was once more a preventive action in face of alarmist forecasts in relation to a possible default by the two largest countries in the Southern Cone, both with a relatively high external debt servicing ratio to exports.

In this and in other circumstances, the United States treated Brazil well if compared with Argentina, which was treated with either benign neglect or simple indifference as demonstrated when, at the end of that year, the country was left to its own fate, ending up financially broken and having to declare a moratorium on its external debt (an unprecedented event, given the amounts involved). Both before and after the December 2001 crisis and the moratorium (formally declared the following January), Brazil sought to support Argentina,

both with the American government and with the multilateral financial bodies in Washington, but to no avail. In order to do this, President Cardoso went as far as requesting letters from other presidents of the region, such as Chile and Mexico, to convince the Washington establishment.

The terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001, unprecedented in history, opened new aspects of international relations and this, of course, also affected the bilateral, continental and global agendas. The American reaction and a strengthening of its unilateralist behavior in matters related to security led to subsequent disagreements in various areas of interest. However, initial declarations of solidarity and even mobilization in the continent, resulted in a statement of support organized by Brazil within the framework of existing mechanisms of continental security (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - IATRA, an old Cold War instrument now being used in the war against terrorism).

The economic impact of the terrorist attacks deepened the recession evident since the previous year, when the investment 'bubble' of the so-called 'new economy' burst (IT and e-commerce companies), ruthlessly reducing the equity of hundreds of thousands of investors and also affecting countries like Brazil (due to the effects of retraction in the flow of trade and investments, either directly or in portfolios). In addition, illegal safeguard measures were applied by the United States to steel imports, affecting one of Brazil's most internationally competitive sectors. Further adding to this state of affairs was the excessively restrictive mandate the US Congress had imposed on the government in relation to trade negotiations at multilateral, continental and bilateral levels. All this resulted in a scenario where the generally good economic relationship which had been maintained during the previous period was visibly eroding away.

However, difficulties in trade were partially obscured by the new priorities of the Bush Government in their fight against terrorism following the 11th September attacks. This was clear during the last official meeting which President Cardoso held with President Bush in November of 2001 in Washington. Shortly before this meeting, during his visit to France, President Cardoso made allusion to the arrogance of unilateralism and a rejection of multilateralism as one of the factors, together with the barbarity of terrorism, destabilizing international relations. This was not well received in Washington. However, the Bush administration avoided mentioning this verbal slip, since it sought to maintain the best relations it could with

Brazil, wishing to minimize potential problems in Latin America: there were enough difficulties with Chavez's impertinence, perpetual challenges from Castro and threats to regional stability from economic and political problems faced by countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay and, above all, in relation to financial concerns concerning Argentina.

The United States sought to develop a cooperative relationship with Brazil, free from past conditionalities (which in any case no longer held sway since Brazil's adherence to the principles of non-proliferation) and characterized by the full recognition of Brazil's central importance in terms of democratic stability and growth across the whole region. Furthermore, it was in Brazil that the core of American investments and trade with the region rested, in particular the financial sector. Brazil's importance had already been recognized by an 'Independent Taskforce', sponsored by the New York based Council for Foreign Affairs. The report was sent to President Bush soon after his election and stated very clearly that 'Brazil was a fundamental key to American policy in the western world', highlighting therefore 'that there should be constant dialogue in order to determine whether the United States and Brazil could work more efficiently together for their mutual benefit'.

Despite the fact that recommendations had been made focusing almost exclusively on American national interests, they were significant because of the new consensus about Brazil on the part of the establishment *par excellence*, the American foreign policy community. Thus, Brazil received a lengthy citation where priority issues for the American agenda were identified. As can be observed in the report of the Council on Foreign Affairs (2001):

Brazil can and should be an agent of utmost importance, together with the United States, in sustaining economic reform and democracy, in promoting free trade and open markets, in combating drug trafficking, terrorism and cross-border crime. Brazil's role will be decisive if we want to expand the North America Free Trade Area to South America. If we want to address the issue of drugs in the Continent, it will not be possible to do so without Brazil. Ultimately, none of the United States' fundamental policies will have any effect if Brazil is not involved. Brazil is at the core of these policies.

The electoral process in Brazil during 2002 anticipated many changes latent in society for a long time. It nurtured serious concerns on the part of the financial markets (particularly in New York) as to whether the macroeconomic policies followed by Cardoso's administration (managed by the duo Pedro

Malan-Arminio Fraga) would be maintained. These concerns were reflected in risk indicator ratings, with considerable deterioration in the exchange rate and the price of traded shares, and a general drop in commercial lines of credit and investment flows (both direct and in portfolios). During the presidential campaign, politicians representing the main opposition candidate, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, who was now disputing the election in a broad coalition, travelled to the United States to hold talks with American government representatives and the so-called 'New York speculators'. However, this did not manage to forestall episodes of economic turbulence which continued throughout the electoral campaign.

Well before the first round of elections, the Republican government, probably well advised by their ambassador in Brasilia, had been reacting benevolently to the new emergent forces in Brazilian politics. Nevertheless, the American conservatives raised the issue that the PT (the Workers' Party) had instigated anti-American protests in the past. They were also concerned about the special relations PT had with political leaders not well regarded in Washington circles (such as President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela), or not welcomed at all (the case of Fidel Castro). Opposition forces in Brazil had little sympathy for projects such as FTAA – when the election campaign was launched, there was still talk of an 'annexation project'. They also seemed to anticipate the possibility of conflicts in the bilateral and regional agenda and, more generally, in relation to the multilateral system, as the nature of the so-called 'Bush doctrine' became clearer, based on an inhibited affirmation of unilateralism and the adoption of internally defined preventative measures against any possible sources of danger to American national security. This position clearly went against the multilateralist tradition of Brazilian diplomacy, and moreover, awakened fear and animosity among left and traditional 'anti-imperialist' groups in Brazil.

The moderate behavior of the opposition candidate - who signaled his support for the agreement with the IMF in August 2002 and confirmed his acceptance of the principles of the intangibility of contracts (obviously related to the external debt) and fiscal responsibility - eased tensions with the American conservative government, who showed willingness for dialogue once the victory of the Lula candidacy had been confirmed. President Bush not only telephoned immediately and personally complimented the winner as soon as results were announced, but also invited him for a first meeting

and informal discussion. As part of a well-thought out diplomatic strategy the president-elect completed very few trips abroad before his inauguration. He focused on visits to the most important leaders in the Southern Cone and accepted the American President's invitation.

During his first informal visit to Washington, on 10th December 2002 – somewhat unprecedented by American diplomatic standards, though in accordance with the Brazilian tradition of visits by president-elects – there seemed to be visible empathy between the leader of the most powerful nation in the world and the future president of the largest South American country. During the interview the atmosphere was relaxed and there was willingness to start off a cooperative agenda between the two countries. The American president suggested a high-level meeting, involving members of the cabinet, to take place within the first semester of 2003 (for a period this meeting seemed threatened by developments relating to the U.S.A. - Iraq conflict). During his first trip to Washington, the Brazilian president-elect confirmed the interest of his government to start off four years of sincere, constructive and mutually beneficial relations for both countries. He thus disarmed his conservative American critics and surprised radical groups in Brazil.

Once American representatives found out, on that very same day, the name of the Brazilian Minister of Finance, Antonio Palocci - who was part of the delegation - they were positively impressed by this confirmation of a continuum in the general lines of macroeconomic policy. There is no doubt that this arrested the deterioration of economic indexes which had been a constant up to this moment. At the same time, and also in Washington, (with visible relief in New York), the future president of the Brazilian Central Bank was announced - Henrique Meirelles, former Chief Executive of the important Fleet-Boston banking consortium who had been recently elected as federal deputy for the PSDB in Goiás state. These decisions were highly relevant for the implementation of the new government's economic policy. Furthermore the astute speech of Lula at the National Press Club, Washington, not only served to dispel the potential pessimistic atmosphere in relation to the macroeconomic situation in Brazil (and a possible request for financial aid), but made possible predictions of continuity and improvement in the good political and diplomatic relations Brazil had enjoyed with the United States during the administration that was coming to an end.

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Chronology of Brazil-USA relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso Governments 1995-2002			
International and domestic scenarios		Regional scenario	Bilateral relations USA-Brazil
1995	<p>WTO is established; Bretton Woods (FMI-IBRD) is fifty years old;</p> <p>Agreement creating the Association of Coffee Producing Countries;</p> <p>World Conference on Women (Beijing);</p> <p>Global Summit on Social Development (Copenhagen);</p> <p>Oslo 2 – Israeli-Palestinian Accord;</p> <p>Fernando Henrique Cardoso inauguration: politics of international affirmation; constitutional process of reforms, above all, in the economic area;</p> <p>Presidential diplomacy acquires new weight as foreign policy instrument: during his first mandate, FHC officially visited 26 countries; was visited by 31 Heads of State, as well as by Pope John Paul II;</p> <p>Brazilian Congress approves Legislation on Bio-security;</p> <p>Brazil signs the MTCR.</p>	<p>The Mercosur customs union is established; The External Common Tariff is managed by the Mercosur's Trade Commission; remaining exceptions in intra-zone trade (special regimes for automobiles and sugar);</p> <p>American Congress refuses Chile's 'fast track' entry into Nafta;</p> <p>OAS establishes the Committee on Hemispheric Security;</p> <p>1st Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, in Williamsburg;</p> <p>1st Hemispheric Ministerial Process (FTAA) in Denver: US press for anticipated results in 2000;</p> <p>Articles of Agreement, Multilateral Investments Fund (IDB).</p>	<p>President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's trip to the United States: High-level talks with President Clinton.</p> <p>Brazil and USA draft Common Bilateral Agenda on Environment;</p> <p>Complementary Adjustment to the Agreement on Technical Cooperation on Health;</p> <p>Agreement on Mutual Cooperation for Reducing Demand, Preventing Improper Use and Combating the Illicit Production and Traffic of Narcotics;</p> <p>The WTO took on board Brazil and Venezuela's request and used its controversy resolution mechanism to recommend that the USA adjust regulations regarding petrol, in line with the rules of the multilateral trade system.</p> <p>Brazilian ambassador: Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima (12th November 1993 to 26th May 1999);</p> <p>American ambassador: Melvyn Levitsky (1994-1998);</p>

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<p>1996</p>	<p>In Algeria, civil war instigated by Islamic fundamentalists;</p> <p>1st WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore;</p> <p>Brazil invited to be part of BIS;</p> <p>Global Conference on Human Settlements - Habitat II;</p> <p>World Food Summit;</p> <p>Brazil becomes member of Nuclear Supply Group;</p> <p>Brazil: amendments to the Constitution, in particular regarding the economy; privatizations and opening to foreign capital:</p> <p>Brazilian Congress approves the new Code on Industrial Property;</p> <p>Creation of the Ministry of Defense;</p> <p>National Defense Policy is launched;</p>	<p>Agreement on Chile's association to the Mercosur;</p> <p>Brazil's entry into the Andean Development Corporation;</p> <p>At the AGNU resolution project Brazil demands the recognition of the denuclearization statute established by the treaties creating Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) in large parts of the southern hemisphere.</p>	<p>1st Brazil-U.S.A., Common Agenda Operation Meeting, Brasilia.</p> <p>Framework Agreement on the Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.</p>
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1997	<p>Financial crisis in Asia has repercussions in Brazil;</p> <p>Brazil decides to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (after 30 years of refusal);</p> <p>Rio+5 non-governmental conference;</p> <p>Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons comes into force: OPCW is established;</p> <p>Kyoto Protocol - United Nations Framework -Convention on Climate Change;</p> <p>SIVAM is implemented in Brazil;</p> <p>Constitutional Reform approves the principle of re-election;</p> <p>C o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment introduces the end of the state's monopoly on oil.</p>	<p>Agreements on association of Bolivia to the Mercosur;</p> <p>Protocol for Reforming the Charter of the Organization of American States, or 'Washington Protocol';</p> <p>3rd FTAA Ministerial Convention, Belo Horizonte: Brazil argues for principle of 'building blocks' and balanced results, which were accepted;</p> <p>OAS establishes the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.</p>	<p>In October 1997, President Clinton visits Brazil;</p> <p>Agreement, for exchanging notes, amending the Air Transport Agreement on 21st March 1989;</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding on Drug Control;</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding on Education;</p> <p>Complementary adjustment on Technical Cooperation;</p> <p>Cooperation Agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy;</p> <p>Agreement on Judicial Assistance on Criminal Matters;</p> <p>Declaration on Parks;</p> <p>Complementary adjustment on Design, Development, Operation and Use of Flight Equipment and Useful Loads for the International Space Station Program;</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation on Public Administration State Reform and Modernization.</p>
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<p>1998</p>	<p>Inspections system crisis in Iraq: 'Operation Desert Fox' (USA and UK military offensive against Iraq);</p> <p>Second Ministerial WTO Conference, in Geneva: commemoration of 50 years of multilateral trade system triggers wave of demonstrations against globalization;</p> <p>First World Social Forum, in Porto Alegre, RS;</p> <p>Brazil is one of the first countries to sign and ratify the CTBT;</p> <p>Aggravation of international financial crisis and Russia's insolvency;</p> <p>India and Pakistan carry out underground nuclear tests;</p> <p>Laurent Kabila seizes power in the Zaire, which becomes the Democratic Republic of Congo;</p> <p>Brazil approves Law on Refugees;</p> <p>Law n. 9.613 is approved. Deals with the crime of 'laundering or concealment of assets, rights and valuables' and sets up the Council for Financial Activities Control - COAF;</p> <p>Law 9.614 is passed allowing the Federal Government to bring down any aircraft transiting illegally through Brazilian airspace (regulated in 2004);</p> <p>Fernando Henrique Cardoso is re-elected in the first round.</p>	<p>Brazil recognizes the mandatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights;</p> <p>Pinochet is detained in the United Kingdom: His extradition to Spain is requested.</p> <p>4th FTAA Ministerial Meeting in Costa Rica;</p> <p>III Summit of the Americas, in Santiago: FTAA negotiations launched; education plan is discussed;</p> <p>Framework-Agreement between Mercosur and CAN foresees Free Trade zone between both blocs from 2000 (not executed until 2004).</p>	<p>Brazilian imports from USA total US\$ 13.3 billion, whilst Brazilian exports to USA are US\$ 9.7 billion (US\$ deficit 3.6 billion); Causes: Tariff and non-tariff barriers on Brazilian goods and overvalued exchange rate;</p> <p>Direct American investments in Brazil exceed US\$ 18.9 billion in 1994, approximately US\$ 38 billion in 1998 (over half of total American direct investment in South America);</p> <p>Brazil signs preventive agreement with IMF, with support of the USA, of 41.5 billion dollars in assistance and fiscal adjustment program (no changes in exchange rate policy);</p> <p>Complementary adjustment to the Cooperation in Science and Technology Treaty (06/02/84);</p> <p>Complementary adjustment to the Cooperation in Science and Technology Treaty on Health;</p> <p>Complementary adjustment on Cooperation on Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission part of the Large-scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA);</p> <p>Complementary adjustment of Cooperation on Ecological Research, part of the Large-scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA);</p>
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1999	<p>Launching of the euro in the European Union (in 11 out of 15 member-states);</p> <p>The US Senate rejects treaty on banning nuclear tests (CTBT);</p> <p>Massacres in Kosovo and NATO intervention against Serbia;</p> <p>Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are admitted to NATO, which commemorates 50 years;</p> <p>UN approves East Timor Peace Mission; Brazilian Sergio Vieira de Mello is head of UNTAET;</p> <p>Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction;</p> <p>President Cardoso participates in the 1st Progressive Governance Summit in 21st Century, in Florence;</p> <p>3rd WTO Ministerial Conference in the United States (Seattle) fails to launch new round of trade negotiations (Millennium Round).</p>	<p>Europe-Latin America Conference in Rio de Janeiro: confirms the launch of bi-regional negotiations between the EU and Mercosur (Madrid Treaty, 1995);</p> <p>Ministerial Hemispheric Conference in Toronto decides to conclude FTAA draft project;</p> <p>Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials;</p> <p>Crisis in Paraguay: Vice-president, Luis Maria Argaña, is murdered, President Raul Cubas resigns and Congress President Luiz Macchi takes over;</p> <p>Peace established between Peru and Ecuador;</p> <p>Devolution of Panama Canal to the Government of Panama by the United States.</p>	<p>Crisis in Brazil and changes in exchange rate policy, introduction of fluctuation regime, provokes revision in IMP agreement with US support;</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding on Drug Control;</p> <p>Brazil is again included on the Special Watch List, Section 301 of American Trade Act.</p> <p>Brazilian ambassador: Rubens Antonio Barbosa (8th June 1999 to 31st March 2004).</p>
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<p>2000</p>	<p>UN Millennium Declaration sets socio-economic goals to be attained by the international community, amongst them, the reduction of absolute poverty by half to 2015;</p> <p>Electoral defeat of Kuo Min Tang regime in Taiwan: tensions with continental China;</p> <p>Meeting between the Presidents of both Koreas: historical agreement of cooperation is signed;</p> <p>WTO conflict between Brazil and Canada (Embraer versus. Bombardier);</p> <p>Deposition of Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia;</p> <p>Provisional government in East Timor;</p> <p>Iran: reformists get majority in Parliament;</p> <p>500 years since discovery of Brazil: Manifestation of indigenous people and other protesters prevented from participating in official event;</p> <p>Angra II in operation;</p> <p>Legislation on Financial Responsibility approved;</p> <p>President Cardoso participates in 2nd Progressive Governance Summit, in Berlin;</p> <p>Vice-president Albert Gore (winner by n. of popular votes) and governor of Texas, George Bush (winner of electoral college) dispute the presidential elections in USA (count in Florida is interrupted by the Supreme Court, George Bush is declared victorious).</p>	<p>Fujimori wins a third mandate (contested) in Peru;</p> <p>Ecuador deposes legal president and dollarizes the economy amid a severe national crisis;</p> <p>Bolivia: demonstrations against unemployment and higher taxes. President Hugo Banzer decrees state of emergency;</p> <p>Chile: socialist Ricardo Lagos elected president;</p> <p>Mexico: after 70 years in the power, PRI is defeated. PAN candidate, Vicente Fox, elected president;</p> <p>Trade frictions in Mercosur, re-launches with the new Argentine Government (Radical Party President Fernando de la Rúa);</p> <p>Summit of South American Presidents, in Brasilia: South American Peace Zone established;</p> <p>Plan Colombia (USA) is launched;</p> <p>Chile and USA announce negotiation of free-trade agreement (interrupted by negotiations on Chile's entry to the Mercosur);</p> <p>4th Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, in Manaus: Brazil argues that economic, social, geographic, cultural and political realities are different in the three Americas.</p>	<p>Complementary adjustment, via exchange of Notes, to the Agreement of Cooperation on Science and Technology for the Biological Control of Aedes Aegypti Mosquito;</p> <p>Joint Declaration on the creation of an Agricultural Advisory Committee;</p> <p>Brazil-USA agreement on Technological Safeguards (agreement on Alcantara) signed on 18th April 2000;</p> <p>'Agreement 505' signed, which allows the transferable to Brazil, on a concessional basis, of deactivated military equipment belonging to the USA Armed Forces.</p> <p>American ambassador: Anthony Harrington (2000-2001);</p>
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2001	<p>Inauguration of President George W. Bush, in USA: Declaration of unilateralism and deceleration of economic activity in USA;</p> <p>Terrorist Attacks in New York and Washington, in September, they lead to a new conjecture for international security: USA attack Taliban regime in Afghanistan;</p> <p>International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings;</p> <p>Resolution 1373 (2001) of the Security Council (terrorist attacks against the USA);</p> <p>China: WTO membership formalized at the Ministerial Meeting in Qatar;</p> <p>3rd World Conference against Racism, Race Discrimination, Xenophobia and other forms of related Intolerance, in Durban; United States and Israel walk out mid-debate;</p> <p>Brazil acquires the right to produce generic medication to combat AIDS;</p> <p>George W. Bush, launches a controversial project of anti-missile shields;</p> <p>SUDAM and SUDENE are made extinct;</p> <p>Energy crisis: government launches Strategic Emergency Electricity Program;</p> <p>New Brazilian Civil Code.</p>	<p>3rd Summit of the Americas, in Canada; Brazil and USA become co-coordinators of the final FTAA negotiations 2003-2005;</p> <p>The American Embassy, Commission Fulbright and UFPE formalize the creation of the Centre for American Studies;</p> <p>The American aircraft carrier Nimitz (CVN-8) conducts exercises with the Brazilian navy: maneuvers are part of the aircraft carrier's journey across South America;</p> <p>Joint Declaration on Trade 'Four-plus-one' between the USA and the Mercosur.</p> <p>'Mad Cow' conflict, between Brazil and Canada;</p> <p>Argentine economic crisis has impact on Brazil: new financial support agreement with FMI;</p> <p>In Peru, Alejandro Toledo wins presidential elections with 53.08% of votes;</p> <p>Brazil calls for IATRA meeting - Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance - in response to terrorist attacks against USA;</p> <p>Inauguration of the first center for joint trade promotion, part of the Mercosur;</p>	<p>First meeting between President Cardoso and the new American president (February);</p> <p>USA: For the 1st time USA leave the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights;</p> <p>Brazil and the United States formalize Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, with the objective of promoting greater cooperation between the two countries on legal matters;</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding (MDE) on Drug Control and Legal Repression - 2001.</p> <p>Brazil authorizes the opening of a USA Secret Service Office in São Paulo;</p> <p>USAID: Agreement on the Prevention of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Tuberculosis in Brazil;</p> <p>Brazil-USA partnership in a number of projects: Large-Scale Biosphere Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia, International Space Station; HSB instrument in mission of meteorological satellite Aqua;</p> <p>Brazil-USA Consultation Mechanism set up in the areas of Trade and Investment;</p> <p>In a speech at the National Assembly of France, Cardoso argues that 'barbarity is not only the cowardice of terrorism, but also intolerance or the imposition of unilateral policies on a global scale'; November: new meeting between Bush and President Cardoso.</p>
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BRAZIL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

<p>2002</p>	<p>Sustainable Development Summit (Rio+10), in Johannesburg (South Africa);</p> <p>Brazil signs the Instrument which ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations' Framework-Convention on Climate Change</p> <p>Brazil ratifies the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;</p> <p>Terrorist attack in Bali;</p> <p>Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian, becomes the United Nations' High Commissioner for the Human Rights;</p> <p>Xanana Gusmão is elected first president of East Timor;</p> <p>Brazil becomes soccer world champion for the 5th time;</p> <p>Resounding victory in the second round of the presidential elections for the PT (Workers' Party) candidate Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva; Ambassador Celso Amorim is made Minister for Foreign Affairs for the 2nd time.</p>	<p>Olivos Protocol to provide a solution to controversies in Mercosur;</p> <p>2nd Convention of South American Presidents, Guayaquil, Equator;</p> <p>The Ushuaia Protocol is enacted on Democratic Commitment in the Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile (signed in 1998);</p> <p>B r a z i l - M e x i c o Preferential Tariff Agreement;</p> <p>2nd Latin American and the Caribbean –European Union Summit;</p> <p>Political Crisis in Venezuela;</p> <p>President-elect Lula travels to Buenos Aires and Chile.</p>	<p>Department of State considers that relations between Brazil and USA are the best for decades;</p> <p>USA and Brazil sign a term of international cooperation to fight the abuse and sexual exploitation of children and adolescents throughout Brazil;</p> <p>USA Report on Property Rights cites Argentina and Brazil; USTR reports that the situation improved in Argentina and worsened in Brazil;</p> <p>Brazil remembers 11th September with exhibitions in nine cities; Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, USA trade representative, opens exhibition in Brasilia;</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding Brazil-USA, 2002 (MDE 2002) on Agreement on Mutual Cooperation for Reducing Demand, Preventing Improper Use and Combating the Illicit Production and Traffic of Narcotics, 1995;</p> <p>As President-Elect, Lula travels to Washington, invited by the American president, and meets George Bush for the first time.</p> <p>American Ambassador: Donna J. Hrinak (2002-2004).</p>
<p>Author: Paulo Roberto de Almeida.</p>			

The Foreign Policy of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva's Government and its relations with the USA

Ricardo Pereira Cabral

Introduction

The start of President Luíz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva's government was marked by expectations, apprehension and a certain amount of skepticism on the part of international analysts, despite the fact that during the election campaign the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* [Workers' Party- PT] had published a 'Letter to the Brazilian People'¹ making clear their intention to neither breach contracts nor eschew fiscal responsibility.

At the start of the government, the international economic scenario was favorable: American interest rates were at their lowest level since World War II, prices of the main export commodities were rising, the rapid rate of economic growth in China was fuelling sales abroad and, since the 1990s, world trade had been growing by 5% a year.

1 *Carta aos Brasileiros* [Open letter to the Brazilian People]– Electoral campaign document from the PT, 2003. Accessed January 26, 2011. http://www.iisg.nl/collections/carta_ao_povo_brasileiro.pdf.

In order to gain greater credibility in the international financial system, the Lula government adopted a conservative and orthodox posture in terms of economic policy (though this led to criticism from members of the government further to the left, both from the PT and its main allies), generating solid results across a number of areas, such as: economic growth, reduction in the internal debt, growth in formal employment, fall in unemployment, increase in average incomes, growth in exports, positive trade balance, surplus in the balance of payments and fall in social inequality. This was achieved within the paradigm of fiscal responsibility and control of public expenditure and therefore enjoyed the support of the United States and the international financial community.

Brazil's success in managing its economy led to an invitation to participate in the conference of the wealthiest countries in the world, the G7. The Brazilian government, supported by China, argued for a greater role of developing countries in discussions about achieving a better equilibrium in relation to the world's economy and demanded a greater commitment on the part of the G7 in terms of global growth.

Contrary to what was expected at the start of his government, President George W. Bush (2001-2009) did not attempt to promote a regional agenda with the continent and the international political scenario was dominated by the American unilateral agenda of fighting terrorism.

The Republican administration's proposals for the FFTA met with internal and external opposition, its immigration policy did not meet the demands of the huge number of workers (especially Mexicans) who had illegal status in the United States, and its policy towards the continent added new sources of antipathy (support for the coup attempt in Venezuela) to those which had been evident since the Cold War (hardening of the blockade on Cuba).

The fight against terrorism lent new meanings to old problems, as in the case of guerrillas/drugs traffickers now transformed into narcoterrorists in Colombia and the role of criminality in the area of the Tri-Border areabetween Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil (fake merchandise, smuggling, money laundering, drugs and arms trafficking, etc), seen from this point on as a region with a high murder rate, from where terrorism was funded and where criminals sheltered (Teixeira da Silva 2002).

After seven years in office President Lula adopted a more politicized foreign policy, characterized hereinafter as much by change as by continuity. Among the constant elements of Brazilian diplomacy was a commitment to multilateralism, a focus on development, a strong international identity, pragmatism, predictability and reliability. The elements which changed were: introducing a new topic to the international agenda (the issue of hunger); a new intensity and determination in conducting international negotiations; expanding relations with Africa, the Middle East and the Far East; and giving greater priority to the Mercosur and to advancing the process of South American integration. These elements were part of the objective of lending Brazil's political leadership a strong social character in international politics. In terms of the great powers (USA, China and the EU) and medium-sized powers (Venezuela, Iran, India, etc.), PT's foreign policy sought to develop strong ties and economic relations while staying clear of political alignments and radical postures. It was marked by moderation, flexibility and a capacity for negotiation which surprised many analysts.

Development

In his acceptance speech in January 2003 President Lula argued for a change in Brazil's posture within the world scenario, as an important protagonist both regionally and globally. The PT government's position was guided by greater participation and more firmness in defending Brazilian interests in international negotiations, an effort to open up new markets, support for multilateralism and demands for greater commitment on the part of other nations to fight the social inequality and hunger which plagued the world. An emphasis was put on the fact that diplomatic actions would, above all, be an instrument for national development (*Discurso de posse no Congresso Nacional* 2003).

Lula adopted a pragmatic posture towards foreign policy, maintaining a low profile in terms of confrontations with the USA by isolating areas and negotiations where there was greatest disagreement and prioritizing points of agreement, so as to avoid any animosity towards the Republican administration. This position was rewarded with positive results, as despite

following an ideology further towards the left, Brazil moved closer to the USA, leaving less room for other Latin American countries to maneuver (making it more difficult for them to adopt an oscillating position), and thus expanding its geostrategic space within South America.

Pragmatism became Lula's *modus operandi* in foreign policy, where Marco Aurélio Garcia, a university lecturer, and ex-Minister José Dirceu, fronted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, successfully negotiated alliances with South Africa, China, India, Russia and Venezuela, and within the FFTA, the WTO and the UN.

In an interview with the *El País* newspaper, the Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, argued that Brazil's participation,

[...] should be proportional to its significance and responsibilities, and also to its potential. Brazil's foreign policy is against all types of hegemony or the persecution of any leaders or anything similar. We do, however, have responsibilities as a very significant regional economy. Our first priority is the Mercosul, and, in a wider sense, South America. Another important priority is our relationship with other large developing countries with who we often share problems and solutions. I include Russia, China, India and South Africa, among others (Amorim 2003a) (author's summary).²

At the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2003 and the World Economic Forum in 2004, Lula was extremely adept at exploiting his exposure in the international media in order to introduce to the international agenda a new issue, the fight against hunger and poverty.

This had positive repercussions and resulted in a change of focus in World Bank programs. In addition to concerns with the environment and development, income distribution and other social policies were also brought to the fore.³

2 [...] debe ser acorde con su tamaño y sus responsabilidades, pero también con sus posibilidades. Brasil tiene una política exterior que es contraria a cualquier tipo de hegemonía o a la persecución de un liderazgo o algo así, pero, por otra parte, al ser una economía muy importante en la región tiene también sus responsabilidades. Nuestra primera prioridad es el Mercosur, y más ampliamente, América del Sur. Otro aspecto muy importante es la relación con otros grandes países en desarrollo, que tienen problemas, y algunas veces soluciones, similares a las nuestras. Citaría a Rusia, China, India y África del Sur, entre otros.

3 "G-7 Discute o cancelamento de dívidas de países pobres 2005." *Exame*, February, 3. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://exame.abril.com.br/economia/mundo/noticias/g-span-span-7-discute-cancelamento-de-dividas-de-paises-pobres-m0075840>.

After lengthy negotiations, the International Monetary Fund launched a pilot program to monitor the Public-Private Partnerships Project and other funding development activities, without the need for these funds to be included in public deficit calculations (Bertonha 2003).

The world economic crisis led the PT government to seek a compromise between fiscal responsibility (the difficult balance between a fall in tax receipts, an increase in public investment and a reduction in domestic debt) and the need to adopt anti-cyclical policies in order to sustain the same level of economic activity despite the fact that a number of the world's main economic powers were entering into recession⁴.

Lula's initiatives were an attempt to find the common ground between political discourse and the practical reality of government, leading with the message that the international agenda needed to be redrafted to include new topics addressing social development.

Economic Diplomacy

Brazilian diplomatic priorities targeted an increase in trade opportunities, and focused on securing productive investments and advanced technologies, so as to improve the living standards of the population through raising incomes and creating jobs.

Brazil sought to form alliances with emerging nations (China, India, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, etc.), establishing a new dynamic and completely revolutionizing the trade scenario, including a South-South dialogue and international negotiations (G3 and G20 - developing countries). In other words, this position neither abandoned developed countries nor demanded from them a wider opening of markets (already relatively saturated), but looked to other import markets in developing economies, increasing exchanges and nurturing economic integration (Ricupero 2003).

4 "Governo reduz meta de superávit e ganha folga de R\$ 40 bilhões." 2009. *Época Negócios*, April, 16. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://epocanegocios.globo.com/Revista/Common/0,EMI68571-16357,00-GOVERNO+REDUZ+META+DE+SUPERAVIT+E+GANHA+FOLGA+DE+R+BILHOES.html>.

President Lula was very active, visiting around 46 countries and conducting around 130 official visits abroad in his eight years in government. Presidential visits to Asia, Africa and the Arab nations resulted in the signing of trade agreements, cooperation treaties and proposals for establishing air and maritime routes. Lula was accompanied on these trips by ministers, members of the business community and by the former Argentine President, Eduardo Duhalde, President of the Mercosur Commission of Permanent Representatives. In the Americas, the Mercosur, led by Brazil, sought to sign trade agreements, in line with the 4+1 format, with Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Cuba.⁵

Itamaraty committed itself to an agenda of reforming international economic organizations, putting forward candidates for its main positions and negotiating the adoption of programs to fight hunger and poverty, and making proposals for changes in the criteria for drawing up budgets and investment frameworks, as well as formulating debt payment/conversion proposals.⁶

The PT government adopted more daring positions at WTO negotiations. In the Doha Round, and subsequently in Seattle, Brazil allied itself with other countries, establishing the G20⁷. It defended the complete elimination of agricultural export subsidies on the part of the rich nations, a reduction in their domestic agricultural subsidies and access to their internal markets. In addition, it argued for differentiated treatment for developing countries in terms of their economic growth and food security. Furthermore, the Brazilian government succeeded in vetoing, up to the present moment, USA and EU proposals to regulate areas of interest to transnational corporations, such as investment policies, commercial rivalries, governmental purchases and intellectual property⁸.

5 "Fox crê que México vá dar alento a Mercosul. 2004." *Folha de São Paulo*, July, 6 Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft0607200401.htm>; "Cuba pretende se associar ao Mercosul." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft0403200510.htm>.

6 "Investimentos: governo quer R\$ 2,5 bi fora do acerto com o FMI." *Folha de São Paulo*, November, 2004. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi2911200407.htm>; "Trocar dívida por educação é boa idéia." *Folha de São Paulo*, March, 23. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2303200512.htm>.

7 Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Thailand, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

8 "Brasil, política externa e comércio internacional" - article the former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim published in *Brasil International Gazeta*, 2004, December, 22. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://mundorama.net/2004/12/21/artigo-do-ministro-celso-amorim->

President Lula worked hard in the Doha Round, as he believed that negotiations needed political momentum and he supported a meeting of the main WTO leaders in order to open up negotiations which had been, up to that point, characterized by deadlocks and failures. Barak Obama's new Democratic administration showed an interest in resuming the Doha Round negotiations but up to April 2009 there was no progress in relation to Brazilian proposals.

In the third round of negotiations of the General System of Trade Preferences at the 11th United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in June 2003 in São Paulo, Brazil was successful in introducing measures to increase trade between countries from the South, providing a new dynamic to trade relations and opening up new possibilities of exchange and complementarity among developing nations⁹.

Negotiations for a free trade agreement with the European Union, which had been dragging on for five years, were interrupted in November 2004. It was thought that the opening up of the European agricultural market, the main demand of the Mercosur, would mean the acceptance of smaller quotas than those in force at the time. This would not compensate for concessions made in the areas of investments, services and industrial products.

In 2005, negotiations resumed under the condition that the Mercosur would receive special treatment in order to redress and reduce existing imbalances between the two regions. Negotiations tended to be difficult and an agreement was not foreseen before the conclusion of the Doha Round, but there was political will to reach a position which satisfied the two blocs¹⁰.

During the 1st Arab League-South America Summit, in Brasília in 2005, Brazil's diplomatic objective was to move closer to the Arab countries in order to increase trade, as well as political, commercial, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, whilst simultaneously rejecting the doctrine of a

publicado-na-brasil-international-gazeta-brasil-politica-externa-e-comercio-internacional-brasil-ia-df-21122004.

9 "Brasil, política externa e comércio internacional" - article the former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim published in *Brasil International Gazeta*, 2004, December, 22. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://mundorama.net/2004/12/21/artigo-do-ministro-celso-amorim-publicado-na-brasil-international-gazeta-brasil-politica-externa-e-comercio-internacional-brasil-ia-df-21122004>.

10 "Mercosul que condições especiais para retomar negociações com a UE." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*, March, 22. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi2203200536.htm>.

clash of civilizations and giving a more pragmatic tone to relations between these regions.

In 2009 in Doha, Qatar, at the 2nd Arab League-South America Summit, Brazil argued for the need to establish ‘financial cooperation mechanisms’ to fight the economic crisis in poor countries:

[...] establish an international financial system to prevent financial speculation and introduce adequate market regulations, an issue which will be on the agenda of the G20 meeting. Furthermore, to stage an international conference sponsored by the WTO to debate the international financial crisis and consider solutions¹¹.

This summit generated a certain degree of opposition from Israel and the United States, but it fell within the Brazilian multilateral tradition of encouraging other South American states to widen their international relations. Trade with South America tripled, reaching 18 billion dollars in 2007. With regard to international policy, the Summits criticized Israel over the issue of the creation a viable and autonomous Palestinian State and the violent repression of the Palestinian people. It also condemned terrorism and refused to endorse positions which violated human rights, sovereignty of peoples (in a clear allusion to Darfur) and democracy (while respecting the specificities of each nation).

The South American Integration Project

Historically, Brazil has always been more focused on Europe and the United States than on its South American neighbors. We can identify the beginning of a change of attitude in the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), with the Pan-American Operation (1958), and later, with negotiations for building Itaipu during the military regime.

11 See: “Cúpula entre árabes e sul-americanos concorda sobre crise, mas não sobre Sudão.” 2009. Accessed January 26, 2011. http://br.noticias.yahoo.com/s/afp/090331/mundo/qatar_rabes_amlat_prev.

These moves became more consistent during the democratic period, during the government of José Sarney, when an alliance with Brazil's old rival, Argentina, was established. This alliance was the strategic core of the Brazilian project for regional integration and an advancement of an alternative to American leadership.

In 2003, Lula and Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) met in Buenos Aires and presented a document entitled the Buenos Aires Consensus, setting out their positions against the neoliberal policies adopted by the Washington Consensus (1989). The main points of the document were: reinforcing the role of the State as the main instrument for socio-economic development; promoting public policies geared towards development, employment and income distribution; prioritizing education as a mechanism for social inclusion, and eradicating hunger and poverty; integrating development policies; searching for sustainable solutions for the integrated management of natural resources in socio-economic development; prioritizing the Mercosur and regional integration; developing common positions in multilateral trade negotiations against discriminatory policies, subsidies and barriers to trade in agricultural products; supporting the UN in relation to multilateralism; respect for the rules and principles of international law, international disarmament policies and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This document reaffirmed the Brasília-Buenos Aires alliance, demonstrating a convergence in their positions and the common approach underpinning their foreign policy¹².

However, relations between Brazil and Argentina have been characterized by ups and downs for a number of reasons: existing rivalry (which is not limited to football); Argentine opposition to Brazil's candidacy for a seat at the UN Security Council; difficulties in trade relations due to Brazil leaving the semi-fixed exchange rate mechanism and the Argentine economic crisis which reversed the tendency of the trade balance between the two countries; protectionist measures adopted by Argentina against Brazilian products; Brazil's discreet support for restructuring Argentina's foreign debt and Argentina's increasing discomfort in relation to Brazil's regional leadership.

These difficulties have been circumvented by the recognition of a clear imbalance between the two economies and successive concessions made to Argentina – despite the fact that sometimes the Brazilian government has

12 "O consenso de Buenos Aires." 2003. (October, 18). Accessed January 26, 2011. http://www2.mre.gov.br/dai/b_argt_385_5167.htm.

threatened retaliations or appealed to the WTO - in addition to measures such as those to balance bilateral trade, policies to integrate their respective productive chains, joint investments, external fund raising and fiscal incentives. The wider objective is greater integration and acceptance, albeit reluctantly, by Argentina of Brazilian leadership in the Southern Cone¹³.

Uruguay and Paraguay, smaller member-states of the Mercosur, have been the source of a number of problems and provoked embarrassment with regard to Brazilian common policy initiatives. In 2004 the Uruguayan government launched the candidature of Pérez del Castillo, a pro-American and conservative diplomat, to the administration of the WTO¹⁴, and also passed legislation and signed agreements outside the rules of the Mercosur. President Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) continued the tendency of detachment from the bloc, particularly with the emergence of the controversy with Argentina involving the paper industry. Uruguay also initiated discussions with the USA concerning a trade agreement outside the Mercosur, without success¹⁵.

In relation to Paraguay, a number of problems remain on the agenda: the question of '*Brasiguaios*' (Brazilian born residents) and the legality of properties situated along the border with Brazil, questioned by the Paraguayan government; Paraguayan demands for the revision of the Itaipu Treaty, firmly resisted by Brazil. Negotiations point towards an increase in revenue from energy sales and a debt reduction program but without the need to amend the treaty. The Lula government has been closely monitoring Paraguayan cooperation with the United States in the fight against contraband in the Tri-Border area. This has led to speculation about the role of FARC in the kidnapping and murder of the daughter of Raúl Cubas, the former Paraguayan president. The United States already has a number of agencies and 'aides', civilian and military, installed and acting freely in Paraguayan territory, increasing the possibility of a direct and unilateral American intervention in the Tri-Border area (Bartolomé 2003).

13 "Briga de vizinhos: Argentina vê danos a indústria de TV." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*, February, 10. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1002200508.htm>.

14 "Corrida pela OMC; Brasileiro é o 1º eliminado em disputa na OMC." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*, April, 16. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1604200518.htm>.

15 "Integração não é só afinidade." 2006. *Folha de São Paulo*, May, 14. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1405200612.htm>.

The election of Fernando Lugo, which broke the traditional power alternation between the '*Blancos*' and '*Colorados*' in Paraguay, was celebrated by the PT government. However, even before taking office, Lugo put the revision of the Itaipu Treaty on the agenda for negotiation (the debate concerning the price of energy, the debt generated by the construction of the plant and the potential sale of Paraguay's share of the energy produced to third parties) and argued for agrarian reform, particularly focusing on 'illegal' land possession and on the border region occupied by the so-called *Brasiguaios*.

When he took office Lula sought closer Brazil-Venezuela cooperation, making their alliance a strategic one, based on a number of political-economic partnership projects, such as the establishment of a South American energy company (a consortium between PVDSA and Petrobrás), the creation of a South American television channel (in the molds of the American CNN), Venezuela's membership to the Mercosur, financial and investment agreements in infrastructure, mining, energy and telecommunications, the purchase of military equipment and joint actions in defense of the Amazon region, and finally, an increase in trade and cultural exchange.

The main problem in relation to this partnership is that Washington accused President Hugo Chávez of using oil resources to promote an arms race in the region and of supporting popular and political movements in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, thus exacerbating regional instability.

American initiatives to politically isolate Chávez from his neighbors - based on issues of freedom of the press, the independence of the Judiciary, disrespect to democratic rules and repeated interference in the internal affairs of other countries - have had relative success, despite the strong political support that the Venezuelan president has enjoyed from Brazil.

In 2004, Chávez created the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas - Alba - (Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela), characterized by strong anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism and political radicalism. This organization together with high oil prices (until October 2008) allowed him to increase his influence and provide political support to presidents Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Fernando Lugo (Paraguay) and Cristina Kirchner (Argentina). Chávez sought to present himself as an alternative leader in the Americas and as a focus for opposing not only the

United States but more moderate regimes. He also fought against attempts by the Brazilian government to advance its projects for political and economic regional integration.

Itamaraty has gone to great strides to show that the alliance with Chávez was not an affront to the United States, but primarily a fundamental partnership within the regional integration project (Barbosa 2005a). The Lula government has sought to maintain a moderate position characterized by dialogue, convergence and conciliation, steering clear of disagreements and maintaining influence and open channels of communication with Venezuela, despite the disquiet provoked by the following episodes: nationalization of oil and gas fields in Bolivia; the dispute between the Ecuadorian government and Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction company, and the Brazilian state company, Furnas; Chávez's support for Paraguayan demands in relation to Itaipu; criticisms directed at the G20 in Economic Forums and the Summit of the Americas concerning biofuels; the fact that some 'Bolivarian' initiatives have disrupted Brazilian plans in terms of policies for the continent; and increasing domestic opposition to this alliance with Chavism¹⁶.

The Lula government led the process of regional integration, acting as a stabilizing force, mediating conflicts, positioning itself as the main interlocutor in the region and as the engine of regional development, based on investments in infrastructure integration and the fostering of exchange between the region's nations.

The PT government sought to revitalize old Brazilian dreams, such as building a route to the Pacific to boost exports to Asia and strengthen its presence in the South American market, so as to generate an intra-regional process capable of establishing a centre for autonomous development based on future economic compatibility¹⁷.

The Mercosur is the engine of South American integration and in order to promote it the Lula government speeded up the process of internal integration by establishing a timescale for the creation of a court to resolve controversies, updating trade and employment legislation, integrating productive chains,

16 "Luiz Nassif: A aposta em Cháves." 2006. *Folha de São Paulo*, May, 18. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1805200610.htm>.

17 "Uma abertura para o Pacífico." 2004. *Gazeta Mercantil*, December, 2004. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/artigos-relevantes/artigo-uma-abertura-para-o-pacifico-gazeta-mercantil-08-de-dezembro-de-2004>.

and in the long-term, planning to establish a single currency and elect a Parliament.

The Brazilian strategy for South American integration involves geographically expanding the Mercosur by merging it with the Andean Community, thus increasing exchange at all levels, and integrating transport, energy and communication infrastructure. This strategy saw a number of agreements signed in 2004 between the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. The purpose of these treaties was to create an economic regional centre that carried as much political weight as other blocs such as the EU, NAFTA and the group of Asian nations.

A further step in this direction was the launch, at the Cuzco regional summit in December 2004, of the Community of South American Nations (CSN), subsequently called the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), comprising Mercosur and Andean Community countries as well as Chile, Guyana and Suriname. Mexico and Panama participate as observers. The final objective is to advance economic and infrastructure integration, establish cooperation mechanisms on a number of levels and, in the long-term, establish a common market, a parliament, a currency and a common passport¹⁸.

In 2007, acting on Chávez's proposal, the *Banco del Sur* was established, with headquarters in Caracas, whose objectives were to finance regional development at low cost and assist countries affected by the economic crisis, to act as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund, and to establish a South American single currency (at an unspecified time in the future).

In accordance with the agreements reached up to April 2009, the headquarters of Unasur will be in Quito, Ecuador, and the parliament in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

In the vision of the PT government, South American integration would strengthen all countries in the subcontinent, leading to benefits which would result in better life conditions for the whole population, this being the ultimate objective.

The main obstacles to the UNASUR project are regional rivalries (exemplified by the absence of the presidents of Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay

18 "Nasce o bloco integrador mais importante da América Latina". 2004. *Notícias UOL*, December, 9. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/efe/2004/12/08/ult1808u29632.jhtm>.

and Uruguay), the lack of convergence in macroeconomic policies, oscillating political relations with the USA in a number of South American countries (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) as well as the hegemonic power's ability to be an attractive alternative.

It is worth emphasizing that Brazilian actions were not facilitated by the increasing ideological convergence of elected governments in the region. Countries such as Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela either have left-leaning progressive governments or they are sympathetic to left-wing views, though in economic terms, their practices remain nationalistic.

In order to stimulate and increase trade in the region Lula emphasized the importance of bilateral and multilateral investments, funding from international agencies, Brazil's willingness to invest in regional infrastructure integration (through BNDES), the need to foster partnerships with and between domestic and foreign entrepreneurs (with the support of local governments) and the need to integrate the many South American productive, energy and transport chains (Antunes 2007).

South America has been historically unstable and the Brazilian government is closely observing the political unrest in the Andean region countries, provoked by popular movements unhappy with the implementation of coca eradication programs and their consequences for rural and indigenous peoples.

In addition to these movements, there are others demanding, among other things, greater regional autonomy, the emancipation of indigenous communities, better living standards and more equitable income distribution of the wealth generated by the exploitation of natural resources in areas of environmental and indigenous reserves.

Another factor contributing to political-social instability in the region is a direct consequence of years of economic programs and neoliberal reforms (sponsored by Washington, the IMF, the World Bank, etc.), and more recently, the world economic crisis. These have had terrible effects on low income groups, as they face high levels of corruption and discredited national elites, leading to constant political crises and a lack of trust in the democratic process and institutions, in turn fuelling the rise of new nationalistic leaders.

FTAA

One of the objectives of expanding South American integration is to increase the bargaining power of Brazil and its partners in negotiations with the FTAA.

At present there are differences of interest and even hostility in relation to proposals and positions adopted by Brazil and the United States.

The Americans want to speed up the implementation of the FTAA and include all aspects of trade relations, though they also want to exclude issues that are currently being negotiated within WTO. Coincidentally, these are issues which are high on the agendas of Brazil and its partners such as subsidies, anti-dumping legislation and immigration. A further factor is that a number of points in the American proposal, such as patents, government purchases and investment regulation may limit the future success of national development policies.

The Brazilian proposal was guided by the fact that the FFTA would only come into force after all issues had been negotiated. Furthermore, the system would have to be flexible, excluding areas which particular countries would wish to omit - for example, government purchases, services, investments, intellectual property, agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping legislation - without, however, preventing countries from adopting the agreement (Amorim 2003)¹⁹. In other words, a level of flexibility was sought in order to satisfy particular points and specificities, taking into account each country's stage of development and particular interests.

The Americans were extremely unhappy that this proposal prevailed and they launched a campaign against the Brazilian government consisting of threats (if it did not agree to the terms of the FFTA negotiations, it would end up trading with the Antarctic) and accusations (of not wanting it implemented, of damaging the negotiations and the interests of other countries). The Brazilian government retaliated by claiming that it defended Brazilian interests in the same way the US defended its interests. Furthermore, the Brazilian government accused the United States of supporting, but not

19 "ALCA: EUA descartam acordo bilateral com o Mercosul." 2003. *Folha de São Paulo*, February, 28. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://busca.folha.uol.com.br/search?q=EUA%20descartam%20acordo%20bilateral%20com%20o%20Mercosul&site=jornal>.

actually practicing, free trade, as well as adopting a unilateral and imperious position. Brazil claimed that, for the Americans, the aim of the FFTA was to reserve the Latin American market for the USA, reduce their trade deficit and avoid seeking real continental integration (Bahadian 2004).

The difficulties in negotiations led the American government to adopt a strategy of signing bilateral agreements with other South American countries, with the exception of Mercosur countries, in order to obtain concessions other than those linked to trade (labor, capital controls, appeals, extraterritorial rights, patent rights, as well as the implications of TRIPS²⁰ etc.) In fact this was an attempt to establish precedents which favored internal lobbies so that, subsequently, these concessions would be forcibly incorporated into other negotiations, in order to establish standards. This negotiation strategy, as well as damaging the international trade system, weakened the claims of other developing countries at the WTO (Bhawati 2003).

Negotiations broke down in May 2004 due to American withdrawal of its proposals concerning agreements which took place at the Miami meeting that same year. The resumption of negotiations was announced for the middle of 2005. However, there was little progress due to increasing American protectionism and the fact that Bush Jr.'s mandate was coming to a close. It was concluded that a further round of negotiations would only be entered into after the election of a new American president.

Given the current state of negotiations and forming a synthesis of American positions and Brazilian perspectives, we can make the following observations:

- (1) The USA is not willing to make concessions in relation to access to its domestic market in line with the expectations of the Mercosur, above all in agriculture;
- (2) A partial opening up of the American market means accepting stricter rules than those foreseen by WTO agreements and also the opening up of Mercosur markets to services, investments, government purchases, industrial goods and intellectual property, as well as accepting quota restrictions and the maintenance of tariff protection for some agricultural products;

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- (3) The consolidation of bilateral agreements with all the countries in the continent, except the Mercosur, Venezuela and Caricom countries. These have already been signed or are in the final stages of negotiations, within a model of restricted market opening to sensitive products (agriculture, textiles) and stricter rules in relation to those adopted at the WTO;
- (4) Acceptance of strict compliance with American intellectual property legislation, with possible cross-retaliation in cases of violation;
- (5) The United States only accepted the framework for negotiation proposed by Brazil (multilateral lowest common denominator), as established in Miami (2003), because the proposal was not acceptable to most countries in the hemisphere;
- (6) Implementation of the FFTA will not result in significant gains within the next ten years as approximately 68% of Mercosur exports are already imported by the USA at zero tariff. That is, they are not subject to any type of restrictions. The remaining 32%, which are subject to restrictions, will not be free from duties during the transition period (ten years);
- (7) It will be necessary to renegotiate all agreements signed by Brazil and the Mercosur across the continent as a direct consequence of American bilateral negotiations with these countries;
- (8) The possibility remains that in the near future the USA will resume negotiations to include environmental and social clauses and that these may be linked to retaliations and trade sanctions;
- (9) It should be taken into account that negotiations evolved around the time of the end of the Doha Round and the vote in the American Congress on agricultural laws and other measures aimed at reducing the American deficit (trade and fiscal) (Barbosa 2005b; 2006).

Negotiations for a possible resumption of the FFTA talks proved to be very difficult and after counterbalancing benefits with concessions, it may not have been worthwhile, particularly in view of the present level of trade not subjected to agreements, as FFTA agreements continued to exclude highly competitive Brazilian products which remained subject to restrictions in accessing the American market (Bahadram 2004).

At the 2005 Summit of the Americas, in Mar del Plata, the FFTA was practically 'shelved' due to difficulties in conciliating Mercosur and American demands. Consequently, the USA further advanced its strategy of bilateral and trade agreements with Caribbean and Central American countries. The Barak Obama government and its main leaders have so far made no pronouncements regarding the resumption of negotiations (April/2009).

The Security of the Hemisphere

The Lula government's assessment of the international scenario in the post-Cold War period was that the world was experiencing a period of instability, with the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts, humanitarian tragedies and the resurgence of terrorism, as well as an increase in transnational organized crime. His government also believed that there had been a lack of progress in both nuclear and conventional weapon disarmament, resulting in the aggravation of risks due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, spending on defense was rising, a sign that the world was increasingly insecure.

At a political-strategic level, Celso Amorim expressed growing concern with security issues, given that military alliances committed to collective defense, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), conferred upon themselves new roles, drawing up doctrines which dangerously confused established ideas on legitimate defense, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the authority of the UN Security Council (Amorim 2003).

In relation to terrorism, the PT government argued that necessary preventive and pre-emptive actions should be carried out against a backdrop of greater cooperation, forged along two main lines: (1) the adoption of repressive measures against terrorist organizations and organized crime, by means of agreements, the exchange of intelligence and closer contact between judicial institutions and police forces; (2) the promotion of tolerance and democratic values, whilst focusing on the social and economic roots of terrorism.

It is worth emphasizing that there are no studies showing a direct relationship between poverty and terrorism, though it is clear that economic struggles and social exclusion are factors that may contribute to illegal activities, above all when these are combined with an absence of social and political freedom (Amorim 2004).

In terms of continental security, Brazil defended a revision of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), though its remit should be restricted to recommendations and agreements undertaken by the Committee on Hemispheric Security and to maintaining the role of the Inter-American Defense Board as a body for technical and military consultancy with no operational functions.

In terms of South American security, Brazil put more troops in the Amazon region and is sharing SIVAM (System of Surveillance for the Amazon) information with neighboring countries. These measures, together with the *Lei do Abate*²¹, aim to improve control of movements along Brazil's extensive borders, whilst providing very discreet and restricted support for the American plan to fight Colombian narco-terrorism and drug trafficking (Martu 2002 and Teixeira da Silva 2002).

In fact, the USA would like Brazil to be more active in combating drug trafficking with the support of the Brazilian Air Force in direct operations. However, this does not have the backing of the Brazilian Armed Forces, despite the fact that conservative political groups are in favor of greater involvement in the war against organized crime.

The main regional security problems are: (1) constant American speculation that radical Islamic groups use the Tri-Border area as an operational, refuge and money laundering base, in addition to other illicit activities such as smuggling, counterfeiting, drug trafficking and so on. The United States believes that these extremist groups are operating together with organized crime to finance operations against the USA; (2) FARC operations and their links with drug producers and traffickers (Hill 2003); (3) Networks of drug production and distribution, and organized crime, have been growing in the region causing an increase in violence in both urban and rural areas, creating areas of anomy within States; (4) indigenous movements, mainly in the Andes, de-stabilizing a number

21 "Lei do Abate só vai permitir ataques a aviões de tráfico." 2004. *Folha de São Paulo*, July, 19. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1907200402.htm>.

of governments (Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru) and their associations with drug traffickers; (5) illicit trafficking in the Triple Frontier, Pantanal and Amazon regions; (6) potential direct or indirect American intervention in the internal conflicts of South American countries (Venezuela, Colombia; (7) the issue of internal violence, resulting from crime linked to drug trafficking, corruption, poverty and inequality; (8) an increase in military expenditure above historic averages in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and (9) the return of old territorial claims, stimulated by nationalistic politicians.

Despite growing regional instability and military vulnerability, Brazil continues to be one of the countries that least spends on defense, a position which is incompatible with its political-strategic status. The Lula government disappointed the Armed Forces - which supported him, albeit inconspicuously, during the election campaign - by lowering the profile of national defense at all levels and pursuing the previous government's policy of marginalizing the military and ignoring basic national security needs. The defense ministers chosen (José Viegas, a diplomat, the vice-president José Alencar, Waldir Pires and Nelson Jobim) did not have the "appropriate profile"²² and/or the necessary knowledge to effectively perform their role. This political weakness has been demonstrated by the delay in modernizing the Armed Forces (the best examples of this are the cancellation by the Air Force of the purchase of fighter jets, the suspension of modernization projects and the postponement of a starting date for the construction of a nuclear submarine and re-equipping programs) and the outdated make-up of its warfare equipment which is now old and, to a large degree, obsolete.

National Security, up to this point, had not received the required attention a sector of this importance merits. The long-awaited and vital redrafting of the National Defense Policy had not progressed and the budget was, at best, insufficient. The Lula government's stance in pursuing the previous government's policy did not meet the basic needs of defense, given the unstable international and regional scenario, leaving Brazil exposed and in a position of extreme fragility and vulnerability, given minimum deterrence requirements and the increase in military expenditure by Brazil's neighbors.

22 "Alencar diz que não tem perfil para a Defesa." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*, March, 12. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1203200506.htm>.

The Brazilian Armed Forces have been involved in activities to support development, maintain internal order, combat illegal trafficking and assist the population after natural catastrophes.

Despite this lack of resources, the Armed Forces have tried to adapt by reformulating strategies, transferring units to the most vulnerable regions and participating in other activities which provide them with resources such as road paving, bridge-building and other repairs, as well as maintaining and modernizing foreign aircraft and ships.

The last two budgets saw an increase in resources, though in practice this has been hampered by cuts and other types of restrictions. At present, Brazil does not have deterrence capacity and the clearest example of this is the development of studies carried out by the Brazilian Army on strategies of resistance. In these terms, USA policy for South America's Armed Forces (Williamsburg Conference) has been implemented without disagreements between Washington and Brasília, despite the fact that there is a contradiction in the way Brazil claims a seat at the Security Council while recognizing that the present scenario is unstable both in regional and global terms.

Brazil's participation in leading the Peace Force in Haiti is worthy of special note for the manner in which it sought to introduce a new approach to peacekeeping missions by redirecting the objectives and mechanisms of international action towards the reconstruction of the country, drawing attention to socio-economic and infrastructure problems and prioritizing humanitarian actions in order to re-establish minimum conditions of dignity. However, the mission began to present problems due to its inability to fulfill promises relating to resources for the country's reconstruction and economic reorganization. This failure was directly reflected in an increase in violence.²³

One of the main focal points of South American instability lies in the arc that runs from the north of Paraguay to the south of Colombia, where the demands of indigenous communities are most keenly expressed: better conditions for substituting coca cultivation and demands for the implementation of policies to improve living standards through the employment and distribution of income resulting from the exploitation of

23 "O atoleiro em que o Brasil se meteu." 2004. *Veja*, 37, no. 1883, n. 49, (December, 8). Accessed January 26, 2011. http://veja.abril.com.br/081204/p_130.html.

natural resources. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are the countries that are most affected by rural and indigenous troubles.

In the case of Colombia, when Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002 he promised more vigorous action against the guerrilla forces, associating them to drug trafficking and terrorism. Under the allegation that FARC did not comply with the 2000 agreements, Uribe broke off dialogue and adopted a series of politically repressive measures (Democratic Security Plan and the Anti-terrorist Statute) together with a military offensive (Patriot Plan) which, despite weakening FARC, did not achieve definitive results.

The Colombian attack in 2008 on FARC bases in Ecuador, which resulted in the death of Raul Reys and 26 other guerrillas, led local governments to react against the implementation of the doctrine of pre-emptive actions in the region with American support. This attack provoked a serious diplomatic crisis in the region. Colombia was almost unanimously condemned throughout the American Continent. In the OAS, it was on the receiving end of a resolution rejecting its military operation on Ecuadorian territory. The crisis was only resolved with the mediation of Chile and Brazil and an official apology from Colombia to Ecuador, as well as a commitment that such action would not reoccur.

The Colombian government was leading the fight against narcoterrorists in South America and argued for a greater engagement from its neighbors in actions against FARC. Uribe counted with the support of the Republicans in the American Congress for the renewal of *Plano Colombia* which increased both the number of 'monitors' and funds for military actions, and access to equipment and information. The program of assistance for combating drugs made the Andean country the third largest recipient of American resources, only trailing Israel and Egypt (Echavarria 2004). However, will continue this policy in the Obama administration is still unknown.

The Brazilian Armed Forces and Itamaraty have been monitoring the development of various crises on their borders with considerable concern, particularly in the Amazon region, where the high number of forest and indigenous reserves along the borders, rich in natural resources, make them prime targets as sanctuaries and encourage others powers to intervene directly in the region.

Another issue of considerable concern is the growth in tension between the United States and Venezuela, despite attempts at a re-approximation by Chávez, during the Summit of the Americas (2009). Chávez's policy of closer

ties with China, Iran and Cuba, joint military maneuvers with Russia in the Caribbean, and the arming and support of popular opposition movements in some South American countries has contributed significantly to a rapid deterioration in relations between the two countries. The fundamental question was to what extent the United States would tolerate Chávez's provocative stance, given that with regard to South America security, his posture was already seen as detrimental to American interests (altering the regional strategic balance of power and his alliance with China, Russia and Iran). Though unlikely, mainly because of President Barak Obama, direct or covert intervention by the United States cannot be discarded if American interests were to become directly affected. Brazil is against any type of American intervention or unilateral action in the domestic affairs of Venezuela and urged the resumption of talks.

With regard to the collective security of South America - despite the disquiet of the United States which prompted it to present an alternative hemisphere-wide proposal - the creation of the South American Defense Council was the result of Brazil's effort to establish a permanent body for debating regional security and defense issues, promoting trust-building measures and the exchange of information and analysis on matters of regional and global defense. The Council should encourage the development of collective defense policies for the South American region, promote exchange between regional Armed Forces, coordinate joint military exercises, participate in peace missions organized by the UN and integrate the local armament industries²⁴.

The UN

President Lula, pursuing a long tradition in Brazilian foreign policy, defended the need to respect and strengthen multilateral institutions, stressing the importance of restructuring the UN in order to meet the new demands of its member-states and the international environment which emerged at the end of the Cold War. This re-structuring would mean an expansion of the

24 "UNASUL aprova a criação do Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa." 2008. Folha de São Paulo, December, 16. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/internacional/2008/12/16/ult1859u493.jhtm>.

Security Council (SC) and the end of the power of veto in decisions agreed by a majority of countries in the General Assembly.

Brazil's wish to be a permanent member of the Security Council has been an ever-present aspiration since the foundation of this body and has been supported by a number of countries in recognition of the country's balanced role in international politics. However, reform of the SC in the current climate remains secondary due to the power of its permanent members (despite some support for Brazilian demands, this has not been translated into effective actions), opposition to the inclusion of some countries (particularly Germany and Japan) and other nations' opposition to the proposal (including Argentina, Chile, Canada, Mexico and Pakistan).²⁵

Brazil's proposal for reforming the Security Council is not restricted to the inclusion of new members but embraces the need to improve and re-examine the relationship between the SC and other UN organizations and agencies. For example, in relation to disarmament and policies to control weapons of mass destruction, the SC should develop more robust partnerships with the agencies addressing this problem, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). Other (Brazilian) proposals have a more systematic focus on issues of human rights, establishing criteria agreed multilaterally and modes of involvement on issues such as social justice through policies which target the end of hunger and extreme poverty, stimulating socio-economic development.

In terms of Collective Security, the Brazilian government considers that no regional groups of nations or alliances, however noble their objectives, can be credible or legitimate substitutes for the UN in consensus-building at an international level, a task that only the United Nations can perform. Thus, the need for a more representative and multilateral Security Council.

In a report on proposals to reform the organization, presented by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the following points appear as paramount: a definition for terrorism, clear rules for military intervention, reformulation of the structure of human rights, inclusion of programs to combat hunger and poverty and the re-structuring of the Security Council. In the present

25 "Diplomacia: Annan divulga sua proposta sobre reforma da ONU." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*, March, 21. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft2103200509.htm>.

administration of Ban Ki-moon, which continued until April 2009, reform appears to have been suspended indefinitely.

The USA

Foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration was a combination of the main Republican characteristics, unilateralism and isolationism, with elements from the Christian right.

Generally speaking, and ignoring the many nuances and contradictions, Republicans tend to be more isolationist and wary of any wider involvement in international politics, which is only acceptable if American security or interests are at stake. They also tend to be more pragmatic and realistic. However, for both Republicans and Democrats, the main objective of the American government is the continuance of their hegemony for as long as possible.

The team which George W. Bush formed was not homogenous and included both traditional Republicans, such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates and members from a wider spectrum of the American Right, such as the Christian Right fundamentalist John Ashcroft (against abortion, gay marriage, stem-cell research and so on) and intellectuals from think-tanks, the media and conservative universities, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, William Kristal and Robert Kaplan.

The contradictory, and often diverging, positions of Bush's main aides were mediated by the President's pragmatism and his wish that his whole government would make wide-ranging use of the power accrued by the USA through unilateral measures, intervening anywhere in the world and on any issue on the international agenda in order to maintain American hegemony, even if this caused external opposition or sacrificed civil rights at home. The latter is what differentiated this group of Republicans from traditional conservatives and defined this phase of American neo-imperialism (Bertonha 2003b).

The group of New Right intellectuals which comprised Bush's government adopted certain spaces and positions from the Left, such as using power and

influence in international negotiations within multilateral organizations and foreign intervention, in order to promote concrete interests, convictions and ideals, for example, the dissemination of the American political model.

Bush stated in his acceptance speech at the start of his second mandate that the United States has an obligation to 'extend liberty and peace to the world' and that he would look to build 'a world without tyranny' where 'the expression of liberty is important', justified by 'a commitment to human dignity', as reflected in the values and system of the United States.

Bush denied on a number of occasions that the USA was imperialist or that it sought to implement a utopia, but he made it clear that the country's role would be to steer nations towards building a global environment characterized by order, progress, liberty and respect for the rule of law, women, private property, free speech and equality before the law. American actions would seek to foster democracy, development, the free market and free trade. This would lead to a more peaceful world with more freedom, serving the interests of the United States and its allies, as well as reflecting American ideals (Bush 2002).

In his second term of office Bush made some amendments to the direction of his foreign policy. Changes which had taken place in his first term (an end to Cold War convictions, the absolute priority of national security after the 11th September 2001 attacks, the doctrine of pre-emptive attacks and unilateralism) (Rice 2002-2003) caused more problems and opposition than effectively contributed to the advancement of the foreign policy agenda.

However, this did not amount to great changes in policy, as was clear by the nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to the World Bank and the choice of Condoleezza Rice, National Security Secretary, to run the State Department and Robert Gates, the Defense Department. John Bolton was made UN Ambassador and Stephen Hadley and Elliot Abrams were appointed to the National Security Council. In fact, this was a strategy of employing multilateral bodies to: (1) deny legal privilege to its opponents; (2) influence the ongoing restructuring process of international bodies, particularly the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, and (3) impose policy changes on these organizations in order to use them as institutional support for American foreign policy, providing legitimacy to US proposals.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice conducted herself in a pragmatic and flexible manner, making 'tactical concessions' in an attempt to secure closer

relations with US allies, and in this regard re-establishing the alliance with Europe was fundamental.

Bush's team believed that multilateral organizations and treaties should not prevail, even when seemingly in line with American interests, as they effectively hindered the United States' freedom of movement. In order to defend its security and national interests, the Americans were not to be restrained by concepts of sovereignty or depend on the support of allies or the authorization of international institutions.²⁶

The Bush government considered the USA to be most vulnerable in countries which did not share American ideals and its way of life, and it believed that such countries used forums, international institutions, judicial processes and terrorism to inhibit and limit American actions in defense of its national interests.²⁷

In what he called 'multilateralism my way' Bush espoused that 'America always prefers to act with its allies. And there is no doubt that the success of multilateralism is measured by its results, not its process'.

In relation to the UN, largely ignored in his first mandate, he proposed that it should be more than a league of nations, in order to achieve its objective of collective security, and become more relevant and efficient so as to be able to face current threats.²⁸

This more pragmatic approach, whilst not abandoning unilateralism, was reaffirmed in his State of the Union speech²⁹ when he focused on liberty rather than democracy: 'The United States has neither the right, the wish or the intention to impose its way of government on anyone', concluding that 'the aim of eradicating tyranny in the world' meant supporting democratization in the Ukraine, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan – without imposing pressure on Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or even China and Russia.

26 "National Security Strategy." 2002. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

27 "Os Estados Unidos não hesitarão em agir sozinhos." 2005. *O Globo*, March, 24. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://oglobo.globo.com/jornal/mundo/167390019.asp>.

28 "O mundo como deve ser, na visão de George Bush." 2005. *Folha de São Paulo*, February, 8. Accessed January 26, 2011. https://acesso.uol.com.br/login.html?dest=CONTENT&url=http://noticias.uol.com.br/midiaglobal/elpais/2005/02/08/ult581u1217.jhtm&COD_PRODUTO=1.

29 "Full text of 2005 State of the Union Speech." 2005. *NBCNews*, February, 2. Accessed January 26, 2011. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6902913/ns/politics-state_of_the_union/.

Charles Krauthammer, a neo-conservative journalist within the realist tendency, observed that “we need to follow the Cold War model; tolerate alliances with these countries in order to defeat radical Islamism and concede that democratic changes cannot occur overnight”.³⁰

Issues which dominated the international Republican agenda were:

- (1) Continuation of the war on terrorism based on military and intelligence operations;
- (2) Continuation of stabilizing operations and combating Taliban resistance in Afghanistan;
- (3) In the Middle East, a focus on Iran (nuclear question), Iraq (stabilization, pacification and democratization), Syria (support for terrorist groups) and Israel/Palestine relations (implementation of the Road Map);
- (4) Negotiations with North Korea on nuclear weapons;
- (5) Monitoring Russia’s movements (contention and democracy);
- (6) Strict monitoring of China (Taiwan issue), already identified by the main analysts as a future rival due to its rapid economic growth and an increase in defense spending in order to modernize its armed forces;
- (7) Environmental issues (Kyoto Protocol and permission to exploit petrol and gas in the Alaskan environmental reserve, as well as intensifying research in biofuels in order to reduce the strategic vulnerability of the country);
- (8) Implementation of the International Criminal Court and its jurisdiction for citizens from non-adherent countries. Following events in Baghram (Afghanistan), Abu Ghraib (Iraq) and Guantánamo (Cuba), the massacres of innocent civilians (Afghanistan and Iraq), condemnations of violations of the Geneva Convention in its operations against terrorism and in establishing an area to detain prisoners of war in the Guantánamo base, where prisoners had no rights and no recognition of their status, the USA was obliged to sign treaties to protect its military personnel and other workers. They also faced heavy criticism from the international community.

30 “O mundo como deve ser, na visão de George Bush.” 2005. *El País*, February, 8.

The main trade negotiations involving the Republican administration, and under the aegis of the WTO, addressed access to markets, subsidies, antidumping legislation and the protection of intellectual property. The Doha Round and the FTAA were characterized by the intransigence of heavily protectionist American positions and the consequent failure to move towards a fairer and more open trade scenario. The strategy of signing bilateral agreements with a number of countries has had very limited success, since the Congress blocked greater concessions.

Contrary to what was initially thought when Bush took power, the 11th September 2001 attacks and the subsequent war on terror left Latin America out on a limb, resulting in a greater isolation in face of a number of regional crises: the Argentine debt crisis, the political crises in Venezuela (2002 and 2003), Bolivia and Haiti (2004) and Ecuador (2005), and finally the diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuador (2008).

In this last instance the United States was not able to exert decisive influence during negotiations due to its lack of credibility and the resistance it provoked in the region. The Brazilian position was to limit conflict resolution to the continent and mediate a solution between the parties involved, shunning American interference.

In the Americas, during Bush's administration, a number of issues and strategies remained on the agenda: tightening the circle around Cuba and monitoring the activities of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia; providing continuity to Plan Colombia, with an emphasis on combating narco-terrorism and attempting to engage neighboring countries in refusing to provide sanctuary and support (to terrorists); resuming the FTAA negotiations; finalizing bilateral treaties with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador; increasing monitoring, intelligence operations and repression in the Tri-Border area, with greater support from Paraguay. Other issues demanded greater caution and raised alarm: the evolution of Brazilian activities in South America, the large number of left-leaning governments elected in the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela), the rise of 'populist-nationalist' governments and the increase of China's influence (in different sectors) in Latin American countries. One of the strategies employed by the USA was to seek even greater approximation with traditional allies such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, rallying around mutual interests and positions of consensus, in order to neutralize Chávez and limit his influence.

During the Bush government there was a feeling of abandonment due to a lack of assistance during times of economic crises. Many of these crises were the consequence of policies supported by the US and its unilateralist policies. There was an almost ubiquitous perception that the United States was only interested in the continent as a market for its products, in the war on terror and in pursuing its interests; it did not consider continental demands (immigration, access to the American market, technologies, etc.). Furthermore, there was a lack of knowledge about continental issues and a lack of political skills when dealing with regional leaders. All these factors led to an anti-American feeling in Latin America, further fuelled by nationalist leaders (Chávez, Morales, Ortega, Correa and so on).

The domestic agenda influenced how foreign policy was conducted and Bush was very clear in stating, 'I've earned some capital in these elections, political capital, and now I intend to spend it on what I said I would spend it on', in other words: social security reform with the partial privatization of pensions, fiscal reform, re-organization of immigration legislation, consolidation of the new security legislation, cuts in social programmes, an increase in tax cuts for the productive sector and an increase in defense spending.

It is worth remembering that despite high levels of economic growth in 2004, at around 4.5% the highest rate of growth since 1999, and a drop in unemployment, the US economy had problems which required serious attention, such as its (public, budgetary, current account and trade) deficits, tax cuts which meant balancing the public accounts was unfeasible, a drop in levels of domestic savings, an increase in private debt (firms and individuals), high risk speculation, lack of regulation and transparency in economic relations, the constant devaluation of the dollar, expenditure on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and an increase in external debt and a large military budget.

Positive economic results meant the Republican administration failed to pay adequate attention to these issues. The result was the economic crisis which began in 2007 and intensified thereafter. The crisis deepened in the first months of 2009, GDP fell 6.3% in the last quarter of 2008 and, despite incentive programs, there were still no perspectives of improvement in the short-term³¹.

31 "Pacote de resgate não é 'panaceia', diz Paulson." 2008. *O Estadão*, November, 18. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,pacote-de-resgate-nao-e-panaceia-diz-paulson,279650,0.htm>.; "Obama sanciona pacote de estímulo econômico de

In 2005 Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve asked how 'big the US current account deficit had to become before it stopped being financed?' The old debt and deficit limits had already been exceeded, but the question remained of how large the deficit would have to get before foreigners (who sustained the dollar and bought American treasury bonds) became concerned about the health of the currency and the ability of the US to guarantee payment of yields on investments.

The Republican administration's proposals to reduce the deficits included cuts in social programs, social security reform, a reduction in subsidies and free trade agreements, though these were considered to be insufficient. As a result, the Democratic opposition, financial analysts, international institutions and even the American public demanded more consistent solutions to resolve these imbalances.

The results of such serious imbalances in the economy were seen in 2007 with the sub-prime crisis which had a major impact on the American and the world economies. This crisis was the result of a number of asymmetries in addition to those previously mentioned, such as a lack of strict control standards over financial corporations, relations between rating agencies and banks, and poor regulation and speculation of financing companies. These factors provoked profound imbalances in the financial sector which quickly spread to the real economy. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008 led to a generalized crisis of confidence in the financial system and the suspension of credit in the US. It rapidly spread to Europe and Japan, thus becoming a global crisis.

The new American president, Barak Obama (2009-), initiated an extensive economic recovery program, a reform of the financial system and changes to the old paradigms, thus encouraging a change in consumer habits and greater saving on the part of the population. He also carried out other reforms in education and the country's energy mix. However, the crisis deepened in the first months of 2009. Signs of recovery were still uncertain in the short-term and analysts only expected some improvement from 2010.³²

US\$ 787 bi." 2009. *O Estadão*, February, 17. Accessed January 26, 2011. http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/not_eco325412,0.htm. Accessed on 17 Feb. 2009; "PIB dos EUA tem maior queda em 26 anos no 4º trimestre." 2009. *O Estadão*, March, 26. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www.estadao.com.br/.../economia,pib-dos-eua-tem-maior-queda-em-26-anos-no-4-trimestre,345187,0.htm>.

32 "Déficit orçamentário atinge nível recorde em março." 2009. *Folha de São Paulo*, April, 11. Accessed January 26, 2011. [http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fil104200913.htm](http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fil104200913.htm;);

The Brazil-USA relationship

In an interview with Univision, the largest Hispanic television network in the United States, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, mentioned the ‘excellent relations between Presidents George W. Bush and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’ as an example that the American government was not concerned about the rise of left-leaning governments in Latin America, as this was taking place within a democratic context and according to the wishes of the people of the region. She added that, in fact, the only concern on the part of the USA was that economic growth ‘which has been flourishing during recent years’ was not only in terms of free trade ‘but was also benefitting the people, making sure that health and education were improving’.³³

Despite good relations between presidents George W. Bush and Lula, relations between the two countries were marked by disagreements in the FTAA negotiations, on issues such as the intervention in Iraq, the war on terrorism, pressure to sign up to the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), policies relating to Venezuela and Bolivia, the refusal to accept the inclusion of an American observer at the South America-Arab League Summit of Heads of States, the policy of approximation to Arab nations and political distancing from Israel. This stemmed from the messianic and ideological nature of the Republican administration’s foreign policy, the difficulty of the United States in recognizing the differences and specificities of the various nations, and the historical American tendency of not respecting the interests of Latin American countries.

The Americans appeared to be satisfied with Brazil’s position of leadership and relied on Brazilian mediation during a number of crises in South America. They believed that the stronger Brazil was in Latin America, the more significant an American ally it would be in negotiations with other countries in the region (Sorman 2005). However, the USA did not seem willing to forego its protagonist role in the region and therefore relied on the traditional divisions and rivalries between South American states as well as its own political, military and economic capacity to maintain its influence in the region.

“EUA tem a maior quebra de banco do ano.” 2009. *Folha de São Paulo*, April, 11. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/dinheiro/fi1104200914.htm>.

33 “Condoleezza: Bush e Lula têm excelente relação.” 2006. *Folha de São Paulo*, March, 9. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u93440.shtml>.

The PT administration criticized the Republican government for its unilateral actions of legitimate pre-emptive defense. The Brazilian government considered that the use of force to prevent imminent threats would only enjoy unquestioned international legitimacy if it were multilaterally negotiated, as 'a world where the use of force is not governed by rules and multilaterally agreed will intrinsically be unstable and structurally insecure'.

In addressing the issue of terrorism, Lula proposed a multidimensional and multilateral approach involving greater cooperation between nations and the UN, highlighting that

[...] the main obstacle to more effective cooperation against terrorism is political. The hatred which galvanizes extremists will not be dissipated by using repressive methods. Diplomatic initiatives are needed, legitimized by international law. The fight against terrorism cannot be seen as incompatible with the promotion and strengthening of human rights (Amorim 2004).

The Brazilian government sought to lessen the impact of American accusations concerning the presence of terrorists in the Tri-Border region, by denying their existence and intensifying the activities of intelligence agencies, restricting and identifying illegal activities (smuggling, piracy, money laundering) and combating these crimes through the action of the police. Up to the present time, this policy has produced positive results, despite the lack of Paraguayan collaboration in fighting crimes and widespread corruption in the region (Silva 2002).

Brazil rejected all American proposals to expand the constitutional role of the Armed Forces to include actions against drug-trafficking and organized crime. Indeed, attempts to reorganize defense institutions through the OAS and establish a continental force focused on regional defense were rejected. These proposals were understood to violate the sovereignty of countries and their national interests and, in practice, national armed forces would be subjected to the command of the United States.³⁴

34 "Brasil rejeita projeto dos EUA de criar exército continental." 2004. *Folha de São Paulo*, November, 19. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1911200421.htm>; "Alencar critica EUA e política de desarmamento nuclear." 2004. *Folha de São Paulo*, November, 18. Accessed January 26, 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1811200419.htm>.

It was very unlikely that the United States would support the Brazilian candidacy to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, not only because of aforementioned disagreements but also due to other factors, such as creating dissatisfaction among other Latin American allies (Colombia, Mexico, etc.), the independent posture of Brazil in voting, lending it the status of an unreliable ally (for the Bush administration ‘ally’ was equivalent to ‘subservient vassal’) and difficulties regarding other candidates (Germany, Japan and principally, India), which in turn could result in more instability and stir up rivalries in their respective regions.

On the trade agenda, the USA believed itself to be competitive and that if it gained access to markets and managed to implement the necessary patent protections it would be able to reduce its deficit with Latin America. It was seen as very likely that the Democrats would continue with the policy of isolating the Mercosur and look towards bilateral agreements with other countries in the continent, but on different premises, a direct consequence of the economic crisis. Negotiations to establish the FTAA under Barak Obama will probably result in a more limited agreement, as both the Americans and the Mercosur countries will not be willing to concede on important issues. The current perception is that the implementation of the FTAA negotiations were abandoned by the U.S. government and the priority is to attract Latin America nations interested in the Trans Pacific Partnership, isolating Mercosur or waiting for a change of position in relation to trade negotiations.

The purpose of the Brazilian strategy of hardening its negotiating position was to establish a more restricted FTAA, extended to other Mercosur partners and South American countries, promoting regional integration and building an alternative center for development focused on Brazil.

The success of negotiations within the WTO directly depends on the ability of developing countries to form alliances, even if merely topical or specific, in order to defend their interests, as was the case with the creation of the G-20 and when Americans and Europeans were co-opted according to their specific interests in the so-called new markets.

The election of the Director-General of the WTO, when the Brazilian candidacy was disqualified in favor of other alignments with the developed countries, was a good example of the power exerted by the United States. The election of Pascal Lamy, a candidate who was not favorable to the ideas of the

developed countries, did not succeed in either establishing a more favorable environment for a substantial trade 'opening' for developing countries or in encouraging concessions on the part of developed countries in terms of a reduction in subsidies and the opening of the agricultural market and other sensitive sectors (steel, shoes, textiles, etc.)

The arrival in government of Barak Hussein Obama in 2009 provoked changes in American policy towards Latin America, despite the fact that it was not the main focus of his government, due to the seriousness of the economic crisis and political and military problems in the Middle East and Central Asia.

During the campaign, Latin America was hardly mentioned. Obama launched *A New Partnership for the Americas*, which would be the basis for his policy for the region.³⁵ In this document the Democratic candidate expressed his opposition to free trade agreements that were then going through Congress and his support for the maintenance and expansion to other countries of policies to fight drug trafficking and transnational crime, already in place in Colombia and Mexico. He did not express a very clear position in relation to immigration or to the wall that is being constructed on the border with Mexico. His proposals were somewhat vague and included partnerships in alternative energy programs and the 'loosening' of the blockade on Cuba.

On taking office Barak Obama took the first steps to close the prison at the Guantánamo military base and expressed his desire to start talks with the main sources of opposition to the US in the region, and to further American relations with the region. He did not, however, draw up new policies or directives³⁶.

At the Summit of the Americas (April/2000), Obama tried very hard to create a better atmosphere, looking to hold talks with leaders more to the left and proposing an 'alliance of equals', whilst not offering more concrete projects or further developing his proposals. Latin America had much higher expectations. It hoped for a change in focus in relations, without interventions and unilateralist positions, the re-introduction of partnerships (not only in the area of energy) and support for the socio-economic development of the

35 "O documento de campanha 'A New Partnership for the Americas'." 2008. Accessed January 26, 2011. http://obama.3cdn.net/f579b3802a3d35c8d5_9aymvyqpo.pdf.

36 "Hillary propõe retomar 'parceria' com América Latina." 2009. Accessed January 26, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2009/01/090113_hillarysenado.shtml.

region, social justice and a reduction in poverty. Moreover, it was hoped that the proposals in *A New Partnership for the Americas* from May 2008 and the positions put forward in the subsequent summit would be discussed with the region, developed and put into practice, and not remain yet another American rhetorical device looking to attract support and sympathy in Latin America.

Conclusion

Lula's foreign policy has been marked by pragmatism, the pursuit of allies for each issue on the international agenda, resolution in international negotiations, challenging but not threatening the great powers, and respecting 'problematical' countries whilst not backing their positions. Brazil sought to be the main instigator of the process of South American integration and development, as well as attempting to consolidate its position as a regional leader and legitimate representative of developing countries in international negotiations.

Other dominant aspects of Lula's foreign policy were the rejection of actions which are not supported by multilateral decision-making bodies and an opposition to unilateralism, whether in military interventions, trade negotiations or the exclusive exploitation of patents which limit scientific and technological developments, and finally, an improvement in the living standards of the population.

At the economic level, foreign policy contributed to the expansion of trade, both with developed and developing countries, supported by a commitment to diversification, increasing the scope for negotiation and bringing a new dynamics to relations between developing countries.

In this sense, ongoing discussions concerning the implementation of FTAA are at a delicate stage as Brazilian policy is often labeled as intransigent and on many occasions the threat of reprisals can be detected in the reaction of developed countries.

For Brazil, fundamental issues concerning the establishment of the FTAA should be debated in multilateral forums such as the WTO, in order to minimize and resolve the imbalances between negotiating parties.

In its relationship with the United States, regardless of the ideology of specific governments, Brazil's approach has been characterized by pragmatism, avoiding disagreements and focusing on points of convergence and partnership. However, the likelihood of the emergence of serious differences in the areas of trade and security cannot be ruled out, given that the United States imposes the agenda and the parameters for international negotiations, and considering the intensity and pressure they employ to defend their strategic interests.

The Bush administration prioritized the fight against terrorism, paying little attention to South America. This allowed the Lula government greater freedom of movement in the region to consolidate its leadership and advance in its project for regional integration. Nevertheless, there is no doubt the influence and power of the United States, diplomatic and trade problems with some neighbors and Chávez's attempts to establish an alternative regional leadership have all hindered Brazil's efforts.

The new hemispheric security structure proposed by the USA expands the role played by the Inter-American Defense Board, looks to create a multinational force for the Americas and increases its capabilities in terms of combating organized crime and drug-traffickers. In addition, this project seeks to subordinate local armed forces to the Southern Command, with its headquarters in Miami, opening up the possibility of deployment as auxiliary forces in American military campaigns. These proposals are not supported by Brazil and other South American countries that, in contraposition, have created a South American security and defense body.

Measures to increase cooperation and trust among South American armed forces should be consolidated by the creation of the South American Defense Council and there is potential for re-equipping the armed forces by the regional warfare industry, opening up the possibility of integration and mass production for local industries.

In the specific case of Brazil, the official documents of the Brazilian government (National Defense Policy, National Defense Strategy, etc.) are aligned with the new regional outlook in the security and defense areas, and as mentioned previously, are the direct initiatives of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. However, the Ministry of Defense and the issue of National Security are given low priority and are not deemed relevant in foreign policy or governmental actions. Re-equipping the armed forces and other

modernizing initiatives have been postponed or implemented very slowly. Within the Continental context, spending on the modernization of arsenals, rivalries and the growing radicalism of some political protagonists have put the viability of the South American Defense Council in doubt.

Transforming the region into an autonomous zone depends on a set of factors, namely that the decline of the USA continues, Brazil is able to increase its rate of socio-economic growth so as to become a viable alternative, the process of integrating social, economic and cultural infrastructure is successful and local rivalries are overcome through increased exchange, cooperation and the strengthening of multilateral regional institutions.

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Part II

**Brazil - United States of America
relations: cooperation, resistance and
tensions**

Brazil-United States Military Relations in the Twentieth Century

Sonny B. Davis

Brazil-United States military relations in the twentieth century were unique in the region. From early wary connections the relationship slowly grew until World War II cemented the bonds between the two hemisphere giants. Brazil expected the alliance to aid its quest for economic and military development while the United States thought its junior partner would give unquestioning loyalty in international affairs. The division of the post-war world into two ideological poles, however, had a profound impact on the relationship. New international conditions led the United States to diffuse military and development assistance to meet the perceived communist threat. The changed world scene also affected national politics in both countries, which further influenced military ties. Though Brazil received the lion's share of U.S. military and development assistance in the hemisphere, the amount and quality failed to meet expectations. Concomitantly, Brazil's military generally supported U.S. international initiatives, except when institutional and national integrity appeared threatened. The result was often strained military ties. Nevertheless, the "brotherhood of arms" served each country well. Despite the stresses, the U.S. military had a valuable ally in the Brazilian military. For Brazil the military relationship aided the national maturation process that, in part, helped end the centuries old pattern of dependence on more powerful nations.

Brazil-United States military relations began in 1914 when an American naval officer was detailed as an instructor at the Brazilian Naval War College in Rio de Janeiro in 1914.¹ In 1922 the United States added a nine-man naval mission to aid the Brazilian Navys reorganization. By the end of the twenties decade military relations remained tenuous at best, which became clear after the 1930 revolution installed Getúlio Vargas in the presidency. Vargas terminated the naval mission, citing U.S. support of ousted President Washington Luís (1926-1930) (Smith 1981, 75-77; Smith 1991, 68). The action may have contained an element of diplomatic retaliation, but Vargas also requested the withdrawal of the French Army Mission at the same time to appease Brazilian nationalists. Displeasure with the United States was of minor importance (Smith 1991, 71, 92, 95).

The increasingly dangerous world of the late 1930s stimulated change in Brazil-U.S. relations that reflected a gradual convergence of national interests. The desire of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to secure economic and security cooperation matched Vargas drive to obtain development aid. Vargas approved the re-establishment of the navy mission in 1932, allowed the use of U.S. Navy and Army advisors in 1936, and agreed to another U.S. naval mission to aid Brazilian destroyer construction with American designs and materials. The Baron of Rio Branco's earlier unwritten alliance with the United States had moved toward more substantial ties. Conditions for the creation of a military alliance, however, remained in the future (Burns 1966, 160-162; McCann 1973, 7-9; Moura 1980, 62-66, 142)²

Formidable obstacles worked against deeper military relations, with Brazilian anxiety over Argentina and arms assistance framing the issue. Long-time competitors for influence in South America, Brazil and Argentina embarked on programs of military expansion from the late 1930s to the early 1940s. Foreign military aid was critical to the process. A 1938 arms barter deal with Germany allowed Brazil to obtain arms and equipment under favorable terms, but U. S. law prevented the Americans from making any such deals. Brazilian military leaders felt the United States ignored their concerns over a rearmed Argentina and their desire to modernize. A political agreement between Washington and Rio de Janeiro whereby Brazil would cut

1 The author acknowledges that all inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere are Americans, but for the sake of clarity this paper will use the term to refer to individuals from the United States.

2 Abelardo B; Bueno do Prado to Cordell Hull, January 16, 1937 and Hull to Prado, February 2, 1937, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, vol; 5, The American Republics* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1954), 375-376 [hereafter cited as *FRUS*]; and Hull to Caffery, May 12, 1938, *FRUS 1938*, 316-317.

its national budget, including the military budget, to pay its debts caused further resentment (Davis 1996, 2-3; Rodriques 1962, 325; Goldwert 1972, 69; Fleischer 1986, 90).

Particularly galling was a failed deal to lease six decommissioned American destroyers. The combined opposition from Argentina, the U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires, and Great Britain forced the U.S. Department of State to withdraw the offer despite Brazilian assurances that the destroyers were designed for training purposes only. Shortly after the collapse of the destroyer deal a program under which Argentine pilots received training from U.S. instructors and Argentine naval officers served aboard American naval vessels led Brazil to charge Washington with abandonment. (Whitaker 1976, 376; Nunn 1983, 216-217)³ The Department of State was the primary arbiter of American foreign policy in the late 1930s and its views generally held sway. Citing multilateral equality of treatment and inter-American solidarity, the Department of State paid little heed to Brazilian Ambassador Oswaldo Aranha appeal to a special relationship between his country and the United States. Brazilian leaders feared Argentina would use U.S. aid and training to make war on Brazil, but the multilateral approach followed by the United States insured that Aranha's arguments fell on deaf ears. The U.S. Navy vetoed the service of Argentine officers aboard its vessels for security reasons unrelated to Brazilian concerns, but the aviation instructors went to Argentina.⁴

Brazil-United States military ties were not special in the 1930s. Existing agreements were minor and they had little impact on relations. U.S. failure to treat Brazil as a special friend and the views of key Brazilian military leaders prevented expansion of ties. A skeptical Brazilian General Staff even viewed the United States as a potential enemy (McCann 1983, 310-311; McCann 1981, 9).⁵ The two most influential Brazilian military leaders, Army Chief of Staff Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro and Minister of War Eurico Gaspar Dutra, opposed closer association with the Americans. The German arms deal and the American inability to provide modern weaponry offered no incentives for a Brazil-U.S. military alliance (Moura 1980, 143).⁶

3 Alexander Weddell to Secretary of State, August 10, 1937; U.S. Chargé in Brazil (Scotten) to Secretary of State, August 12, 1937; British Embassy to U.S. Department of State, September 13, 1937, *FRUS 1937*, 153-157; Hull to Caffery, May 12 1938; Caffery to Hull, May 19, 1938; Hull to Caffery, May 20, 1938, *FRUS 1938*, 316-318.

4 Caffery to Hull, May 12, 1938; and Hull to Caffery, May 23, 1938, *FRUS 1938*, 316-318.

5 Caffery to Hull, May 19, 1938; Hull to Caffery, May 20, 1938, *FRUS 1938*, 316-318.

6 Welles to Caffery, May 8, 1940, *FRUS 1940*, 40-42; and Moura, *Autonomia na dependência*, 143.

Though U.S. policy considered Brazil the same as the smallest Spanish-speaking country, the processes that led to deeper military and political relations began to function in 1938. As the world moved to war the United States sought to curb German, Italian, and Japanese influence in the hemisphere. President Roosevelt approved a Department of State and Department of War plan that called for the attendance of Latin American officers at U.S. military schools, for visits to American military installations, and for access to U.S. armed forces publications. The plan also proposed the provision of aircraft and naval vessels to Latin American militaries, an increase in the number of U.S. military attachés, and the promotion of U.S. arms sales through a series of bilateral agreements. The methods were different but they served goals long established under the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy eschewed direct intervention but kept the objectives of hemispheric security, open markets, and U.S. access to natural resources through trade and military agreements. The role of the Latin American militaries was to safeguard American objectives. Ironically, Getúlio Vargas had proposed closer military ties in 1937, but the United States declined the offer (Child 1980, 17-18; Moura 1980, 147-148; McCann 1973, 7 -110). Events in Europe soon changed the dynamic.

Brazilian-American collaboration in obtaining the Declaration of Lima at the 1938 Eight Inter-American Conference, which called for collective action in the event of aggression from a non-hemisphere state, helped build a foundation for bilateral talks on U.S. economic and military aid. By 1939 Brazil and the United States reached an accord on economic assistance, part of which called for the resumption of debt payments suspended after the 1937 coup that established Vargas Estado Novo. While Brazilian military leaders welcomed economic assistance, they balked at the debt payment arrangement and the linking of Brazilian currency to the dollar. The accord restricted capital available for military purchases and, perhaps more importantly, curtailed the German barter deal. The German connection remained important since Brazil's negotiator Oswaldo Aranha had failed to raise the issue of military aid (Hilton 1975, 181-191).

Vargas supported the deal as a means of playing Germany and the United States against each other to Brazil's advantage. Wary of the German connection and hoping to counter the pro-German slant of the Brazilian High Command, Aranha proposed an exchange of visits by Góes Monteiro and U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall. Marshall readily agreed because a

European war was imminent and American military planners believed U.S. forces would be needed to defend the northeast bulge of Brazil. Cooperation from Góes Monteiro was crucial if the Americans were to obtain transit and troop basing rights to carry out the task.⁷

When Marshall arrived in Rio de Janeiro in May 1939 he soon found that different strategic views prevented the establishment of a formal relationship. While the Americans looked to the northeast, the Brazilian military believed its greatest security threat was Argentina in the south. Potential subversion from the large Germanic population added yet another concern. There was no objection to American use of air and sea bases at Natal and Fernando de Noronha Island, but extreme nationalism closed the issue of U.S. troops on Brazilian soil. That condition, and a lack of confidence in the Brazilian military, led U.S. planners to develop the Pot of Gold plan that called for unilateral intervention if a German invasion of Brazil seemed imminent (Hilton 1981, 195; Conn and Fairchild 1960, 33, 268-273).⁸

Military cooperation remained weak despite an urgency brought on by German advances in France and the Low Countries in 1940. U.S. military leaders felt that the pro-German sympathies of the Brazilian High Command made talks superfluous and Brazilian military leaders would only consider cooperation on a bilateral basis. The key, however, was military assistance. The high cost of American arms, the U.S. cash and carry policy, and the lack of legislation for the provision of military assistance made an alliance doubtful. Aranha bluntly told Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, you [Americans] hold conversations with us and the Germans give us arms. Any alliance hinged upon the provision of aid, if not from the Americans, then from the Germans.⁹

Acquisition of arms and equipment had long been a concern of Brazilian military leaders. During World War I Brazil purchased from the United States

7 General Matthew B. Ridgeway, Conversations with Colonel John M. Blair, December 15, 1971, transcript vol. 1, sess. 2, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military Research Collection, U.S. Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 42 (hereafter the program transcripts of any officer will be cited as Officer's Name, Oral History, date, page number, USMHI).

8 Ridgeway, Oral History, Ibid.; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), 33, 268-273; and Stanley E. Hilton, *Hitler's Secret War in South America: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1981), 195.

9 Caffery to Hull, May 24; June 7; June 10, 1940, *FRUS 1940*. 43-45-47.

arms and machinery to produce military goods locally. The goal was to become self-sufficient, but with World War II rapidly approaching Brazil still lacked the ability to provide for itself (McCann 2004, 208; Hilton 1982, 629-633). Sympathy for Germany had less importance than did arms and equipment for national security. The only question was from which source.

Aranha's message was not lost on U.S. leaders. A new policy that allowed Latin American countries to purchase American arms and equipment on favorable terms and a promise of future aid created a different mood in Rio de Janeiro. Interests began to converge, resulting in a secret agreement for cooperation in hemisphere defense that effectively changed Brazilian orientation. By early 1941 U.S. offers of matériel, financial, and technical assistance persuaded Brazil to remove German and Italian influence in local airlines such as Vasp and Varig, and to participate in the Airport Development Program (ADP) to develop airfields capable of handling military aircraft (Davis 1996, 9-13).

The issue of American troops on Brazilian soil remained non-negotiable. The Brazilians were pragmatic enough, though, to recognize the need for Americans to operate a newly established ferry route from the northeast bulge to Africa and to protect ADP personnel. In a compromise Brazil allowed three uniformed but unarmed Marine companies to provide security at the ADP sites. Success in overcoming opposition in Washington and Rio de Janeiro to the ADP program and to the placement of American Marines in country helped move the nascent relationship to another level (McCann 1973, 233-234).

Despite a split between Góes Monteiro and Eurico Dutra over ties with the United States, both recognized that Brazil's options were shrinking. Vichy France's provision of submarine basing rights in French West Africa to the Germans underscored that point, for more than ever Brazil seemed vulnerable. Resulting negotiations led to the creation of the short-lived Joint Board for the Defense of Northeast Brazil and the signing of a Lend-Lease agreement in late-1941. That Brazil benefited from Lend-Lease more than any other Latin American country, receiving three-fourths of the matériel sent to the region, attested to the importance of the southern giant (Weis 1993, 11).¹⁰

10 Terms of Agreement, *FRUS 1941*, 507-509; A Lend-Lease for Brazil (General), n.d., RG-218, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Commissions U.S.-Brazil, Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commissions, Box 3, BDC 22, NA.

The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United States aligned the national interests of both countries. Still, creation of a Aspecial relationship required hard bargaining by both sides that resulted in the Washington Accords, which provided U.S. economic assistance and expanded Lend-Lease. The agreement set the stage for formal military relations. After lengthy negotiations both nations agreed to a secret political-military accord in 1942 that not only allied Brazil with the United States during the war but forged what General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho called a Abrotherhood-of-arms that lasted for over thirty years after the conflict (Carvalho 1964, 437).¹¹

To coordinate military relations the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission in Washington D.C. and the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission were created. The functions of the Joint Board for the Defense of Northeast Brazil and the army and air mission functions passed to the two new commissions. While Brazilian and American members of the JBUSDC adjusted rapidly to formalized military relations, the JBUSMC suffered from early adjustment problems, most of which were the result of arrogant U.S. officers. Early chiefs of the U.S. Army section of the JBUSMC caused so many problems that they were reduced in rank and sent home in disgrace (Davis 1996, 30-36).¹²

Although the military relationship became regularized with the 1942 political-military agreement and the creation of the JBUSDC and the JBUSMC, personal diplomacy marked early ties between the two militaries. Especially important were relations between naval officers. Brazilians served aboard U.S. Navy vessels in the South Atlantic in World War I and the installation of a U.S. Navy mission in 1922 meant that Brazilian and American navy officers enjoyed closer personal ties than did their army counterparts. Those past links helped Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, commander of the U.S. South Atlantic Force, to negotiate basing rights for American ships engaged in convoy escort, in interception of enemy vessels, and in anti-submarine patrols. Ingram's relationship with Getúlio Vargas was so close that he became a personal and confidential advisor to the Brazilian president, gaining the

11 19 Political-Military Agreement Between the United States of Brazil and the United States of America, n.d., RG-218, Records of the JCS, CCS 334 (6-24-45), NA.

12 Caffery to Aranha, May 27, 1942; Discussions of the Political-Military Agreement, n.d.; Status of Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission, Note for the Record, January 4, 1946; General Hayes A. Kroner to Assistant Chief of Staff, Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission in Rio de Janeiro, November 26, 1942, RG-218, Records of the JCS, CCS 334 (6-24-45), NA.

jocular title of Sea Lord. Despite opposition to personal diplomacy by some in Washington who lacked knowledge of Brazilian culture, the approach was vital to creating close military bonds in the early period of the relationship.¹³ Once the activities of the JBUSDC and JBUSMC became systematized, high-level personal diplomacy receded.

Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy on August 22, 1942, and important segments of Brazil's officer corps and the Foreign Ministry envisioned an active role. Generals Eurico Dutra and Góes Monteiro, as well as many mid-ranked officers, believed sharing in combat would cement military relations, insure continued assistance, and place Brazil among the world powers. The JBUSDC and JBUSMC also supported the idea, but the U.S. General Staff balked, arguing that a Brazilian contingent would have no impact on the war's outcome. The decision, however, hinged upon diplomatic rather than military considerations. At a January 1943 meeting Vargas and Roosevelt agreed that Brazil would send troops into combat (Conn and Fairchild 1960, 328; McCann 1973, 345-346, 349).

The organization of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) and its participation in the Italian campaign solidified the military alliance but at the price of dependence on the United States. The JBUSDC coordinated training for Brazilian officers at U.S. military schools and the JBUSMC oversaw the preparation of the FEB division in Brazil. Arms and equipment were American. Brazilian political and military leaders decided that security and national greatness was best achieved through a partnership, albeit a junior one, with the United States. But before the war ended and the Brazilian troops returned home evidence of a changing relationship emerged (Carvalho 1952, 298-320; Sodré 1968, 286; McCann 1973, 343-377, 403-442; Moraes 1947).¹⁴

Most Brazilians and Americans expected close relations would continue after the conflict ceased. The 1944 extension of the air base agreement for another ten years reflected that belief. The United States thought the deal helped achieve its post-war security needs while Brazilian leaders saw the new arrangement as a basis for a strong alliance in which American economic and military assistance after the war would help develop the nation into the dominant force in Latin America. The greatness fabled would finally be

13 CIA Intelligence Reports, *Brazil*, SR-17, November 30, 1948 (HST-PSF-260), Harry S. Truman Library [hereafter cited as HSTL]; and Historical Division-Air Transport Command, *A History of the South Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command*, microfilm, NA.

14 Ao General Dutra com a palavra, *Correio da Noite*, April 3, 1945, 1.

achieved.¹⁵ An emerging political struggle over foreign policy control in the United States, however, portended changes in the relationship that few expected.

During the war bilateral arrangements drove U.S. military relations with Brazil. Military officials preferred that approach rather than the multilateralism espoused by the U.S. Department of State. Although the 1942 Rio Conference called for the creation of an Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) to coordinate a collective hemisphere defense, military opposition relegated the board to a minor role. Productive military diplomacy occurred on a bilateral basis and no changes were foreseen for the post-war period. Indeed, Brazil served as the model whereby Latin American militaries would be dependent through standardization of arms, doctrine, organization, and training along U.S. lines. Latin American militaries would act as surrogates for the United States. Multilateral agencies like the IADB were fine but only for achieving policy goals within the bilateral framework.¹⁶

The death of Franklin Roosevelt and the ascendancy of Harry S. Truman to the U.S. presidency changed the situation. Roosevelt relied on the military, but Truman deferred to the State Department on diplomatic issues. Indications of change occurred when Sumner Welles, the champion of regionalism and a Brazil supporter, lost a power struggle with Secretary of State to Cordell Hull, who favored internationalism and collective hemisphere defense. Brazil-U.S. military relations were the first to be affected. Bilateral military staff discussions yielded a plan in which large-scale American assistance to the army, navy, and air force would make the Brazilian military the largest and strongest in Latin America. U.S. Department of State officials, especially the new American ambassador to Brazil Adolf Berle, opposed the

15 H. L. Stimson to Secretary of State, January 14, 1944, Appendix AA, A.U.S. Requirements for Post-War Air Bases in Brazil, RG-218 JCS Geographic Files, 1942-1945, CCS 686.9 Brazil (2-14-44) Sec. 1, NA; Secretary of State Stettinus to Admiral William D. Leahy, December 20, 1944, RG-218 JCS Geographic Files, 1942-1945, CCS 676.3 Brazil (11-5-44); Leahy to Stettinus, February 24, 1944, RG-218 JCS Geographic Files, 1942-1945, CCS 686.9 Brazil (2-14-44), Sec. 1 A.U.S. Requirements of Post-War Air Bases in Brazil, Review of Reports on U.S. Military Base Requirements, February 11, 1946, RG-218 JCS Central Decimal File, 1946-1947, CCS 360 (12-9-42), Sec. 14, Appendix B, 391; and Colonel R.L. Vittrup, GSC to Department of State, May 28, 1946, RG-319, P&O Division Decimal File 1946-1948, 686 (Sec. IX) (Cases 36-470), Box 492, NA.

16 Draft Instructions for Staff Conversations with Military and Naval Representatives of the Other American Republics, July 28, 1944, RG-319 P&O Division Decimal File 1946-1948, Box 284, 334 JABOAR (Sec. I) (Cases 1-), NA; Matthew B. Ridgeway Papers, Box 13, Folder Eyes Only, January 5-September 1, 1949, United States Military History Institute (USMHI); and Child, *Unequal Alliance*, 74-77.

plan. Berle argued that the financial burden of purchase and maintenance of arms and equipment was unsustainable for the Brazilian economy and that technological change would rapidly make the arms and equipment obsolete (Elsey 1988, 360).¹⁷

Also impacted were the issues of Brazilian participation in Pacific operations against Japan and the creation of a hemisphere military staff as a basis for collective security as called for at the 1945 Chapultepec Conference. The Brazilian Joint General Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff understood that any decision to utilize Brazilian troops in the Pacific was political but they wanted no interference in military affairs. Bilateral defense deals under a collective defense umbrella remained the preferred mode of operation. Military leaders recognized that collective defense meant a change in which finite U.S. assistance would be diffused to more countries, with less available to Brazil.¹⁸

Proposals in Washington to dismantle all foreign military commissions after the war, including the JBUSDC and the JBUSMC, justified Brazilian fears. In response the JBUSMC issued Recommendation N.16, which called for the diminution of the JBUSDC and an increase in the responsibilities of the Rio commission. The Brazilian Government and the U.S. War and Navy Departments endorsed the proposal, but Góes Monteiro wished to keep the JBUSDC as the preeminent connection because its Washington location placed it closer to the source of assistance. Some members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff erroneously thought Góes Monteiro motives had more to do with prestige rather than substantive reasons (Mello 1946, 14-15).¹⁹

17 Berle to Byrnes, July 26, 1945, *FRUS* 1945, 600-620; Merwin L. Bohan (U.S. Commissioner, Joint-Brazil-U.S. Economic Commission, 1952-1953), oral history transcript, June 15, 1974, 20, HST Library [hereafter any oral history will be cited as Name, Oral History, date, page number, location]; Major General Kenner F. Hertford, Oral History, June 17, 1974, 12, HST Library.

18 President Vargas to President Truman, Subject Brazil Declaration of War on Japan, telegram 6/16/45, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official Files-80, Box No. 80, HST Library; Joseph C. Grew to Secretary of State, May 23, 1945 & Freeman Matthews to Secretary of State, May 30, 1945, RG-218 JCS Combined Chiefs of Staff Decimal File, 1942-1945, CCS 382 (5-21-45), NA; Thomas Mann, Oral History, n.d., 12-13, HST Library; and General K. F. Hertford to Chief of Staff, March 13, 1946, RG-319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 091 Brazil (Sec. I) (Cases 1-), NA.

19 Memo by Vice Admiral A. W. Johnson, August 14, 1945; Admiral E. J. King to Secretary of Navy James Forrestal, August 24, 1945, RG-218, JCS Combined Chiefs of Staff Decimal File, 1942-1945, CCS 300 (8-35-45, JCS 1485; Notes of 64th Meeting of the JBUSMC, August 3, 1945, RG-218, JCS Military Commissions, U.S.-Brazil, 33-29, DDC 1350, Visits, Box 1; Recommendation No. 16 (Rio), October 15, 1945; RG-218, JCS Military Commissions, U.S.-Brazil, 9010 (International Agreements, Political-Military Agreements), Box 3, Sec. 1-3; and Hertford to Chief of Staff, March 13, 1946, RG-319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-

The JCS clearly lacked knowledge of Brazilian culture and history. Brazilian foreign policy considers the past and future contexts, but U.S. policy too often focuses on the present. In the past Brazil allied with a powerful England to secure the nation and as a means to achieve *grandeza*, and now the United States fulfilled that role. Góes Monteiro's position reflected the traditional long view of relations while many U.S. leaders adhered to an episodic ideal. The war was a unique historical moment whose time had passed and, therefore, arrangements created due to immediate needs could be modified. As often happened, though, neither the desire of the JCS nor that of Góes Monteiro came to fruition. The JBUSDC was downgraded and the commission became a reward posting for Brazilian and American officers nearing retirement but it remained intact until the 1977 end of formal military ties. The JBUSMC expanded, absorbing many of the Washington commissions former duties.²⁰

The struggle for dominance created a confused U.S. post-war policy that bewildered the Brazilians. Members of the U.S. Congress and the Department of State who supported multilateralism took American economic and military hegemony for granted and sought to diminish Latin American military relations. Concerned that arms transfers might lead to an arms race and interregional conflict, this group sought to cut sales to the Latin American nations. The U.S. War and Navy Departments drew upon the wartime experience and wanted the Latin Americans, especially the Brazilians, to play a major role in hemisphere defense. Providing surplus war matériel to Brazil would achieve that goal (Kaplan 1975, 407-410; Malan 1984, 59).²¹

American foreign policy confusion had great implications for a changing Brazil. Although a palace coup in October 1945 ousted Vargas and placed Eurico Dutra (1946-1951) in Catete Palace, rising nationalism led many Brazilian military leaders to question and even oppose the U.S. connection. Brazil continued to support U.S. policies, but as Foreign Minister João Neves

1948, 091 Brazil (Sec. 10) (Cases1-), Box 59, NA; and Cel. Humberto Martins de Mello, AA reestruturação do exército, *A Defesa Nacional* 33:384 (May 1946):14-15; and Editorial, *A Defesa Nacional* 22:376 (September 1945): 5-8.

20 Interview by author with Lt. Colonel Daniel Mason, Military Liaison Office, United States Embassy, June 14, 1985, Brasília, Brazil; and Secretary of the Army to Secretary of Defense, November 7, 1949, Appendix, Current Status of the Military Aspects of Brazilian-American Relations, RG-218, JCS Central Decimal File, 1948-1950, CCS 091.73 (6-6-47), Sec. 1, NA.

21 Gen. Paul L. Freeman, Oral History, November 29, n.d., USMHI; Braden to Byrnes, December 16, 1946, *FRUS* 1946, 108-110; A. A. Berle to Harry S. Truman, June 25, 1945, White House Central Files, State Department Correspondence, 1945-1946, Box 33, Folder 4, CF-33, HST Library.

da Fontoura pointed out, it would be helpful if we knew just what is the policy. As the Cold War and U.S. anti-communism came into better focus, so too did the U.S. view of the Brazilian military's role in the new bipolar world. Brazil would be the key country in which bilateral arrangements existed under multilateral machinery. That view satisfied the government of Eurico Dutra and Brazil faithfully supported the U.S. anti-communist crusade, backing the 1947 American call for collective security of the hemisphere. The resulting Rio Treaty provided for such a system but did not alter bilateral Brazil-U.S. military ties.²²

Though voicing public support of collective defense, Brazilian military leaders privately expressed doubt that the special relationship could continue under the scheme. The Brazilian Joint General Staff sought to clarify matters and requested that the JBUSMC prepare a study on Brazil's defense role since the upcoming 1948 Bogotá Conference would deal with collective defense issues. Instead, the commission developed a complete strategic concept for Brazil that called for the continuance of wartime defense roles, including the maintenance of internal security and order, under a joint command agency. Although the American Joint Chiefs of Staff did not disagree with the areas of responsibility outlined for Brazilian forces, they opposed any mention of a command agency because it could prevent unilateral actions by the United States. Mainly, the JCS wanted *status quo* until a new framework of Brazil-U.S. military relations could be developed.²³

Still, U.S. Army leaders in 1948 planed an expanded role for Brazil's armed forces to include hemisphere intelligence and counterintelligence activity. The plan also called for U.S. assistance to develop two Brazilian army divisions trained to intervene in Latin American countries Ato maintain internal order, which would forestall the necessity for employing U.S. forces for this purpose with the resultant ill-feeling engendered toward the United States. Brazil would enforce U.S. policy while at the same time elevating its

22 Daniels to Byrnes, December 28, 1945; Byrnes to Daniels, December 31, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, 249-254, 622-623; La Guardia to Truman, Mission to Dutra's Inauguration, February 13, 1946, Subject Files, Foreign Affairs Brazil, PSF 171; William Pawley to George Marshall, February 6, 1947, William D. Pawley General File, PSF-133; and João Henrique, Speech on U.S.-Brazil Friendship on the Occasion of HST Visit to Chamber, 6-7, Trip Files, PSE, August 31-September 20, 1947, Box 103, Folder 2, HST Library.

23 The Role of Brazil in a Hemisphere Defense Scheme, Staff Study, U.S. Delegation JBUSMC, June 16, 1947; Ordway, Chief, Western Hemisphere Branch, OPS Group Plans & Operations, to U.S. Army Delegation JBUSMC, August 6, 1947; Lt. Col. Edward L. Austin, Secretary-JBUSMC, to Director, Plans & Operations, September 15, 1947, RG-319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 381 TS (Sec. V) (Cases81-90), NA.

national greatness as the arbiter of Latin American affairs. Thus, according to planners, Brazil could fulfill a long-cherished goal and the U.S. influence would continue.²⁴

Clearly, the Americans believed that arms dependence and influence meant unquestioned adherence to U.S. wishes. Lost on most American military leaders were Brazil's national goals, which often led to divergent positions. Two events in the early post-war period reflect such a notion. In 1947 the Brazilian military offered instructors to the Bolivian Higher War School. True to its allegiance, Brazil sought American approval before taking action. Surprisingly, the U.S. War Department objected despite assurances from the Bolivians that only American doctrine would be taught. A few months later a similar event occurred when Brazil and Paraguay agreed to replace the Brazilian cavalry mission that had been in the country since 1943 with a new mission. Again, the Americans rejected the idea from fear of losing influence. Brazil and Paraguay ignored U.S. opposition, the former because national objectives were at stake and the latter because of American arrogance.²⁵

Presumptions of a one-sided relationship blinded many American leaders to warnings about taking the military relationship for granted. A 1948 secret Central Intelligence Agency report pointed out that dependence did not deter independent action by Brazil where issues of national importance were concerned.²⁶ U.S. leaders understood that Brazil was the most important ally in the region but they failed to heed the CIA warning or grasp the distinctions that might arise between divergent national and, in the military case, institutional interests. Much in the manner that the post-war world divided into divergent ideological camps, so too did Brazilian society, including the military. The result was that military relations evolved at the same time the Brazilian military was redefining its role as an institution and in national and international life.

24 Troop Basis for Brazilian Army, Memo for the Record, June 10, 1948, RG-319, P&O Decimal File, 1949-Feb. 1950, 091 Brazil, Box 534 (Sec. 11) (Cases 21-), NA.

25 Col. Paul W. Steinbeck to U.S. Ambassador, April 2, 1947; Joseph Black to Secretary of State, April 7, 1947; Col. G. Ordway to Jack D. Neal, May 7, 1947, RG-319, P&O Decimal File 1946-1948, 350.1 (Sec.000) (Case 21), NA; Memo for the Record, July 30, 1947; Ordway to Department of State, October 13, 1947; and U.S. Embassy in Asunción to Secretary of State, January 5, 1948, RG-319 P&O Decimal File 1946-1948 (Army Staff), 091 Brazil (Sec.I) (Cases 1-), NA.

26 CIA Intelligence Reports, *Brazil*, SR-17, November 30, 1948, PSF-260, HST Library; and Visit of Salvador Cesar Obino, Brazilian Army, January 1947, Willis D. Crittenger Papers, Box AH, U.S. Army History Collection, USMHI.

Brazilians leaders also misjudged the effect of American domestic politics and the new U.S. role as one of the two superpowers. Though neither side realized it at first, changed conditions forced the maturation of the Brazilian nation and its military to a point where dependency could be shrugged off (Davis 2002, 11-29). The first step in the process came when the U.S. Congress failed to pass the Inter-American Cooperation Act under which Brazil expected to receive major military assistance. Even more important was U.S. rapprochement with Argentina that included the provision of arms aid. Though at odds during World War II, the Cold War meant Argentina's geographic position made it important in maintaining a southern ocean transit should the Panama Canal become inoperative. American military planners noted but ignored Brazilian opposition.²⁷

U.S. actions shocked the Brazilians, but the episode had long-term national benefits. The jolt pushed Brazil to approach military relations less emotionally and more pragmatically. General Salvador Cesar Obino, chief of the Armed Forces Joint Staff, linked Brazilian willingness to support the United States with the provision of military assistance. The 1949 Mutual Defense Act, however, allocated no arms assistance funds for Latin America; military hardware could only be purchased with cash. Training at U.S. military schools and bases was different. The U.S. Congress funded training and placed Brazil in the high priority category Group I, and many of the officers who played future leading roles in Brazil's military and political life attended those schools, including Eduardo Gomes, Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, and Ernesto Geisel.²⁸

More reflective of changed conditions were the negotiations for U.S. assistance in establishing the Escola Superior de Guerra. The idea first arose in 1946 in discussions between General Obino and General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Obino wanted active-duty U.S. officers from each service branch

27 Royall to Molina, June 4, 1948, *FRUS 1947*, 322; and Ridgeway to Bradley, July 28, 1949, Box 13, Official Papers Folder, Matthew B. Ridgeway Papers, USMHI.

28 Notes of Conference Between General Obino (Brazil) and General Eisenhower at 0930, December 4, 1946; RG-319, P&O Decimal File 1946-1948, Entry 154, Box 73, P&O Top Secret, P&O 337 TS (Sec. I) (Case 14), NA; Gen. T.S. Timberman, to Director, P&O General Staff-U.S. Army, July 12, 1948, RG-319, P&O Decimal File 1946-1948, 334 Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission (Sec. I) (Cases 1-), Box 284; Ridgeway Oral History, USMHI, 10-12; Training Foreign Nationals at U.S. Service Schools, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS, August 12, 1949, annex to Appendix A t enclosure A, RG-218 JCS Central Decimal File 1948-1950, CCS 353 (5-31-43), Sec 6, 566-567; and Adjutant General to Commandant AAF Special Staff School, June 7, 1946, RG-218, JCS Military Commissions, U.S.-Brazil, BOC 1300-1350, Visits-1-, BDC 3500-3520, Schools Book-1, 15-8, NA.

to create a school on the U.S. model with an American lieutenant general or higher as commandant. Creating the school under the JBUSMC would avoid extra costs and the need to negotiate a new agreement. The U.S. military supported the idea, believing that American tutelage would influence the politically important Brazilian officer corps positively. The problem was that U.S. law required a mission separate from the JBUSMC, and the Americans wanted to use retired personnel who would receive high salaries paid by Brazil. U.S. military leaders did not want a school based on the U.S. model; the Americans wanted a smaller school that combined the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, and the Industrial College (Davis 1996, 21-22).

The American position surprised Obino and the Brazilian military attaché in Washington, General Henrique Teixeira Lott. Lott's was especially shocked, since discussions about the project with U.S. military leaders left no clue of the American position. Both Obino and Lott believed the precedent of a French officer heading the Escola Maior do Exército and the Escola de Aperfeiçoamento in the early 1900's, and the relatively informal manner with which issues were dealt during the war would make the process simple. The U.S. position forced Brazil to adopt a formal approach that yielded agreement only after lengthy negotiations. Both sides reduced their demands and the ESG was established. Although U.S. influence permeated the school, the curriculum reflected a Brazilian reality.²⁹

After the ESG agreement military diplomacy settled into a pattern that remained the same throughout formalized ties. Institutional and national issues notwithstanding, the question of aid colored all military and political relations. With important exceptions, Brazilians always negotiated for greater amounts and better quality of military hardware at minimal cost while the Americans always provided just enough of the desired goods to maintain its dominance. Negotiations often strained the relationship without destroying it. The previous emotional attachment disappeared and was replaced by *quid pro quo* pragmatism. Negotiations for a U.S. missile-tracking station on Fernando de Noronha Island, a radio communications site in Maceió, a Long

29 Freeman to Mullins, January 13, 1950, RG-319, P&O Decimal File, 1949-February 1950, Entry 154, Box 200, 334 JBUSMC TS (Sec. I) (Case 1); Brig. Gen. Henrique Baptista Teixeira Duffles Lott to Foreign Liaison Officer, February 12, 1947; Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Chief of Staff, May 9, 1947, RG-319 P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, Box 332 (Sec. II) (Case 20 only) (Sub-Nos 1), NA; Comissão de Relações Públicas do Exército, *O seu exército* (N.p., 1967, 23; and Joffre Gomes da Costa, *Marechal Henrique Lott* (Rio de Janeiro: N.p., 1960), 201.

Range Navigation (LORAN) station in the Northeast, and for U.S. arms and equipment were emblematic of the new military diplomacy (Davis 1996, 147-161). These issues had little impact on Brazilian institutional or national integrity, so military diplomacy resembled business deals. American requests for Brazilian support in the Korean War, however, laid bare important national and institutional matters that affected military diplomacy.

Cold War leadership placed new demands on the United States that seemed to ignore the special relationship with Brazil. Articles in *A Defesa Nacional* that questioned the value of the American connection began to appear for the first time since the war. U.S. military leaders split, with some senior officers arguing for continued preeminence of Brazil in military relations while others rejected Brazilian criticism. The return of Getúlio Vargas to the presidency in the 1950 worried the Americans because of his nationalistic stance but none believed the military would allow him to eschew U.S. leadership in international affairs (Adelardo Filho 1950, 95-96; Sodré 1968, 304-355).³⁰ The erroneous and arrogant belief in Brazilian subservience became clear with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

U.S. officials believed Brazil would give unquestioned support in the Korean War. Arrogance blinded the Americans to developments in Brazil where ideological differences divided society over issues such as U.S. involvement in the petroleum industry and the dispatch of Brazilian troops to the Korean conflict. The Brazilian military was not immune from such trends. The officer corps split between the pro-American 'Sorbonne'³¹ group, headed by Castello Branco, and the nationalists, headed by Newton Estillac Leal and Nelson Werneck Sodré, who wanted to align with the Third World. A small group of leftist radical nationalists who laid the blame for the Korean War on the United States wanted to sever all ties with the Americans. The struggle within the officer corps had the potential of wrecking havoc on the institution. Similar struggles after the collapse of the monarchy had almost destroyed the army (Collação 1952, 1; McCann 2004, 1-63).³²

30 Dean Acheson, Memorandum for the President, May 1 and May 10, 1950, Dean Acheson Papers, Folder 22 Boxes 22 & 37; HSTL; Ridgeway to Bradley, July 28, 1949, Box 13, Official Papers Folder, Matthew B. Ridgeway Papers, USMHI; Dean Acheson, Effect in Brazil and Argentine Developments and Significance to Brazilian-American Relations of Possible Election of Vargas to Presidency, May 1, 1950, White House Central Files 37, Folder 22 Box, 22, HSTL.

31 Ironical expression to the Escola Superior de Guerra, used by his detractors in Brazil (Note the technical reviewer).

32 Memorandum by Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hicherson), Subject: Military Assistance for Korea, March 16, 1951, *FRUS* 1951, 1009; Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Milton

The internal struggle peaked with the publication of the anti-American article *A Considerations about the War in Korea* in the August 1950 issue of *A Defesa Nacional* authored by the anonymous Capitão X. Opposing sides soon spat forth accusations and counteraccusation in the military journal and in newspapers. The bitterness of the debate led Army minister General Canobret Pereira da Costa to transfer the most vocal nationalist officers to distant posts. Nevertheless, the pro-American National Security Council failed to reach a decision on the U.S. request for troops. Instead, Brazilian military and diplomatic officials sought large-scale economic and military aid, holding out the possibility of sending troops to Korea as the bait. Vargas even seemed to indicate that agreements on assistance would lead to participation in the conflict.³³

Vargas sent Góes Monteiro to Washington to discuss possible Brazilian participation in Korea. Góes Monteiro made clear that any deal was contingent on the success of Minister of Finance Horacio Lafer mission to obtain economic assistance, to the linking of hemisphere defense to Korea, and to arms aid. When Lafer succeeded in obtaining all he sought and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to Góes conditions, draft agreements were created. Included in the drafts were provisions for the creation of industries destined to play vital roles in Brazil's future economic development and military independence. Articles 5 and 6 granted Brazil technical aid and licenses for the development of local arms and munitions industries, and aid and licenses for the development of aircraft and naval industries. Despite the draft agreements and American promises, Vargas and important segments of the Brazilian military chose not to send troops to Korea. U.S. refusal to specify the types and amounts of aid and the divisions among the Brazilian military and political elite offered no advantages (Davis 1996, 26-28).

Attempts to shore up military ties came with a new military accord in 1952 that was made possible by the 1951 Mutual Security Act, which allowed

Barall of the Office of South American Affairs, Subject: Request for Assignment of Chilean Troops to Korea, April 7, 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 1275; Vargas fixa os rumos do futuro governo, *O Jornal*, November 5, 1950, 1-2.

33 Ten. Cel. Riograndino da Costa e Silva, O comunismo e as forças armadas, *A Defesa Nacional* 38:437 (December 1950): 115-117; Solon Lopes de Oliveira, Uma opinião, *A Defesa Nacional* 38:444 (July 1951): 128; A política externa e as forças armadas, *Correio da Manhã*, December 7, 1950, sec. 2, 1; O Brasil e a situação internacional, *Correio da Manhã*, December 9, 1950, sec. 2, 2; Economic and Military Cooperation Between Brazil and the United States, April 5, 1951, Dean Acheson Papers, Box 66, HSTL; Truman to Vargas, April 9, 1951, White House Central Files 38, Folder 36, Box 38, HSTL; and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller) to Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgeway), August, 10, 1951, *FRUS 1951*, 1211-1212.

American grant and sale military aid to Latin America through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Based upon the draft agreement on hemisphere defense, the 1952 accord included Articles 5 and 6 but made no mention of Brazilian troops for Korea. Still, the debate in Brazil over ratification of the new arrangement caused as much divisiveness as did the issue of Korea. Both Vargas Labor Party (PTB) and the pro-U.S. National Democratic Union Party (UDN) opposed the accord. Nationalist officers also argued against a new arrangement, which made the issue central in the 1952 elections for Clube Militar leadership. The split over the accord so worried Góes Monteiro that he urged Vargas to remove it from the ratification process. The advantages of the deal, however, outweighed the disadvantages and the Brazilian congress ratified the treaty. Nevertheless, Brazil refused to send Brazilian troops to Korea (Coutinho 1956, 517; Moniz Bandeira 1989, 25-48; Weis 1993, 45-46; Sodré 1968, 323).³⁴

The accord saved the brotherhood-of arms but did not recreate the previous closeness. Brazil attempted to restore relations to earlier levels with a proposal to create a new joint defense board staffed by military and diplomatic representatives. Agreement was reached quickly but before formal notes could be exchanged bickering between the U.S. State and Defense Departments over the name and inclusion of diplomats affected matters. The issue became embroiled in the JBUSMC Recommendation No. 18, a \$50 million plan to expand the Brazilian Army, Navy, and Air Force with U.S. arms, ships, and planes. Other matters such as U.S. desires to build a communications station at Maceió, to continue operation of the naval radio station in Recife; to construct a missile-tracking station on Fernando de Noronha Island, and to build a Long Range Radar Navigation (LORAN) site in the northeast impacted relations as well (Davis 1996, 141-148).

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff killed the idea of a new defense board; the JBUSDC and the JBUSMC remained as the main agencies in Brazil-United States military relations. At the same time the U.S. Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that expansion of the Brazilian military was unrealistic and refused to approve the JBUSMC plan. Opposition to the new defense board made Brazilian leaders unhappy, but American refusal to provide the means for military expansion caused even greater anger. Ambassador João Carlos Muniz pressured the Department of State on the

34 Memorandum by Under Secretary of State to Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, First Progress Report on NSC 144/1, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, July 23, 1953, *FRUS 1952-1954*, 20.

diplomatic front while Admiral Renato de Almeida Guilhobel threatened to downsize the U.S. Navy Mission staff, to withdraw support of the U.S. Navy operated radio station in Recife, and to delay naval base improvements desired by the Americans. Implied was that all U.S. militarys objectives in Brazil were in jeopardy. Only after the United States promised to examine the Brazilian requests for arms and equipment did discussions on the missile-tracking and radio and radar stations commence. Those talks highlighted the price of failure to create a new board and to expand the Brazilian military, for Brazil's stance became harder and the cost to the United States greater.³⁵

U.S. officials first broached the idea of a missile-tracking station on Fernando de Noronha Island and a communication center in Maceió in 1952, but the unsettled Brazilian political situation prevented discussions until 1956 when Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1956-1961) became president of Brazil. By 1956 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff understood that previous attitudes endangered the relationship and they approved Recommendation No. 18, even increasing the amount of military aid. Damaged relations now became apparent. Brazilian military leaders insisted that the amount of aid and delivery time were inadequate and they made clear that any arrangement rested on a quid pro quo deal; the amount and quality of assistance would determine acceptance of the U.S. proposals.³⁶

The United States disliked quid pro quo and argued that dissatisfaction over assistance should be discussed after agreement on the Fernando de Noronha station. Protracted negotiations resulted, which gave nationalists in the Brazilian military and in congress time to mount a campaign against any agreement on the grounds of increased dependency and danger from a Soviet attack. Talks stalled until Eisenhower sent a personal note to Kubitschek promising maximum Brazilian participation at the station, except in classified areas, and serious U.S. consideration of assistance requests. Eisenhower promises and Kubitschek's intervention eased nationalist fears

35 Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, July 12, 1954, *FRUS 1952-1954*, 652-657; Report by the Chairman, U.S. Delegation, Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission to Joint Chiefs of Staff on Proposed Combined Meeting of JBUSDC and JBUSMC, September 18, 1956, RG-218, JCS Geographic Decimal File, 1954-1956, Box 11, CCS 092.2 Brazil (1-11-49), Sec. 6, NA.

36 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Deputy Under Secretary of State, July 29, 1956; Under Secretary of State to Deputy Secretary of Defense, June 9, 1955; Briggs to Department of State, December 18, 1956, *FRUS 1955-1957*, 222, 229, 288, 715, & 731-732; Siracusa to Briggs, May 2, 1958, RG-59, Records of the Department of State, Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), 32.1.1, Folder 1, Box 3, Lot 62D308, NA; and Wilson to Dillon, Increased Military Assistance to Brazil, n.d., RG-59, Records of the Department of State, Micro. 1511, Roll 8, NA.

and in January 1957 an agreement was reached under the umbrella of the 1952 Military Accord.³⁷

Under Article 6 of the Fernando de Noronha deal the United States promised to examine new defense roles for the Brazilians that would entail an increase in military assistance. Both sides agreed that bargaining over Article 6 and negotiations for the Maceió radio station and the LORAN sites would take place simultaneously but on separate tracks. Article 6 was to be dealt with on a military level by the JBUSDC and JBUSMC while military and diplomatic officials conducted talks on the radio and radar stations. Before discussions began two incidents occurred that indicated the new relationship. In the first Foreign Minister Macedo Soares leaked news of the American proposals for the radio and radar sites, and for expansion of the Military Transport System (MATS) facilities. The Americans became angry over the leak because the secret talks were now made public, subjecting them to greater opposition (Leite Filho 1957, 20).³⁸

The second incident caused an uproar in the Brazilian officer corps. Eisenhower 1956 letter to Kubitschek made clear that Brazilian access to the missile-tracking station would be limited to non-classified areas. Article 4 of the agreement on the station, however, stated that Brazilian technicians and military personnel would assist the U.S. commanded base and Article 5 implied joint operations, with Brazilians gradually replacing American technicians. Problems arose when the U.S. Air Force liaison officer told the G-2 of the Brazilian Army General Staff that participation would only be allowed in non-technical operations. Military officials accused the United States of reneging on its agreement. The only reason the high command supported the arrangement, they claimed, was the training available through joint operations and the future passing of the base to Brazilian control. Military leaders also hoped the deal would lead to the provision of NIKE missiles they wished to place in the Northeast. The issue became moot in mid-1957 when a U.S. military review determined that technological advances made the missile-tracking station unnecessary. U.S. personnel withdrew and were replaced by Brazilians, but the Americans retained access rights to the base should the situation warrant it.³⁹

37 Briggs to Secretary of State, January 22, 1958; Wilson to Dillion, April 23, 1958, RG-59 Records of the Department of State, Micro. 1511, Roll 8, NA.

38 Memorandum of Conversation, February 25, 1957 and Chair, USDEL JBUSMC to JCS, April 9, 1957, RG-59 Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), Box 3, Folder 5, Lot 62D308, NA.

39 Chair, USDEL JBUSMC to JCS, April 9, 1957; Sayre to Siracusa, April 18, 1957; JCS to USDEL JBUSMC, May 15, 1957; Memorandum for William Briggs, Brazilian Affairs Desk, June 21, 1957; William F. Sandusky, Major, USAF, AFMTC Liaison Officer, to General

Affects of the Fernando de Noronha station deal reverberated in subsequent talks on the Maceió and LORAN sites. Some Brazilians viewed negotiations on the stations as a crossroads in Brazil-U.S. relations. Brazil would not link economic aid to military assistance, but the level of military aid was important. Although Article 6 of the missile-tracking station agreement had not offered specifics, Brazilian military leaders accepted the deal because it gave them claim on additional hardware. Those leaders were not willing to make the same mistake in discussions on the Maceió and LORAN stations, and on Article 6 aid. Acceptance of any deal required greater assistance than provided for in the MAP program. The military could prevent ratification of any agreement, so if the United States wished to obtain the sites it would have to pay the Brazilian price.⁴⁰

Complications marred negotiations from the outset. U.S. negotiators wanted to hold the talks in Rio de Janeiro under the auspices of the JBUSMC while the Brazilians wanted to conduct discussions in Washington away from potential opposition. Brazil also wanted to make any agreements on Article 6 aid and the radio and radar stations part of the 1952 Accord in order to avoid congressional ratification and to blunt charges of U.S. dominance. U.S. officials refused to budge on the location and sought to separate the radio and radar stations talks from Article 6 negotiations. As an incentive, the Americans stressed the value of the radar sites to Brazilian air and sea navigation, and offered to create a signal corps school in conjunction with the radio station. Brazil accepted the American position not only because of the school offer but also due to the knowledge that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff planned a reduction in 1959 MAP assistance.⁴¹

While the Brazilians understood that the relationship and national politics could not be separated, the Americans misread the political impact of the missile-tracking deal on other negotiations. Kubitschek's use of the 1952

Honorato Pradel, President, COPANE, and Commander 4th Army, AStatement Concerning Reduction of Station, June 7, 1957, RG-59, Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), 1956-1957, Box 3, Folder 5, Lot 62D308, NA; and Briggs to Secretary of State, April 2, 1957, RG-59, General Records of the Department of State, 1955-1959, Micro. 1511, Roll 8.

40 Transcript of Meeting, Meeting of Brazilian and United States Representatives in Regard to Agreements for an Army Communications Facility at Maceió and Three Coast Guard LORAN Stations, May 9, 1959, RG-59, Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), Ibid.

41 Memorandum of Conversation, February 25, 1957 & May 6, 1957, RG-59, Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), Ibid.; Memeorandum for the Secretary of Defense, February 19, 1957, & May 7, 1957, RG-218, JCS Geographic Decimal File, 1954-1956, Box 11, Folder Ccs 092.2 Brazil (1-11-49), Sec. 8, NA; and Briggs to Department of State, July 18, 1957, *FRUS* 1955-1957, 284-285 & 757-759.

accord to outmaneuver opponents for the Fernando de Noronha agreement led the major Brazilian political parties to oppose further military arrangements. Nationalists in the Brazilian Congress and military were able to force the Itamaraty to shelve a U.S. survey for the proposed radio station and to require that military agreements be ratified by congress rather than operate under the 1952 accord. By August 1957 U.S. officials recognized that political opposition in Brazil was too great and that technological advances and available sites in Puerto Rico meant protracted negotiations with uncertain outcomes could be avoided. As a result, in January 1958 the United States dropped its request for the Maceió radio station and for the LORAN sites.⁴²

Brazil-United States military relations reached their lowest point in the last few years of the fifties decade. Disillusionment grew, leading to distrust by many on both sides. American officials considered Brazilian demands excessive, particularly since Brazil received the lion share of U.S. military aid in the hemisphere. Nationalistic feelings, a desire for an independent foreign policy, and a belief that the United States was stalling on Article 6 aid caused an increasing number of Brazilian officers to question the alliance. Some believed that Brazil-United States relations were beyond repair.⁴³

Discussions on Article 6 assistance began in June 1957, but the state of the relationship precluded any progress. Brazil asked for \$600 million worth of arms and equipment, claiming need due to increased defense responsibilities. U.S. representatives dismissed the claim and argued that the amount requested was excessive. Perhaps recognizing that the relationship was close to disintegrating, each side made concessions. Over Department of State objections, the U.S. Department of Defense agreed to provide electronic equipment for a newly purchased Brazilian aircraft carrier. At the same time, Brazil consented to U.S. requests to expand the MATS air bases in Belém and Natal, to increase MATS traffic, and to increase American support personnel at the bases. The concessions cost each little but had great impact. In May 1958 the two sides agreed that Brazil would receive \$87.1 million in military

42 Siracusa to Sayre, March 21, 1957; Siracusa to Rubottom, July 23, 1957; Siracusa to Wallner, August 1, 1957; Siracusa to Briggs, December 4, 1957; and Memorandum for the Chief Signal Officer, Status of Negotiations for Base Rights for ACAN TROPACON Station in Brazil, n.d., RG-59 Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), Box 3, Folder 1, NA.

43 Wallner to Siracusa, July 25, 1957, RG-59, Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), Ibid.; Briggs to Secretary of State, February 1, 1958, April 23, 1958 & May 5, 1958, RG-59, General Records of the Department of State, 1955-1959, Micro. 1511, Roll 8, NA; and Memorandum of Conversation, President Eisenhower and Ambassador Peixoto, March 12, 1957, *FRUS* 1955-1957, 754-755.

aid over a three-year period and that the United States would obtain its MATS desires (Weis 1987, 201-202; Kaplan 1975, 414).⁴⁴

Neither Brazil nor the United States had been satisfied with the relationship since the Korean War period. Institutional, national, and international developments had strained ties, but the military relationship adapted and survived. New challenges threatened military ties in the 1960s, but events of the 1950s indicated that Brazil was maturing militarily and politically.

U.S. studies in the late-1950s questioned the value of the Military Assistance Program. New emphasis on economic aid and national development as a means of eliminating the allure of communism emerged but expanded military aid remained the hallmark of the world ideological struggle. The primary use of that aid was for defense from external forces on the land or on and under, the seas. Vice-President Richard Nixon's disastrous trip to South America in 1958, Fidel Castro's successful 1959 revolution in Cuba, and the Soviet support for Awaras of national liberation caused the United States to refocus the use of military aid in the 1960s. At the same time many Brazilian military and political leaders endorsed the drive by President Jânio da Silva Quadros (1961) and General Antônio de Souza Junior to reach out to the Third World and communist countries with a more independent foreign policy. The idea was not new but achieved greater expression now (Souza Junior 1959, 285; Rabe 1988, 107-108; Dantas 1962).⁴⁵

American planners considered the Latin American militaries the only truly functioning national institutions in the region and believed that much of U.S. arms and training aid could be redirected toward civic development and internal defense. Anti-guerilla training by U.S. instructors became one of the more prominent ideas espoused. Still, when John F. Kennedy entered the White House heavy emphasis was placed on economic aid to stabilize Latin America and to remove the attraction of communism. Thus, the multi-billion dollar Alliance for Progress economic aid program was born. The

44 Negotiations for Defense Sites Agreement with Brazil, June 29, 1956, RG-59, Office of East Coast Affairs (Brazil), 1956-1957, Box 4 Folder 5, Lot 62D308, NA; Memorandum of Conversation, Military Aid for Brazil Electronic Equipment for Aircraft Carrier, March 20, 1958, RG-59, Micro. 1511, Roll 8, NA.

45 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Mutual Security Act of 1960*, Report 1286, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, 6-9; U.S. Congress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, Report 354, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, 6-8; CIA, *Brazil*, November 30, 1948, S-17, President's Secretary File, Central Intelligence Reports Situation Reports, Box 260, HSTL.

problem for Kennedy was that economic development required a stability that communist-inspired guerilla movements prevented. As a result, in December 1961 Kennedy ordered the incorporation of civic action into MAP aid. Included were training programs in internal security for Latin American police, paramilitary, and military forces, and for training middle-grade and senior Latin American officers at U.S. counterinsurgency schools in Panama and North Carolina (Levinson and Onis 1970, 48-50; Langley 1969, 351; Paterson 1978, 193-212).⁴⁶

As the United States closest military partner Brazil was to be the model. The Kennedy administration believed the internal security program would strengthen Brazil-U.S. ties and that Brazilians could act as surrogates for similar programs in Africa. Civic action and counterinsurgency were not new ideas to the Brazilians; the concepts had been the subject of discussions at the ESG and the ECEME long before the United States provided aid to put theory into practice. That practice became glaringly clear when the political crisis in Brazil precipitated by the abrupt resignation of Jânio Quadros and the move to the far political left by his successor João Goulart (1961-1964) resulted in the 1964 military coup (Stepan 1971, 126-127, 210-211).⁴⁷

The role of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the 1964 coup is well known, but the impact of military ties is fuzzy. U.S. willingness to provide the conspirators arms and ammunition, fuel, and communications through the secret Brother Sam operation could not have occurred without logistical coordination from American military personnel in Brazil, and the most likely group was the U.S. section of the JBUSMC. U.S. Military Attaché Vernon Walters, the former liaison officer with the FEB in World War II and close friend with the leading Brazilian officers, was aware of coup planning and offered advice. No evidence indicates that JBUSMC contacts in key non-military agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance, Vehicle Registration, Chief of Police, Director of Traffic, Inspector of Customs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had any impact on the coup planning. It is certain that key conspirators received training at service schools in the United States or in

46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Action Memorandum 119:Civic Action, *Counterinsurgency Bluebook Fiscal Year 1966*, November 15, 1966, DDRS 242-D, 1-3, 41-42, Library of Congress [hereafter cited as LC]; U.S. Congress, Senate, *United States Policies and Programs in Brazil*, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., May 4, 5, & 11, 1971, 86-88; President's Talking Paper, President Kennedy Papers, NSF Countries Brazil, 3/16/62-3/31/62, Box 11-13, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library [hereafter cited as JFKL].

47 Brazil as an Instrument of Western Influence in Africa, n.d., President Kennedy Papers, NSF Countries Brazil, 6/61-7/61, Box 11-13, JFKL.

Brazil, and had served or were serving on the JBUSMC (Moniz Bandeira 1989; Dreifuss 1981).⁴⁸

The removal of Goulart and the installation of General Humberto Castello Branco in the presidency, and U.S. support for the coup, reaffirmed military relations but did not stop the move toward independent foreign policies. The coup, in many ways, represented the pen-ultimate step in Brazil's military maturation. A new confidence permeated the Brazilian officer corps, which only increased when Brazil cooperated with the United States in the Dominican Republic crisis in 1965. In essence, by 1965 the Brazilian military no longer needed the tutorship of its American brothers-in-arms.

When civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, President Lyndon Johnson unilaterally intervened by sending U.S. paratroops to the troubled nation. Johnson only went to the Organization of American States (OAS) for approval and participation of a regional military force after criticism of U.S. actions. The United States made special efforts to obtain Brazilian support, and its willingness to aid the in the 1964 coup now paid dividends. In May the OAS authorized the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Over American objections the OAS named Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim overall commander. The IAPF had two elements, with one part comprised of U.S. troops and the other one made up of a Latin American Brigade dominated by Brazilian forces. Although there were troops from other Latin American countries, the force composition and command meant the intervention was an almost exclusive Brazilian and American affair (Moniz Bandeira 1989, 141-157; Slater 1970; Walters 1978, 400; Viana Filho 1975, 434; Mattos 1967, 40-41).⁴⁹

When Alvim arrived in the Dominican Republic an immediate clash with the U.S. commander General Bruce Palmer arose. Palmer objected to Alvim's direct command of American troops and the naming of a Latin American officer chief of staff of all IAPF forces. Alvim and Palmer also butted heads when the United States attempted to remove troops after a peace agreement

48 See Luíz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *O Governo João Goulart: As lutas sociais no Brasil*, Rene A Dreifuss, 1964: *A conquista do estado; ação política, poder, e golpe de classe*, Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution*, Jan Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil*, and CIA reports in the U.S. Library of Congress. Also see Testimony of General George S. Beatty, in U.S. Senate, *United States Policies and Programs in Brazil*, 56; General Geogre R. Mather, Oral History, January 1972, 1972 and General Paul L. Freeman, Oral History, November 30, 1973, USMHI.

49 Cel. Inf. (QUEME).

between the Dominican military and the constitutionalist forces seemed imminent. Fearing withdrawal of U.S. troops would lead to renewed conflict, Alvim refused to release the American soldiers, an act that angered Palmer and the Johnson administration. Only after the Dominican provisional president Hector García-Godoy pleaded for the U.S. troops to remain did the Americans relent (Yates 1988, 149-153).⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the Alvim-Palmer conflict had yet to reach its zenith.

In January 1966 rebellious Dominican soldiers threatened to overturn the carefully brokered peace. García-Godoy requested that the OAS Ad Hoc Committee, which was in charge of the Dominican operation, order the IAPF to quell the disturbance. Rather than order Alvim to take action, the committee only asked that he do so. Alvim declined the request because he distrusted García-Godoy. De facto committee chairman Ellsworth Bunker, with the support of the OAS Council, forced Alvim to act. Bunker later traveled secretly to Brazil to obtain Alvim's dismissal. Castello Branco agreed but only if Palmer too was removed. As OAS operations wound down a new American general replaced Palmer and Major General Alvaro Alves da Silva Braga took command of the IAPF.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Alvim's action offered another indication of Brazil's military maturity.

Brazil-U.S. operations in the Dominican intervention represented the highwater mark in the post-war military relationship. Though still joined by the Military Accord, the Brazilian military was no longer a satellite of the United States. Brazil's refusal to send air force, army, and navy personnel to help the United States in the Vietnam War indicated that fact. The potential for high casualty rates, domestic opposition, financial costs, and a lack of United Nations sanctions made participation in Southeast Asia unattractive. Brazil supported U.S. efforts publically and privately but despite a scheme by Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry Pío Correa to trade naval aid for gradual entry into the war, there was never serious consideration of participation. The Johnson government did not press the issue or take Correa's scheme seriously because it wanted to avoid quid pro quo negotiations. Besides, the cost of the Vietnam War led to reduced MAP aid to many countries, including Brazil. Brazil sent a small medical detachment to South Vietnam and one thousand

50 General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Oral History, January 6, 1976, 179, 184, 187, USMHI; Palmer to Vernon Walters, April 26, 1966, ADominican Republic Fact Sheets, Bruce Palmer, Jr. Papers, USMHI.

51 CIA, Biographic Register, Commander Designate of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), December 1965, DDRS 15-1, LC; and Slater, *Ibid.*, 98, 138-149, 152.

bags of coffee, both of which had minimal impact. Although Brazil had the largest number of teams at the U.S. Counterinsurgency Mobile Training program in Panama, and the Agency for International Development trained Brazilian military personnel in police techniques, none were sent to Vietnam (Huggins 1991, 219-242).⁵²

Two factors affected Brazil-United States military relations in the mid to late-1960s. The first was Brazil's independent and nationalistic foreign policy under the presidency of Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969). Since Costa e Silva had not been a member of the FEB or the ESG group, he had no special attachment to the U.S. military connection. Costa e Silva also began a process of removing Brazil from dependence on the United States for military goods. From 1968 to 1972 Brazil purchased nearly 500 million dollars worth of European military equipment that normally would have been bought from the United States. The second factor that impacted military relations was a large scale reduction of U.S. operations in Latin America that weakened the brotherhood. In Brazil, the plan known as Operation Topsy reduced American military personnel by forty-seven percent between June 1966 and January 1972. The plan also called for the gradual phasing out of grant military aid. After 1968 Brazil received no new grant military aid from the United States. Grant training and military missions remained the same and personal contact remained close between U.S. and Brazilian officers, but the brotherhood of arms was an empty shell (Fishlow 1982, 906; Tuthill 1972, 63-65, 69-85).⁵³

Termination of grant aid had enormous national consequences for Brazil. For many years the military sought to remove itself from foreign arms dependence. The end of military hardware from the United States helped push Brazil into creating an indigenous arms industry. In 1969 Brazil founded the Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica, a national aircraft construction industry and in 1975 the Indústria do Material Bélico was created to coordinate the production of military equipment. By 1976 Brazilian military equipment could be found at conflict points in Africa and the Middle East; Brazil became one of the world's largest arms and equipment exporters and a major provider of arms to the Third World. In a sense, Brazil had reached greatness. For all practical purposes development of the arms industry spelled the useful end of the military accord. The JBUSDC and JBUSMC became non-entities,

52 Department of State, Background Paper, Brazil and Vietnam, January 23, 1967, in *Visit of President Costa e Silva of Brazil, January 25-27, 1967*, DDRS-199B, LC.

53 Department of State to Brazil, October 26, 1964, DDRS 184-F, LC.

with military relations conducted through a variety of other military agencies (Mattos 1977, 142; Oliveira 1949, 69; Briggão 1979, 22-28).

Military relations remained low-key until a dispute over atomic energy brought ties to another ebb in the early 1970s. Brazil had been developing nuclear capabilities for energy and military purposes since the 1950s. Because of close ties, the United States aided Brazil in the development of its nuclear program until India exploded an atomic bomb in 1974. The event frightened the United States into refusing to provide Brazil already paid for enriched uranium fuel, an action that angered military and political leaders. President Richard Nixon tried to repair the damaged relationship by transferring naval vessels to Brazil and by facilitating the sale on credit of supersonic jet fighter aircraft. More importantly, Nixon, and his successor Gerald Ford, did not stand in the way of a 1975 deal Brazil made with a West German company for the construction of nuclear reactors and enriched fuel-processing plants. Nixon and Ford's efforts only briefly mollified Brazil, for when James E. Carter entered the U.S. presidency the stage was set for the end of formal ties (Mainwaring 1984, 57; Gugliamelli 1976, 8; Gorman 1979, 57).⁵⁴

During the last years of the Ford presidency the U.S. Congress passed the Harkin Amendment, a law that tied receipt of U.S. military assistance to human rights. While Ford ignored the law, his successor Jimmy Carter enforced it with zeal. In 1977 the Department of States first report singled out Brazil for criticism. Reaction among Brazil's political and military leaders, including opposition groups, was swift. Carter already had raised Brazilian ire when his government pressured Brazil to halt its nuclear program and attempted to force West Germany to repudiate its deal on facilities construction. Nationalist feelings emerged among a wide segment of the Brazilian population, and on March 11, 1977 Brazilian diplomatic officials informed the United States that the 1952 military accord would be canceled. The following September Brazil terminated the U.S. Navy Mission, its participation on the JBUSMC, and an agreement on joint aerial mapping. Under the accord's procedures, the JBUSMC continued its work for another four years to process aid already in the pipeline, but the formal Abrotherhood-of-arms was dead.⁵⁵

54 Embaixada do Brasil Washington, Visita do Presidente Emílio Garrastazú Médici aos Estados Unidos da América, 7 a 9 de Dezembro de 1971, *Discursos do Presidente do Brasil e comunicado conjunto* (No pub. data), 2.

55 Nabuco aplaude; Brasil denuncia acordo militar; and Carlos Prado, O fim do acordo militar, *Opinão*, March 18, 1977, 5; and U.S. Congress, House, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International Relations*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., June 27-28, July 19-20, & August 2, 9, 1978, 77-78.

Small-scale military to military ties remained close, but the debacle of the Carter presidency caused great wariness of any U.S. connection. Relations were such that when Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in 1980 President João Baptista Figueriedo did not offer the traditional victory congratulations. Brazil, however, was an important part of Reagan's struggle against the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration dropped the human rights condition for receipt of U.S. military assistance and gave Brazil a special case exemption on the purchase of nuclear fuel without the safeguards required of other customers. Reagan also named former U.S. Air Force officer Langhorne Motely ambassador to Brazil and provided a \$1 billion emergency bridge loan to the government. Relations under Reagan warmed to the point that in 1982 the two nations formed a joint military study group and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Military Industry in 1984 that called for intelligence sharing, military doctrine exchanges, and transference of sophisticated American technology to the Brazilian arms industry. The Reagan administration sought a new military accord, but the Brazilian military declined the proposal (Hirst 1986, 100-101).⁵⁶

Reagan's successor Bill Clinton did nothing to change Brazil-U.S. military ties. To be sure, Clinton did not have the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union to burden him, but the new challenge of drug trafficking emerged that continues to drive much of Brazil-U.S. military relations. The Clinton administration pressured for military involvement in the drug war, but Brazilian military leaders were reluctant to redefine their mission. Matters changed by the time George Bush, Jr. entered the White House. Colombian guerillas and drug traffickers began using the border areas of Brazil, which led to deals to enhance security. In 1997 the U.S. financed \$1.4 billion Amazon Vigilance System (SIVAM) radar project that the Brazilian military uses to track guerilla movements and drug traffickers. In 2001 Brazil accepted a \$26.1 million security assistance package to keep guerillas and drug traffickers out of the Amazon region. Essentially, Brazil militarized the drug war as the Clinton administration desired but not because the United States wanted it. Rather, the spilling of drug and guerilla activities into Brazilian territory was an attack on national sovereignty.⁵⁷

56 Howard J. Wiarda, *American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 80s and 90s: Issues and Controversies from Reagan to Bush* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 25; *New York Times*, January 4, 1981, A-7; October 16, 1981, A-3; & February 7, 1984, A-3.

57 *New York Times*, June 20, 1999, part 5 sec. 4; October 30, 2000, A-1; and My 17, 2001, A-12.

Military education continued to be an important area of contact between the Brazilian and American militaries despite the end of formal ties. U.S. military personnel attended Brazilian courses at the ECEME, the Centro de Operações da Selva e Ação de Commando, and the Estado Maior do Exército. Brazilian military personnel attended a variety of U.S. service schools, taught Portuguese at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and provided liaison at the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff School. Brazilians made up the largest contingent of Latin American officers at the Inter-American Defense College in the 1990s. In addition, joint naval exercises in the South Atlantic under UNITAS remained after the demise of formal relations. Almost all these points of contact between the Brazilian and United States militaries continue today.⁵⁸

The end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries brought the challenge of terrorism that promises to affect Brazil-U.S. military relations. The degree to which the rise of world-wide terrorism impacts the Western Hemisphere will undoubtedly determine the manner in which military relations evolve. It is doubtful that a new military accord will result, but the adaption to changing events that has marked Brazil-U.S. military ties since 1945 will continue.

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58 Unitas preserva segurança e solidifica pan-americanismo, *Revista do Clube Militar* 172:44 (February 1970): 20-23; author interview, source wishes to remain unnamed, Inter-American Defense College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1989; and author interview with Lt. Colonel Daniel Mason, Military Liaison Office, United States Embassy, Brasília, Brazil, June 14, 1985.

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From the Good Neighbor policy to the Iron Curtain: politics and cinema in Brazil-US relations in the mid-20th century¹

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Introduction

In the mid-20th century, the ties between Washington and Hollywood revealed a degree of ambiguity as regards the film industry and its relationship with politicians, particularly given the backdrop of US involvement in World War II. Entertainment and political propaganda seemed worlds apart and yet, when we observe the periods when US public opinion needed to be mobilized, we see in fact that the two did in fact go hand in hand.

The film industry in the United States used different strategies to coordinate efforts to deliver the political message, a market strategy that utterly transformed the discourse of power into a lucrative product for consumption. Entertainment and profit were the two sides of the political

¹ My thanks go to Professor Ana Maria Mauad (UFF) for her valuable contributions to the text. Obviously, I assume full responsibility for any inaccuracies and omissions in this work.

coin minted by the film industry. Nevertheless, a number of individuals and their expectations and susceptibilities clashed in the 1940s and 1950s in the political game of international relations, which showed that what won over US public opinion did not always do the same in other countries.

The objective of this chapter is thus to study how the Second World War became a massive testing ground in terms of propaganda and cinema over two successive periods in time.² The first period concerns the experiments carried out under the Good Neighbor Policy. These were adopted under the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration (1939-1946) as a way of controlling the western hemisphere, particularly “the other American republics”, as the countries making up Central and South America, including Mexico, were labeled by the US administration using this symbolic geography. The second period covers the Cold War, the policy shift following the Allied victory and the gradual polarization of the world between the USA and the USSR against the threat of a nuclear war.

We shall evaluate both periods, firstly by looking at the development of political strategies that the industry implemented in cinematographic production and how they relate to regulations imposed by the US administration’s oversight and censorship bodies. Then we will analyze similar strategies that were adopted at a later date in Brazil, based on how the films were received, drawing on comments published in the press at the time and the stance of the Brazilian authorities. We shall endeavor to highlight cinema’s ability to create a variety of emotions and reactions. This is something that has never gone unnoticed, which therefore makes it a key topic for studies of political culture.

War, entertainment, propaganda and politics

Washington and Hollywood pored over the relationship between entertainment, propaganda and politics with the greatest care while the Second World War raged. Dozens of films, cartoons, newsreels etc. were able

² Understood here as an economic structure (production, circulation and consumption of films), cultural activity and social imagination (Lagny 1997).

to be made by the two being in synch with each other. These productions were very often backed with financial support from the administration and were promoted both internally for domestic consumption and to the outside world as part of a wide-ranging PR campaign where economic, diplomatic, military and cultural interests dovetailed. These productions included a number of cartoons aimed at Latin America and the Good Neighbor Policy.

There were four types of target audience for propaganda during the Second World War: the domestic front and combat troops, friendly countries, neutral countries and enemy countries. The vehicles for disseminating propaganda were used in the first and second cases. Yet what exactly could be deemed “propaganda”? Propaganda traditionally has a negative connotation when it implies an idea of hidden persuasion, of subliminally conditioning citizens, which robs them of their right to choose their own direction. Nevertheless, whereas the German government explicitly used the term propaganda in its Ministry of Propaganda, euphemistic forms were used in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, such as the Ministry of Information, Committee on Public Information, Office of War Information, etc. Obviously they were always anti-propaganda: we make information.³

It might be interesting to use Giaime Alonge’s definition in order to deal with the term appropriately. In his view, the term ‘propaganda’ can be viewed as neutral in meaning, without having a pejorative connotation attached to it: “propaganda is an activity by an official organization designed to disseminate a consensus around a policy promoting the government for which this organization is the mouthpiece - in the public opinion in its own country or that of a foreign country” (Alonge 2000, 9-12).

Of all the countries involved in the Second World War, the USA was the one that produced the most propaganda. At the beginning of 1942, we can identify a war being waged on several fronts, including economic, military, domestic and propaganda. When viewed as a fundamental support for other fronts, propaganda had a twin purpose in this context. On the one hand, to laud and magnify the values and justness of one country in particular: the USA. On the other, to belittle opponents, to make fun of the enemy, to demonize them, to blame them for the war and, lastly, to criminalize them.

3 For a discussion of the differences and similarities between the institutions responsible for propaganda in the USA and Germany, and how the Americans viewed Nazi propaganda cf.: Laurie (1997).

Several propaganda vehicles were used to this end, such as newsreels, documentaries, films, newspapers, songs, public speeches, posters and cartoons. Between 1942 and 1945, some of these products, which had previously been seen as pure entertainment aimed at a young audience or children, were rethought with the help of propaganda and psychology professionals. As Paul Virilio indicates, there are no wars without representation or sophisticated weapons without psychological mystification. In other words, before they are tools of destruction, weapons are tools of perception. Seen from this point of view - i.e. the use of cinema to create technical or psychological surprises - films, documentaries, newsreels and cartoons became true weapons of war (Virilio 1993, 12).

The recurrence of certain themes is striking in these initially mass-produced features. Although Germany, Italy and Japan were formally the enemies of the nation, the propaganda spared the Japanese no quarter in particular. Fundamentally designed for the domestic front, many of these products emphasized not only the enemy's villainy and the value and patriotism of Americans, but also the sale of War Bonds. The sale of War Bonds was seen as a way of taking money out of circulation and avoiding inflation, as well as swelling the government's coffers. Bonds could be bought for amounts ranging from 25 to 10,000 dollars and could be redeemed in 10 years with a yield of 2.9%. In total, eight series of War Bonds were launched between 1941 and 1945 with a myriad of different characteristics. In general, and depending on the amount, they were sold at 75% face value.⁴

Between 1939 and 1941, government news agencies and offices mushroomed in order to manage the relations between the film industry, the press and the Department of State. Each one was the responsibility of a political bigwig with strong ties to the business world or media in all instances. It was only after the attack on Pearl Harbor that war-related information and propaganda policy became centralized when the Office of War Information (OWI) was set up. Only two bodies managed to remain independent: the one headed by William 'Wild Bill' Donovan (Office of Strategic Service), a type of embryonic CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) – Donovan was later recognized as one of this agency's 'fathers' – and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) (Rowland 1946, 69; Koppes and Black 1990, 50-60).

In the United States, the need for a united country against a common enemy in such a costly war meant it was essential that products could be manufactured that could amalgamate the main interests of the military

4 Of the works that focus on the topic, we would highlight: Lingeman (2003) and, particularly, Kimble (2006).

and that could be absorbed by the general public in a quick and effective manner. In this regard, the activities of the Office of Facts and Figures, which was set up in October 1941 and which was designed to disseminate government information, were incorporated into those of the Office of War Information (OWI) in July 1942, under the leadership of Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood. The creation of the OWI was more than just Washington's play in the propaganda game. It represented a change from a policy where information should not have been manipulated by the government to another where information could and should be dramatized. However, external propaganda remained the responsibility of the Office of Strategic Services Morale Operation Branch, headed by William 'Wild Bill' Donovan.⁵ As far as their *modus operandi* is concerned, these agencies were broadly-speaking set up in a way that reflected how their directors thought propaganda should be carried out.

In practice, the creation of agencies like these and their out-and-out opposition to the way the Office of Fact and Figures operated meant crossing the thin red line separating information from propaganda and stood as a positive response to the question asked by the Production Code Administration in 1938: "Are we ready to depart from the pleasant and profitable course of entertainment, to engage in propaganda?" (Koppes and Black 1990, 17).

The work done by agencies of this nature made it possible for different films, cartoons and newsreels to be made, such as the series of cartoons steered by the Office of War Information called *Snafu*, an abbreviation of 'situation normal: all fucked up'. The aim behind *Snafu*, a clumsy cadet who went through life falling into traps created by enemies, was to show soldiers on military bases a range of precautions that should be taken in a real-life conflict. In other words, it was a fun way of showing them something that could end up as a terrible nightmare.

It is well worth highlighting the fact that there were at least three main pressure groups as regards audiovisual production during World War II. The first was the censor, using The Production Code, which was also known as Hays Office. Hays Office was set up by the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America and played an important role in restricting what films could be shown from the 1930s to 1960s. The second lobby during the Second World War was the

⁵ After 1941, the US Armed Forces also began planning and conducting propaganda campaigns in Europe, which sometimes caused clashes with the OSS, headed by Donovan (Laurie 1997).

military, especially as regards films that might show aspects deemed sensitive or related to national security. Lastly, the third pressure group was the Office of War Information, which even produced a manual entitled *Government Information Manual for the Motion Pictures Industry*, in which it proffered questions for the Studios to “reflect” on their own productions, such as, by way of example: “Will this film help win the war?” or “is this film ‘escapist’, will it damage the war effort, creating a false image of America, its Allies or the world in which we live?” (McLaughlin 2006, 18-23).

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7th December 1941, a consensus on the war was constructed and swiftly disseminated and the whole film industry was soon mobilized. Government sectors linked to the domestic war effort had concerns about describing some of the enemies of the nation too judgmentally because although the German and Japanese communities may have lacked robust political representation, the Italian community had already scaled these heights. However, backed up by a number of opinion polls, there were many in government circles that held no such fears about using stronger images or rhetoric in domestic cohesion campaigns. The differences of opinion between those who preferred a moderate campaign (such as the Office of Fact and Figures), and those who, even before Pearl Harbor, advocated more radical action (like William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)) were visible both in cartoons and other products aimed at generating a consensus, such as films, newsreels and posters.

Just as with studies on propaganda, the US government used various studies on social psychology to optimize these messages. Curiously enough, one of the authors most read by the government was Ellis Freeman, a social psychologist specializing in fascist propaganda techniques.⁶

Another social psychologist who contributed towards rationalizing fear and how propaganda could be used more effectively in the war effort was Harold Lasweel. By using the concept of the ‘entrenched State’, Lasweel showed the government how to militarize the country’s culture in an effective way that would not be widely questioned, in other words, “free rein was given to those in charge of propaganda” (Marvick 1977, 3).⁷

6 His most famous book *Conquering the man in the street: a psychological analysis of propaganda in war, fascism, and politics* was published in 1940 and became a key reference for studies on propaganda in the Social Psychology field (Freeman 1940).

7 On the notion of the ‘Entrenched State’ cf.: (Marvick 1977, 165-176).

These ideas were put into practice when producing the cartoon *Snafu*, for instance. Initially such products may appear simple and bereft of any greater interest. Yet, besides the propaganda and social psychology techniques, demographic analytical methods were used in *Snafu* to map out the screenplays. In this way, the producers hoped to understand how many men would go and see the cartoon, what their educational background would be and where they had been born and lived. According to Eric Smoodin, the production of *Snafu* shows concerns that went above and beyond mere entertainment. Instead of working as entertainment for military personnel and then civilians, the series was chiefly aimed at internal dissent (Smoodin 1993, 71-95).

One of the lessons the government learned from social psychologists was that one of the most effective ways to grab adults' attention was to refer to them as if they were youngsters. Accordingly, the cartoons in the *Snafu* series that were shown to thousands of soldiers serving on military bases in the four corners of the planet candidly treated them as 'young adults'.

This objective was so close to the government's heart that Theodor Geisel, a specialist in children's literature and the author of various books for young audiences was commissioned to write the *Snafu* scripts. In this way, the cartoons showed soldiers in a light-hearted manner and what might happen to them if they did not do their job efficiently and seriously. Labor relations were a recurring theme in war propaganda, both in US and Canadian output and with good reason. Policies during the War were strongly predicated on the need to ensure growth and continued production, to encourage stability in labor relations and with unions, and to control worker militancy (Atleson 1998, 1-4).

Good (and convenient) Neighbor policy

In the midst of the effervescent and often confusing creation of institutions under Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration, Latin America was accorded special attention. A new body was set up in August 1940 to guarantee and extend trading relations between the Americas. It was dubbed the Office of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, and was later renamed the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs

from 30th July 1941, then the Office of Inter-American Affairs on 23rd March 1941, until it was closed on 20th May 1943. The name changes reflect the way that US international policy towards the rest of the Americas was redefined, increasing its areas of intervention beyond the strictly commercial. Although these efforts were pan-American in inspiration, in practice they were primarily aimed at the Latin American countries. Although Canada still had close ties with the United Kingdom, the Good Neighbor Policy was a breath of fresh air for the country coming at the end of a period of US calls to annex Canadian territory. However, political, military, economic and cultural cooperation programmes were reviewed and bolstered in favor of a relationship that sought to be more respectful of the neighbors to the north.⁸

During the Second World War, Washington and Hollywood pored over the relationship between entertainment, propaganda and politics with the greatest care. Their agreement enabled different cartoons to be produced targeting Latin America and the Good Neighbor Policy. In addition to the cartoon *Alô amigos* (1943) and the *Tres Caballeros* (1944),⁹ the Disney studios renewed contracts with the CIAA, using its visual representation method to produce educational shorts and propaganda films to be distributed throughout the hemisphere. Some of these were used by other CIAA divisions, particularly in the field of public health, sanitation, food supply and education. As it became ever more urgent to keep workers working to produce raw materials, a number of cartoons were created with the objective of educating workers on how to avoid illness (The unseen enemy – 1944 and Defense against invasion – 1943), how to have a clean daily life (Cleanliness brings health - 1944) and healthy eating (Planning for good eating - 1945). Although all of Disney Studios Inc.'s output had originally been planned for non-commercial purposes, some of these were shown on the commercial circuit and generated significant box-office takings which not only completely covered the contractual costs, but also generated profit for the US administration (Rowland 1946, 78-79).

In 1961, Bryce Wood wrote what became the classic interpretation of the US government programme known as the 'Good Neighbor Policy'. Between 1933 and 1939, US policy towards the rest of the hemisphere was based around 'anticipating

8 Although with considerable specificities as regards the Province of Quebec. Cf.: (Klepak 1993; Bernier 1997; MaCauley and Soward 1948). A view that reveals many of the Canadian (*québécois*) fears and mistrust issues with regard to the *Good Neighbor Policy* can be seen in: (Humphrey 1942).

9 For an analysis of these two cartoons, cf.: (Freire-Medeiros 2004, 60-79).

reciprocity'; in other words, in response to the policies of non-intervention and non-interference, the USA hoped that Latin American governments would make commitments to US political interests. With the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe in 1939, Washington started rattling the saber of anticipating reciprocity. In order to construct an Interamerican defense organization that could defend the sphere of influence, or resist an attack by the Axis countries, the USA made specific economic and political concessions (Woods 1979, IX).

As part of the process of rapprochement between Brazil and the United States during the Second World War, important symbolic elements were brought into play so as to construct a cultural cartogram that endorsed US hegemony in the Southern Cone. However, the road between the two Americas needed to be a two-way street. On the one hand, Brazilians had to be convinced that the "American Way of Life" represented the ideal for democracy and, on the other hand, Americans needed to perceive Brazilians as harmless lovers of samba and *mulattas*. In this way, elements of a culture that was spreading internationally were endorsed using all the media resources available at the time – cinema, press and advertising – to disseminate values and create fashions. Among these, film production did the most to mobilize interests and passions (Mauad 2002).

As part of the Good Neighbor Policy and the ensuing construction of US hegemony of the Americas, the way Brazilian culture recreated US culture by ingesting elements (not from any other cultures, such as, for example, Italian or German culture), as Antonio Pedro Tota wanted, heralded a clear political stance in a world split by the war between democratic regimes and totalitarian ones. Accepting features of US culture to be "mixed" with "home-grown" aspects meant taking on a political identity predicated on democracy and individual freedom, to only name the predominant values.

As Ana Maria Mauad sees it, two fundamental problems arise with this process: 1 - Redefining the Brazilian political framework from 1930 and the role that cultural production assumes in this context; 2 - The policy adopted by the US government through its government agencies and contacts with the cultural production world, particularly the major Hollywood studios with regard to foreigners - chiefly Latin Americans.

As regards the first point and taking into account the significant amount of works dealing with the topic, in the author's view, it is only worth noting that the new political project that was initiated in the 1930s was connected to the ideas of modernization and drawing up an identity that was really Brazilian. The

part that could be called the cultural side of this project is defined by the State's implementation of an education and cultural policy, and by the attempts of more intellectual sectors of civil society to reflect on Brazilian culture, which from then on was given attributes such as national and popular (Mauad, n.d.).

However, the period covering the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s can be characterized as firstly a time when the role of the state in the cultural sphere was redefined in order to work towards drawing up a national identity (Ortiz 1989). Secondly, a new relationship was forged between political society and civil society, between the public and private sphere, in the construction of an image of Brazil tied to a new political culture. This then emerged in urban life, in the modernization/industrialization pairing and in greater access to consumer goods, which were deemed an element of social participation.

The second problem impacts directly on how national identities were redefined and updated in the context of the process of the internationalization of culture during and after the Second World War, being thus intrinsically linked to the political project of the 1930s and 1940s.

I started to see a completely new attitude related to other American Republics based on an honest and sincere desire to remove, firstly, all fear of American aggression - be it territorial and financial - and secondly to adopt a type of society in the hemisphere where no one Republic can gain an unfair advantage. (Wood 1961, 130-131)

Therefore, the stereotypes and clichés used by the visual production of the United States to depict 'the other American Republics' were the outcome of an ongoing dialogue between the three main players in the Good Neighbor Policy (O'Neil 2000): I - The big Hollywood studios in charge of producing the images and selecting the right people for the *mise-en-scène* of the different features; II - The US government agencies responsible for establishing guidelines and dovetailing the proposals with the demands of international policy - of particular note being the Office of the Coordinator of Interamerican Affairs (CIAA), which was assisted by Brazilian diplomats and journalists based in the USA, as well as the guidance of the editorial staff/publishers of the magazine National Geographic. They all did everything possible to portray as accurate an image as possible of Latin America. III - Lastly, the dominant Latin American classes who, as part of their political project, were imagining a nation from whose colonial past the stain of slavery could be erased and whose present played a full part of the

international concert of modern nations. At their side in the creative process was the major illustrated press, which was committed to transforming the films of the time into affairs of state (Mauad n.d.).

Pike identified at least two trends among these groups and individuals: one moderate and another conservative. The moderate trend placed less emphasis on the supposed benefits and more on the freedom of initiative, individualism and market capitalism that the *Good Neighbor Policy* could offer. If you follow this line of thought, unchecked freedom of initiative could cause even more social injustice, meaning that there was therefore a need for control mechanisms over the business world. Backers of the conservative trend believed that only competition based on a relatively deregulated market could bring economic development to the region, resulting thus in the accumulation of wealth and by doing so significantly improve Latin American social problems. (Pike 1995, 199-209; Raymont, 2005, 1-5, 29-30).

It is worth recalling that Fredrick B. Pike's approach differed from the so-called dependant one, which saw the Good Neighbor Policy as a policy geared up to serve the US capitalist system alone. Viewed from this angle, a policy of this kind was largely based on opening up Latin American trade to the USA and protecting the US market. Although these approaches were more sophisticated, this perspective was widely adopted by historians influenced by what was known as the 'Wisconsin School', represented by respected intellectuals such as William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber.

Fredrick Pike also criticizes an approach where analysis focuses primarily on defense policy of the hemisphere. The author disagrees with historiography, which views the Good Neighbor Policy as a series of policies influenced by security considerations. With this viewpoint, the author takes a different tangent to historians like Dana G. Munro, Samuel Flagg Bemis and J. Lloyd Mecham. For Pike, the *Good Neighbor Policy* is not exclusively based on trade or security issues. For this reason, the author advocates approaching the issue from an angle where the economy and defense are intrinsically linked (Pike 1995).

In any event, it is important to stress that the cultural dimension of security of the hemisphere was one method Washington found to overcome the obstacles resulting from Latin American opposition to US meddling in the region's business. Cultural investments were often related to bolstering hemispheric security and mainly to acceptance of US economic presence.

However, there were good reasons for these fears. The notion of media imperialism put forward by Fred Fejes would appear to fit the focus set out here well, in addition to the aforementioned Canadian fears. The author studies how transnational agents, transnational corporations and transnational media industries dominate the international set-up and communications. In this way, he observed the importance of intra-national factors and dynamics as part of communication practices and policies. In actual fact, for the first 30 years of the 20th century, Latin America was the biggest arena for US political and economic expansion and our neighbors to the North were well aware of this. By the 1920s, the USA had already managed to dominate the region politically and economically. Many of the techniques used by the USA after the Second World War were developed in Latin America through trial and error and fine-tuning. Therefore one important element in establishing US power in the hemisphere was control of communications. For Fejes, one essential aspect of this system was the prominence of liberal trade policies and the emphasis on inter-American unity against European and interventionist interests (Fejes 1986, 5-7). For this reason, we maintain that the Good Neighbor Policy did not represent the liquidation of old imperialist objectives, rather a creative transformation of other means of control and domination.

What was happening was that old and inefficient control methods and techniques were being dropped and new, more sophisticated forms sought that could reflect the profound and complex political and social changes in Latin America. The main idea present in the vision of inter-American relations was the shared, harmonious interests of the American states, particularly between the industrialized USA and a non-industrialized, raw-material producing Latin America. Accordingly, despite the system being based on the principle of equality for all American nations, it was, in actual fact, a system that was defined and dominated by US interests and objectives (Fejes 1986, 5-7).

From an optimist's point of view, the 1930s was a golden period, in the words of Peter H. Smith, in Latin America-US relations. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's proclaimed Good Neighbor Policy radically changed the way Washington dealt with the region. Under the sway of this policy, troops were no longer sent and intervention was no longer present on the American diplomatic agenda. Following a discourse of cooperation and consultation, the USA started to treat the Latin American nations less as inferiors and more like sovereign countries and equal partners in collectively promoting hemispheric interests (Smith 1996, 65).

From a less optimistic viewpoint, Smith points out that the context was one of an 'Imperial Era' and that the Good Neighbor Policy was not the beginning of a new policy of goodwill, rather the culmination of US political trends vis-à-vis Latin America. Viewed from this angle, a policy of this kind slotted in as part of the US quest for hegemony throughout the hemisphere. In the name of non-intervention, the Good Neighbor Policy did not rank as another objective, rather as a way of imposing and consolidating US hegemony (Smith 1996, 65-70).

Smith states that the concept of the Good Neighbor Policy recognized that the previously adopted interventionist model was not effective and the costs normally outweighed the gains. Against a backdrop of diminishing European influence and power in the region, it did not seem so necessary or advantageous to carry on with certain policies, such as the Roosevelt Corollary, which was proclaimed in the 1910s. It defended not just the right of the USA to intervene, but also its moral obligation to intervene in cases of impotence or chronic problems in Latin American countries.

As Smith stresses, the USA did not adopt an isolationist stance vis-à-vis all the world's regions during the 1930s. While many in Washington kept their distance from the European theatre and advocated an isolationist position, the USA increased its commitments to and concerns about Latin America. What they were doing, therefore, was consolidating their own sphere of influence. And there was every reason to do so. As we stated earlier, Latin America offered strong market potential and between 1929 and 1932, due to the Depression, US exports to the region fell 78% (Smith 1996, 74).

One clear pointer as to the strength of Smith's argument is the pattern that emerged after the negotiations between the USA and some Central American nations between 1935 and 1937. In these negotiations, the USA only concluded agreements with countries that depended to a great extent on the US market. Even more revelatory were the 'dramatic agreements' centered on the USA's fifth biggest supplier of raw materials, Brazil. This was especially due to Brazil's ability to provide raw materials not just to the USA, but also to Germany. In this way, due to its size, location and importance, Brazil became the key target in the 1930s and 1940s in the struggle between the USA and Germany in Latin America (Smith 1996, 75-76).

The 'new wave of goodwill' that was ushered in at the end of the 1950s had a far from straightforward mission. During the 1920s and 1930s, Latin

Americans were viewed by Americans as a primitive, passionate, superstitious and childlike people. Thus, when Brazil began to assume a central position in the struggle for South America, the goodwill expressed, in theory, a change in how all inhabitants of the Americas saw things, with the Latin Americans liking the Americans and the Americans being less prejudiced about their neighbors to the South. The gargantuan effort under the Good Neighbor Policy was aimed at building a solid basis to provide raw materials for the Allied forces, such as rubber and manganese, and to prevent and fight against the influence of the Axis countries. Nevertheless, preparing Brazil meant setting the defenses for half of South America, along with helping the rest with security. Preparing Brazil could be the best way to avoid the USA overtly taking a role in defending Latin America, rendering this strategy less direct and less costly. In this regard, cultural diplomacy played a central role in extending and maintaining an effective hegemonic influence.

As part of this interest, extensive effort went into cartoons. The intention was to both win over the Latin American audience to US interests and familiarize the general public at home with the significant differences among their southern neighbors.

In the following decade, at the end of the Second World War, Brazil was still contested, albeit this time not by the USA and Germany, but by the USA and Soviet Union. What impact did this have on progress in the area of propaganda and cinema? Were they buried away at the end of the conflict? How did Hollywood and Washington deal with these practices against an ideological enemy that was supposedly as or more dangerous than the Nazis? The social impact of US film productions in Brazil can help answer at least some of these questions.

Politics and Cinema in the Iron Curtain era

During the tensest period of the Cold War, between 1945 and the end of the 1950s, some US studios decreased production of quality films and films with social content, which were viewed with suspicion by the more conservative

sectors of society. Heeding the suggestions or even under duress from these sectors, they placed on the market dozens of anti-communist propaganda productions that were produced at lower cost, joining the ranks of what would later be known as 'b movies'. Many films helped construct or reinforce the classic stereotype of the 'communist child eaters', and not just in the United States, as Hollywood's output ruled the big screen worldwide. In 1953, for instance, at the peak of Brazilian film production, 34 home-grown films were marketed alongside 578 imports, of which 344 were American (Viany 1959, 155-156).

At the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, the USA saw one of the biggest anti-communist drives in its history. Despite increasing economic prosperity, the problems arising from the Cold War caused discomfort and fear and not just on US soil, and also influenced the country's foreign relations, prolonging an ideological crisis that emerged post-World War 2. Latin America could be given as a good example of the spread of such fears. As regards containing the 'communist danger' in Latin America, the joint efforts of the USA and various countries led to a number of measures, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA), signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and the Organization of American States (OAS), founded in 1948 in Bogotá.

In the USA, the first official moves to prevent and combat communism began as soon as the Second World War finished. In 1945, an official of the United States Information Service warned his superior General William 'Wild Bill' Donovan, then Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), that the Soviet Union would use certain 'non-conventional' tactics. The way he saw it, the invention of the atomic bomb would cause a shift in the balance of power, changing the ways of exerting international pressure, be they peaceful means or otherwise. For this reason, the USA experimented with a steep hike in the importance of 'peaceful' methods, as their enemies were tinkering with such methods for the purposes of propaganda, to subvert, sabotage and exert pressure on the USA (Saunders 2000, 17- 18). The warning given to the OSS heralded the onset of a Cold War that was locked in a psychological context and where use of 'peaceful methods' of propaganda to weaken hostile positions continued.

With Roosevelt's death on 12th April 1945, US policy changed little in some regards but in others went off in completely opposite directions, such as the tolerance of communists. The political reorientation was caused

by the strengthening of conservative trends and, later on, significant changes in the US Department of State. From 1947, Harry S. Truman's administration officially took the stance that the Soviets were no longer 'unlikely allies' and had become 'potential enemies'. Moreover, the first years of his administration were marked not only by skepticism as regards the Soviets' trustworthiness, but also by a belief in US moral superiority, great optimism and confidence about a long period of nuclear monopoly. However, successive setbacks on the international stage destroyed the comforting understanding that provided this supposed superiority, such as, for example, the 'loss' of China to communism and the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, which both came in 1949.

Anti-communism on the big screen

From 1947, political propaganda regarding the USSR started to take a more aggressive line, which was depicted shortly after in various Hollywood-produced films.

During the hearings of the HUAC in 1947,¹⁰ members of the Committee, including Richard Nixon, made it clear that the studios should produce anti-communist films, just as they had made anti-Nazi films over the course of the Second World War (Sayre 1995, 52). In a military lecture given in Washington in 1947, there was an explicit concern about the spread of communist propaganda; highlighting the view that cinema might become an important battleground between the USA and USSR. According to the document, Communist Party propaganda should be steadfastly fought against, chiefly in the cinematographic medium, where the Party hoped to 'implant communist ideas to a guaranteed audience of 100 million children'. For the speaker,

10 The *House On Un-American Activities Committee* - HUAC was set up in 1938 to investigate subversive activities in the USA. From 1945, HUAC was strengthened, giving power and status to unscrupulous politicians like J. Parnell Thomas, and intensifying the rising anti-communist tide of public opinion. In March 1947, HUAC announced it was intending to investigate what it stated was communist infiltration in cinema. Directors, scriptwriters, actors and producers were summoned to appear before this Committee to explain the suspicion of subversion hanging over their names. The majority of the suspects were immediately blacklisted, which led to unemployment and, in some cases, exile and going underground. The HUAC had a significant body of whistleblowers, from members of law enforcement bodies, such as the FBI, to personalities who would become famous, such as Ronald Reagan (Valim 2004a).

subversives would be happy to insert their ideas in small dialogues or scenes in certain sequences, meaning that their ideas could be seen or heard by millions of Americans. By the same token, communists in cinema would be ready to sabotage, wherever possible, films with anti-communist messages.¹¹

Using the media, between 1945 and 1948, the Truman administration ably turned skeptic congressmen and a large share of the general public into enthusiastic Cold Warriors, ready for action in the face of any supposed threat, wherever it might occur (Small 1992, 170-171). In this way the media fulfilled an important function in the Cold War: to disseminate propaganda, seduce and distort, a direct result of the thin line between information and propaganda, which was crossed during the Second World War. Many top-level politicians became involved in information and disinformation campaigns at a time when propaganda was a key tool linked both to diplomacy and strategic plans and actions.

There were two main views concerning the USSR at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the following decade. The first sought to defend the USA from a declared enemy, communism, represented mainly by the USSR, its satellite countries and its spies. The second was more popular and geared less towards national defense and more towards avoiding the decline of US institutions and moral standards, which explains the great incidence of messages in Hollywood-produced films equating communism to moral perversion.

Although some 30 films with anti-communist themes were produced between 1918 and 1939, this number is trifling when compared to the post-World War II era. Despite the ongoing production of newsreels, documentaries, posters and cartoons with a propaganda purpose, it was in film production that this persuasion came to the fore. Between 1947 and 1954, the number of films with anti-communist themes leapt to roughly 50 productions. One of the best anti-communist films ever produced in the USA, the comedy *Ninotchka*, which was filmed in 1939, was re-launched in 1947, presaging an intensification of this theme. In general, although such films were produced in all manner of styles between 1947 and 1954, one can pick out at least three main groups in anti-communist filmography that are closely related to cinematographic genres: Drama, Science Fiction and War.

11 Cf. Military lecture 180. Translated on 4th July 1947. DOPS Background. Rio de Janeiro State Archive.

Anti-communism and the dramatic genre

In the first group, which mainly takes in the years 1947 to 1952, films with a dramatic content and themes related to espionage in the USA dominated, using resources from the *Noir* and also the documentary style. It was against this backdrop that the film *Iron Curtain* (1948) was produced - the first anti-communist production *par excellence* made after 1945. Containing narrative documentary hallmarks, and greatly influenced by the political and social tensions against which it was produced, the film dealt with a real case of Soviet espionage that occurred in Canada in 1945 and 1946. The use of features linked to the documentary genre, i.e. mixing fictional narrative with documentary narrative is another major characteristic of films from this initial phase and is also present in films like: *The Red Menace* (1949), *I Was a Communist for the FBI* (1951) and *Walk East on Beacon!* (1952), whose script was based on an article written by the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, and bankrolled by the Bureau. The importance of denouncing friends and relatives linked to communist organizations became the central theme of several films from this period, including *Iron Curtain* (1948), *Conspirator* (1949), *I Married a Communist* (1949) and *My Son John* (1952).

From 1949, the number of anti-communist films increased substantially, mainly by virtue of internal conflicts, such as, for example, those related to spy networks in the USA, and to external conflicts, such as the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb (1949). In addition to those already mentioned, among the most interesting and incisive films with anti-communist themes produced in Hollywood in this initial phase are: *Guilty of Treason* (1950) and *Bells of Coronado*, (1950), possibly one of the first Westerns with an anti-communist subtext.

Curiously, after the Second World War, the number of Hollywood films with Russian characters dropped significantly, chiefly when compared to the films produced in the 1930s. Between 1946 and 1962, the Russians were one of the topics Hollywood preferred to skirt around. During this period only a few films, some sixteen, were produced focusing on Russian characters and there were good grounds for this. Most definitely the constant attacks of the

HUAC, from 1947, on pro-Soviet films produced during the Second World War contributed to the wave of 'Russophobia' in film.

Whereas some USSR-related films in the 1930s differentiated between Russians and the Soviet system, this distinction vanished after the Second World War. The representations of Soviets in Hollywood-produced films that we have placed in this first group vary a great deal. Communists were either depicted as extremely dangerous spies that could organize large spy networks - as in *Iron Curtain* (1948), *Conspirator* (1949), *I Was a Communist for the FBI* (1951) and *Big Jim McLain* (1952) -, or as demagogues and hypocrites that were ever ready to prey on the unwary and in other instances as perverts, fools or incompetents, even unable to trick someone, as in *Sofia* (1948). In any event, the representations of communists portrayed by Hollywood always meant a potential threat that was, more often than not, staved off by religion - the best possible antidote to communist poison.

One of the strategies often used by communists represented in Hollywood films was the subversive *femme fatale*; beautiful seductresses preying on careless men, ready to groom them with Marxist-Leninist lessons. In films such as *Iron Curtain* (1948), *Red Menace* (1949) and *I Married a Communist* (1949), the relationship between sexual seduction and ideological subversion is quite clear. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in some films the beautiful communist women were Americans, while the Russian women were generally uncivilized or very ugly, as in *Iron Curtain* (1948).

Many of these characteristics are directly linked to *Film Noir*, where women did more of the seducing or tried to seduce respectable men, leading them to destruction and ruin. Although the *Noir* genre, which was very popular in the 1940s and 1950s, was not directly associated with anti-communism, it depicted the variety of fears cultivated in the post-World War II era, including corruption, subversion and female sexuality. Made quickly on low budgets, many of these films did not fare well at the box-office. However, the majority were based on 1930s gangster films, simply replacing the criminals with communists (Christopher 1997; Mattos 2001; Silver 1992; Valim 2004b).

Nora Sayre highlights how communists were systematically portrayed in a delicious and well-known analysis of these films. Many seemed despicable and occasionally effeminate, as you cannot trust a man who wears gloves. Moreover, as the author noted, communists' shadows were wider and blacker than those of their enemies and they always walked bending forwards,

showing their dedication to the cause. There would be some horrifying scene with a woman, generally a wicked blonde, with some part of her underwear that could be seen through her blouse. Blondes like this always ordered triple whiskeys and often seduced young men to join the Communist Party.

Other portrayals, which were generally caricatures, always honed in on the communists' cruelty towards animals or American symbols, such as the US flag. They could often be spotted by the way they smoked, exhaling smoke extremely slowly through their nostrils before threatening someone's life. For the author, although such scenes were very often crude, they stoked the environment of fear and prejudice at the time (Sayre 1995, 71; Strada 1997). We would highlight the fact that many of these characteristics were present in a number of anti-communist films and in all instances came together to praise the American Way of Life and condemn 'communist immorality'.

The insistent link between communism and immorality was reinforced by the reconstruction of the conventional definitions of masculinity and femininity in the post-World War II era. At that time, an authentic phalanx of doctors, clergy and other 'specialists' were incessantly warning people of the importance of the family nucleus as a line of defense against the communist threat. Psychiatrists warned women not to aspire to professional careers as by escaping their obligations as mothers they would be jeopardizing the future of the USA. The Federal Bureau of Investigation – FBI, for instance, was one of the institutions that hunted homosexuals and other 'deviants' presumed dangerous out of public office, despite the sexual predilections of its director, Edgar J. Hoover. In any event, the FBI onslaught strengthened the links between diseases, sexuality and communism and made them quite convincing for the general public.

Anti-communism and science fiction

The second group of anti-communist films is linked to the science fiction genre, which began to convey anti-communist messages from around 1950, when the threat from the internal 'enemy' stopped taking centre stage

and the external 'enemy' emerged as a constant concern. Science fiction films related to communism/anti-communism portrayed a very wide range of viewpoints, of which the most emphatic are: *Destination Moon* (1950), *The Flying Saucer* (1950), *Red Planet Mars* (1952) and *Them* (1954).

Productions like *The Thing from Another World* (1951) and *Them* (1954) expressed the fear of ideological contamination as an allegory. For the audience, the most terrifying aspect of these films were not the monsters, laser canons or alien spaceships, rather the proximity and invisibility with which the 'alien' enemies could attack US targets. It was in this way that, for example, the victims in *Invaders of Mars* (1953), became 'opinion-less slaves of the totalitarian will', *making it impossible to distinguish between 'them' and 'us'*, while the plant clones in *The Thing from Another World* (1951) were 'devoid of sexual and emotional instincts'.

In this way, the victory of evil, the end of freedom, sexuality and individuality were often dealt with through metaphors in the shape of insect, robot and even zombie attacks. The plots of science fiction films in the 1950s were dominated by hostile forces wishing to enslave Americans. The images and language present in these films did not just represent the fears and worries linked to the Cold War atmosphere, but also strengthened the conviction that the USA needed to defend itself against a possible invasion. Accordingly, the worries stimulated by the possibility of a conflict between the capitalist world and the communist world were widely expressed in science fiction films like *The Man from Planet X* (1951), *The War of the Worlds* (1953) and *Invaders from Mars* (1953). In these films, planet Earth was repeatedly threatened by alien invaders who were cruelly seeking new places to colonies and destroy.

Anti-communism and the war genre

It was not just science fiction films that drew attention to the international context. The third group of anti-communist films comprises productions concerning wars, interventions in foreign countries and major spy networks. Just as in science fiction films, in these productions, fears were not only linked to communist subversion 'at home', but especially around the world. The

reasons for the change were directly related to the Korean War, as the conflict severely impacted on the US media, which, at home and abroad, stopped treating communism as a stand-alone theme. Thus anti-communism progressively became globalised and militarized, as American culture was being disseminated internationally at the time, focusing less on the virtues of the American Way of Life and much more on the immediate threat communism represented.

Films produced in this period with these characteristics include: *I Was a Communist for the FBI* (1951), *The Whip Hand* (1951), *Arctic Flight* (1952), *Assignment - Paris* (1952), *Atomic City* (1952), *Big Jim McLain* (1952), *Red Snow* (1952), *The Steel Fist* (1952), *My Son John* (1952), *Never Let Me Go* (1953), *Savage Drums* (1953), *Savage Mutiny* (1953), *Night People* (1954) and *Prisoner of War* (1954).

Anticommunism for export: **Hollywood communists in Brazil**

Post-war anti-communist filmography can tell us a great deal about the context it was produced in, as it stands as a rich catalogue of a country's domestic life, revealing popular fears and obsessions. Films provide us with good indications about US foreign policy at the time and about what they meant not just for Americans but also for the Brazilians that saw them. At a time when many films exaggerating the communist threat were being shown, many of the viewers were convinced that the Soviets were coming and that 'the bomb' could be dropped at any time during the night.

For Saunders, the international market saw these films as straightforward, poor propaganda, and for a Europe still smarting from the memories of Fascism, the senseless hope and verbal violence of Hollywood anti-communist films was not attractive in the slightest (Saunders 2000, 288). Although we agree with some of the author's hypotheses, the statement cannot be applied to Latin America or Brazil. Taking into account regional specificities, if we align the general framework of US anti-communist ideas to the Brazilian reality, we can see how the Right generally incorporated some of the standards suggested for anti-communism in the USA.

As in other Latin American countries, the logic behind Brazil-US relations, which had previously been strengthened during the Good Neighbor Policy, morphed in favor of preventing and fighting communism. The Good Neighbor Policy during the Second World War strengthened relations between Hollywood and US foreign policy, whilst at the same time, reinforcing transnational ties between Brazil and the USA, especially in the area of the media.

For different reasons, we believe that in the 1940s and 1950s, two political models converged in Brazil: a global one, the Cold War, and a domestic one, a growing belief that communism represented an imminent threat to Brazilian society. In particular, this was due to events taking place in the surrounding environment, such as, for example, when the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was made illegal (7th May 1947), relations with the USSR were severed (20th October 1947), communist deputies were expelled (7th January 1948), or even the resurgence of social issues and the worsening police repression at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the following decade. The internal fault lines, worsened by intensified anti-communism and related fears and anxieties, both in the USA and in Brazil, show us how the 'Iron Curtain' announced in the USA in 1946 was soon reproduced through countless *micro-containments* which in turn were reinforced and disclosed by the media outlets of the period, notably cinema.

During the Cold War, cinema was one of the outlets that transnational anti-communist propaganda used to bring Brazilian and American conservative discourse closer together. It was at exactly this time that the USA started producing a significant number of films *for* the Cold War, and not simply *in* the Cold War, generating and strengthening countless fears and prejudices related to communism.

In Latin America, as in various other places, US propaganda was aimed at changing opinions vis-à-vis different international conflicts, such as, for example, the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), the communist victory in China (1949) and the Korean War (1950-1953). Furthermore, US foreign policy and films produced in Hollywood under the influence of this policy stoked exaggerated reactions to potential threats not only in the USA, but also where this policy and Hollywood productions exerted an effective influence, as in Brazil, for example.

Nelson Rockefeller's belief that anti-communism could become as important to US post-war hegemony as anti-fascism during the Second World

War is significant (FEIN, 2000, p. 88), particularly if we bear in mind that the media resources amplified the scale of the event, increasing the volume of control. Yet this control was not to prove as effective, at least not in Brazil.

‘This is how communists act’

The first protest against an anti-communist film that took place in Brazil seems to have been against a film called ‘Luz Nova’, which was definitely one of the first of the genre produced in Hollywood. The film, which dealt with ‘the socialization of women’, did not go down well, even at its premiere at the Odeon cinema on 31st August 1921. According to Bandeira, the protests against the film resulted in a number of arrests and caused a great deal of disturbance.

Women fainted, God help us. The cinema reimbursed the cost of the tickets and the next day, newspapers reported that ‘70 Russians wreaked havoc on the city’. These facts happened again in Niterói and Rua Hadock Lobo. In Niterói, one speaker, Néelson Belém, climbed on a chair and ended up in jail for saying: ‘the concept of female independence in Russia is morally superior to that of capitalist society’. He also accused the bourgeoisie of being ‘immoral’, to the general applause of the audience. (Bandeira 1980, 195)

In January 1949, three decades after this incident, an investigator from DOPS (Department of Political and Social Order) reported to his superiors that the communists’ line of conduct had recently changed radically: “Until very recently communist activities were carried out cautiously and nearly always covertly, such was the fear of breaking the current laws and crossing the authorities in charge of making sure they were kept faithfully to the letter.”

Suddenly, however, according to the investigator, ‘a metamorphosis took place’. He stated that ‘communist agitators’ had started to act openly, switching from apparent passivity to aggressive actions: “they dropped the supposedly peaceful position that served as their motto to become provocateurs, truculent and, what is more curious, frankly threatening.”¹²

12 Cf. Free newsletter of 10th Jan. 1949. Political Police Background. Rio de Janeiro State Archive.

In 1948 initially and then particularly with the 'August Manifesto' of 1950, the communists adopted a sectarian policy, set in place authoritarian leadership methods, militarized their organization and, in a return to clandestine ways, opted for confrontation. The actions of the militants gradually intensified and became more aggressive; partly as a response to increasing police repression. Several of the aforementioned films gave rise to protests, brawls inside and outside cinemas and even threats against the companies screening them. This received broad coverage in the newspapers of the time from the most conservative through to those with links to the Left – obviously, rather different interpretations of the demonstrations against 'war films'.

At the end of the 1940s, several newspapers led with news stories like: 'Communists vandalize Rio cinemas'; 'Red agent carries out revolting and perverse act' and 'Real Life Stories: This is how communists act'.¹³ The demonstrations, which were perceived as acts of sabotage, were generally interpreted as having been caused by the denouncements made by the films. The films were screened on the Associação Brasileira Cinematográfica (Brazilian Cinematographic Association) – ABC circuit and had a reasonable social impact.¹⁴

In the demonstrations against the film *Iron Curtain*, which took place in January 1949, and on 11th and 12th September of the same year in various cinemas in São Paulo, hydrogen sulphide 'bombs' were used between the seats (which, according to statements taken by DOPS agents, gave off a pungent, foul-smelling odor); black ink 'oranges' were thrown at the screen while the film was being shown; chants, such as 'Riot! Riot!', 'Down with Yankee imperialism' and 'Long live the USSR!' also during the screening; some seats were broken, and, lastly, cinema windows were smashed¹⁵.

Curiously, the film *Iron Curtain* did not generate many protests in Rio de Janeiro, perhaps as it was the first anti-communist propaganda film of the post-war era. It did not draw as much attention as films screened later would, despite the provocative statements on billboards for the film: 'The most sensational film of our time'; 'Revelations that have left people in awe'; 'A huge spy plan'; 'The true story of Igor Gouzenko, the man who revealed surprising secrets to

13 Cf. "O vandalismo dos comunistas nos cinemas do Rio, e prática de revoltante e perverso ato um agente vermelho" 1948. *O Globo*, October 22 ; "Histórias da vida real: assim agem os comunistas." 1950. *O Mundo*, July 3.

14 The Brazilian Cinematographic Association was formed by Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Fox Film, Paramount Films, Columbia Pictures, Universal Films, Warner Bros and U.A. of Brasil Inc.

15 Cf. Report sent to DOPS/RJ: Atividades Comunistas no Estado de São Paulo. 11 Oct. 1949. Office of the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs. National Archives.

the world and for this reason whose life is in serious danger'; 'A film that keeps viewers on a knife's edge and which was made using official documents and with the support of the Canadian government'; 'The story of Igor Gouzenko, former ciphers employee at the USSR embassy in Ottawa, Canada'; 'The most incredible conspiracy in 3300 years of espionage!'; 'The most incredible conspiracy in the history of espionage'.

On 22nd October 1948, the newspaper *O Globo* reported: "Communists vandalize Rio cinemas". During the demonstrations against the film, an individual was caught red-handed "red agent carries out revolting and perverse act", who, according to the report, tried to commit suicide after being arrested.¹⁶ The demonstrations, which were perceived as acts of sabotage, were, according to the report, caused by the denouncements made by the film, which was shown on three other cinema screens. Knifing seats and sofas was a leitmotif with productions not to the liking of left-wing militants, as the report states.

At the beginning of 1949, the screening of the film *Iron Curtain* was still causing protests. According to a report on communist activity in São Paulo, detectives from the Department of Political and Social Order managed to thwart a communist plan to cause panic in the Cine Politeama theatre while the film was being shown. On 11th September 1949, while another 'communist counter-propaganda' film - the film was not identified in the report - was being screened in the Cine Ritz, some black ink bombs were thrown at the screen and hydrogen sulphide bombs between the seats. The document ends by stating that due to the announcement of the planned screening of another film, called 'Marcha Vermelha' (Red March), the offices of Republic Pictures began receiving phone calls from communist elements threatening not only the company, but also the locations where the film would be shown. In this way, on 12th September 1949, Republic Pictures asked the DOPS for assurances for the plane carrying the rolls of film to be unloaded and for the subsequent screening.¹⁷

Documents relating to other films showed that such practices were widespread - ranging from threats to knifed seats - which led to some cinema managers asking DOPS to take measures as they were losing a number of seats each time films with anti-communist references were shown.¹⁸

16 Cf. O vandalismo dos comunistas nos cinemas do Rio. 1948. *O Globo*, October 22.

17 Cf. Report sent to DOPS/RJ: Atividades Comunistas no Estado de São Paulo. 11th Oct. 1949. Office of the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs. National Archives.

18 Such as, for example, in the screening of the film *Red Planet Mars* (1952) at the Cinema Rian. Cf. Boletim Reservado 46. 17th Mar. 1952. DOPS Background. Rio de Janeiro State Archive.

The left-wing newspapers, for their part, viewed protests of this kind as “spirited popular demonstrations against war films”. On 19th April 1950, the newspaper ‘Imprensa Popular’ reported that there had been a large popular demonstration of people voicing their displeasure at the ‘propaganda film’ *The Red Menace*. According to the newspaper, the screening of the film in a better category of cinema, the Íris, rather than in the Cinêlandia, was seen as a challenge to Brazilian pacifist sentiment. However the demonstration against ‘American provocation’ took place in the Cine Rex, hot on the heels of ‘intense propaganda on the radio and in the newspapers’ despite ‘its failure both from an artistic and political point of view’. For the newspaper,

The provocations against the Soviet Union lack any convincing strength – we know this through comments in the foreign press. Nevertheless the propaganda orchestrated by the American embassy has been no less intense regarding this trashy film. Over one of the accesses downstairs they even put up a slogan that was as banal as the rest of it: ‘the film that challenged Stalin’.¹⁹

The “spirited act of repulsion”, as the newspaper put it, took place despite all the propaganda surrounding the film, which did little to help, as the cinema was “virtually dead” apart from the “cops”. However, on the Sunday, when audience numbers are considerably higher, the demonstrations occurred again:

On that day, at around 3 p.m., eggs and stink bombs were thrown from all corners of the cinema, breaking on the screen and tearing it completely. While this was going on, a number hydrogen sulphide glass vessels and ampoules were set off inside the cinema. Within a few minutes the air was unbreathable due to the pungent odor given off by these gases. With the exception of the cops - and understandably so - all the people present supported this gesture of abhorrence in the face of this war-mongering propaganda that the film’s screening represented, being not only condemned by our laws but also our customs and traditions as a peace-loving people. The audience left laughing and supporting the peaceniks’ initiative. The police did what they could to reduce the effects of this bold gesture. A number of low-level lackeys arrived to help the cinema employees clean up the movie theatre. [...] The rejection of the film ‘The Red Menace’ is a repudiation of war. This is how patriots prevented this provocation from being screened in the Cine Rex and doubtlessly they will be even

19 Cf. vigorosa manifestação popular contra um filme guerreiro. 1950. *Imprensa Popular*, April 19.

bolder in preventing the triggering of war and atomic catastrophe.²⁰

Two months later, on 28th June 1950, the 'Imprensa Popular' reported another protest, this time against the screening of the film *Conspirator* at the Cine Metro. According to the newspaper, this was yet another "popular repudiation of a war-mongering propaganda film, in Hitler's old anti-communist style". For the newspaper, the film's screening, with its obvious political purpose, was part of a "general spectacle of provocations nationwide", ranging from the arrest of Captain Agliberto Vieira de Azevedo in Recife to the suspension of councilors' mandates. In the newspaper's view, the film *Conspirator* was a "classic American stinker that even the 'healthy' columnists disliked. The more reactionary newspapers stressed its poor quality".

Yet the "general public", according to the newspaper, rose to the task with its reaction:

Yesterday managers of the American Cinema Trust got their just desserts in Rio. A group of people headed to the Metro Passeio cinema at around 6 p.m. and between shouts of protest against the filthy production commissioned by sordid Wall Street reactionaries stoned the façade, ticket office and luminous billboard hoardings of the movie theatre at length, which its owners had converted into a propaganda mouthpiece for global slaughter. In this way, our people showed the Yankees of Metro Goldwyn Mayer how they reject the expansionist, bloodthirsty policy of the North American capitalists.²¹

For the newspaper 'A Manhã', which was part of the 'healthy press', as the bourgeois press was labeled (in contrast to the 'sick' communist press), the protests at the Metro Passeio cinema against the film *Conspirator* were stoked by some eight 'predatory communists' who managed to escape. According to the newspaper, it was a similar protest to the one that happened shortly before at the Odeon cinema during the screening of the film *Iron Curtain*.²²

20 Cf. "Vigorosa manifestação popular contra um filme guerreiro". 1950. *Imprensa Popular*, April, 19.

21 Cf. "Apedrejado o cinema Metro da Cinelândia." 1950. *Imprensa Popular*. June 28. The newspaper 'Voz operária' also reported the protest: "Groups of members of the public stoned the ticket office and façade of the Cinema Metro do Passeio, thus demonstrating popular repudiation of the American film 'Conspirator', which is a cheap Nazi provocation aimed at the Soviet Union". Cf. "Contra a provocação". 1950. *Voz Operária*, July 1.

22 Cf. "Depredaram o Metro Passeio: Protestos dos comunistas contra o filme em cartaz". 1950. *A Manhã*, June, 28.

The newspaper 'Imprensa Popular' also reported on similar protests in São Paulo. According to the report, the 'paulistas' acted in the same way as the 'cariocas' (Rio de Janeiro inhabitants) in 'voicing their rejection to the Yankee imperialists'. The protests in São Paulo occurred at the premiere itself of the film *Conspirator*, which, according to the newspaper, had awful production values even for "decadent North American cinematography", but in spite of this, it had been shown in the cinemas of the Metro Goldwyn Mayer network as part of the "notorious anti-Soviet and war-mongering campaign unleashed by imperialism". As the report states:

During the showing, different groups of spectators stood up and threw eggs with hydrogen sulphide at the screen, rendering it inoperable, whilst small bombs went off in the building. Taken by surprise, dozens of 'cops' who were guarding the cinema arrested a number of members of the public but it was impossible to prove they had done anything. The few audience members left laughing, satisfied with events, as they saw right from the first few minutes of the film that it was not worth the nine cruzeiros admission.²³

However, unlike the Rio de Janeiro protests, the demonstrations in the Metro and Roxi cinemas in São Paulo appear to have been thwarted, judging by the reports published in the newspapers 'O Globo' on 3rd July 1950 and 'A Manhã' the next day.

Nonetheless, the attempt did not cause panic because the management of these establishments was on their guard and as soon as the first firecracker went off in the movie theatres, the lights went up and the troublemakers were arrested by Political Order police officers. Three communists were arrested in each cinema. The police found on their person low-yield explosive devices and sulphuric acid capsules, in addition to subversive pamphlets.²⁴

Indeed, the precautions taken by cinema managers - requesting preventive policing - stopped the protest from becoming a success. Moreover, the presence of officers from the Department of Political and Social Order suggests the perseverance of such demonstrations.

23 Cf. "Repúdio ao filme Americano. *Imprensa Popular*." 1950. *Imprensa Popular*. Rio de Janeiro, July 4.

24 Cf. "Sob a mesma palavra de ordem." 1950. *O Globo*, July 3; "Tumulto comunista no Metro, de São Paulo", 1950. *A Manhã*. Rio de Janeiro, July 4.

On 2nd November 1951, in Rio de Janeiro, when faced with a spirited protest at the film *Mission to Moscow*, the management of the *Rex* cinema chose to take it off the schedule and replaced it the next day with the film “*O comprador de fazendas* (*The Farm buyer*), penned by the communist writer Monteiro Lobato”. According to the DOPS classified report:

The incident in question, which was reported by some of today’s newspapers as having been the work of vagrants, appears however, to have been committed by red militants used to acts of this nature and who, most definitely having received instructions to carry out such a task as a reprisal for the making of the aforementioned film, which is an indictment of red aggression in Korea, discharged this criminal act with their peculiar brand of fanaticism with no heed to the consequences.²⁵

Just as in this confidential report, in some newspaper articles on protests against screenings of anti-communist films, accusations are made that these protests were being carried out - just like all these militants’ other activities - upon orders from Moscow. Protests related not only to the film *Iron Curtain*, but also to other productions of its kind in São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Montevideo in Uruguay, Lima in Peru and Caracas in Venezuela, in fact hint at the existence of communist guidelines directing these demonstrations. The hypothesis stems from the similarities in the tactics used in these demonstrations against films in different locations and screening periods.

On 1st April 1948, the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs signed an agreement, through confidential document ‘DPO/83/511.(44)’²⁶, with the Uruguayan police force to exchange information on subversive activities that were being carried out throughout Latin America. It was under the auspices of this agreement that DOPS received information from the Uruguayan police on 9th October 1948 regarding ‘serious disturbances’²⁷ that had taken place during the screening of the film *La Cortina de Hierro* (*The Iron Curtain*) at the Trocadero cinema in Montevideo. After concluding their investigations, the Uruguayan police posited, amongst other things, that the demonstration - which was conducted based on the same tactics used in the cities of São Paulo

25 Cf. *Boletim Reservado*, 161 of 3rd Sept. 1951. [flash 1803 – Microfilm 33.] Rio de Janeiro State Archive.

26 Cf. Documento G/1638. 13th Apr. 1948. Office of the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs. National Archives.

27 Cf. Comunismo no Uruguai. DPO /259/600. 1944. 25th Oct. 1948. South American sector. DOPS Background. Rio de Janeiro State Archive.

and Rio de Janeiro - had been meticulously planned, following the example of what had happened in Lima and Caracas while the same film was screened.²⁸

Although we have not found any evidence of the existence of an official guideline directing the communists' action against the screening of anti-communist films, we believe that given the similarities between the demonstrations against the film *Iron Curtain*, that some instructions came from the USSR and were possibly drawn up after *Cominform* (*Communist Information Bureau*) was set up in 1947. Nevertheless, consideration must be given to the fact that although *Cominform* had been set up with the objective of coordinating communist movements in different parts of the world, militants were not simple puppets of Moscow and had a certain degree of independence to act.

Even when faced with the aforementioned protests, the man in the street might not see, and most of the time, not realize the Cold War existed or even understand it, despite being in permanent contact with propaganda stemming from the dénouement of the Berlin Blockade, for example. Despite their global alliances, the USA and USSR strove to establish partnerships and regional treaties in order to extend their political and cultural influence, ideologising parts of the media in the process and making them a battleground for heated disputes.

Conclusion

We realize that culture and politics are not isolated aspects of society, but are instead parts of an integrated whole that form the historical process. In this regards, we agree with Sidnei J. Munhoz when he states that the strategies adopted by the major powers during the Cold War profoundly influenced the lives of everyday citizens throughout the planet and its diverse regions, even if they might not recognize these influences on a daily basis. According to the author,

The image the average citizen had of the conflict, in general, was linked to the messages conveyed by the

28 Cf. Memorandum policial sobre la asonada en el cine trocadero. Office of the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs. National Archives.

mainstream media, films, songs, cartoon strips and other media that produced extremely ideologized and stereotyped images of the confrontation, which is why such sources, which were once undervalued, have been recognized as being of major relevance to studying the effects created by the Cold War throughout the 20th century. (Munhoz 2004, 280-281)

In actual fact, one can monitor in a remarkably realistic fashion how the questions and problems that guided these societies were perceived and dealt with through a specific cultural production. By studying these films and the ways in which they were produced, conveyed and received, we realize that these productions, particularly those that highlighted the Good Neighbor Policy, anti-communism and the American way of life, left deep marks on our society, not only culturally, but also ideologically.

Studying how certain films contributed towards the ideological stance in the contexts of the Good Neighbor Policy and the Iron Curtain implies stretching the possibilities of historical analysis and exploring beyond the cultural influences and behaviors produced by US cinema. By the same token, research on the policies of rapprochement between both countries, concerns about nuclear catastrophe, the various measures to prevent and fight communism adopted in Brazil and the USA and, lastly, the impacts these events exerted on the media, notably cinema, significantly contribute to pushing forward studies related to the influence and, why not say it, the presence of the USA in Brazilian society.

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Solidarity forever: U.S. involvement in brazilian unions, 1945-1965¹

Clifford Andrew Welch

A major question confronting analysts of Latin American labor concerns the relationships among unions, the state, and foreign powers. Some social scientists have argued that the relative autonomy of unions affects the strength of democracy in a given country (Weffort 1978; Hall and Garcia 1989; Epstein 1989; Cohen 1989; Collier and Collier 1991). They have also asserted that Latin America's ability to control its own destiny has been shaped in part by the influence of foreign powers (particularly the United States) over social institutions like unions (Bergquist 1986; Buchanan 1991; Spalding 1992-1993). An evolving branch of labor studies that now offers a unifying perspective for examining this complex set of relationships is the perspective of labor internationalism.

Since the late 1960s, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to this theme in analyzing the development of U.S. labor policy in the region (Spalding 1989). Current transformation of the world economy is making the study of international labor relations even more pertinent. In this context, many recent studies of U.S. involvement in Latin American unions have

1 The author is grateful to the University of New Mexico Press, which kindly granted the rights to the article, which originally appeared as "Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965." 1995. *Latin American Research Review*, v. 30, no. 2 (Spring): 61-88.

focused on Central America and Mexico, while only a few have emphasized South America (Spalding 1988; Frundt 1987; Cantor and Schor 1987; Welch and Pereira 1995).

Although sporadic contacts occurred before and during World War II, U.S. involvement in Brazilian union affairs was formalized during the postwar years (Welch 1987). Motivated by a rising tide of strikes in Brazil, early Cold War worries about communist advances in Latin America, and the frankly imperial objective of exporting U.S. political values and institutional styles, U.S. policymakers decided to teach Brazilians how to manage labor relations in order to maintain productivity, promote stability, and keep out communist agitators. Although these motives remained substantially unchanged during the cold war years, the goals emphasized as well as the means used to implement them changed somewhat over time. In the early heady days that heralded the defeat of fascism, U.S. policymakers rarely questioned their capacity to make the world over in the idealized image of the United States. Once policymakers had secured the collaboration of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the leading two labor union confederations in the U.S., they began to put their training and reporting program into place (Berger 1966, 235-66). Events in Brazil persistently sidetracked U.S. intentions, however, and forced various changes in tactics.

For the purposes of the study, the period from 1945 to 1965 has been subdivided into three shorter phases, each reflecting a shift in the execution of U.S. labor policy. From 1945 to 1952, the United States focused on fostering institutional change in Brazil. From 1952 until 1962, when President João Goulart began to take control of Brazil, U.S. representatives sought to implement a training and exchange program. After 1962, US operatives apparently lost patience and began to anticipate working with the military government that overthrew Goulart in 1964.

The U.S. point of view, 1945-1952

The period beginning with the closing months of World War II and lasting until 1952 laid the cornerstones of U.S. labor policy in Brazil. These

foundations included isolating communist and nationalist unions and making a commitment to implanting among Brazilian workers an idealized version of the trade-union movement in the United States. The first steps toward these goals involved creating a Brazilian national labor federation modeled on the AFT and securing its affiliation with US-sponsored international organizations. In the meantime, a collaborative relationship developed between the recently merged AFL-CIO and the US State Department, one that existed until the close of the 20th century.

In August 1945, U.S. consul general in São Paulo Cecil Cross advocated sending interested Brazilian union leaders on a tour of the United States. Several of them had come to him seeking information about labor conditions in the United States and Cross was convinced that the effect of such a tour “would be both profound and permanent.” The growing number of strikes in the state of São Paulo and the increasing militancy of many workers and leaders deeply concerned him: “The whole São Paulo labor situation has entered a period of flux and reorientation, and time is a crucial factor.”²

The U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Adolph Berle, Jr., agreed that something should be done. He and his staff soon developed a proposal entitled “Informational Program Directed toward Brazilian Labor.” It called for using films, books, news bulletins, and exhibitions to “promote a better understanding of U.S. labor and laboring conditions among Brazilian workers.” The understanding conveyed was to be selective, however. According to Berle, “The emphasis should be on efforts toward cooperative solution [of problems] and not on the existence of conflict either among workers or as between labor and other economic and social groups.” To this end, Berle suggested that the propaganda program highlight the presence of “company towns and stores” in the United States, even though US labor considered them “an element of oppression.”³

Cross was attracted to the ambitious plan proposed by his boss and urged Washington to back the extensive propaganda and training campaign: “The moment is particularly favorable for the putting forward of the American

2 Cross to the Secretary of State, 22 Aug 1945, Record Group 59, Decimal File 832.5043, Dept of State, U.S. National Archives. Hereafter, U.S. State Department documents will be cited in abbreviated form: RG number, DF decimal number, DS/USNA.

3 Berle to the Secretary of State, “Informational Program...,” 19 Sept 1945, RG 59, DF 832.504, Dept of State, USNA, with enclosures: US labor attaché Edward J Rowell, “American Propaganda to Brazilian Workers”; and Convey Egan of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in Brazil, “Informational Activities Aimed at Brazilian Working-Class Audiences.”

point of view” among Brazilian union leaders.⁴ The plan also captured the imagination of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Spruille Braden, although he could not endorse the consul’s sense of urgency. Two major stumbling blocks stood in the way of the plan’s immediate implementation. As had occurred in Brazil, demobilization in the United States had ended the wartime cease-fire between labor and capital. In 1945 and 1946, US industrial relations exploded in some of the largest and longest strikes in the country’s history. By visiting this kind of living classroom, Braden wrote, the Brazilians would learn only how to run a U.S.-style strike. In addition, Braden was worried that the program would give “rise to accusations” that the United States “was attempting to practice an indirect form of intervention in the internal affairs” of Brazil. The benefits to be derived from the proposals were not worth the risk, in his opinion, and the government therefore should not “invite such accusations gratuitously.”⁵

Berle agreed with Braden that the propaganda campaign would be more effective (and less likely to be criticized) if carried out by U.S. labor unions.⁶ But the division of the US labor movement into two distinct umbrella organizations frustrated the state department’s plans. Fundamental differences had led the CIO and AFL to endorse and pursue contrary policies in Latin America. At the Mexico City conference on war and peace in February 1945, the AFT backed the liberal economic measures introduced by the United States, which called for unrestricted trade, minimal state economic intervention, and private-sector development. The CIO, in contrast, backed the policy recommendations of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL), a ten-year-old inter-American labor organization based in Mexico that supported protectionist tariffs and state-directed development of basic industries (Mosk 1950, 12-25; Levenstein 1971, 206-42; Quintanilla Obregon 1982, 12-58). Although the U.S. State Department clearly preferred the AFL over the CIO, it had been unwilling thus far to risk alienating one union by openly favoring the other.⁷

4 Cross to the Dept of State, 20 Sept 1945, Airgram no. 144, RG 59, DF 832.5043, Dept of State, USNA.

5 Braden to Dr. Inman, 6 Feb 1946; and Braden to Frank B. Kellogg, 6 March 1946, in the Papers of Serafino Romualdi, box 9, file 1, Labor-Management Documentation Center, Martin P. Catherwood Library, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Hereafter, cited as Romualdi Papers, with box and file numbers given as (box)9/1(file).

6 Berle to the Secretary of State, “Informational Program,” 19 Sept 1945, RG 59, DF 832.504, Dept of State, USNA

7 See Berger 1966, pages 235-66; and James Byrnes, Secretary of State, 11 June 1946, RG 59, DF 810.504, Dept of State, USNA.

But as economic conditions in Brazil worsened, US officials became increasingly concerned about the enhanced potential there for the growth of the Communist Party (the Partido Comunista do Brasil, or PCB). US labor attaché Edward Rowell reported, “The consensus in labor circles is that the PCB is growing in strength..., and unless there is a marked change in general economic conditions it will truly dominate any elections that might be held, let us say, four or six years hence.”⁸ Given these pressures, in mid-1946 the State Department quietly turned to the AFL for help. Embassies in Latin America were ordered to give “informal assistance” to Serafino Romualdi, the AFL’s chosen inter-American representatives, who was scheduled to tour the region in June of that year. But Secretary of State James Byrnes also warned officials to “avoid any formal sponsorship of Mr. Romualdi’s activities that might give rise to charges that the State Department is favoring the AFL over the Congress of Industrial Organizations.”⁹

An Italian émigré, Romualdi was a fervent anticommunist and a strong trade unionist who had been working since 1943 to persuade the AFL to adopt a direct role in Latin American unions. While serving as an agent of the Office of Strategic Services in 1944 and 1945, Romualdi had developed contacts among Italian unions in Brazil (Berger 1990, 5). Certain that the United States would “set the pace of industrial expansion” in South America, he argued that it was up to labor unions throughout the hemisphere to ensure that this expansion also raised the standard of living of all workers.¹⁰ In response, the AFL hierarchy agreed that it was important “to raise labor standards in the South American countries so that there would be an equitable basis for commerce between the two continents.”¹¹ Later, AFL Vice President George Meany argued that it was “up to the AFL to see to it that the workers of Latin America understand our philosophy, understand our desire to create a solid front among the working people of the hemisphere and to see to it these people do not listen to the mouthings of those who receive their orders from Moscow.”¹²

8 Rowell, “Memorandum to Paul Daniels,” 14 March 1946, enclosure in Clarence C. Brooks to the Secretary of State, 18 March 1946, Despatch no. 4526, RG 59, DF 832.5045, Dept of State, USNA.

9 James Byrnes to US embassies and consulates in Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Quito, Bogotá, Panama City, and Mexico City, 11 June 1946, RG 59, DF 810.504, Dept of State, USNA.

10 Romualdi to Matthew Woll, 18 Dec 1943, Romualdi Papers, 1/1. See also Romualdi 1947 and 1967; Berger 1990.

11 Minutes of the meeting of the Committee on International Labor Relations, American Federation of Labor, 2 Aug 1946, as cited in Berger 1966, page 264.

12 Meany, “Pan-American Day Address, 11 Oct. 1946, cited in Romualdi 1967, page 47.

Romualdi's June trip to Latin America launched a pattern of collaboration between U.S. policymakers and AFL operatives that came to characterize US involvement in regional union affairs. In Rio de Janeiro, the US embassy staff received Romualdi warmly, and in São Paulo, Cross placed his staff at the labor envoy's "disposal with instructions to cooperate to the limit." As Romualdi reported later, his mission in Brazil would have been impossible to carry out without the assistance of US government personnel (Romualdi 1967, 47). Following the announcement of President Harry Truman's famous 1947 doctrine of communist containment, the AFL-State Department partnership solidified further. Meeting with Braden in April, Romualdi reported that "the attitude of the State Department towards our [AFL] efforts to combat Communists and other totalitarian influences in Latin American labor, will from now on be not only sympathetic but cooperative." Romualdi claimed that Braden "went even further by pledging...whatever assistance (compatible with the obvious limitations of non-direct government interference and diplomatic propriety) we may require in our work...."¹³ Official support for the AFL indeed intensified in subsequent years.

Making two trips to Latin America in 1946, Romualdi focused on developing contacts with pro-US unionists and appealing for their help in establishing a new hemispheric labor organization that was intended to rival the Mexico-based CTAL. Romualdi agreed with the US State Department in considering the CTAL a communist-directed organization because of its affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The WFTU was an international labor organization composed of national union groups as diverse as the British Trade Unions Council, the CIO, and many Soviet labor federations (Kofas 1992; Weiler 1981). In general, WFTU member organizations were statist unions that depended more on the government for their legitimacy and effectiveness than did the so-called free trade and craft unions belonging to the AFL. In this sense, Brazilian unions too were far more statist than free.

The modern structure of Brazilian unions had been established largely by the Estado Novo, a corporatist system imposed between 1937 and 1945 under the rule of President Getúlio Vargas. In 1943, the corporatist labor relations system was codified in the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho* (CLT), with executive authority vested in the labor ministry. Under this structure, the

13 Romualdi to Florence Thorne (secretary to AFL President William Green), 15 April 1947, Romualdi Papers, 9/2.

state could exercise enormous control over unions, including the power to recognize petitions to form new unions, administer the election of officers, collect and distribute union dues (known in Brazil as *o imposto sindical*), and place uncooperative unions in trusteeship (Brasil 1943; French 1992). According to the much more liberal U.S. views on state-labor relations, this system constituted a nightmare. Romualdi flatly stated that the government's control of the unions was "one of the major contributing factors of the political chaos and economic disaster that plagued Brazil," and he urged Brazilian labor leaders to liberate their organizations from "every form of government control and domination."¹⁴

Without reflecting on the inherent contradictions, Romualdi was in effect advising his peers in Brazil to use the government to escape the government. He also encouraged fellow unionists to secure labor ministry approval for establishing a national labor federation like the AFL. The new Brazilian body would be able to select delegates to attend the upcoming conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO). They would then join with others in "plans for the organization of an Inter-American body opposed to totalitarianism." This body would serve as a regional arm of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the global organization eventually established by the AFL to compete with the WFTU. Finally, in various meetings with labor leaders, Romualdi advised the Brazilians to send selected members to the United States and to invite AFL experts to Brazil to learn "the elementary rules of independent trade unionism."¹⁵

Romualdi arrived in Brazil at a crucial moment in the national struggle for labor autonomy. Since the end of fighting in the European theatre of WWII, forces had been marshaled supporting or opposing the continuation of Vargas's tenure as head of state. One of these factors was labor, and even though Vargas was forced out of office in October 1945, the labor movement continued to play an influential role in politics during this period of democratization. One of the most active groups in 1945 and 1946 was the PCB-led Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (MUT). Although it lacked official status, the MUT supported the corporatist labor system as a means of protecting the working class from the capitalist class and sought to strengthen it in collaboration with the government. In January 1946,

14 "Meeting with Trade-Union Leaders" in Romualdi to Woll, 5 July 1946, Romualdi Papers, 2/6.

15 Romualdi to Woll, 5 July 1946, Romualdi Papers, 2/6.

MUT coordinators sponsored a conference in São Paulo that urged workers to support the formation of a permanent national labor federation (Carone 1981, 186-88). Organized workers in various cities responded to the call, but the government outlawed the MUT in April and intervened to replace the officers of MUT-linked unions (Werneck Vianna 1976, 254-6).

U.S. officials did not uniformly support the repression of the MUT. Rowell, the U.S. labor attaché in Rio, worried that the government's actions would only strengthen the appeal of the PCB and emphasized the need for positive alternatives. In Rowell's view, what was needed was for "the government or the producing classes to embark on a program that would result in genuine improvements in the standard of living of the working classes and the elimination of the elements which they feel are exploiting them."¹⁶

Romualdi welcomed the MUT's demise. He believed the institutional power of the labor ministry could be used to overcome the spirited organizing work of the PCB. He therefore proposed the idea of having the ministry seize the MUT's strategy and itself sponsor the creation of a national labor federation. Romualdi was sure the ministry would exclude militants and communists, the first order of business in his mind. Demonstrating that the autonomy of Brazilian labor could wait, Romualdi met covertly with a number of ministry officials in June 1946. He was pleased when Minister Octacílio Negro de Lima announced plans to hold a national labor congress in Recife at the end of July.¹⁷ Supporters of the original MUT conference were still powerful in the unions, however, and to buy time to ensure a compliant delegation, the ministry postponed the congress until late September and moved it to the national capital in Rio.¹⁸

16 Rowell to the Sec. of State, 26 July 1946, 832.5043 and Parsloe to U.S. embassy (Rio), 23 February 1946, both RG 59, DF, DS/USNA. Generally speaking, Rowell was more independent-minded than most incoming U.S. foreign policymakers, to such an extent that some questioned his politics. See French 1992, page 342 n47.

17 Romualdi to Woll, 5 July 1946, Romualdi Papers, 2/6. That Romualdi so quickly embraced the small, government-linked labor sector seems to contradict his stated desire to free Brazilian unions from ministry oversight. In retrospect, this contradiction apparently disturbed him as well. In the memoir he wrote twenty years later, he emphasized how careful he was to avoid contact with government officials because he "refused to be a party to the government's domination of labor." While in Brazil, however, Romualdi met regularly with a number of labor ministry officials and boasted of his access to ministers and presidents. See Romualdi 1967, page 273.

18 Attaché Clarence Brooks to the Secretary of State, 2 August 1946, RG 59, 832.5043 DF, DS/USNA. The attaché said that his insights were drawn from "conversations with responsible officers in the Ministry of Labor...." There are no definitive accounts of this important congress; conflicting information can be found in the documents used here and in Rodrigues (1986, 538), French, (1992, 189-95), and Werneck Vianna (1976, 257-60).

The ministry's efforts to control the outcome of the congress proved futile. Revealing the independence of the labor movement, the congress embarrassed the government by demonstrating the smallness of the minority of unionists willing to practice what Romualdi preached. More than 2,000 delegates, representing over 1,000 unions, attended the meeting. They fell into three main factions: those aligned with the PCB, those backing the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), and those going along with the labor ministry. While the majority PCB- and PTB-linked delegates agreed on a variety of resolutions, including steps toward greater autonomy, the three-way division of the delegates became controversial when the subject of establishing a national labor federation was introduced. Delegates loyal to the ministry, including those whom Romualdi had recently befriended, confronted PCB members and walked out in protest. "The labor ministry's faithful minority abandoned the meeting," reported *The Economist*, and the labor minister dissolved the congress. A few days later, on 22 September, more than 1,000 dissident delegates met and formed the Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (CTB). In a separate convention, some 240 pro-government delegates founded the Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores (CNT). When the congress exposed the government's weak labor support, the ministry used its power to mask the loss of face by recognizing only the CNT.¹⁹ The legal standing of the CTB remained uncertain, even though supporters viewed it as collaborator rather than opponent to the state-centered labor relations system (Werneck Vianna 1976, 259).

Romualdi milked the split for all its potential benefits. The incident had shaken from the woods "stooges" and "fellow travelers" as well as Communists, all of whom could be isolated by their affiliation to the CTB. Meanwhile, Romualdi's allies in the CNT could benefit from governmental favoritism. His divisionist tactics were rewarded when the AFL's recently selected São Paulo corresponding secretary, Deocleciano Hollanda de Cavalcanti (president of the city's food workers' union), was named as the first president of the CNT. Further encouragement came when the labor ministry agreed to sponsor sending a CNT delegate, Renato Socci of the Rio maritime workers federation, to the Montreal convention of the ILO.²⁰

19 See *The Economist*, 19 October 1946, cited in Goldman to Hussey, 20 November 1946; see also Rowell to State, Despatch no. 594, 17 September 1946; and John Edgar Hoover to Jack Neal, 1 October 1946, all in RG 59, 832.504/3 DF, DS/USNA. See also Telles (1981, pages 243-59).

20 See Romualdi (1967, 45-48) and Romualdi to the AFL International Relations Committee, 10 September 1946, Romualdi Papers, 9/1.

But Romualdi's dream of eventually dealing with only the CNT was ultimately frustrated by Brazilian law and politics. A number of federal legislators complained that the government had overstepped its authority by recognizing the CNT because the 1946 constitution had no provisions for a national labor body. The Brazilian Congress would have to amend the law, but the legislature was divided over the issue. Conservatives saw no benefit in loosening government control over the labor movement, while PCB and PTB representatives preferred to see the CTB recognized rather than the CNT. After much debate, the law was left unchanged, and the ministry had to retract its recognition from the CNT because the labor code permitted unions to unify nationally only within economic sectors. Consequently, the CNT was transformed in April 1947 into two separate groups: the CNTI (Confederacao Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Industria) for industrial workers and the CNTC (Confederacao Nacional dos Trabalhadores no Comercio) for workers in commerce (Telles 1981, 179-93). These changes left no room at all for the CTB. It was therefore outlawed in May, when the ministry intervened in 400 of 944 legally recognized unions and ousted their officers (Carone 1982, 281-83).

Finding his allies' efforts to establish a central federation blocked, Romualdi turned his attention in 1947 to winning Brazilian affiliation with a regional labor organization called the Confederacion Inter-Americano de Trabajo (CIT). In August Romualdi went to Brazil again, but rather than try to organize support among labor leaders, he concentrated on the government, knowing that Brazilian law prohibited unions from joining any international organization. Changing the law would take time, so he lobbied the labor ministry to allow delegates to attend the CIT's founding congress scheduled for Lima in January 1948. He reasoned that once the CIT had been established with Brazilian participation, lobbying to change the law could proceed more methodically. Strangely unconcerned about his contacts with the Brazilian government, Romualdi reported in his memoir that, "the Minister of Labor and the Presidential entourage wanted to know many, many things before committing themselves. Above all, they wanted to know the position of the American Embassy and the United States Government vis-a-vis this proposed Lima meeting. Although I could not speak for the State Department, I assured the Brazilians that my demarché was favored by Washington. In a few days I was promised that a large delegation would attend the Lima Conference" (Romualdi 1967, 71-72). Romualdi related that after President Eurico Gaspar Dutra consulted with him, the chief executive made the decision himself. But

as Romualdi was to discover, Dutra's willingness to send delegates to Lima was not the same as pushing for the legal changes that would allow Brazilian unions to affiliate with the CIT.

Although a Brazilian delegate was elected as one of CIT's ten vice presidents (Cid Cabral de Mello, president of the Rio commercial workers' federation), affiliation would be another four years in coming. Brazilians soon realized that the CIT was advocating U.S. values and policy, not Latin American beliefs and desires, and so they postponed joining it. Ideologically, the platform of the CIT was inconsistent with the Brazilian political and labor relations system. Its main ideas – national labor unity, collective bargaining, the unhampered right to strike, and universal manhood suffrage – all conflicted with the corporatist ideology of managed political and economic participation that dominated the Brazilian state. According to the labor code, both workers and employers alike were organized in state-sanctioned syndicates that were neither free trade unions nor voluntary professional associations. Their bargaining activities were regulated purposefully by the state, not by market forces. The interests of each group were not to be fought out in the street but through the administrative and judicial arms of the labor ministry, an institution that claimed to represent the greater interests of both capital and labor, just as a father knows the interests of his children. Moreover, Brazilians acquired the right to vote not by turning 21-years-old but by demonstrating through one's education or membership in a syndicate that one was prepared to contribute to the progress of the fatherland (Gomes 1988). These values were deeply ingrained in Brazilian society, to such an extent that at least one worker-delegate to the Lima conference, Antônio Soares Campos of the Rio maritime workers federation, vehemently opposed affiliation, claiming the CIT "upheld principles of the class struggle incompatible with the Brazilian social system."²¹

The Dutra administration's objections to affiliation were less philosophical and more pragmatic than the seafarer's. To the great dissatisfaction of the Brazilian government, the CIT stressed U.S. objectives in the region rather than Latin American ones. Before Dutra approved the Lima delegation, he asked Romualdi if he would be able to count on support from the CIT at an inter-American economic conference scheduled for March 1948. Like other Latin American nations, Brazil wanted U.S. support for its plans for post-

21 Charge d'Affairs in Rio embassy to the Secretary of State, 5 March 1948, RG 59, 832.5043 DE, DS/USNA.

war development. As is well known, the Truman administration refused to support these ambitions, arguing that rebuilding Europe had to take priority over an industrializing Latin America.²² Romualdi's response to Dutra's request was vague but his role at the Lima conference left no doubt that the CIT was going to place U.S. objectives ahead of Brazilian ones. For example, Romualdi helped strike down motions supporting Dutra's position favoring economic planning and criticizing U.S. imperialism, and Romualdi succeeded in eliminating any language that might "be contrary to the economic views of the U.S. labor movement." (Romualdi 1967, 82-82)

Dutra soured on the CIT, adopting a non-committal stance. Although the government did not prevent Brazilian labor representatives from attending CIT meetings, it refused to finance such trips with union funds and stalled on the question of affiliation. Only when pressured by U.S. Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson, who personally discussed the matter with Dutra's foreign and labor ministers in October 1950, did the president finally send a message to congress requesting the required legislative amendments. By that time, Dutra was a lame-duck president. With Getúlio Vargas contesting the presidency, politics were in transition and no action would be taken on the question for another two years.²³

Vargas won the October 1950 presidential election by appealing for working-class support (French 1992, 247-67). The issue of affiliation remained central to U.S. labor policy, but it was not as important to Vargas and his new administration. While Vargas was suspicious and fearful of PCB strength in the labor movement, he wanted to reward workers for their support of his candidacy and therefore allowed new union elections to be held in order to clear away the government-appointed trustees (*interventores*) put in place by his predecessor. More confident of labor's allegiance to his labor party, Vargas was ready to consider the question of affiliation by 1952 when he appointed José de Segades Vianna as labor minister.

22 The content of the Romualdi-Dutra conversation is revealed in Clarence Brooks to Secretary of State, 5 November 1947, RG59, 832.5043 DE, DS/USNA.

23 In a January 1952 memorandum, labor attaché Henry S. Hammond speculated as to why affiliation was still unrealized: an "inner government circle" might be pushing the project; Brazilian congress really was backlogged with more important matters; or the Vargas administration disliked the current labor leadership and wanted it changed before permission to affiliate would be granted. Hammond to embassy counsel Sheldon T. Mills, 10 January 1952. Hammond's replacement, Irving Salert, suggested a fourth reason: that Cavalcanti (Romualdi's principal labor ally in Brazil) was feuding with CIT president Bernardo Ibanez and was therefore unwilling to lobby the administration for affiliation. Salert to Sec. of State, 5 March 1952, Despatch No. 1460. Both in RG 84, 310/Post Files, DS/USNA.

A PTB legislator and one of the key framers of Brazilian labor law, Vianna had ambitions to head the International Labor Organization. But this prestigious position could not be won if Brazil continued to snub the Americans and their international labor bodies such as the Ogranizacion Regional Interamericana de Trabajo (ORIT), which had replaced the CIT in January. Thus in anticipation of an ILO congress in Geneva, Vianna and Vargas pressured congress to allow affiliation in July.²⁴ Vargas was soon rewarded when the ORIT held its second congress in Rio de Janeiro to honor and fortify its new Brazilian alliances.²⁵

By 1952, the cornerstones of U.S. involvement in Brazilian unions had been set in place. The AFL and CIO had been unified and the CTAL overshadowed by the U.S.-dominated ORIT.²⁶ Communist and nationalist leaders had been isolated, alliances had been made with anticommunist leaders, and an institutional structure compatible with U.S. interests had been established. Yet not one of these achievements had been fulfilled according to plan, nor had action been taken on the propaganda and educational program proposed back in 1945. Consequently, none of the stones sat quite right. Leftist-nationalist leaders may have been thrust out of the limelight, but they still retained substantial popularity. Those allied with the U.S. perspective, in contrast, were some of the least popular of leaders. John Fishburn, a career Latin American labor specialist working in the State Department from 1943 to 1966, observed, "ORIT took on all the fallen labor leaders."²⁷ Meanwhile, the union structure remained statist and politicized, a situation U.S. operatives claimed to oppose but had little trouble accommodating, even nurturing. Perhaps the most striking thing about this foundation was its instability, for

24 US labor attaché Salert to State, 19 May 1952, Despatch No. 1941, RG 59, 832.06 DF, and Salert to Sec. of State, 25 July 1952, Despatch No. 131, RG 84, PF 310, both DS/USNA.

25 ISalert to the Dept of State, Despatch No. 917, and U.S. Embassy in Montevideo to the Department of State, Despatch No. 492, both RG 84, PF 310/Labor, DS/USNA.

26 This event was important to the U.S. because it meant that Latin American unions lacking AFL endorsement would have no other place to turn to get support from their comparatively rich union brothers in the United States. In a confidential circular to consular offices in Latin America, the State Department underscored this implication: "CIO participation also makes it impossible for the Communist-led CTAL to utilize alleged support or sympathies from any important United States labor organization." Because ORIT "holds a number of objectives in common with the United States Government, including opposition to aggressive totalitarianism," the circular advised foreign service officers to "cooperate" with the organization. See, Department of State Inter-American Affairs, Regional Circular No. 4, 8 May 1951, RG 84, PF 560, DS/USNA.

26. John T. Fishburn, former attaché to the US Dept of Labor, interviewed by author, Woodstock, VA., 27 April 1985.

27 John T. Fishburn, former attaché to the US Dept of Labor, interviewed by author, Woodstock, VA., 27 April 1985.

it seemed that both the Brazilian government and labor movement responded more to local considerations than the wishes of the United States.

Orit and point iv, 1952-1962

After the CNTI (the Brazilian industrial workers confederation) joined ORIT in 1952, the international organization set up a travel and training program much like the one proposed by Cross and Berle just after the war. Funded under the Point IV initiative announced by President Truman in his 1949 inaugural address on the “four freedoms,” the new program counted on close cooperation between the U.S. Foreign Service and ORIT directors like the AFL’s Romualdi. As Fishburn explained to me, “ORIT was bought and paid for by Uncle Sam.” Romualdi, Fishburn and their colleagues first identified “suitable” leaders to send to the U.S. for training, which invariably meant anticommunist leaders. The ultimate goal of the Point IV program was to make them pro-United States. In this way, it promised to help with the all-important struggle against communist and independent (i.e. nationalist, Peronist, socialist, or simply uncooperative) unionists (Thorp 1950; Hanson 1950; Griffith 1982). Romualdi, Fishburn and other officials expected great results from this effort over the course of the decade.²⁸

The purpose of Point IV was to fight communism with prosperity, as suggested by the very title of the enabling legislation, the Mutual Security Act. Sections 516 and 528 of the act called on the U.S. to encourage the establishment in participating countries of “fair labor standards of wages and working conditions” and the development of “free labor union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor.” According to the guidelines, the goals of Point IV were to increase productivity and foster “balanced economic and social development” as well as “a strong free trade-union movement [that would] contribute to all of these objectives and [be] the best assurance against the invasion of workers’ groups by professional communist and other revolutionaries.”²⁹ These were precisely the principles guiding ORIT. In the

28 Ibid.

29 “Policy Guidance Regarding Labor and Manpower Aspects of Technical Cooperation Program,” a confidential policy statement from the Acting Administrator to Technical Cooperation Country Director, All Missions, 5 March 1952, RG 84, PF 560, DS/USNA.

context of the 1950s, both the US State Department and the AFL viewed technical training and assistance as central to fulfilling this mission.

The first Point IV training program for Brazil got underway in January 1953, when a group of ten students arrived at American University in Washington, DC. These first trainees were not labor leaders but technicians of the Brazilian labor ministry and instructors in a management-run, government-sanctioned worker training and assistance program called the Serviço Social da Indústria (SESI).³⁰ During their six-month stay, they studied United States labor economics, statistics, and history. After three weeks of intensive English, the group turned to “an analysis of the human factors influencing productivity,” the overall theme of the program.³¹ Later, they moved to Pennsylvania State College for a six-week program in U.S. trade-union history, structure, and operations.³² The Brazilians spent their final weeks visiting unions and factories to observe operations.

U.S. policymakers may have planned to influence the ministry and SESI professionals (as well as their future working class students) by training these visitors first. Such employees were natural choices for the program since the double-edged sword of anticommunism and enhancing labor force productivity was shared by the Brazilian institution. As the industrialist and co-founder Roberto Simonsen explained: “SESI...will enable the Brazilian working masses to cross the Red Sea of oppressive and inhumane totalitarianism without wetting their feet in it, and, after the undoubtedly arduous journey, [the workers] will breathe the clean Brazilian air, purified by our civic spirit and by our vocation for democracy.” (Weinstein 1990, 398; Gomes 1988)

But although American and Brazilian goals were similar, the two countries’ interests often diverged, generating tensions between officials. For example, U.S. officials were convinced that trade unions free of management and government control were ideal and therefore wanted to eliminate the

30 Maximilian Wallach (Chief, American Republics Program Operations) to U.S. labor attaché Irving Salert, “Brazilian Labor Department Group,” 28 January 1953, RG 84, Rio de Janeiro PF, DS/USNA.

31 U.S. Department of Labor, Office of International Labor Affairs, “Tentative Point IV Training Program for Brazilian Labor Department Group 1, January 26-July 25, 1953,” RG 84, Rio de Janeiro PF, DS/USNA.

32 Some of the instructors at Pennsylvania State were professors Joseph Raybeck, Edward Abramson, Eugene A. Myers, Ronaldo Donovan, Fred Hoehler, Jr., and A. H. Reeds. Eugene A. Myers to the Policy Committee, “Weekly Report No. 3,” 2 March 1953, RG 84, PF (Rio), DS/USNA.

interventionist aspects of the labor ministry. In January 1956, Romualdi revealed a four-point plan he had worked out with the new U.S. ambassador to Brazil, James Dunn. The first two points called for "lifting the strangling government control over union bargaining procedures" and "stopping the practice of government intervention" in Brazilian unions.³³ This was anathema to Brazilian bureaucrats, who believed the labor movement would either fall apart or fall into the hands of the Communists without ministry intervention. The United States recognized the potential for disruption but claimed to prefer to risk it, confident that such efforts would eventually win over the Brazilians.³⁴

As one might expect, shades of difference separated AFL and government opinions on this point. AFL operatives showed greater interest in the withering away of the Brazilian state than did U.S. policymakers. For the latter, the allegiances and character of those holding the reins of power mattered most. If U.S. officials liked the current Brazilian labor minister, then Brazilian government meddling in the labor movement troubled them less than if the minister was someone they distrusted.

While the 1953 training session was underway in the United States, three Brazilian labor leaders were sent to an ORIT training school at the University of Puerto Rico. The unionists selected were Enoch Gresenberg, president of the Light and Power Union of São Paulo, Alberto Bettamio, president of the Rio de Janeiro Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Empresas Comerciais de Minérios e Combustíveis Minerais, and Luiz José Baptista Guimarães, president of Rio's Sindicato dos Empregados no Comércio. The U.S. consul general in São Paulo picked Gresenberg, while Irving Salert, the new U.S. labor attaché at the embassy in Rio, chose the other two. Salert seemed to have been impressed by the commitment of his nominees to union work, describing Bettamio's union as "one of the few...that has completely organized the industry" in Rio. The union had also set up a primary school for the children of members. Guimarães appealed to Salert because of his

33 Romualdi to George Meany, "Background Information on Brazilian President-elect Kubitschek," 4 January 1956, Romualdi Papers, 2/5. By using the term "intervention" in the second point, Romualdi referred to a specific ministry capacity to unseat elected union officials, appoint a caretaker board of directors, and order new elections.

34 In 1953 and 1956, the U.S. labor studies scholar Robert J. Alexander traveled on fact-finding missions to Latin America for the AFL. On both occasions, he commented on government control of the labor movement in Brazil. He also argued that while liberalization might benefit communists initially, there was "no alternative but to continue to push for the conversion of the remnants of the fascist corporate system into real trade unionism." See, Alexander, "Report from Robert Alexander," Uruguay, 13 May 1956, Romualdi Papers, 2/6.

knowledge of Brazilian labor law and his cooperation in helping the labor attaché establish worker education programs in Rio.³⁵ It should also be noted that Gresenberg and Bettamio worked in strategic industries (electric utilities and oil production) where foreign investment, ownership, and control was an important issue at the time (Skidmore 1967).

Regarding the ORIT program, the U.S. government coordinator of Point IV, Maximilian Wallach, stayed “in almost daily contact with Serafino Romualdi.” Wallach claimed that “most of the arrangements for the ORIT project [were] done by my shop,” meaning the American Republics Program of the U.S. Department of Labor.³⁶ In 1954 Salert selected eight Brazilian unionists to send to a new ORIT school in Montevideo, Uruguay. In May Salert himself was given permission by the State Department to shelve his embassy duties for two weeks in order to lecture at the school.³⁷ In October 1955, Salert prepared Romualdi’s itinerary for a visit to Brazil that included a meeting with Ambassador Dunn. As Salert reported, the AFL operative “urged” the ambassador to support Romualdi’s effort to provide a Brazilian university with a Point IV grant. He also thanked Dunn for backing the labor-leader exchange program and explained that the AFL worked “closely with U.S. government agencies” to make sure the Brazilians visiting the U.S. “understand the necessity of combating communism in a positive way.”³⁸

In reality the budget for the Brazilian leader exchange program was quite small: less than four thousand dollars in 1954, and about five thousand in 1955. These figures represented about 1 percent of the total annual budget for U.S. propaganda in Brazil.³⁹ Frustrated by this low level of support, Salert argued for expanding the program significantly in 1957. He recommended sponsoring 150 Brazilian labor leaders on three-month trips to the United States every year until 10 percent of the leadership of national, state and local unions had gotten a chance to see U.S. trade unions in action. Salert claimed that “literally hundreds of applicants” had called on him for scholarships. In his view, the program had already “become the most important adjunct to

35 Salert to Romualdi, 16 January 1953, RG 84, Rio PF, DS/USNA.

36 Wallach to Salert, 28 January 1953, p. 2, RG 84, Rio labor PF, DS/USNA.

37 Salert to Wallach, 18 August 1953, RG 84, Rio labor PF, and Smith to U.S. Embassy, Airgram No. 317, 29 April 1954, RG 84, Rio PF 310, both DS/USNA.

38 Salert to the Department of State, Despatch No. 573, 28 October 1955, RG 84, Rio labor PF 560, DS/USNA.

39 U.S. Information Service attaché William C. Trimble to the Ambassador, “USIS Operations,” 28 September 1954, RG 84, Brazil-USA Rio PF 320, DS/USNA.

the Brazilian trade union movement” and an essential tool aiding leaders to “become articulate champions of democracy and anti-communism.”⁴⁰

The actual effectiveness of the program is difficult to measure. Officials like Salert and Romualdi sang its praises, wasting no chance to celebrate successes and to report back to Washington the glowing comments of Brazilians just returned from the States. For example, in a 1957 dispatch, Salert quoted at length Hilario José Buselatto, city councilman and union man from Caxias do Sul in the state of Rio Grande do Sul: “I know now why American workers are anti-communist. They live and work with dignity.... [N]ow I have seen the living conditions myself.... We have to rid our unions of communists and I will lead the fight.”⁴¹ Another trainee, Domingos Savino, identified as president of the “Union of Workers in Farinaceous Industries,” reported to the consulate in São Paulo an incident in which he claimed to have successfully out-debated PCB leader Luis Carlos Prestes in a discussion of U.S. economic imperialism.⁴² In November 1958, a number of graduates of the program established the Eloy Chaves Club in São Paulo.⁴³ Much to the satisfaction of U.S. officials, club members traveled about the state recounting their positive experiences in the U.S. and explaining “free trade unionism.”⁴⁴

Close alliance with the United States did not guarantee a labor leader’s success in Brazil, however. The careers of two of the first ORIT trainees, Gresenberg and Bettamio, actually collapsed after their training in 1953. Gresenberg’s opponents for election to the São Paulo Light and Power union used his visit to the U.S. to discredit him in the eyes of union members. Thus, shortly after his return from abroad, Gresenberg lost re-election as president

40 Salert to the Dept of State, “Labor Participation Project for Fiscal Year 1957,” 5 September 1956, Despatch No. 270, RG 59, DF 832.06/9-556, DS/USNA. In this same despatch, Salert claimed that “approximately 1,000 well-trained communist agents” were operating within Brazilian unions. His proposal for building up labor leadership purportedly would have bridged this training gap in ten years.

41 Salert to Dept of State, Despatch No. 939, 20 February 1957, RG 59, DF 832.062/2-2057, DS/USNA.

42 São Paulo Consul General Richard P Butrick to Dept of State, Despatch No. 163, 10 October 1958, RG 59, DF 832.062/10-1058, DS/USNA.

43 This organization was named after the São Paulo State Secretary of Justice and Public Safety, who convinced industrialists to negotiate a settlement with workers in the 1917 general strike rather than simply repressing it.

44 43. Several reports, including Butrick to Dept of Stae, Despatch no. 62, 13 Aug 1958, RG 59, DF 832.062/8-1358, and Consul Ralph J. Burton to Dept of state, Despatch no. 341, 20 Jan 1959, DF 832.062/1-2059, both in Dept of State, USNA.

of the union and decided to abandon union work.⁴⁵ In 1957 Bettamio also failed to win election as president of the national-level organization of his union, the oil workers' federation. According to Salert, Bettamio lost by 250 votes out of 2,500 cast, to a slate led by Domenico Sergio. Charging fraud, he asked the labor ministry to overturn the results and call a new election. The second time, however, management and not the communists were blamed for pressuring workers to vote for Sergio. Salert's quarterly labor reports never again mentioned the election or Bettamio again.⁴⁶

The case of 1956 Point IV grant recipient José Sanchez Duran, who was president of the São Paulo state federation of metal workers, offers an interesting opportunity to reflect on the troubles encountered by this U.S. labor policy toward the end of the 1950s. During Duran's training in the United States, he was befriended by George Meany, Serafino Romualdi and other American labor officials. Duran and other labor leaders invited Meany to Brazil for an official visit, and when Duran returned to São Paulo in October, he began "coaching a group of twenty-five presidents" of metalworkers' locals around the state "on American methods of negotiations." Such an enthusiastic response pleased both AFL and U.S. government officials.⁴⁷

But after Meany's visit at the end of the year, the honeymoon with Duran began to sour and the United States' tenuous grip on the Brazilian metalworkers began to slip until relations with this strategic movement all but ended. Duran stopped showing up at meetings called by labor attaché Salert and refused to respond to the pressure of fellow trainees who wanted him to attend their meetings. Worse still, informants such as metalworker José Maria Ribeiro reported that Duran was helping the Communists by warning them that "one of their trusted leaders was a plant of the state security police." Salert considered the reasons for Duran's new aloof posture, speculating that the federation president was afraid to "give his enemies ammunition" by "making his friendship for the United States too conspicuous."⁴⁸ By August 1957, Duran had already grown too soft on communism for some free trade

45 U.S. consul in Sao Paulo Philip Raine to Dept of State, "Labor Organization of the Light and Power Company," Dispatch No. 54, 5 October 1956, RG 59, DF 832.062/10-556, DS/USNA.

46 Salert to Dept of State, "First Quarterly Labor Report," Dispatch No. 1117, 5 April 1957 and Salert to Dept of State, "Second Quarterly Labor Report--1957," Dispatch No. 1424, 28 June 1957, both RG 59, DF 832.06, DS/USNA.

47 See Romualdi to Salert, 26 June 1956, Romualdi Papers, 2/5 and Butrick to Dept of State, "Ceremony of Presentation of Certificates to Point IV Labor Trainees," Despatch No. 76, 29 October 1956, RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA.

48 Butrick to Dept of State, Despatch 187, 1 March 1957, RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA.

unionists, but his shift to the left proved too opportunistic to save his re-election as president. By the time of the large general strike in October, his name disappeared from embassy dispatches.⁴⁹

One month later in November, the metalworkers held their first national convention in Porto Alegre, bringing added frustrations for U.S. labor policy in Brazil. With the fall of Duran and the success of the Communist-oriented strike, U.S. stature within the labor movement was at a low ebb. U.S. officials continued nevertheless to try to establish ties with the metalworkers through one of their last remaining collaborators, Antônio Fernandes de Lima, president of the metalworkers' local in Niteroi. Lima was interviewed about the convention by assistant labor attaché James F. Shea, and was then nominated for a Point IV scholarship. The São Paulo delegation to the convention, in contrast, was dominated by independent leaders such as José Busto, secretary general of the São Paulo local, and Waldimir Jorge Schnor, Duran's successor as president of the state federation. At the Porto Alegre convention, Busto reportedly pushed for affiliation with the Communist-dominated WFTU and denounced ORIT as "a tool of the [U.S.] state department." Convention leaders "head[ed] off this campaign" by appointing a commission to study the issue. This was a matter of grave concern to U.S. policymakers and labor operatives.⁵⁰

With 120,000 members, Busto's São Paulo local was by far the largest unit (the national membership totaled 200,000, according to foreign service estimates).⁵¹ Thus, on the occasion of the category's second congress, held in São Paulo in April 1959, US State Department officials were especially anxious about the question of international affiliation. Officially, the congress invited both groups to send representatives. The International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), linked to the ILO in Geneva, was asked to help pay for the congress and to send representatives as well. The commission appointed to study the question had equivocated, deciding to recommend maintaining friendly relations with both international organizations. But this was unacceptable to the AFL-CIO, and in March, George Meany advised ORIT's parent organization, the ICFTU, and the IMF to boycott the congress. With

49 Butrick to Dept of State, "Labor Leader Talks Straight to Commies," Despatch 72, 30 August 1957, and "The São Paulo Strike of October 15-25, 1957," Despatch No. 215, 10 December 1957, both RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA.

50 James F. Shea to Dept of State, "Memorandum of Conversation with Antônio Fernandes de Lima," Despatch No. 1025, 9 March 1959, RG 59, DF 832.062/3-959, DS/USNA.

51 Wallner to Sec of State, Airgram No. 1049, RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA.

only the WFTU represented, the metalworkers' federation voted to formalize cooperative relations with that international body.⁵²

Frustrated by these developments, U.S. labor operatives refocused their attention on restoring U.S. trainees like Duran to the presidency of the São Paulo federation of metalworkers. In this campaign, however, they ran afoul of the Brazilian labor ministry. Federation leaders were elected on 5 December 1959, and a slate including two recipients of Point IV grants won narrowly over a slate led by incumbent president Waldimir Schnor, allegedly a member of the Communist party. According to Brazilian labor law, each local union within a category has one vote for federation officers regardless of the size of its membership. Thus, the nineteen locals in the state split, with the delegates of the smaller unions located in interior cities such as Santos, Ribeirão Preto, and Piracicaba voting for the pro-U.S. slate.⁵³ Furious with the results, Schnor and Bustos of the large São Paulo city local reportedly accused the winning slate of fraud and asked the labor ministry to void the results and supervise a new election. Labor Minister Gilberto Crockett de Sá complied with the request, invalidating the election and scheduling a new one for March 1960.⁵⁴

U.S. labor officials were livid but their troubles with the ministry had just begun. The next dispute involved the ministry's desire to have veto power over the selection of labor leaders being considered for Point IV grants. Up to that time, trainee selection depended on the recommendation of the U.S. labor attaché and the approval of Romualdi (or another ORIT official) and Dr. João Guilherme de Aragão, the Brazilian government's Point IV representative. Now the ministry wanted to write new regulations requiring its approval for prospective candidates. The dispute ended only when it became clear that no new funds had been appropriated for travel

52 See Dept of State advisor on Latin American labor Benjamin S. Stephansky to Amembassy (Rio), Despatch No. 1025, 17 March 1959; Geneva to the Sec of State, Despatch no. 1189, 24 March 1959; Stephansky to Amembassy (Rio), Telegram no. 870, 9 April 1959; and Herter to Amembassy, Telegram, 10 April 1959, all RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA.

53 Shea to Dept of State, "Communist Setback in Metalworker Elections," Despatch no. 198, 7 December 1959, RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA. The Point IV trainees were Argeu Egidio dos Santos, president of the Ribeirão Preto local, and Jaime Cunha Caldeira, president of the Piracicaba local. Both were elected to the new federation executive board.

54 Shea to Dept of State, "Metalworkers' Elections Annulled by Minister of Labor," Despatch no. 225, 21 December 1959, RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA. Currently available documents do not reveal the results of the second election.

grants in 1960.⁵⁵ This incident as well as the ministry's intervention in the metalworkers' election pointed to increasing tension between Brazilian and U.S. labor officials.

For much of the 1950s, the ministry had been influenced by João Goulart, a leader of the PTB from Rio Grande do Sul who served as labor minister in 1953 and was elected vice president of Brazil in 1955 and again in 1960. In September 1961, he became president when President Janio Quadros suddenly resigned. Although Goulart had never accused of being a communist by U.S. labor policymakers, they nonetheless viewed him with suspicion. In the eyes of these U.S. officials, Goulart was the worst sort of "fellow traveler," one who allied with communists when it suited his political needs. By intervening in the metalworkers' election, Goulart undoubtedly hoped to appease the powerful São Paulo local with its communist leadership and large membership. Goulart's own sympathies (like those of the Brazilian population in general) were nationalistic. Thus as left-nationalist strength increased with the economic crisis of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Goulart and the labor ministry found it more difficult to confront communists in the labor movement (Benevides 1989; Bandeira 1983).

In a complex and confusing series of events occurring between mid-1960 to mid-1962, the U.S. lost its finger hold on the Brazilian labor movement as the influence of left-nationalists (with whom Goulart was more or less aligned) increased dramatically.⁵⁶ The first sign of slippage came in August 1960, at the Third National Labor Congress held in Rio de Janeiro. A serious split widened over establishing a single and central labor confederation in Brazil. The leftists favored the idea, but influential labor officers like the U.S. first labor ally CNTI president Deocleciano Hollanda de Cavalcanti, opposed the idea. (Ironically, Romualdi had pressured Brazilian labor leaders, including Cavalcanti, to establish an AFL-like central fourteen years earlier in 1946.) Frustrated with their minority position, Cavalcanti led a dramatic walk-out from the congress, taking some forty-five of 2,500 delegates with him (Harding 1960; Delgado 1986, 41-43).

As it turned out, this maneuver served only to isolate the Cavalcanti faction. In July 1961, Cavalcanti lost the presidency of the CNTI to Clodsmidt

55 Shea to Howard H. Cottam, Minister of Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy (Rio), Stephansky, and U.S. labor attaché John T. Fishburn, memorandum, 31 December 1959, RG 59, DF 832.062, DS/USNA.

56 55. Fishburn interview, 27 April 1985.

Riani, an independent-leftist union leader from Minas Gerais and an organizer of the third congress. That congress agreed to table the idea of establishing a central but at the fourth congress held in August 1962, 3,500 delegates from almost 600 unions created the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT) without opposition (Delgado 1986, 54-56). Riani became president of the CGT, while Communist-union officers such as Hércules Correa and Luis Tenório de Lima were elected to its board. This outcome dealt U.S. labor policy a serious setback. Moreover, the Brazilian labor minister, although far from happy with the growing autonomy of the labor movement, decided to tolerate the CGT rather than repress this extra-legal body.

Thus, after more than a decade of operation, the ORIT Point IV training program for Brazilian unionists came to a disappointing halt in the early 1960s. Several trainees had been ousted from their unions, and other leaders abhorred by the U.S. had been elevated to positions of leadership. Ironically, the CGT remained largely free of government control and included demands for trade-union autonomy and collective bargaining as platform planks, all objectives of U.S. free trade-union policy. Yet, the CGT's anti-imperialist, nationalist stance made it a symbol of U.S. failure rather than success. By 1962, putting forward the American point of view had become a difficult task indeed.

AIFLD: intervention and control, 1962-1965

While it is tempting to claim that U.S. labor policy shifted radically after 1962, such an interpretation conflicts with the documentation available. Beginning in 1946, U.S. labor officials willingly served and helped shape U.S. foreign policy in Brazil, forming a partnership with the government that continued into the 1960s. What changed somewhat was U.S. foreign policy. The administration of President John F. Kennedy was pressing the U.S. Foreign Service to become more aggressive and activist in its work abroad, and labor policy reflected this general trend. By 1964 U.S. labor policy tactics were carried by overall policy to the extreme position of helping to overthrow the legally constituted government of President Goulart. In the aftermath of the

April coup d'état, U.S. labor again collaborated with U.S. officials in helping build a solid foothold for what proved to be a repressive and authoritarian government. The new government quickly proved to be the antithesis of the vital democracy called for by free trade-union ideology (Leacock 1990).

U.S. involvement in the labor movement had long been a means of covertly influencing Brazilian politics. In 1962, this project took a more refined and concentrated form when the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) set up operations in Recife and São Paulo. Although AFL-CIO personnel administered the institute, AIFLD was a product of the reassessment of international labor activities carried out by the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. A study conducted toward the end of his second term stated that, "The Department of State, Labor and Defense are deeply involved in international labor matters as are ICA, USIA and CIA." The study concluded, however, that the lines of authority between these agencies were "obscure" and required "improved direction and coordination." The labor department recommended establishing an inter-agency labor advisory committee to coordinate operations.⁵⁷ In May 1961, Eisenhower's successor followed the study's recommendations. Kennedy also asked Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg to make particular arrangements for Latin American labor in the context of the newly established Alliance for Progress program. In response, a special labor advisory committee for the region was set up, and in August 1962, AIFLD was chartered as part of this collaborative effort.⁵⁸

The Labor Advisory Committee for the Alliance for Progress met for the second time on 12 March 1962. AFL-CIO President George Meany had been named chairman, and members included AIFLD Executive Director William Doherty, Jr., Romualdi, AIFLD Secretary-Treasurer Joseph Beirne, Central Intelligence Agency Director Thomas McCone, Agency for International Development Administrator Fowler Hamilton, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Secretary of Labor Goldberg himself. Everyone attended the meeting except Rusk, who sent an assistant secretary. The meeting decided that AIFLD would "contract directly with the Agency for International

57 "A Proposal Regarding Administration of International Labor Affairs Within the U.S. Government," an unsigned, confidential memorandum dated 31 February 1961. Enclosed in Undersecretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz to Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, 28 February 1961, RG 174, Box 61, Department of Labor (DL), Records of the Secretary of Labor, Arthur J. Goldberg, USNA. (Hereafter, Goldberg Records.)

58 Goldberg to President John F. Kennedy, "Labor Program for Latin America," 17 November 1961, RG 174, Box 114; and Goldberg to USAID administrator Fowler Hamilton, 29 November 1961, RG 174, Box 113, both Goldberg Records, DL/USNA.

Development (AID) to carry out [the advisory committee's] projects in Latin America." This decision was made, Beirne later claimed, because "the private and non-governmental character of the institute" would enable AIFLD to develop programs "which as a result of diplomatic and political conditions may not be undertaken directly by the U.S. Government."⁵⁹ In other words, AIFLD was to be an undercover instrument of U.S. foreign policy, guided in part by the CIA. Goldberg further underscored this point in a letter to Beirne, reiterating that all AIFLD projects, whether or not they were funded by the government, were subject to review by the labor advisory committee.⁶⁰

AIFLD established propaganda and training institutes in Brazil at the end of 1962, including the Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (ICT) in São Paulo. In addition to identifying candidates for travel to AIFLD's training courses in Washington, the ICT sponsored a number of studies of the Brazilian labor movement, leadership, and structure under the direction of J. V. Freitas Marcondes, a Brazilian sociologist trained at the University of Florida. U.S. attention was also focused on continuing the labor leader training program and in January 1963, the first class of Brazilians arrived in Washington for a six month stay under AIFLD's guidance. Like their predecessors under the ORIT Point IV programs, the thirty-three trainees studied U.S. labor history, economics, structures, and techniques for identifying and defending themselves against communists and fascists.⁶¹

Yet no matter how much more efficiently such programs were run than their predecessors, they had only limited impact on the labor movement. As one of ICT's own studies showed, shortly before the coup d'état, many labor leaders were unimpressed by the promise of U.S. trade union ideology, unconcerned about Communism, and supportive of the CGT. About eighty union officials were asked if they found a labor central like the CGT "necessary," forty-four answered "yes," twenty-two said "no," and twelve did not reply. Only five considered necessary the rival União Sindical dos Trabalhadores (recently established by Cavalcanti with U.S. backing). When asked what "forces" most prohibited Brazil's economic development, a plurality of eighteen faulted "retrograde capitalism," fourteen the "ignorance and laziness of workers,"

59 Beirne to Hamilton, 26 April 1962, RG 174, box 45, Goldberg Records, DL/USNA.

60 Goldberg to Beirne, 7 May 1962, RG 174, box 45, Goldberg Records, DL/USNA.

61 "Academic Program of the Institute," American Institute for Free Labor Development, an enclosure in Romualdi to Goldberg, 27 July 1962, RG 174, box 37, Goldberg Records; and Romualdi to Wirtz, 26 November 1962, RG 174, box 12, Records of Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, both in DL/USNA. Hereafter cited as Wirtz Records.

twelve complained about “political groups,” and eleven cast the responsibility on communism (Marcondes 1964, 79-81). Clearly, by 1964 the U.S. point of view still had not been put forward successfully.

The idea for overthrowing President Goulart did not originate with U.S. labor policymakers, but their impatience with the training program and frustration with the administration compelled them to waste little time pondering the ethics and morality of taking part in the overthrow of legitimate government. Fishburn, for example, noted that the labor ministry under Goulart was “absolutely impossible” to deal with and that U.S. efforts were in a “retreat mode.” Until he left Brazil in 1963, Fishburn, an unidentified CIA officer at the embassy, and special envoy Colonel Vernon Walters lobbied U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to support the budding *golpe*.⁶² According to AIFLD Director Doherty, the institute’s trainees were “intimately involved” in the military and civilian conspiracy against President Goulart. Exactly what they did remains unclear, but it seems unlikely that their role was as central as Doherty claimed (Doherty 1964; Agee 1974, 244-47). Reportedly, AIFLD trainees helped the conspirators by keeping communication links open for the military and closed to Goulart’s defenders. This may have been the case in São Paulo and Recife, where AIFLD had an institutional presence, but in Rio de Janeiro, forces supporting Goulart and his government claim to have taken command of most local television and radio stations (Spalding 1988, 20; Leacock 1990, 210). Whatever AIFLD’s role, Doherty’s boast certainly projects a contradictory image of the democratic core of free trade unionism.

After the coup, AIFLD graduates helped take control of Brazilian unions from which suspected leftist leaders had been purged, thereby helping the new government establish greater influence over organized labor (Spalding 1988, 20; Methvin 1966, 28). Such contradictions between theory and practice strained relations among U.S. policymakers. In May 1964, Victor Reuther, director of the International Affairs Department of the United Auto Workers union, raised questions about the ethics of labor’s role in Brazil at the first meeting of the Labor Advisory Committee held after the coup. Attending in an ex officio capacity, Reuther listened to reports about the doubling of AIFLD activities in Brazil and the operatives “frequent consultation with Ambassador Gordon, labor minister Sussekund and labor attaché Baker.” AFL-CIO inter-American representative Andrew C. McLellan defended the Brazilian government’s practice of intervening in the unions as “necessary to

62 61. Fishburn interview, 27 April 1985.

provide continuity in the legal counseling and social welfare services” provided by the unions. The labor ministry had scheduled a labor “symposium” for 8 June that, in McLellan’s words, promised to “result in the establishment of a new democratically-oriented trade union movement.” At long last, the institutional structure of American labor system was coming to Brazil.⁶³

Reuther seemed less impressed by the course of events than the rest of the committee. He questioned if a conference run by the government was really a sign of democracy. Was it the right of the Brazilian government, he asked, “to in effect determine the eligibility of candidates for union office at the 8 June symposium?” Others present discussed the question but rationalized that the Brazilian government had always interfered in the unions and controlled them. It was then determined that the U.S. should do nothing “to jeopardize the prospects of a free democratic labor movement emerging in Brazil.” In that regard, the committee “could not and should not give its approval to the procedures now being applied to unions in Brazil.” Reuther also asked about the arrest of CGT president Clodsmidt Riani, suggesting that a controversy over his incarceration could arise at an upcoming ILO meeting. On this matter, the committee decided to prepare U.S. and Latin American government and worker delegates to sidetrack debate over Riani’s arrest by claiming it was a criminal rather than a labor matter because Riani had been charged under penal law.⁶⁴

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64 Ibid.

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Opposing the Dictatorship in the United States: Human Rights and the Organization of American States

James N. Green

There is an untold story in the history of opposition to the Brazilian military government. Scholars have written about Brazilian exiles in Europe who forged links across the ideological rifts that had polarized the left and organized unified campaigns to denounce the dictatorship and call for amnesty for all political prisoners (Rollemberg 1999). However, the Brazilian public knows little about the activities of a handful of Brazilian exiles and their allies who engaged in numerous actions in the United States to pressure the Brazilian government to cease human rights violations. This chapter examines one aspect of that history, namely the efforts to get the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States to investigate the torture and mistreatment of Brazilian political prisoners¹.

1 Space did not permit me to write about the other important case that came before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at the same time involving the death under torture of São Paulo trade union activist Olavo Hansen. In that case, No. 1683, Brazilian officials alleged that Hansen had committed suicide by ingesting poison while in prison. Ultimately, the Commission did not buy the Brazilian government's version of events and

In late 1969, Protestant religious activists Jether Ramalho and Domínico Pereira smuggled into the United States a collection of documents and testimonials about the brutal treatment of Brazilian political prisoners. Dozens of Brazilians had gathered material to prove the allegations that surfaced on the cover of *Veja* magazine in December 1969. With the support of Rev. Bill Wipfler at the National Council of Churches, representatives of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. scholars of Brazilian history and culture, and others concerned about the deterioration of human rights in Brazil after AI-5, a small group of dedicated activists, including historian Ralph Della Cava and American University professor Brady Tyson, led a successful campaign in the United States media to educate the American public about the situation in Brazil. In April 1970, at the Second Congress of the Latin American Studies Association held in Washington, D.C., members of the organization supported a resolution introduced by historian Thomas E. Skidmore during their Second Congress that denounced torture and repression in Brazil. In May 1970, while students in U.S. universities throughout the country organized the first successful national student strike in opposition to the escalation of the war in Indochina, Márcio Moreira Alves conducted a speaking tour on campuses criticizing the Brazilian military regime's policies. By June 1970, the weight of evidence about the gross violation of human rights by the Brazilian military regime had become unquestionable. Editorials in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* indicated that these two public opinion makers no longer had any doubts that torture had become a common practice in Brazilian jails against leftists. Noted U.S. clergy, academics, and civil rights leaders had spoken out and signed petitions. Fresh reports coming from Brazil reinforced the conclusions of the dossiers. The time was ripe for a broader and more concerted campaign in the United States to pressure the Brazilian government to ease up on human rights abuses.

With President Richard M. Nixon in the White House and State Department officials unwilling to curtail the U.S. government's cozy relationship with the Brazilian military regime, activists turned to allies in the U.S. Congress, as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS). In both cases it took over three years and long, laborious, and circuitous routes before these two institutions publicly positioned themselves against human rights

declared that Hansen had been killed while detained. Collectively, the two cases offered both a detailed individual case and a collective indictment of the treatment of political prisoners.

abuses in Brazil. Throughout the entire process, Brazilian international representatives adamantly denied that security agencies routinely used torture on political prisoners. Moreover, they insisted that virtually all oppositionists arrested were actually terrorists and therefore common criminals. Even when a significant international campaign had tarnished Brazil's image abroad, the military regime only managed clumsy responses, largely relying on bureaucratic stalling, bold-faced lies, and ineffective Cold War rhetoric to quell critics. By 1974, however, the Brazilian government was entirely on the defensive. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had found that gross human rights violations had occurred in Brazil. That same year, the U.S. Congress passed legislation limiting foreign aid to countries whose governments tortured their citizens. Seen in retrospect, the campaigns waged on behalf of Brazilian political prisoners served as the foundation for activists addressing the flood of human rights violations that took place in Uruguayan, Chilean, and Argentine governments as military regimes took over in those countries between 1973 and 1976. They also laid some of the groundwork for Carter's human rights policy in the late 1970s. Modest measures initially begun in Brazil eventually reaped colossal results throughout Latin America.

A Catholic and Protestant Initiative

On May 26, 1970, the International Affairs Committee of the U.S. Catholic Conference issued a statement on Brazil. The date was symbolic, as it marked the first anniversary of the murder in Recife of Father Henrique Pereira Neto by rightwing elements. The pronouncement linked the priest's death to a "wider picture of systematic terror" against the Brazilian Catholic Church. The declaration called upon "the appropriate international agencies, whether of the United Nations or the Organization of American States, to conduct a thorough on-site investigation into the charges of systematic terror and torture." It also urged "the immediate cessation of all U.S. assistance, private as well as public, to the government of Brazil, should these grave allegations be substantiated."²

2 International Affairs Committee of the U.S. 1970. Catholic Conference, "Statement on Brazil" May 26, USCCB, Latin American Division, unprocessed files.

The driving force behind the pronouncement was Rev. Louis M. Colonnese, at the time the dynamic and dedicated director of the Conference's Latin American Bureau. In a personal declaration attached to the official statement, Colonnese expressed his frustrations about how little action had been taken place to curb the violence in Brazil: "My deep love for the people of Brazil compels me to ask whether such Church statements could become meaningless rituals with almost no pragmatic potential." He recounted that he had visited the Pope in 1969 and presented him with a document on torture and repression in Brazil, and that since then the Holy See had received collaborating information that Brazilian bishops, priests, religious and lay leaders were being unjustly imprisoned, tortured, and in some cases even murdered. Although Colonnese acknowledged that the Pope Paul VI had expressed his "interest and concern," the activist priest pressed for further action, suggesting that the U.S. Catholic Church consider forwarding a recommendation to the Vatican that it sever all relations with the Brazilian government.

The U.S. Catholic Conference declaration was followed by a similar statement on "Political Repression and Terror in Brazil" by the Latin American Department of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., issued the following week. In a preface that outlined the complex U.S. involvement in Latin America, the NCC pronouncement pointed out that Brazil was the third largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, that some 600 U.S. industries operated in Brazil, and that almost 3,000 American Protestant and Catholic missionaries worked in the country. "In spite of the vast range of this involvement," the statement continued, "the people of the United States have not been apprised of the extensive information regarding the repression, terror, and torture by which Brazil is governed today."³ Commenting that the Brazilian government frequently denied news of torture, the NCC statement countered that "the reports have been too numerous, too widely documented and recognized by too many reliable sources to be discounted." After expressing its solidarity with the U.S. Catholic Conference's statement on Brazil, the NCC Latin America Department made a series of action proposals that included a call upon the U.S. Congress to hold a hearing on the effects of U.S. government policy in Brazil and the suggestion that the Vatican, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the United

3 Latin American Department, Division of Overseas Ministries, National Council of Churches of Christ in U.S.A., "Statement on Political Repression and Terror in Brazil," June 5, 1970. Copy in author's personal archives.

Nations Commission on Human Rights investigate human rights abuses. The National Council of Churches and the U.S. Catholic Conference statements had set the agenda for pressuring governmental entities into action.

On June 25, 1970, Louis M. Colonnese directed a letter to Dr. Gabin Fraga, the President of the IACHR. The correspondence explained how the Latin American Department of the National Council of Churches and the U.S. Catholic Conference were jointly requesting that the Commission “conduct a thorough on-site investigation of the charges of torture and repression in Brazil,” in accordance with Article II, Paragraph C of the Basic Documents of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.⁴ Accompanying documentation supplied the names of dozens of political prisoners who had been beaten or tortured, and included the names and ranks of people in the police and military involved in administering the pain. The material submitted along with the petition also included the documents “Dossier on Brazil” presented to the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace in Rome, “Terror in Brazil: A Dossier” distributed at the Latin American Studies Association meeting in April 1970, “Terreur et Torture au Brésil” that had circulated in Europe, as well as numerous articles that had appeared in the United States, Brazil, and Germany.⁵ Bill Wipfler recalled the initial reaction when he contacted the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:

I went down to Washington to talk with Luiz Reque, the Secretary to the Commission. Up until that point they had only dealt with cases in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Haiti. When I talked about human rights violations in Brazil, Reque got nervous. Brazil was the biggest country in South America. He was not sure we knew what we were doing. When Father McGuire, Tom Quigley, and I later presented the documentation in thick ringed binders, he was stunned. We had original documents, signed depositions, printed material, and all of it had been meticulously cross-indexed to show that there were multiple sources denouncing specific cases. It was all very organized. Here were representatives from the largest Catholic and Protestant organizations in the United States bringing in evidence and presenting a formal denunciation. He couldn't turn us away.⁶

4 Rev. Louis M. Colonnese to Dr. Gabino Fraga, June 25, 1970. USCCB, Latin American Division, unprocessed files.

5 “Initial List of Documentation Presented to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States,” Washington, D.C., June 25, 1970. USCCB, Latin American Division, unprocessed files.

6 William L. Wipfler. 2004. telephone interview with author, September 8, notes.

Over the next three and a half years, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry would expend considerable effort in denying the accusations presented by the U.S. Catholic Conference and the National Council of Churches and received by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as Case No. 1684.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Brief History

The founding of the Organization of American States in Bogotá, Colombia in 1948 initiated greater collective interest in promoting human rights in the Americas. The Charter's Preamble stated that "the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man (sic) (Sohn and Buergenthal 1978, 1274)" With the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a framing text, over the next decade the OAS debated the best way to guarantee them in the Americas. At the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in Caracas in 1954, the body approved a resolution proposing the establishment of an Inter-American Court for the Protection of Human Rights. As with many other events, programs, and policies of the 1960s, the Cuban Revolution gave the final impetus for establishing such a body. No doubt many member states of the OAS calculated that more attention to the violation of human rights could root out causes that might lead individuals toward radicalism or communism. At the same time, in the context of the Cold War, such a Court could become a forum to denounce the excesses of left-leaning governments. At the initiative of representatives from Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the United States, the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Council of the OAS that met in Santiago, Chile in August 1959 voted to establish the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Sohn and Buergenthal 1978, 1278).

As constituted in 1959, the Commission is composed of seven members, presumably authorities in the field of human rights. They are elected for four-year terms from panels of three names presented by their governments,

with the right to be reelected. No more than one person from a given country may serve on the Commission at the same time. Theoretically, Commission members serve in their personal capacity rather than as representatives of their respective governments (Farer 1988, 71). Initially, the OAS merely empowered the IACHR to promote respect for human rights by making recommendations to governments of the member states “for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic legislation and in accordance with their constitutional precepts” (Sohn and Buergeth 1973, 1285). The Commission could prepare studies or reports, urge member states to supply information on measures adopted by them in matters of human rights, and serve as an advisory body to the OAS.

Almost immediately, a debate arose about whether or not to expand the powers of the Commission so that it could examine communications by persons or groups of persons, or by associations having legal status in member countries with regard to serious human rights violations. At the time, Durward V. Sandifer, the U.S. member of the IACHR, opposed the alteration in the scope of its activities, arguing that granting the Commission power to examine individual cases would serve to weaken rather than strengthen its position as an agency concerned with human rights. He defended his viewpoint directly:

Conferring jurisdiction on the Commission over individual and group complaints would inject it into the middle of the most controversial disputes within the member state. By virtue of such jurisdiction the Commission would become in effect an agency of review of the executive and judicial actions of the member states. Even if the Commission had ample resources and authority at its disposal for the discharge of such responsibilities, it would be difficult to carry out this task without generating resentment and a lack of confidence both on the part of individuals and governments. There would be likely to accrue to the Commission a cumulative burden of criticism and resistance which would seriously impair its effectiveness as an agency for encouraging and stimulating constructive economic, social and political action to bring about increasing respect for human rights.⁷

7 Sandifer, Durward V. 1960. “Statement by Dr. Durward V. Sandifer, Member of the Commission, Concerning Proposal to Amend Statutory Provisions Regarding Competence,” October 28. Washington, D.C. : Organization of American States.

Sandifer, an international lawyer with a long career in the U.S. Foreign Service, had served as General Secretary and Chief Technical expert of the U.S. delegation at the 1945 founding meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco. He had also been the chief collaborator with Eleanor Roosevelt in drafting the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Appointed during the Eisenhower administration as a nominee to serve on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at the time he saw economic and social development as the greatest guarantee of human rights.⁸ Over the next decade, he would radically shift his position about the role of the Commission in investigating abuses.

The Second Special Inter-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in November 1965 expanded the Commission's powers. The OAS allowed the body to receive specific complaints of human rights violations, requested that it "conduct a continuing survey of the observance of fundamental human rights in each of the member states of the Organization," and mandated that it provide an annual report to the Inter-American Conference or Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Affairs.⁹ The Brazilian government backed the modifications in the Commission's scope and duties. Apparently, despite the fact that reports of torture in Brazil had surfaced in 1964, the newly established military regime seemed confident that the expansion of the IACHR's powers and responsibilities would not affect or interfere with how it treated its domestic opposition.

During the 1960s, the Commission largely dealt with complaints against Haiti and the Dominican Republic, both before and after the U.S. invasion of the latter in 1965. The abuses of Duvalier's dictatorship in Haiti were soundly condemned by the Commission, as were the excesses of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. In 1963, the Commission held part of its Sixth Session on the island, taking the opportunity to interview people about alleged human rights violations. After the 1965 OAS-sponsored invasion of the Dominican Republic—led by the United States with the support of Brazilian troops—the IACHR was again called in to address complaints of human rights abuses, establishing the precedent for *in loco* inquiries and

8 For Durward V. Sandifer's participation in the early days of the United Nations, see "Oral History Interview with Durward V. Sandifer," Truman Presidential Museum and Library, www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/sandifer.htm.

9 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 1969. "Report on the Work Accomplished During its Twentieth Session, December 2 through 12, 1968," Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 15.

oversight. The Chairman of the Commission and the Executive Secretary visited the country to conduct investigations, with the support of the Costa Rican, Brazilian, and United States members that acted as representatives of the IACHR at different moments in 1965 and 1966. The Commission served as an observer in the June 1, 1966 election that voted Dr. Joaquim Balaguer to the Presidency, and then withdrew from the island.

Until petitions against Brazil were filed in June 1970, the IACHR had only dealt with Brazil in one other case. Just before leaving office in March 1967, President Castelo Branco pushed a new Press Law through Congress “to regulate freedom of thought and information.” In October of that same year, the IACHR received a request to consider whether or not the new legislation violated human rights in Brazil. In early 1968, Dr. Gonzalo Escudero, the appointed rapporteur for the case, reported to the Commission that it should consider the advisability of asking the Brazilian government “to adopt progressive measures in its present Press Law, in accordance with the power of the Commission to make recommendations to the governments of member states of the OAS” (*Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos* 1969, 15). At that session, the Commission requested a copy of the Press Law from the Brazilian government and background information on the issue. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ignored the request, and so the matter was raised again at the Commission’s Twentieth Session held in Washington, D.C. between December 2 and 12, 1968. After deliberating on the case, the Commission ruled that the petition was “inadmissible as an individual case, in view of the fact that it did not refer to specific events or situations that bear a relation to a disregard of human rights by the government against which the complaint is directed” (*Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos* 1969, 15). Ironically, the Commission ruled on the case on the eve of the promulgation of Institutional Act No. 5 (IA-5). The day after the IACHR adjourned the Costa e Silva government closed the Congress, expanded censorship, and initiated the harshest period in the dictatorship’s rule.

The dossier of denunciations presented to the IACHR by Rev. William Wipfler of the National Council of Churches and Father Frederick McGuire of the U.S. Catholic Conference on June 25, 1970, along with supplementary material submitted later, offered a strong indictment of the Brazilian government. (*Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos* 1982). During a press conference held at the OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C. when

Wipfler and McGuire turned over the material that they had collected, the Episcopal minister commented:

We have been concerned since 1969 with the use of instruments of repression, but more so after the press in Brazil was frustrated by government censorship in attempts to report the tortures. . . The alternative was for credible individuals in Brazil to report secretly to their friends abroad on this issue. We feel we have a personal commitment with them to repeat what they say, to speak for the rights and dignity of the person in Brazil, and to protest against torture. (Fonseca 1970, 1)

The IACHR requested that the Brazilian government provide pertinent information, and “in light of the seriousness and the urgency of the denunciations” asked that Durward V. Sandifer, the U.S. representative on the Commission and the rapporteur for the denunciations, be permitted to visit Brazil to look into the charges.

While the Brazilian Ministry of Justice prepared a lengthy rebuttal to the accusations leveled against the government, in late July 1970, Justice Minister Buzaid insisted in a meeting with 40 foreign correspondents that torture was not being practiced against political prisoners. Journalist accounts of his luncheon remarks rendered slightly different versions of his statement, but the general idea was the same. The *Jornal do Brasil* reported that Buzaid proclaimed: “I reaffirm once again that there is no torture in Brazil. The official work of the government cannot be questioned principally because enemies of the Government through lies create an incompatibility between our regime and other nations.”¹⁰ *O Estado de São Paulo* quoted Buzaid as having declared: “No one in Brazil is imprisoned for having thoughts different from [those of] the government. In Brazil, there are no political prisoners, but, yes, detained terrorists.”¹¹ He went on to explain that those people were detained not simply because they disagree with the general policies of the government. All of those in jail were criminals, responsible for kidnapping diplomats, robbing banks and other acts of revolutionary war.

Apparently confident that this approach of continued and consistent denial was an effective response to attacks from foreign sources, Buzaid prepared for a European tour. In September, the Brazilian press reported that

10 “Buzaid afirma que não há torturas no Brasil,” 1970. *Jornal do Brasil*, August 1: 3; “Buzaid garante a opinião divergente,” 1970. *O Estado de São Paulo*, August 1: 3.

11 “Buzaid garante a opinião divergente,” 1970. *O Estado de São Paulo*, August 1: 3.

the Justice Minister had accepted an invitation to participate in a Congress of Jurists in Madrid. He then planned to travel to Germany to speak at the Teutonic-Brazilian Society in order to give a “broad and firm reply to the campaign against Brazil abroad.” A Justice Ministry spokesperson explained that Buzaid’s desire to respond to these accusations was natural because “one of the things that most irritates Minister Buzaid is this defamatory campaign.”¹² After the official government visits in Spain and Germany, the Minister planned to tour Italy, France, and England in an unofficial capacity, although, according to the press, he would not shy away from clarifying actions of the Brazilian government.¹³ The following day, however, the Ministry of Justice press spokesperson backtracked and clarified that Buzaid had no intentions of debating or engaging in polemics with anyone, although he would be willing to informally explain any issues raised surrounding criticisms of the government.¹⁴ Why the Ministry of Justice shifted its explanation about the purpose of the tour is unclear. Perhaps it was to emphasize that the Médici government did not need to defend itself abroad. Yet at the same time, that is precisely what the tour seemed to be designed to do.

After participating in the Madrid Conference, Buzaid flew to Bonn where he met with government officials who thanked him for his action on behalf of the kidnapped German ambassador. While in Bonn, the Minister of Justice was scheduled to lecture at the State Museum on the topic “Objectives and Directions of the Brazilian Revolution.” At the last minute, however, he canceled his speaking engagement. A press release explained why the talk had been abruptly called off:

During the afternoon, leaflets were distributed calling people to join a protest demonstration in front of the place where the talk was to be held. Even though the demonstrators had announced in their fliers the desire to establish a dialogue with the Minister, the aggressive way in which they gathered in that location made it clear that the real intention was to prevent the lecture from taking place in an orderly atmosphere that would respect the esteemed lecturer. As a result, it was cancelled.¹⁵

12 “Buzaid desmentirá difamação,” 1970. *Jornal do Brasil*, September 10: 3.

13 “Buzaid vai esclarecer,” 1970. *O Estado de São Paulo*, September 10: 5.

14 “Buzaid esclarece sua viagem,” 1970. *Jornal do Brasil*, September 11: 3.

15 “Nota Oficial,” 1970. *Jornal do Brasil* (September 29,): 4.

The German police reported that 100 people participated in the demonstration, mostly students, but also members of the Dominican order who supported the non-violent Catholic peace group "Pax Christi."¹⁶ Buzaid also cancelled his trip to Berlin without giving further explanations, although U.S. State Department officials in Brazil reported to Washington that Buzaid had nixed the Berlin leg of the tour "in order to avoid what he feared might be a hostile reception."¹⁷

When Buzaid traveled on to London, British journalists pressed him on the issue of torture. Alluding to the charges under investigation with the IACHR, Buzaid argued: "When they refer to torture they only cite thirty names, and the government is carefully investigating these cases. Brazilian pride has been wounded with the announcement [of the charges] before we had an opportunity to refute them." The Minister reiterated that the allegations of torture were baseless: "In Brazil, no one is imprisoned for their political convictions or their opposition to the government. We have a system of two parties in which the opposition can criticize the government, which in fact it does."¹⁸ Buzaid also informed the journalists that the government was preparing a "White Book" to refute the torture denunciations.

The next month, the Brazilian delegation to the 58th Inter-parliamentary Union annual meeting in The Hague had to confront a small protest demonstration at the reception that the Brazilians had hosted. Congressional Deputy Flávio Márcilio, the Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, headed the delegation. In a private meeting with President Médici soon after returning to Brasília, he stressed his concern about this significant show of anti-Brazilian sentiment. According to a U.S. State Department memo, "what had apparently impressed the Congressmen most was that whenever they were identified as Brazilians they almost invariably met hostile questions about torture and repression."¹⁹ Those who had previously visited Europe noted that "interest in Brazil had never been higher and all of this new interest was focused on the allegedly repressive nature of the Government."²⁰

16 "Cancelada Palestra de Buzaid," 1970. *Estado de São Paulo* (September 29): 6

17 "Increasing Concern Over Brazil's Image Abroad," Airgram 68, Brasília to Washington, November 3, 1970, FRUS, Box 1362.

18 "Buzaid nega as torturas," 1970. *O Estado de São Paulo*, October 3: 1.

19 "Increasing Concern Over Brazil's Image Abroad," Airgram 68, Brasília to Washington, November 3, 1970, FRUS, Box 1362.

20 Ibid.

Roadblocks and Stalling Tactics

The IACHR investigation process is a slow one. Its procedures require that the country in question submit documentation in response to the petition or complaint of human rights violations. The country accused generally has 180 days to turn over material. In what would become standard practice, Dr. Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, the Brazilian member of the IACHR, presented an official response to the Commission's request only a week before the 180-day deadline had lapsed. In a note dated January 11, 1971, the Brazilian government responded to the IACHR's correspondences. The note expressed "great surprise" about the request for a visit by Dr. Durward V. Sandifer and denied the application for an *in loco* investigation. Dunshee de Abranches insisted that "sending an observer constitutes an exceptional measure that should be applied only when the Commission has no other means of verifying the facts." Moreover, the Brazilian government argued, the Commission had made the request to visit the country in July 1970. Because the 180 day time period for the Brazilian government to provide information had not run out when the request had been made, it violated internal procedures of the Commission. The letter also vehemently refuted the charges that there were political prisoners in Brazilian jails. Rather, the correspondence insisted once again that those currently in Brazilian jails were terrorists and common criminals who, moreover, had received proper and adequate treatment during incarceration. As proof the letter cited the fact that all of the prisoners released in exchange for the kidnapped foreign ambassadors "appeared in public in a completely normal state of health." To substantiate its claims, the Brazilian government attached a multi-volume report with the correspondence.

The letter refuting the charges made against the Brazilians in IACHR Case No. 1684 paralleled the overall strategy employed by the Médici government to counter the "international campaign to defame Brazil abroad," as it fashioned a five-pronged approach to deflecting charges of gross violation of human rights. First, the government continued to insist, in a string of public announcements, that it did not torture detained citizens. Second, it used every means possible to delay, postpone, or quash any determination by the IACHR, or any other international body, about the question of torture and other human rights violations. Third, as he had indicated in London, Minister of Justice Alfredo Buzaid commissioned a thick eight-volume "White

Book” to refute the specific charges contained in the petitions to the IACHR. Fourth, after considering the establishment of a new government propaganda agency empowered to develop an international publicity campaign in favor of the military regime, the government opted for a more modest measure of actively encouraging sympathetic foreign journalists to visit Brazil in order to report favorably about the country. Finally, Brazil’s representatives aggressively maneuvered within the OAS so that the organization would adopt a set of resolutions condemning terrorist acts. Although it constituted a comprehensive plan, it proved to be a failed strategy.

Médici’s ‘White Book’

The response presented by the Brazilian government to refute the claims that it engaged in gross violations of human rights had a shrill and defensive tone, to say the least. The report’s official title was “Information of the Brazilian Government to Clarify Supposed Violations of Human Rights Related in Communications Transmitted to the ‘Inter-American Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States.” One might suppose that its unofficial designation as the “White Book” reflected an attempt to offset the impact of the “Livre Noir” or “Black Book” that had circulated in Europe in 1969 itemizing abuses of the military regime. In classical Manichean terms, the entire work was an exposition of the pure goodness of the Brazilian government in its battle against communism, terrorism, and international deceptions. Adopting the strategy that the best defense is a good offense, the preface to the report set the tone:

This information is directed toward offering substantial facts about the origins and sources of the insidious campaign of defamations against BRAZIL directed from abroad and, in addition, providing documented clarifications regarding the different slanders against Brazilian authorities for the practice of supposed torture as a systematic form of repression.²¹

21 Government of Brazil, “Information of the Brazilian Government to Clarify Supposed Violations of Human Rights Related in Communications Transmitted by the ‘Inter-American Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States.” DSI, National Archive, Rio de Janeiro.

The dossier then presented a series of objectives that it intended to prove in the report. They constituted the outline of the government's entire international counteroffensive. There were no "political prisoners" in Brazil. Those imprisoned were more interested in conducting terrorist criminal acts—which they carried out in a barbarous fashion—than in achieving any possible political objectives. The government handled all prisoners humanely. The "terrorists," in fact, received better treatment (due to their social origins and own resources) than other prisoners. There was no torture in Brazil.

The report also attacked the "campaign of defamations against Brazil." Its origins and the sources of the denunciations were "spurious, illegal, and clandestine." The effort was part of a psychological war of the International Communist Movement, and was partially supported by international organizations aligned with the terrorist groups. The report then analyzed specific cases of alleged torture. They included the 1969 murder of Father Antonio Henrique Pereira da Silva Neto, the death of trade unionist Olavo Hansen the following year, as well as the mistreatment of others accused of being members of the groups engaged in armed actions to overthrow the government. The response ended by offering examples of Brazilian legislation, including the "Magna Carta of Brazil, one of the most perfect constitutions in the world," as proof that the country operated within the confines of law.

One wonders why the Brazilian government adopted such a maladroitness approach to defending itself in the international arena. To be sure, the core ideology of the military in power closely identified with simplistic anti-communist rhetoric that justified its prolonged stay at the helm of the state. Yet the use of language, such as the use of the term ICM, or International Communist Movement, to describe a concerted international conspiracy that including prestigious intellectuals, non-governmental organizations, and even sectors of the Catholic Church, although familiar discourse to defenders of the regime, must have sounded archaic and flat to outsiders, including the members of the IHCHR. The notion that the ICM was slandering the honor of Brazil dovetailed with ultranationalist domestic campaigns promoted by the Médici government that ranged from the slogan, "Brazil: Love it or Leave it" (appropriated from the pro-Nixon forces in the United States) to the optimistic jingle that "This is a Country Moving Forward" (Fico 1997, 100). Still, the content of the voluminous report was directed at an international audience rather unlikely to jump on a jingoistic bandwagon. Nor was this dossier boiled down into a brief report that could have been sold or even given away in Brazil or abroad to bolster the government's campaign against terrorism and

boost its image outside the country. The central arguments presented in the response to the IACHR constituted the talking points of official government statements on the armed opposition, accusations of torture, and international denunciations. They seemed less an effective set of defenses and more a required, albeit clumsy, rhetorical response.

This was especially the case in the section addressing torture, which was the core accusation against the Brazilian government and the prime motivating factor in the groundswell of broad international condemnations of the regime. The report asserted that the allegations of torture were a smokescreen and part of the “psychological warfare planned by the International Communist Movement.” In the fight against the terrorists, so the report argued, inevitably the subversives responded to their detention with gunfire, causing wounds when they resisted arrest. While in custody, authorities provided appropriate medical treatment, even dental care. In those sections of “White Book” where allegations regarding individuals were refuted, the report in many cases merely listed dates when prisoners received medical treatment as a response to the charges that they had been tortured, hardly a convincing rebuttal. In other cases, the rejoinder was simply that the prisoner had made up the allegation.

Since the IACHR deliberated behind closed doors, only announcing its conclusions in published reports and in occasional press releases, journalists inclined to cover these proceedings had scant material at hand to examine the charges and counterclaims. As a result, there were few opportunities for the press to cover the course of the case and demand explanations from the Brazilian government. The petitioners, in this case the U.S. Catholic Conference and the National Council of Churches, however, had the right to offer responses to the Brazilian government’s report. They did so, writing to Luis Reque, the Executive Secretary of the IACHR. Because of the confidential nature of the proceedings at the time, their rebuttal to the military regime’s defense remained within the confines of the Commission’s deliberations. However, their responses, in general, dismantled the Brazilian government’s case. Wipfler and McGuire stated in no uncertain terms that “the answer of the Government of Brazil, as represented in the documents transmitted to us, and in its negative reply to the Commission’s request to be allowed to visit the country to gather information . . . [was] insufficient and unsatisfactory.”²² Just as the “White Book” served as the talking points for Brazilian diplomats, so too the reasoning behind the material submitted by

22 Letter from Frederick A. McGuire, C.M. and William L. Wipfler to Luis Reque, December 6, 1971, USCCB Archives, unprocessed files.

the NCC and USCC representatives summarized their overall approach to addressing the issue of human rights abuses in Brazil. Some of their logic and language even appeared in the Commission's reports.

Responding to the assertion that "there are no political prisoners in Brazil," the petitioners first pointed out that the 1967 National Security Act, as well as Institutional Acts No. 5 and 6, had suspended the right of *habeas corpus*, broadened the criteria for categories of crime, and given military courts the jurisdiction over cases that had formerly been tried in civil courts. Even discounting those prisoners involved in violent acts, bank robberies, kidnappings, and hijackings, the brief argued that at least nine, if not more of the original victims cited in the petition to the IACHR, had not been involved in any of the aforementioned activities. They then offered further examples, such as historian Caio Prado Júnior's four-year sentence for giving a "subversive" interview, the arbitrary arrest and mistreatment of lawyers defending political prisoners, the harassment and detention of prominent writers and journalists, and the charges leveled against those accused of sending denunciations abroad.²³

Addressing the chapter in the Brazilian government's document titled "The Question of Torture," the respondents pointed out that "whether or not the Communist Party (Brazilian or other) has publicized a charge does not affect the truth of the charge."²⁴ Why had such a broad range of prominent Catholics, from the Pope to Cardinal Alfrink of Holland spoken out against torture in Brazil? Were they a part of the International Communist Movement? After analyzing the specific examples of torture from the original petition and the reply by the Brazilian government, the communication to the IACHR pointed out that the best way to verify the charges could be through an in-site investigation by the Commission, the International Red Cross, or another widely respected international agency. Barring that possibility, the letter noted that the Brazilian government's response had failed to address the specific allegations. At one point, Reverends McGuire and Wipfler noted that "it is probable that the 'dialogue of the deaf' between the Commission and the Brazilian government will continue. The former brings to light the gravest charges of violations of human rights by Brazilian authorities and the latter simply denies such charges without any substantial change occurring in

23 Letter from Frederick A. McGuire, C.M. and William L. Wipfler to Luis Reque, December 6, 1971, USCCB Archives, unprocessed files. p. 2-17.

24 Letter from Frederick A. McGuire, C.M. and William L. Wipfler to Luis Reque, December 6, 1971, USCCB Archives, unprocessed files. p. 18.

this sad situation.”²⁵ As might have been expected, the Brazilian government responded to the response with a request to delay any action on the case until further documentation could be sent.

Losing the Propaganda War

In December 1970, after two years of constant official denials stating that torture did not taken place among prisoners under detention, Brazilian Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho admitted there was torture on a television program: “To say that there is no torture would be to avoid the truth. However, to say torture is a systematic policy of the government would not only be avoiding the truth, it would be infamy.” The Minister added: “. . . To say there is no torture, even in the countries that accused us of it would also be a lie, because in some prisons torture and violence exists. It is the police violence that we are all familiar with from the time we read *Les Misérables* by Victor Hugo.” Once again the Brazilian government was on the defensive. Although conceding that the practice took place, Passarinho attempted to mitigate the impact of his statement with a counterattack. Brazil was no worse than accuser countries, an apparent reference to Kennedy’s United States and *Le Livre Noir*’s France. Admittedly, he had to reach back to nineteenth-century France to make his point. Nonetheless, Passarinho had finally acknowledged that the swell of denunciations surfacing in the United States and Europe had validity. Yet, the Minister of Education equivocated with his admission about torture in Brazil. Although such practices existed, they were neither government sanctioned nor systematic. Passarinho’s remark was also a justification that could distance his government from culpability and place the blame on hard-line forces in the military and a cluster of out-of-control cops.

It was simply too little too late. The Brazilian government would drag out consideration of the accusations of human rights abuses in the IACHR for another two years, but the damage to Brazil’s image had been done. Refusing to let observers conduct on-site investigations, presenting

25 Letter from Frederick A. McGuire, C.M. and William L. Wipfler to Luis Reque, December 6, 1971, 16-17. USCCB Archives, unprocessed files.

a contrived “White Book” that ducked the accusations, delaying responses to requests for more information until the last minute, and coming up with specious legal objections merely postponed the inevitable. The Commission laid blame at the feet of the Brazilian generals. The report to the OAS General Assembly declared that “the evidence gathered in case 1684 leads to the persuasive presumption that in Brazil serious cases of torture, abuse, and maltreatment have occurred against persons of both sexes while they were deprived of their liberty.” (Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos 1973, 80). The IACHR resolution also castigated the Brazilian government for refusing to:

[...] adopt the measures recommended by the Commission, directed toward determining whether acts of torture, abuse, or maltreatment have been carried against persons detained in the establishments indicated; toward verifying whether the military and police authorities whose names are indicated have or have not participated in these acts; and, if so, toward making possible the punishment of those responsible. (Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos 1973, 81)

As in previous reports on the subject, Dunshee de Abranches voted against the rapporteur’s resolution and presented an explanation of his vote.

In one respect, however, the military regime had been successful. Its stalling tactics, which took advantage of the ample time allotted to respond to accusations, as well as numerous appeals, had stretched out the final resolution of the investigation for almost four years. Médici left office before the IACHR managed to make its final recommendation to the OAS General Assembly in April 1974, which, as in the Hansen case, merely received and filed the report. By that time, international attention about torture and human rights abuses had turned away from Brazil to focus on the mass round-ups and executions of leftists in Chile after the military took over in that country on September 11, 1973. The Brazilian generals were no longer Latin America’s number one pariahs.

Just a month before the OAS General Assembly meeting in Atlanta, General Geisel assumed the presidency in Brasilia and hinted that he would pursue a gradual and controlled liberalization policy. A *New York Times* editorial entitled “Brazil’s New Chance” reminded readers that the last two presidents had promised a similar return to democracy at the beginning of

their terms and then reneged on their pledges. Nonetheless, the editorial suggested that Geisel had an opportunity to fix Brazil's international image:

If the President will use his strong current position to lighten repression and take modest first steps to expand political participation, he may well be astonished at the favorable response he will draw at home and abroad. He might head off serious charges of "torture, abuse and maltreatment," scheduled to be leveled against Brazil by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States next month.²⁶

A week after Geisel's inauguration, the *Miami Herald*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* all lamented the fact that the new government had continued censoring the press (Howe 1974, 9; Anderson 1974).²⁷ In these journalists' assessment, democratization, if it were indeed to come, would be slow in the making.

Immediately prior to the announcement of the IACHR's resolution, Rev. McGuire of the U.S. Catholic Conference indicated his satisfaction with the Commission's procedure. "The Brazilian government is sensitive to mounting adverse international public opinion. Hopefully, this public outrage will be effectively translated into economic sanctions" (Diuguid 1974, A-18). The priest also called for an end to U.S. and other foreign aid to Brazil. The U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, however, was less enthusiastic than Father McGuire about condemning its giant partner to the south. Unlike Dunward V. Sandifer, who had remained non-partisan as the rapporteur for the Commission, William S. Mailliard, the United States's ambassador to the OAS, followed the Nixon administration's on-going approach to Latin America, namely, supporting authoritarian regimes throughout the continent. After the IACHR presented its report to the OAS General Assembly, he declined to take the initiative to push for a further vote to follow-up on the Commission's findings. According to a House of Representatives staffer, the U.S. government had decided that it would not press the OAS into any action unless there was consensus on the matter. Obviously, Brazil would have been a barrier to unanimity. By April 1974, Rep. Donald M. Fraser, the chairman of the House subcommittee on International Organizations, had begun to prod the IACHR to investigate allegations of human rights violations in Chile. Thus, Pinochet's man in Washington also would also have blocked any

26 Editorial, "Brazil's New Chance," 1974. *New York Times*, March 23: 30.

27 "After Week of New Regime, Brazil Censorship Remains," 1974. *Miami Herald* (March 25).

possibility for an OAS consensus. As a result, the comprehensive report of the Commission remained sealed. The general public ended up receiving only a scattering of journalistic accounts of the OAS's investigation and results.

So, did all the efforts of filing petitions, drafting responses, countering reports, and issuing press releases have any real effect on the political prisoners in Brazil? Tom J. Farer, who served on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from 1976 to 1983, tackled the same question after he completed his term on the Commission, although he posed it in more general terms.

Governments still do not admit delinquencies. If individuals are freed, their liberation, if it is advertised at all, is presented as an act of official grace. It also is difficult to measure achievement outside the paper world of reports and communications, because the commission has no absolute right of access to the prisoners, detention camps, and interrogation centers where hope is crushed and identity extinguished. (Farer 1988, 77)

In fact, no paper trail leads one from Commission reports to Brazilian cell blocks to measure whether or not fewer electrical current or physical poundings took place because of the petitions filed in Washington, D.C. in June 1970. In April 1974, it might have appeared that the effect of the final IACHR report was merely another slap on the wrist of a regime that simply ignored such reprimands and forged ahead with its day-to-day business of authoritarian rule.

Yet the scattered documents found in the Itamaraty archives indicate a diplomatic corps particularly unnerved by what seemed to be an ever-increasingly successful effort to isolate the country abroad. Essentially, the Commission's findings had condemned the military regime, albeit in diplomatic terms. Even though the OAS failed to follow up by publishing a report or pushing for further actions against the military regime, the IACHR's conclusions became another in the long string of denunciations of abhorrent practices committed under the generals' watch. The cumulative effect ultimately reached a crescendo in the mid-1970s, forcing the military regime to realize that they were paying too high a price in permitting the gross human rights violations to take place. Over a decade after leaving office, Ernesto Geisel, Médici's presidential successor, admitted that torture had been necessary during military rule, but ultimately the generals had had to order an end to its practice (D'Araújo and Castro 1997, 223-235).

Even if no immediate and direct causality can be drawn between the denunciations examined by the IACHR and the end to torture in Brazil, the cases filed on behalf of hundreds of political prisoners offered a precedent that reached beyond the country's borders. As the Commission ended its final deliberations on case 1864, sharply rebuked the government for its lack of cooperation, and found *prima facie* evidence of gross violations of human rights, the IACHR was inundated with hundreds and then thousands of petitions regarding Uruguay, Chilean, and Argentine political prisoners. Although Dunshee de Abranches may have kept up a familiar diplomatic façade in consistently proclaiming the innocence of his government, this defense must have worn quite thin among other commissioners. The nearly unanimous decision of the Commission (Brazil's vote aside) emphasized that its members were unconvinced by Dunshee de Abranches's feeble denials and delays.

Brazil denied *in loco* investigations in 1972 and managed to extend final consideration another two years. The country's apparent success in diluting the impact of the Commission's work probably influenced Chilean President Pinochet's decision to outmaneuver the IACHR by actually allowing them to hold a session in the country and investigate alleged violations. His plan backfired. Unlike the Brazilian cases, the Commission's investigations and subsequent reports about Chile reached the General Assembly and produced a string of stinging indictments of the Chilean dictatorship. (Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos 1982, 261-265). Later investigations about Argentina also brought significant international attention to the plight of thousands of political prisoners (Farer 1988, 87-89). Although those suffering in Brazilian jails may not have seen their pain lessened by the Commission's investigation, the documentation of torture served to show that it was, in fact, systematic, widespread, and state-sanctioned. Brazil's example made it more difficult for other governments to fall back on the "isolated incidents" defense.

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Consequences for Security and Defense in Brazil-USA relations in face of the 11th September Attacks¹

Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva

Days after the 11th September attacks, and still under its impact, the then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, asked General Charles Holland - Air Forces Four-Star Commander of US Special Operations - to compile a list of possible terrorist targets around the world to be presented to President Bush for immediate retaliation “[...] The general returned two weeks later with four possible targets: suspect Islamic strongholds in Somalia, Mauritania, the Philippines and the Tri-Border Area, a region where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet” (Hersh 2004, 286)².

This was the start of a serious, albeit imperceptible, crisis in Brazil/United States relations, perhaps the most serious crisis in thirty years.

1 I would like to thank my friends for reading and correcting the original text, and for their suggestions. However, any errors and opinions herein are naturally my own responsibility.

2 A description of the American Action Plan and its context is found in Hersh, 2004, p.286 and following pages, in particular p. 290. Seymour Hersh is an American journalist who has received many prizes, including the Pulitzer Prize, he writes for *The New Yorker*. He was responsible for publicizing the My Lai case, during the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal.

It is not possible to exaggerate the impact of the cruel 11th September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington on the sentiments of average Americans. There are also no explanations or analyses which could possibly justify or legitimize an unexpected act of mass murder. The American government – caught off guard, like everyone else – quickly moved towards a ‘never again’ position. The continuity of the government, the leadership of the Republican Party and the role of the party in government required explicit and effective mechanisms for preventing and pre-empting subsequent mass terrorist acts³. Therefore, many of the United States government’s post-9/11 actions were steered by this new posture of searching for an illusory and foolproof anti-terrorist security. Often these actions were excessive and resulted in cases of discrimination against and humiliation of ethnic or religious groups, in particular in the military prisons of Baghdad, Guantanamo Bay and Mezar-i-Sharif (Paden 2003, 20-28). In the following years, these activities were not restricted to the American authorities. The unfortunate fate of Jean Charles de Menezes in England and Nicola Calipari in Iraq tragically confirmed the consequences of excessive behavior resulting from the obsession with security and anti-terrorist polices as experienced by some Western democratic nations⁴.

Any analysis of international relations post-9/11 must necessarily take into account the impact of this new American posture since it pervaded all areas, even affecting mass psychology. There were also repercussions for bilateral relations, including those between Brazil and the United States. From the very first moment after the terrorist attacks, the American authorities, and most of all the President, declared any mediation or contextualization to be unacceptable. Either you were with the United States or you were with the terrorists (Lichtenberg 2004).

3 For pre-emption, or pre-emptive warfare, we understand a very aggressive model of warfare in which one side attacks their opponent as soon as a capacity and disposition for an imminent attack is detected. Thus, the objective is to reduce or expunge the military potential and deadliness of the enemy, so any element of surprise is taken away. For a discussion on the concepts of ‘prevention’ and ‘pre-emption’ see: (Teixeira da Silva 2004, 9; McNeilly 2003, 74).

4 On the Nicola Calipari case – the Italian agent at *SISMI*/Italian Intelligence and Security Services, was killed by American soldiers in Iraq after rescuing an Italian hostage, see: (Teixeira da Silva 2005).

Brazil and the United States in face of 9/11

Bilateral relations during the mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in Brazil, and Bill Clinton, in the United States, had been marked by a strict cordiality based on personal relations and a mutual empathy which continued even after both men had left power. Other officials from the American administration also espoused a clear position of cooperation with Brazil, including Vice-President Al Gore. President Cardoso's university background and Clinton's academic leanings, as well as the latter's inherent respect for the positions of the Brazilian president meant that the Brazilian government was seen by the United States as a serious mediator, particularly given the emergence of the first nationalistic leaderships in South America. Excepting some trade questions within the remit of the FTAA, which emerged from cooperation proposals during the 1994 Summit in Miami, relations between the two countries were marked by close cooperation in international forums such as the WTO, OAS and the UN. Proposals for 'world governance', expressed in a number of multilateral initiatives for establishing international legal frameworks, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, received strong Brazilian support right from the start (Cabral 2009, 451). Therefore, Clinton's exit from the political scenario with the unexpected defeat of Al Gore in the American elections was greeted by surprise and disappointment by the Brazilian governing elite. The decisions of the Bush administration clashed head-on with the Brazilian international agenda. During the first few days of the new government, there were attempts to adapt to this new environment. However, President Cardoso was often uneasy with President Bush's 'style' and with the constant talk of a preferential relationship with Mexico⁵. After a number of years of being

5 Throughout the Bush administration, Mexico, under Vicente Fox (a pro-American liberal, opposed to the nationalist tradition in the PRI) played a very critical role in relation to Brazilian Foreign Policy, particularly during negotiations to implement the FTAA. Mexico, a member of NAFTA, a free trade area with the USA, since 1994, greatly feared the negotiations led by Brazil as it had already ceded in all areas and had nothing further to negotiate. Thus, Brazilian demands – the drafting of a 'crossed FTAA' would benefit Brazil (and Argentina), but Mexico had nothing to gain (it had already opened its market during the NAFTA negotiations). Similarly, Brazilian hopes of joining the UN Security Council – after NAFTA, this was no longer possible for Mexico – would mean the end of the Mexican dream of being Latin America's most important partner and representative in relation to the USA and the UN.

treated as an equal by world leaders such as François Mitterrand, Tony Blair and Clinton himself, and being tipped for the presidency of international bodies, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was somewhat disappointed by the clear loss of prestige resulting from the unilateral nature of the Bush administration's foreign policy doctrines. It was, of course, well-known that this American government disliked international forums, conferences and institutions which were so clearly a part of Cardoso's political conceptions.

9/11 speeded up and deepened changes

The Brazilian position in face of the international crisis triggered by the 11th September attacks was initially – and it could not have been otherwise – one of perplexity and paralysis. This was expressed in formal, and frequently incoherent, declarations by the principle Brazilian authorities condemning any form of terrorism. It was quickly discovered that there was a lack of specific institutional intelligence in the country to understand the new mechanisms of the post-Cold War international crisis. Most still thought in terms of Cold War geopolitics, centered on concepts of 'Subversive Warfare' though obsolete since 1991.

The highest echelons of Brazilian diplomacy reacted correctly by reasserting a traditional position of rejecting violence and drawing on multilateral mechanisms in order to prevent Terror. A letter sent by President Cardoso to President Bush, on 12th September of 2001, demonstrating his indignation and solidarity in face of the terrorist attacks, revealed that Brazilian diplomacy was ready to support any measures the 'international community' saw fit in the war against terrorism⁶.

Nevertheless, the positions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs revealed a degree of perplexity and lack of vision regarding the significance of the event, hastily comparing 9/11 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union, as the beginning of a 'new age'. Adjectives such as 'historical event' and 'new age' came up in interviews and declarations, demonstrating

6 Carta de FHC para Bush. 2001. *O Globo*, September 12: 10.

a total lack of familiarity with international terrorist organizations and the existence of attacks prior to 9/11. Nevertheless, after calm consideration it was rapidly understood that there was potential for redrafting international relations with a strong possibility of global realignment⁷. This was not the beginning of a 'new age' – which in fact started in 1991 (or 1989) with the fall of communism in the States in Eastern Europe. Indeed, this was the total and brutal disclosure, through the media, of the nature of the New World Order. This new world order was based on insecurity and uncertainty and an omnipresent enemy who was, at the same time, invisible and mainly concentrated into what became known as the 'new threats', such as terrorism and organized crime; pandemics and threats to human rights [...]⁸.

From the point of view of Brazilian diplomacy, this meant clearly accepting that the challenge launched against the United States would lead to the intensification of the Bush administration's inherent unilateralist position, with a shrinking of the international space for the so-called emerging nations and a certain disdain for international organizations and institutions. Given the widespread feeling of fear and insecurity they inculcated, the terrorist attacks further exacerbated the unilateral nature of the Bush administration. They were not the origin of the arrogant politics that the United States would conduct between 2001 and 2008, but they were the perfect justification.

Both the Presidency and Itamaraty - Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs - focused on the economic impacts the attacks were likely to have provoked and the consequences for Brazil. Brazil's administration was particularly concerned about the uncontrollable movement and flow of capital and the reduction of investments in the country, potentially reproducing conditions similar to the financial crisis of 1999. As was expected from a government so obsessive about economic policy as the core of its administration, the geopolitical consequences were initially neglected because of fears of a global financial panic. Despite this concern, they failed to predict some of the indirect economic consequences which ensued in the years following 9/11, for example, an increase in the cost of products and services such as insurance, international freight, oil and foodstuffs, and the commercial aviation crisis. Brazilian concerns were exclusively financial, in line with the predominance and centrality of this area in the Cardoso government, in turn based on the fragility felt since the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999. Members of

7 Lafer diz que o cenário internacional vai mudar. 2001. *O Globo*, September 12: 10.

8 For a discussion on the New World Order, see (Teixeira da Silva 2009)

the government could still vividly recall the impact of this latter event on the macroeconomic stability plan.

However, it became clear a few days after the terrorist attacks that their geo-political implications far outweighed impacts at the economic level and Itamaraty felt obliged to clarify Brazil's position. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Celso Lafer, reacted quickly. His careful pronouncements were the first coherent declarations made by Brazilian authorities. Through his personal contacts with Presidents Ricardo Lagos in Chile, Fernando de La Rúa in Argentina and Jorge Battle in Uruguay, Cardoso announced the possibility of employing the OAS Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, IATRA, as a mechanism to demonstrate continental solidarity with the United States. In this way, the Brazilian government insisted on deploying multilateral mechanisms and framing American reactions within International Law, and within limits, it sought to prevent uncontrolled unilateral actions on the part of the United States.

It is important to highlight that, to a large extent, the Brazilian attitude to the crisis was part of the so-called 'Presidential Diplomacy' which was deemed to be moderately successful, given the difficult and limited framework of maneuver. This 'Presidential Diplomacy', however, remained under the direct influence of Lafer, the Foreign Minister, and his 'co-operativist' vision of international relations. Cardoso was very aware of the significance of the incident and took it upon himself to conduct negotiations and show solidarity, moving away from the *parochialism* which reigned in other areas of his government.

Thus, the Presidency eventually established a 'crisis cabinet' to monitor political developments emerging from 11th September⁹. This was an informal mechanism with no administrative structure or established functions. It did not produce any information or analyses (which remained within the remit of CIS – the Cabinet of Institutional Security, part of the Presidency of the Republic, then under the direction of General Alberto Cardoso). Regular meetings between the Foreign Minister, the Minister for Development and the Minister of Finances – as well as some military leaders – took place so as to continually assess the global situation. Throughout the first spasmodic period

9 We refer here to the meeting of the so-called 'inner core' of the government, a political meeting called by a presidential decision. It is important not to confuse the action of the Office of Institutional Security/OIS with the Secretariat for Institutional Monitoring and Research/SEAIE, formally established on 8th May 2003, though already in (precarious) operation since 1998.

of crises, the absence of the Minister of Defense - a civilian - is notable¹⁰. Nevertheless, the main concerns of Brazil during this period remained international monetary and financial stability, in particular, the impact of dollar fluctuations on Brazil's recently achieved financial stability. The political and military repercussions of these events were largely disregarded by Brazilian Authorities (though eventually they were belatedly recognized). This was the case despite the fact that the American government had declared a global 'crusade' against terrorism, which was later renamed the Global War on Terror/GWOT. Far more serious, however, was the fact that Brazil's political elite, including ministers and members of Congress, were not attentive to new American interest in the Tri-Border Area. The government did not have, at the time, the mechanisms for predicting the growing crisis between Washington and Brasilia concerning a distant border in southern Brazil.

On 18th September 2001, due to the insistence of the American government in declaring itself 'under siege' and accusing countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq of being responsible for the attacks, President Cardoso felt the need to state that he would not be sending troops abroad to support possible counter-terrorist actions. President George Bush was already alluding to a 'coalition of the willing' in order to fight terrorism according to a number of articles written by the then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice¹¹.

Brazil, insisted Fernando Henrique Cardoso, would demand that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance/IATRA be complied with, during a meeting at the Permanent Council of the OAS, in Washington on 19th September, in accordance with prior consultation with friendly countries. For the Brazilian government it was crucial at this time to provide a collective continental response, avoiding isolated positions with some Latin American countries disputing the sympathy of the USA and making opportunist calculations (Paraguay would later announce that it would go to war to defend the United States!). The Advisory Office of the Presidency talked incessantly

10 FH debate com ministros possíveis efeitos da guerra. 2001. *O Globo*, September 17: 6.

11 Condoleezza Rice developed a new version of the USA's military future operations abroad, based on the concept of an 'alliance à la carte': the nature of the mission defines the nature of coalition forces. This concept makes permanent alliances (UN, OAS, NATO, etc.) redundant. Donald Rumsfeld would test this new mechanism during the 2003 Iraq War. The main arguments of the new American doctrine can be found in: THE WHITE HOUSE. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC., Sept., 2002. Available at: www.usinfo.state.gov. Accessed on: 17 Sept. 2007.

of multilateral action and pointed to the OAS as the most appropriate forum from the American continent's perspective¹².

As the situation evolved, the Minister of Justice is belatedly called to expound on plans for strengthening Brazil's civil defense, in particular airports and main thoroughfares, within a plan for the reorganization of the country's Civil Defense. However, no mechanism for readying or effectively controlling sensitive areas is disclosed in the following weeks and months.

On 21st September the Minister of Defense finally appears in public for the first time to analyze the incident which took place ten days earlier. These declarations, however, arose out of forthright pressure from the media during a seminar at the University of Rio de Janeiro. The Minister claimed that attacks would necessarily lead to a detailed revision of Brazil's defense policy. Minister Geraldo Quintão argued for drafting an autonomous political strategy for South American countries, establishing their own priorities in terms of security¹³.

Gradually, the focus switched to the 'discovery' of a large and prosperous Brazilian Islamic community, after a report was shown on Brazilian television about how Islamic settlers living in the South of Brazil reacted to the 11th September attacks. Long before the attacks took place, on 7th March 2001, the Ministry of the Defense announced its intention to more effectively occupy the Tri-Border Area, in the south of the country¹⁴. According to the program drawn up by the Ministry of Defense approximately 1,150 men would be placed in 19 newly-created border posts, in order to establish a security zone with the purpose of controlling 'illegal traffic', such as smuggling, drug-trafficking and money laundering across the border. There were no references to local terrorist networks. At the time, the main concern was combating organized crime, particularly the smuggling of drugs and weapons. The Rio de Janeiro daily papers had for some time reported on the porosity of the borders as one of the reasons for the aggravation of urban violence.

12 Brasil descarta o envio de tropas. 2001. *O Globo*, September 18: 5.

13 Quintão diz que Brasil revê política de defesa. 2001. *O Globo*, September 21: 6.

14 Exército ocupará fronteiras do Brasil. 2001. *Jornal do Brasil*, March 7: 13.

Manufacturing a crisis

The CNN broadcasting network - perfectly in line with the American Department of State in the days following the terrorist attacks - reported that Francis Taylor, the American Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and director of the Office of Foreign Missions, responsible for coordinating the anti-terrorist activities of the US government, had concerns about a possible Brazilian connection with Islamic terrorism, apparently centered in Foz do Iguaçu, state of Paraná, in the Tri-Border Area. The news had a serious impact in Paraguay, where the public prosecutor service and the national police – who had very long experience in dealing with illegal trafficking, such as smuggling and the stolen cars market in Brazil - promptly decided to pursue terrorists, particularly when a team of American agents started local investigations. In the case of Paraguay, who welcomed the American agents with a certain amount of euphoria, the issue of the Tri-Border Area was an opportunity to extend its friendship with the United States and, at the same time, retaliate against Brazil's insistence in controlling cross-border contraband (and to heavily tax the so-called *sacoleiro*¹⁵ trade between the two countries), especially the smuggling of stolen cars.

In order to attract more publicity to Taylor's announcement, the then Ambassador of the United States for the OAS, Robert Noriega, called a meeting of the OAS Committee Against Terrorism, which he presided, in order to define "[...] the practical and urgent steps that the governments of the region should take"¹⁶. Noriega's statements were supported by another round of interviews in which Taylor pontificated on how the three governments should act on their borders: "[...] 'hand in glove' – with strict cohesion between the sectors of intelligence, customs, policing and immigration"¹⁷, he insisted.

In fact, American counter-terrorist organizations looked at information from various sources to certify themselves of the presence of 'terrorist cells' in the Tri-Border Area. There was considerable difficulty in providing evidence for the accusations repeated by CNN, both in its Atlanta and Mexico City broadcasts. Ambassador Francis Taylor, in a report to the US Senate Committee

15 *Sacoleiro* – the name given to individuals who informally import goods across the Paraguay-Brazil border.

16 Investigação será reforçada no Mercosul. 2001. *O Globo*, October 15: 3.

17 Ibid.

on Foreign Affairs, on 10th October 2001 - therefore after the terrorist attacks - insisted on the presence of money laundering, piracy and contraband in the region, erroneously locating Hamas, *Islamayia al-Gamaat* and Hezbollah 'cells'. At this point, there was no mention of any links to Al-Qaeda or with the groups who committed the attacks in New York and Washington¹⁸. Other American civil servants appeared before Congress committees and presented information on the Tri-Border Area, further stressing that the region was apparently very dangerous. It must be pointed out that, at the time, the Bush administration was attempting to appear well-informed and capable of producing a framework for diagnosing global terrorism, in face of the criticism - still insignificant - of bouts of incompetence on the part of the American intelligence system. In this context James Mack, who was responsible for the combat of drug-trafficking, points to the Tri-Border Area. Mack goes as far as disclosing an imaginary attack of *Islamayia al-Gamaat* - a Sunni terrorist group of Egyptian origin - against the American Embassy in Asunción, in a repeat of the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania¹⁹.

Obviously, these facts were never confirmed, either by the Department of State or by the Paraguayan government.

The American insistence on 'terrorist cells' in the TBA - the American acronym for the Tri-Border Area - began to seriously concern Brazilian authorities. It was very clear that the constant reports in the American press did not have any substance and that claims about Al-Qaeda activities in the region were unfounded. Moreover, the Tripartite Commission of the Triple Frontier (as the TBA is also known) had been in existence since 1998. This was a security instrument established by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay in which the United States had been invited (and had accepted) to participate. It implemented the 3+1 (Three-Plus-One) mechanism which was fully functioning (subsequently, under direct pressure of the United States, it would become an international treaty).

Shortly before the attacks, the Department of State, (in a document only published in 2004), recognized Brazil's cooperation and willingness to provide support: *This "Three-Plus-One" meeting (the three TBA countries plus the United States) serves as a continuing forum for counterterrorism cooperation and*

18 Department of State. [2001]. *Ambassador Francis Taylor on Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere*. Accessed October 10, 2010. www.usinfo.state.gov.

19 Department of State. [2001] James Mack tells Congress of Drug, Terror links. Accessed October 10, 2010. www.usinfo.state.gov.

*prevention among all four countries*²⁰. Thus, systematically and deliberately, the United States publicly declared the existence of terrorist threats which in secret documents it recognized not to exist. The insistence of the American government in publicly talking about threats and in providing 'outdated' or 'mistaken' evidence to the press may have concealed other American interests. Well-informed sources within the Brazilian government recalled that the consistent refusal of the administration to accept American demands for the extradition (to the United States) of drug traffickers and its refusal to draft a list of terrorist organizations, which included the Colombian FARC, played a central role in the formulation of American accusations against the country. The Colombian government, under the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, clearly adopted a position of regionalizing the 'Global War on Terror'. Thus, it expressed Colombia's clashes with FARC, a conflict which had been ongoing for a number of decades, within the context of 9/11. Colombia would open its territory to American actions, within the so-called *Plan Colombia*, or *Plan Patriota*. In addition, it would provide troops for a potential and expected American retaliation. From that moment onwards, approximately 800 American 'advisers' and a non-disclosed number of Israeli experts started to operate inside Colombia²¹.

In fact, terrorism in the TBA countries was, (and still is) rare, and almost inexistent in Brazil and Paraguay (notwithstanding the unconfirmed bombing incident against the American Embassy in Asunción). The main argument in favor of an 'Islamic connection to international terrorism' in the

20 Department of State. [2004]. Issues Overview of Terrorist Threat in the Americas. *Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.* Accessed October 10, 2010. <http://usinfo.state.gov>.

21 The Colombian government advanced its actions during the second Bush mandate, when Uribe clearly seeks to take on the role of main American ally in South America. Thus, the American administration made extensive use of Bogotá and its conflict with 'Bolivarian' Venezuela, and subsequently, against Rafael Correa's Ecuador, in a veritable media war on the funding and provision of weapons to FARC. Subsequent to Ecuador's non-renewal of the lease for the strategic aero-naval base in Manta, on the Pacific coast, Colombia (and Guyana) offered to host American interests, resulting in a strong reaction on the part of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela. Cf.: Brasil busca informações sobre bases na Colômbia. 2009. *O Globo*, July 31: 34. Brazil had been seeking for a long time to limit foreign presence in the continent, in particular close to the Amazon region, and this is the basis for the establishment in 2009 of the Regional Security Council for South America. Thus, from 1993 onwards, Brazilian Armed Forces Officers have denounced the presence of an American military 'arch' in the region. See: Exército teme cerco dos EUA na Amazônia. 1993. *Jornal do Brasil*, August 13: 3; Exército denuncia bases americanas na Amazônia. 1993. *Jornal de Brasília*, August 13: 8; Bases dos EUA cercam a Amazônia. 1993. *O Estado de São Paulo*, August 13: 5.

Tri-Border Area related to two brutal anti-Jewish attacks which took place in Argentina in the 1990s.

One was a high explosive bomb attack against the Embassy of Israel in Buenos Aires in 1992, in which 29 people died; the other was an attack against the Israel-Argentina Mutual Association - AMIA, in 1994, in which 86 people died.

Investigations of these two attacks were not given the attention they deserved by the Argentine police and military authorities (known to be influenced by anti-Semitism). There were serious judicial errors and extensive involvement of Israeli Intelligence (interested in bringing South American countries to a pro-Israeli position, in view of the fact that 'the conflict was spreading to its territories'). A number of years later, the judge in charge of the case pointed to 12 Iranian Embassy employees, the Iranian Ambassador in Buenos Aires and a Lebanese national linked to Hezbollah as responsible for the attacks. According to the British Foreign Office, the Iranian diplomat, who held a position in London at the time, was not extradited by the United Kingdom after police investigations, due to 'lack of evidence'. Furthermore, a 'Brazilian connection' was never proven or clarified. A large amount of evidence was disregarded during the investigative process; in particular, connections with the Argentine police itself and its anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi factions. The - quite likely - possibility that the attacks were anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi terrorist actions associated to the Argentine extreme-right (paramilitary and para-police) was discarded from the outset. Any de-stabilizing implications to Argentine domestic policy were also not investigated, in particular, any connections with those being punished for their involvement in the *Guerra Sucia* [Dirty War] during the years of military dictatorship and violence in Argentina²².

The part Israel played in the investigations - as well as in producing strategic information regarding the Tri-Border Area - followed pre-established conceptions aimed at criminalizing the activities of the Arab and Palestinian communities in the region. It also revealed the objectives of the Israeli State *vis-à-vis* Islamic Iran. It is clear that this approach - disregarding concerns relating to the resurgence of Nazism and the actions of the extreme right - led to serious distortions, such as ignoring the possibility of terrorist attacks by

22 For a discussion about terrorism in the continent from an American point of view see: (Levitt 2003). The author argues that he received assistance in the shape of information from Israeli officials on the TBA case. Accessed April 29, 2004. www.usinfo.state.gov.

the extreme right, for example, those which occurred in Oklahoma City, the murder of Itzhak Rabin and cases involving anthrax (attacks disseminating biological weapons via the post) in the period immediately after 9/11 in the United States.

The emergence of an international crisis concerning the existence of Islamic terrorists in the Tri-Border Area - in particular the activities of Israeli Intelligence, the Paraguayan police and American counter-terrorist organizations – casts light on a new and worrying facet related to terrorism.

The alignment between various Intelligence Systems which share the objectives of the parties in power leads to confusing the permanent objectives of the State (and the security and defense of its citizens) with the party-political ideas of those who are temporarily in power. Examples are the Likud Party in Israel, and the Republicans and Neo-Conservatives in the United States, and their insistence on an Iraq connection with the 9/11 attacks; the PP [*Partido Popular*] in Spain, on occasion of the attacks on the Atocha trains in Madrid, and its insistence on the involvement of Basque organizations and the Pakistani ISI. The intelligence services' loss of autonomy is currently one of the greatest threats to conducting efficient intelligence activities in order to combat terrorism (Laurent 2004).

The debate on the autonomy of intelligence services is serious and is at the core of the debate about their role in democratic regimes, their autonomy and their relations with civil society. The partisan and political use of these services, as in the case of Spain's *Comisión Nacional de Inteligencia/CNI* [National Intelligence Commission], by José María Aznar, strongly denied by CNI itself, opens up an important discussion. Given their countries' reproachful history on human rights violations, South Americans view this autonomy, not without reason, with great mistrust. On the one hand, South American governments do not think twice about using their intelligence organizations in a partisan way, investigating members of the opposition, judges and members of congress. They also maintain a large network of internal spies with widespread practice of undercover surveillance. On the other hand, the manipulation and debilitation of these services can, within a short period, make governments 'blind' to increasingly imminent potential threats.

Brazil's case is typical of the dichotomy between the need for strategic information on the one hand, and the partisan and political control of

intelligence agencies on the other, for example, in the case of the extinct SNI [National Information Service] and ABIN [Brazilian Intelligence Agency]. Perhaps an important conciliatory solution would be to empower the parliamentary monitoring committees, such as the Joint Committee for Controlling Intelligence Activities/CCAI, part of the Brazilian National Congress. However, procedures would necessitate improving the process of membership of this committee (congress members should have a real interest in and knowledge of the sector) and implementing measures restricting the dissemination of committee information (Figueiredo 2005; Gonçalves 2003)²³.

In this context, American initiatives and the emphasis on an Al-Qaeda connection in the Tri-Border Area resulted in irritation and concern on the part of the Brazilian authorities, in particular, the Presidency of the Republic. On 9th October 2001, during the meeting of Mercosur presidents in São Paulo, President Cardoso was forced to discuss this matter publicly. His purpose was to alert Argentina about Brazil's irritation with American insistence that there were Islamic terrorist activities taking place in Brazilian territory. At the same time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso reasserted the Brazilian position of strengthening the country's role in the UN in face of the crisis. From this moment on, the Cardoso government revealed great coherence and strength. It clearly opposed a unilateral approach to the War on Terror as formulated by Bush.

Brazil and the Bush Doctrine

After a controversial election and amidst feelings of insecurity, Bush decided to form a palpably conservative government, opening up space for

23 SNI/Brazilian National Intelligence Agency was extensively used for partisan objectives. It was one of the symbols of the Brazilian civil-military regime. It was made extinct by the Collor Government in 1989. Its successor was ABIN/Brazilian Intelligence Agency, established by Law n.9.883, of 07/12/1999. However, ABIN was not able to maintain its distance from political party scandals in Brazil. It controlled its staff and demanded their discretion and loyalty, as in the so-called '*mensalão*' scandal in 2005, or the Satiagraha Operation in 2008. Similarly, duality, ambiguity and duplicity of functions with the Federal Police have led to confusion, intrigues and inappropriate behaviour, causing serious damage to the Brazilian capacity to produce quality strategic information. For the problematization of the Brazilian information network.

Republican Party ‘fundamentalists’’: politicians from the Reagan and Bush (Senior) governments were recalled, particularly for positions at the UN, in Latin American affairs and the in middle echelons of the Ministry of Defense. ‘Pragmatic’ politicians from the Nixon/Ford era, such as Henry Kissinger, were kept at arms length by the new government.

The Conservative group was formed by Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and John Ashcroft - then Secretary of State for Justice - and Condoleezza Rice. The only more moderate member was the Secretary of State, Colin Powell – *the general who did not like to fight* - as Madeleine Albright, his Democratic predecessor once labeled him. From January to September 2001, this new team conducted a foreign policy strictly focused on its own interests (and often even opposing these same interests). Thus, the United States reserved for itself the right to analyze each global situation and act according to its own interests, regardless of international treaties or legal restrictions. Within a few months the country rejected a number of international instruments such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on Portable Automatic Weapons, restrictions on the use of landmines, control of chemical weapons of mass destruction, setting up of the International Criminal Court, and the agreement with Russia to limit missile use. Few powers exerted the global power at their disposal and placed their own sovereignty above international relations like this government (Barber 2003). When circumstances became more difficult, the United States simply refused to act or chose to follow its own political line, without consulting its allies or world organizations. This was the case in the Middle East where a devastating speech by Ariel Sharon, then in the Likud Party, was fully accepted by the new cabinet. Another example relates to the Far East where the People’s Republic of China, an emerging power, was treated with indifference and arrogance, culminating in the greatest political crisis in thirty years of relations between these two countries²⁴.

At the same time, conscious of the power of the European Union and China, the United States moved to safeguard its own economic space, speeding up the re-launch of the FTAA- further restricting the interests of

24 We refer here to the incident between an American spying aircraft which invaded Chinese air space in 2001 and collided and brought down a Chinese Air Force craft, see: BBC/ Brasil: Caça chinês cai após colisão com avião espião dos EUA. *BBC Brasilcom* April 1, 2001. Accessed April 1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2001/010401_aviao.shtml. Similarly, men notoriously identified with Taiwan and opposed to the so-called ‘One China, two States’ policy, such as Richard Bolton become very prominent in the new government. The Chinese perplexity with American Foreign Policy is well analysed in: Nathan; Bruce, 2002.

potential partners, even more than the previous administration had done - and opening the way towards the unification of the Pacific/Americas zone, as an alternative to the complex economic and geo-strategic spaces of Europe and the Asia which were undergoing clear expansion. From the point of view of the Bush era strategists, the FTAA would counterbalance the growth of China and the institutionalization of the European Union (Kennedy 2003, 12).

The 11th September 2001 attacks profoundly shook the world scenario, but did not reverse it. On the contrary, changes were an exacerbation of American unilateralist positions already laid out in the first days of the Bush administration. Thus, 9/11 did not signify a rupture - as the Brazilian authorities first believed - but a move in the same direction. The Bush administration did not alter its strategic objectives because of large scale International Terrorism. Indeed, the war on terrorism was 'adapted' to the objectives of government, as the Iraq War in 2003 tragically illustrated (Barnett 2005). All offers by international organizations such as the UN Security Council, NATO and even IATRA to act against international terrorism within the international legal framework were rejected by the American administration. In a notorious speech given on Capitol Hill on 20th September of 2001, in front of American members of Congress and former presidents, George Bush solemnly reaffirmed his 'crusade' against terrorism and his intention to put into practice a purely American, non-mediated policy to expunge Terror: 'there is no room for mistakes or complacency in this crusade, either you are with America or you are considered an enemy!'

Global responses to the 'American ultimatum' varied according to the different means and resources of countries and global institutions.

European reaction was defined by its total inability to achieve a 'European-wide' foreign or defense policy. There were a number of isolated actions on the part of America's most important partners. The United Kingdom stood out from the very first day, it was cooperative and full of initiatives. France, caught off-guard, shrunk away, while Putin's Russia, an experienced hand at dealing with terrorism (including in Central Asia), showed itself ever more willing to contribute to the cause of the United States. Disappointed at not receiving the expected returns for their solidarity, the Russians quickly decided to stand with the Europeans in their rejection of American unilateralism (Teixeira da Silva 2005).

American insistence in seeking a global and definitive solution to terrorism included a new dimension, the so-called ‘sum of all fears’: the possibility of terrorist organizations getting hold of weapons of mass destruction. Condoleezza Rice set out a new concept with the purpose of discarding the Cold War’s doctrine of containment. This new policy clearly stressed pre-emptive action by the United States when it associated terrorism, even against all available evidence, with weapons of mass destruction. According to Rice, in contrast to the Cold War, the strategic nuclear arsenal in the hands of the USA or the USSR was no longer capable of deterring attacks. The enemy was a diffuse, leaderless, tangled and multiple structure - the network-state of Al Qaeda, for example, did not have targets to protect such as people, territory or economic infrastructure and, therefore, it did not fear threats of destruction. The new terrorist network-state is invisible and strengthens its power with each spectacular action. Therefore, the world could only be made more secure through prevention, by pre-empting terrorist activity through swift action and, if need be, outside the framework of international legislation. Rice’s proposals were fully endorsed in Bush’s ‘State of the Union’ speech on 30th January 2002. He drafted a new doctrine in which the United States had the right to employ pre-emptive measures to attack certain countries - which became from then on known as the ‘axis of evil’: Iraq, Iran and North Korea – because they had the capability of developing weapons which could threaten American security (Heisbourg 2003)²⁵.

The path to war

On the eve of the American attacks against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October 2001, Brazil noted the extreme subversion of international relations laid down in the new American security and defense doctrine²⁶. In a letter dated 8th October 2001, President Cardoso insisted on

25 The best assessment of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, from the point of view of the Anglo-American coalition, is found in UK GOVERNMENT.

26 A total reformulation of the new American Security Doctrine only happens in September 2002. However, the central foundations of American action had already been clearly drafted, in particular in a document called ‘The New American Century’ produced by the main proponents of the so-called neo-cons (new conservatives) brought into the administration

a multilateral approach to the crisis. It was sent to the presidents of Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and the United States, as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and other countries considered important in the international political scenario such as India, China and the Russian Federation. This letter - kept secret by the Brazilian government but disclosed by the Argentine diplomatic services - requested both greater cooperation to control movement in the Tri-Border Area and demanded from the United Nations multilateral measures to combat terrorism. A particular point made by the letter should be looked at in detail: alongside the war on terrorism, Cardoso insisted on a critical and fundamental point: “[...] just as with the war against terrorism, it is also important that the world fights inequality and draws up a common policy on development²⁷”. The rejection of terrorism as the central item on the international agenda became a constant feature of Brazilian diplomacy post-9/11. It remained so throughout the government of the Workers’ Party [PT], under Lula da Silva, a proof of diplomatic continuity in addressing this issue. For President Cardoso - still influenced by the ‘speculative attack’ of 1999 - issues of development and financial security should have been the main topics on the international agenda. Later, under the presidency of the PT’s Lula da Silva, this agenda was re-asserted, in the shape of the fight against hunger. There is also continuity in the fact that both governments refused to make terrorism the central axis of Brazilian foreign policy. Significant changes in focus – financial security for Cardoso and food security for Lula da Silva – are less profound than their refusal in accepting American directives.

At the same time, President Cardoso met the Argentine president De La Rúa, to highlight the need, outside the scope of the MERCOSUR, to commit both countries to a common South American course, to include issues of common security²⁸. This was, of course, a subtle criticism, at the highest level of Brazilian diplomacy, of the overly hasty activities of the Paraguayan National Police and Argentine diplomacy. They were both, at that point, far too interested in pleasing the United States with a possible return to the so-called ‘*unión carnal*’ [love affair] policy practiced during Menem’s government. For De la Rúa, with the Argentine crisis in full swing, this meant

by President Bush. Core aspects of this new policy could be summarized in three points: 1. total freedom for American action in international crises; 2. pre-emptive action in detriment of multilateral diplomacy; 3. the importance attached to combating both terrorism, and in particular, the dissemination of so-called weapons of mass destruction. See note 9, *Infra*.

27 Ação contra o terrorismo une Brasil e Argentina. 2001. *O Globo*, October 9: 9.

28 Ação contra o terrorismo une Brasil e Argentina. 2001. *O Globo*, October 9: 9.

being solicitous and a loyal ally to the United States. In this scenario - when emergency funding was already being contemplated – he steered Argentine foreign policy in the direction of clear continuity to the *'relaciones carnales'* practiced by Carlos Menem towards the United States.

Brazil's objective, on the other hand, was not to remain isolated whilst the Continent was competing with each other in terms of showing solidarity to the big brother of the north.

The Crisis between Brazil and the Bush Administration

It is important to note that the American Diplomatic staff appointed to work with Latin America after January 2001 (that is, the personnel appointed by the Bush administration) was very knowledgeable about the continent. This knowledge and experience, however, could not be described as constructive. The key men involved in diplomacy for the hemisphere were: Elliot Abrams, Otto Reich, Roger Noriega, John Negroponte and Francis Taylor. They had all held prominent positions during the Reagan/Bush (Senior) years and showed complete disregard for human rights, the external debt and the development needs of the countries of the American continent. They were considered to be Cold War 'veterans' associated to the large American companies which conducted business in Latin America. In the name of American interests, they had supported highly condemnable activities on the part of the dictatorship regimes in the continent. Some, such as Negroponte – who would have a long career in the Bush government, in positions ranging from the UN to Iraq - and Noriega were strongly committed to paramilitary activities in Central America. Others, like Otto Reich, had contact with Cuban exiles, acting as intermediaries in financial activities involving American firms and South and Central American countries. Otto Reich, an ally of Cisneros, a Venezuela millionaire (Hugo Chávez's arch-enemy), was to play a central role in the coup against the Chávez government in April 2002. Bush, however, saw fit to call on the old guard who 'fought' in the last stages of the Cold War, brazenly disregarding the new political and social climate in Latin America. Thus, while Noriega was appointed

Ambassador to the OAS, Negroponte represented American interests in the UN and later he was in Iraq after the American invasion. He finally took on the position of coordinating American Intelligence. Going against the predominant opinion in the American Congress, Reich was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America²⁹.

The *SouthCom* - the United States Southern Command - played an important role in the development of the crisis. With great audacity General Myers, and his successor Marine Corps General Peter Pace, insisted on the possibility of Islamic terrorism in the continent, even in face of explicit declarations by the Department of State regarding the unreliability of this analysis. There was, thereafter, growing hostility between the Department of State (led by Collin Powell) and the Department of Defense (led by Donald Rumsfeld) in relation to their approach to the TBA region. For the SouthCom, the presence of terrorists in the TBA was incontestable, as was the region's association with organized crime and even with the Colombian FARC, despite the lack of empirical evidence (SouthCom 2002)³⁰. There were particular concerns in relation to the American military authorities' conviction that Tri-Border Area countries were unable to effectively control their own borders. In the view of American officials, American citizens in the region – and in the USA itself - were at risk. Diagnosing these countries as incapable of controlling their own territories - and thus practically labeling them as 'failed states' - opened the way for 'consultancy' activities and the promotion of 'security', which were euphemisms for clear intervention. Apart from the TBA, in a moment of opportunism and irresponsibility, the SouthCom even pointed to Margarita Island and Trinidad-Tobago – islands immediately adjacent to Venezuela's offshore oil exploration sites - as 'havens' for terrorists and organized crime. This was the proof that the Chávez government needed of an imminent intervention, which eventually took place in April 2002 (Maringoni 2004).

For Brazil, this meant a rapid intensification of American military presence close to its borders. In addition to US military bases in Colombia,

29 In the second Bush government, from 2005, the 'old guard' combatants still predominated. Negroponte left the UN to take a strategic position in the American Embassy in Iraq and was subsequently appointed to head the entire American intelligence system, including the CIA. As we will see, this appointment was very significant in terms of Brazilian policy in relation to the United States.

30 And subsequently, the declarations of General Rod Bishop, the Deputy Commander of SouthCom, reasserted the existence of "the Middle East terrorist connection in Latin America". US Officials (2004).

Guyana, Peru and Ecuador (until Rafael Correa's presidency) this was an opportune moment for installing a strong military presence on its southern border, or even a possible occupation of the territory³¹. Acting well beyond its remits, SouthCom started making constant references to 'irresponsible governments' or populist leaders ready to make concessions to organized crime and terrorism, in a clear allusion to the Chávez government and to the then leader of MAS/*Movimiento al Socialismo* [Movement towards Socialism], Evo Morales.

These were the men, in the Department of Defense and SouthCom, who drafted the first Bush policies for the hemisphere.

Under pressure, and at the same time, aware of the magnitude of the international crisis, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister, Celso Lafer, emphatically reaffirmed that Brazil had no plans, under any circumstances, of sending troops abroad or of taking part in any military actions resulting from the 11th September incidents³².

Discovering the Tri-Border Area

On 15th September 2001, a report by the Brazilian Federal Police announced the existence of a *probable* connection between the Muslim community of Chuí, Rio Grande do Sul, and the terrorist Osama Bin Laden. The report - which the Federal Police handed directly to the press, without the authorization of the Minister of Justice or the knowledge of the Brazilian

31 Paraguay is a case apart. Though a member of the MERCOSUR, it had long insisted on privileged relations with the USA, due to asymmetries within the South American organization. Since MERCOSUR was created, Asunción lost its only strategic advantage, that is, its ability to oscillate between Buenos Aires and Brasília. With negotiations and understandings occurring directly between the two larger countries, the Paraguayan government was no longer able to employ its traditional policy of 'friendly blackmail' with the two partners. Therefore, from 11/09/2001, it opted for closer ties with Washington, thus 'blackmailing' both its partners. The 5th May 2005 Treaty between Asunción and Washington granted the American Forces the ability to operate extra-territorially. It also ensured for the American administration the Mariscal Estigarribia base, very close to the Bolivian border. It is no less ironic that President Fernando Lugo's government, both left-wing and nationalist, kept to previous understandings with the Americans, including the use of the military base in the Chaco region. See: how the Brazilian government expressed its dissatisfaction in: O acordo da discórdia 2009. *O Globo*, August 1: 38.

32 Governo brasileiro sugere decisão conjunta. 2001. *O Globo*, September 15: 2.

government - did not present any proof to back up these claims, nor espouse any political activity which may have justified its publication in the press³³. The *Agência Folha* report forced Abin [Brazilian Intelligence Agency] to start investigations in the so-called Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil), where there are approximately 10,000 immigrants of Arab origin and almost 40,000 of their descendants, mostly refugees from the long war in the Lebanon.³⁴

It is worth highlighting here a new and very disturbing hypothesis used for drafting the post-9/11 defense doctrine. Shortly after the attacks, the American Government created the Homeland Security Agency and appointed the Republican congressman Tom Ridge as its coordinator. Among the many tasks of the new Agency, the issue of the security of the United States' international borders with Canada and Mexico quickly emerged. Both borders were considered insecure and highly susceptible to terrorist penetration. Despite the diagnosis of 'border vulnerability' the 9/11 attacks had no links with the 'undocumented' migrants who entered the country illegally. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were citizens of 'friendly' nations in the possession of legal documents and resources to remain in the United States (the same would apply in relation to the London and Madrid attacks). In fact, the 9/11 men had arrived legally from Europe and Canada and they could not have been exposed by any 'clandestine' activity which would have resulted in the discovery of the 'operation'. They were mostly citizens of an allied country (Saudi Arabia) with valid visas and the financial resources to allow them to remain legally in the country.

However, because of the attacks, thousands of 'economic asylum seekers' who looked to settle in the United States - many of whom had been victims of the World Trade Center attacks - became the target of the federal administration's security concerns. As a result, security measures were increased at airports and airline companies were forced to provide lists of passengers for analysis, in addition to the renewed significance of terrestrial borders. Ridge, however, did not limit his activities to the national borders of the USA. He promptly proposed to 'reassess the notion of border', abandoning the concept of a geographic line separating two sovereign states. For Ridge, and his new Agency, 'a border encompasses a wide network of material and

33 Prefeito de Chuí diz que acusações acabarão em esfiha. 2001. *Folha de São Paulo*, September 15: 6.

34 ABIN mobiliza agentes na fronteira. 2001. *Folha de São Paulo*, September 15: 6.

immaterial traffic, both legal and illegal'. Evidently, this is an expansive and unilateral notion of border, which goes far beyond the sovereign prerogatives of a single nation. In a way, this concept captured some of the ideas in vogue during the Clinton years linked to globalization, as well as the theories of authors such as Negri and Hardt, and Manuel Castells, who highlighted the concepts of networks and flows as part of a new geography of globalization (Castells 2002). Tom Ridge and his team transposed these new concepts to the area of security. Therefore, the security of American borders was located far beyond the Rio Grande or the San Lorenzo rivers. It was to be addressed in various points across the planet, many thousands of kilometers away from American territory (Ridge 2004).

Thus, the Tri-Border Area, in the south of Brazil, became a concern when the Brazilian Federal Police arrested a Lebanese national, Marwan Adid Safadi, in 1994. He had been accused by the FBI of having participated, in 1993, in an attack against the World Trade Center towers. There were no further details or evidence in relation to these accusations made by Mossad/Israeli Secret Service agents who had been active in the region since the anti-Jewish attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994. To Mossad and the FBI's great displeasure, Adid Safadi managed to escape, prior to being properly and seriously interrogated, from where he was being held by the Federal Police in Foz do Iguaçu.

Apparently, the Federal Police - in constant conflict with the other security sectors of government - was responsible for disseminating the initial information about terrorist connections with the region. Their aim was to discredit Abin and other government organizations (a useless and anti-productive internal struggle for power and prestige), in order to obtain more resources and be able to act in the region with more autonomy. Thus, it painted a picture of a high-risk scenario for the country. The Federal Police's political naivety was astounding. It unconsciously validated Israeli and American arguments against the diagnosis of the Brazilian government.

General Alberto Cardoso, Chief Minister of the Office of National Security, became responsible for declaring that the region was under the complete control of the Brazilian authorities. He also headed investigations in order to establish the basis (fictitious or not) for fears about the permeability of the borders. At the same time, he also insisted that Brazil did not need the 'help' of American agencies to conduct its investigations.

The Tri-Border Area quickly developed into a more serious problem when Brazilian authorities - above all the Federal Police - authorized an assignment of American investigators to act in Foz de Iguaçu, counteracting the initial declarations made by the Chief Minister of National Security. The Paraguayan authorities become the main source of information and principal perpetrator of activities against the Islamic community in the Tri-Border Area. At the end of September and in the first weeks of October 2001, the Special Operations Force, part of the Paraguayan National Police, carried out a series of activities against suspected terrorists in the region. In some cases, covert American agents played a direct part in the arrest and interrogation of those involved. A list of arrested citizens was provided to the Paraguayan National Police by the FBI, who in turn, had received this list from Mossad.

In fact, the only existing concrete information on the Islamic community in the region points to a high number of refugees. Many sought refuge as they mostly came from war-torn Lebanon and other conflicts in the Middle East, particularly after the Israeli invasion and the consequent civil war between 1982 and 1990. There is no doubt that a large part of the Muslim community regularly sends money to the Lebanon, frequently through Muslim traders established in the region. A part of these funds are directed to charity organizations in the Gaza Strip and Israeli-occupied Palestine. According to the accusations, these resources were used by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah terrorists. Documents apprehended by the Paraguayan National Police apparently proved money remittances “[...] to the orphans of Muslims who died in combat”³⁵. The Ambassador of Lebanon in Paraguay confirmed these remittances, further adding that sending money was a normal and humanitarian action, proof of solidarity with charitable institutions in the Middle East. For the Paraguayan public prosecution service this, however, was a ‘crime’. It was clear that this information was passed on to the Paraguayan public prosecution service by local Mossad agents in order to undermine the actions of local sympathizers.

It is important to clarify two fundamental points: the diverse associations of Islamic organizations in the TBA region and the local objectives of Israeli intelligence services. Hezbollah is an Islamic fundamentalist political party which adopted armed combat and political means to fight Israeli occupation in Lebanon. Similarly, under Iranian influence, it wants to continue to act as the Shiite military force in the region. It is heavily financed by Iran and

35 Paraguai pede a prisão de libanês no Brasil. 2001. *O Globo*, November, 6: 26.

receives Syrian logistic support, maintaining constant military pressure on Israel. Through the deployment of rockets against Israeli territory, it has caused a number of civilian victims, as for example in the 34-Day War, in 2006. The funding of these activities by traders established in the Tri-Border Area is very debatable, if not ludicrous, in face of the financial power of neighboring oil-rich nations, such as Iran. The relationship between the 'Iranian connection' and the 1992 and 1994 attacks in Buenos Aires have so far not been concretely established and international institutions, as well as the British government, considered the dossier presented by the Argentine Judiciary to be unreliable. Local Mossad activities are intent on establishing links between terrorism in the Middle East and the Tri-Border Area so they are legally able to act in the region. It is true that a considerable number of Islamic activists who carry out acts of terrorism in the occupied territories and Israel, as a form of 'struggle for national resistance', have sought refuge in the region, particularly in face of the 'selective assassination' program carried out by the Tel Aviv government. Thus, the TBA region was converted into a freezer for 'hot' elements who were being pursued by Israel, and in this region, they were out of the reach of its long punitive arm. However, the association of these groups with Al-Qaeda and international terrorism are very tenuous. Hezbollah is a Shiite organization supported by Shiite Iran, while Syria is Alawite and represses Sunni fundamentalism. Therefore it is not politically coherent to believe that these groups would be working together. They are rival groups who hate each other and fight violently against one another in the Middle East, as for example, in Iraq and Lebanon. However, lack of professional training and a refusal to employ academic intelligence available in Brazilian universities, means that the Federal Police and other intelligence organizations in the country accept Israeli reports which are purposefully 'confusing' (Bishara 2002).

The local Muslim community presented a series of accusations of extortion against Paraguayan authorities - demanding higher bribes than usual - in particular on the part of the *Fiscalia* - the Paraguayan Tax Department, the Paraguayan judiciary and the public prosecution service. These extortions are the reason for the continuity of local contraband. An increase in fees was justified by more serious accusations (terrorism) - largely manufactured by these same authorities so as to 'increase' the level of bribes³⁶.

36 Árabes da fronteira denunciam perseguição. 2001. *O Globo*, November 4: 34.

It is, however, important to remember some fundamental points, forgotten by the Paraguayan National Police: (a) Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah have many significant and reliable sources of funding in the Arab world, which include a number of oil states in the Persian Gulf, therefore any contribution of Foz de Iguacu traders is ludicrously small; (b) many national communities in foreign countries send money to their families and institutions, such as Turkish people living in Germany, Brazilians in Japan or even Jewish people in Brazil or the United States. Today, international capital flow as a result of immigration and 'temporary workers' is one of the items within the balance of payments of a number of countries which has increased the most, particularly in Latin America (Cortina 2005).

The Americans want to disembark!

In the United States, however, Ambassador Francis Taylor, Coordinator of the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism program, informed the American Congress Committee on International Relations that a number of terrorist organizations were firmly established in the Tri-Border Area. Thus, the firmly held official view was that Hezbollah and particularly Hamas had agents based in the region. In order to add more drama to his report before the American Congress, Taylor claimed that these agents were raising funds to finance terrorist attacks. According to him, terrorist acts could be perpetrated against American targets in South America. In this report he once again cited Israeli information sources (Levitt, 2005). Among the ten thousand Muslims in the region, many were indeed involved in contraband and money laundering, something the Federal Police had known for some time, as we have seen. It is also the case that a number of wealthy traders were sending money to Palestine and the Gaza Strip to provide formal assistance to institutions which resist Israeli occupation in Palestine. According to an unpublished study by the *Naval War College*, data point to US\$ 10 million per year of illicit money directed to 'terrorist' organizations. Taylor does not, however, make his sources explicit (SouthCom in turn cites a figure of US\$ 300 million and, likewise, does not mention its sources). These resources were apparently sent to a network of hospital organizations with headquarters in Nabatiyah, in southern Lebanon. This money would then have reached the

Gaza Strip to support social actions maintained by Hamas. Taylor's study also mentioned other fund-raising regions such as Canada, Germany, Holland and even Detroit and Boston. It is not known, however, whether SouthCom was preparing actions to intervene in these areas.

A large part of the post-9/11 'rush' to find 'terrorist cells' was a result of contradictory declarations by the Bush administration belying information from intelligence organizations. It became increasingly clear that these organizations had important information about the likelihood of the 9/11 attacks taking place: the FBI, CIA and the Immigration Department had followed Mohammed Atta and his men. They knew about their registrations in pilot schools and the idiosyncrasies of their behavior. However, there was a lack of analysis in order to direct preventive action (Sant'Ana, 2000)³⁷. In this context, it was crucial for the government to produce a large amount of information and show itself to be in control of the process. FBI and the Department of State were still stunned by the events of 11th September and, subsequently, by bioterrorist attacks - anthrax sent to American authorities by post - which had not yet been solved. However, they did highlight the existence of a list, easily put together with information provided by Mossad agents.

The new international climate clearly surprised Brazilian authorities. At the time, apart from the Mercosur, Brazilian diplomacy seemed to focus on two main points: the trade dispute with Canada, within the scope of WTO and effectively managed by Itamaraty, and negotiations regarding the FTAA and its timetable. Outside these concerns, it directed a small amount of effort, without great conviction, to the Colombian issue which it deemed to be of limited significance and capable of resolution. Brazilian diplomacy was not expecting the Americans to carry out efficient and decisive actions around *Calha Norte* and transform it into a fundamental element of the 'Global War on Terror'. Most significantly, Brazilian diplomacy under president Cardoso

37 Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice attempted to distance the American Presidency from a number of reports inherited from the Clinton administration pointing towards a likely attack on the United States by Al-Qaeda. At the time, they were already obsessed with 'finishing the job' in Iraq, a foremost concern of the Federal administration. After the 9/11 attacks, Condoleezza Rice would say 'nobody could have predicted an attack using airplanes', and Rumsfeld said 'these things happen'. Nevertheless, French and Egyptian intelligence had notified the American government of this possibility. The case of the Air France Airbus which had been hijacked in Algiers in 1995 to be launched over Paris by the Algerian GIA group was still frequently cited in the operations of French DST, the French Intelligence Agency (not to mention the VASP plane which was taken off course to be launched against the Brazilian Presidential Palace in 1988).

had *shrunk at many levels*. It opened up space for presidential diplomacy and abandoned clear political action (in areas such as defense, security and expanding cooperation ties), in favor of a diplomacy which was predominantly based on economic issues and geared towards the organizations managing globalization. However, the president's actions, bolder than those of Itamaraty, focused on the recognition of Brazil as a relevant country within the scope of the G7 and its incorporation as a trustworthy partner.

This agenda, albeit positive (had it not also been self-restrictive), meant a significant effort by Itamaraty to modernize itself and put forward Brazil-USA economic disagreements – in particular within WTO – in terms of the crucial points of Brazilian foreign policy. Thus, it paid very little attention to new geo-political configurations and gave even less weight to a new national defense doctrine which would have been able to steer the country in the post-Cold War world. The emergence of a new post-Cold War geopolitics did not figure in Itamaraty's plans, or those of the other national defense bodies. Even specialized agencies still harbored an obsession, typical of the post-1964 civilian-military regime, with the MST [Landless Peasants' Movement] and indigenous movements (always wary of the possibility of their connection to FARC). There was, however, no evolution in their approach to the emergence of the country within the context of the New World Order.

This was the backdrop in which pressures relating to the Tri-Border Area emerged and which led Brazil to appeal to IATRA. Here, it is important to keep the aforementioned dates in mind. Brazil's aim was to frame the United States' irrefutable solidarity within existing international law, thus restricting its unilateralism and its tendency to infringe on the sovereignty of other countries.

For Brazilian diplomacy, American military retaliation seemed already certain by 18th September. They were aware that this was not going to be restricted to the remits of the incident which had just taken place (a possible intervention in Iraq had already been predicted at the time). President Cardoso was concerned and ordered Itamaraty to indefinitely postpone the reopening of its embassy in Bagdad, planned for the beginning of November, 2001. Similarly, he stressed that Brazil was not going to send troops to a foreign war. Therefore, the appeal to IATRA transpired with clear restrictions. Brazil sought to frame the United States within international law, despite IATRA being a military instrument. Colin Powell was visibly displeased, since he was forced, for the first and last time, to explain American motives for its actions

before a collegiate diplomatic body, during an OAS meeting in Washington. Similarly, Brazil appealed to IATRA while stating that they were against any military participation. Thus, in this way, they seemed to be restricting the role of IATRA itself.

Through this maneuver - debatable though efficient - Brazil intended to regain the leadership of the continent, particularly at a time when Argentina was preparing a propaganda stunt by offering unconditional support - that is, military support - to the United States. At the same time, Paraguayan initiatives in the Tri-Border Area increasingly involved American authorities in the region and caused tension in relation to any joint initiatives. If the general scenario as conceived by Brazilian diplomacy seemed reasonable in the immediate post-9/11 period, the implementation of its plans over the subsequent period proved difficult if not disastrous. Unfortunately, all the Brazilian authorities involved in the international crisis, such as the Federal Police, the Ministry of Justice, the Presidential Office and the Ministry of Health, acted with no apparent coordination and sometimes against each other. The Presidential Office was forced, in an unprecedented move, to covertly warn other authorities that only Itamaraty and the Presidency could speak on behalf of Brazil. Surprisingly, the new Ministry of Defense was not involved in managing the crisis, and apart from the aforementioned intervention of the Minister during a seminar in Rio de Janeiro, both the Minister and his department were excluded from events, unable to even justify their own existence.

Within this context and for the first time, General Alberto Cardoso, Chief Minister for the Office of Institutional Security/OIS, made the only systematic and coherent intervention during the whole crisis. In an article published in the editorial pages of a São Paulo newspaper, the General denied the existence of terrorist cells operating in the country: *...all the investigations point to the fact that there are no terrorist groups in Brazil*. In this way, the General sought to repudiate press speculation nurtured by the Federal Police and the American media about the vulnerability of the Tri-Border Area, stressing (in opposition to American and Paraguayan authorities) that “[...] the work carried out by Brazilian intelligence agencies in cooperation with their counterparts in other countries has so far not detected a potential presence in Brazil of international terrorist cells” (Cardoso 2001). The General’s intervention was aimed in two directions: first, to bring harmony to the dissonant (and

sometimes cacophonous) voices of Brazilian authorities and second, to reassert responsibility for negotiating with the American authorities on this issue.

These actions, therefore, led to or at least engendered a certain degree of goodwill towards the resolution of the crisis.

Exactly a month after the attacks, on 11th October, the Ministry of Defense announced that the President impelled urgency in sending a draft bill on the National Deployment System to the Brazilian Congress. This, however did not result in any practical structural actions, thus Brazil still lacks a coordinated anti-terrorist security plan (even after measures taken during the Rio de Janeiro Pan-American Games) establishing responsibilities, lines of command and the required readiness in case of threats³⁸.

Despite the President's rallying call, a series of conflicting and often contradictory decisions were taken which made their way into the Brazilian media. There is no need to go into details here, but we should mention the most critical episodes: the inspection of Brazilian airports by American authorities, confirmed by Noriega and denied by the Chief Minister of OIS; the opening of an American Intelligence Office in São Paulo; reports about anthrax contamination in a Lufthansa airplane, followed by a letter sent to the Rio office of an American news agency which resulted in a fruitless argument between the directors of Fiocruz and American journalists on Brazil's ability to diagnose anthrax contamination.

Furthermore, there was another incident - a bomb exploded in a MacDonald's restaurant in the center of Rio de Janeiro. The bomb was *signed* and had an objective. It was a reflection of the displeasure and unease surrounding the Brazilian government's policies in relation to American demands. It was a highly explosive bomb, placed at a carefully considered place and time - in the early hours of the morning - to avoid victims, and it contained specific components - it clearly expressed the new anti-American

38 We refer here to the lack of technical preparation and the availability of proper equipment to effectively carry out counter-terrorist actions, in view of various interviews and meetings with the responsible military and civil authorities. There is, for example, a lack of adequate logistics identification of specialized personnel such as elite snipers belonging to the various state military police forces, as well as a management plan for strategic places for withdrawal, support and deployment and the development of a legal framework for federal action in places under the jurisdiction of various states, such as public transport. However, it is important to highlight ABIN's efforts in the areas of counter-terrorism and the unique capacity of the Goiânia Rapid Movement Brigade, part of the Brazilian Army.

feeling in the country. American security agents further aggravated the situation by arrogantly arriving on site to collect evidence ‘on orders from the Rio de Janeiro Consulate General’ (sic!). Officially, they had been called by a chief officer from the Rio de Janeiro State Police who had not received any orders from either Itamaraty or the Ministry of Justice, further adding to the appearance of ineptness in the management of the crisis.

Simultaneously, American pressure continued to grow with reports of terrorism in the Tri-Border Area³⁹.

It reached a climax in October, when reports of a terrorist activity ‘no control zone’ took hold in Washington - reaching the FBI, the Department of State and the American Delegation at the OAS. At the beginning of the month the American government asked the Brazilian authorities to adopt measures to protect the 30,000 Americans resident in the country. This request led President Cardoso to give an interview analyzing the Brazilian political scenario post-11th September. For the President, who recommended that the appropriate agencies improve the protection of the American Embassy and Consulates, this was a good opportunity to clearly express the Brazilian view on the crisis. The international crisis opened the possibility for an extensive debate on the international order - introducing other concerns alongside terrorism - *cum grano salis* - such as “[...] irrationalism, intolerance and exclusion”⁴⁰ in international relations. At the same time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso stressed the need for a multilateral approach to international relations and insisted that the international crisis was not solely a meaningful issue for the rich western nations. He tentatively defended the G-20, a group of industrialized and emerging countries, as an appropriate forum for debating the new world order, dismissing the G-7 (or G-8) as the only forum, in view of “[...] its performance [being] questioned and the fact that it could no longer hold peaceful meetings” (it is worth noting that, subsequently, at a meeting on 17-18 November, in Ottawa in Canada, the government seemed to diverge from the President’s suggestion, and sent the Minister of Finances, instead of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, who limited his interventions to statements about trade).⁴¹ Nevertheless, Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s comments belonged to a world which no longer existed, characterized by a type of global

39 *O Globo*, 2001, October 21: 35; Grupo de Bin Laden seria culpado por atentado contra a Amia. 2001. *O Globo*, October 20: 32. Brasileiros na rede do terrorismo. 2001. *O Globo*, November 3: 22; Maratona de espões. 2001. *O Globo*, November 4.

40 EUA pedem proteção a americanos no Brasil. 2001. *O Globo*, October 11: 10.

41 FMI e economistas divergem sobre 2002. 2001. *O Globo*, November 18: 1.

governance typical of the Clinton era. It would be necessary to wait for the election of Barack Obama and the global crisis of 2008 to see some of these points put back on the table.

It was in this context that President Cardoso spoke openly of the letter sent to a number of countries - to the G-8, India and China - defending a multilateral approach to the crisis and the election of a forum - in the letter the UN is designated as the appropriate forum - in order to debate the measures to be taken against terrorism. Thus Brazil insisted - in a letter dated 8th October, 2001 - in the inclusion on the global agenda of other issues to be debated, such as the exclusion and inequality arising from the globalization process, where a military solution would be neither sufficient nor decisive in resolving the crisis. It became clear that the Brazilian authorities had not yet understood the extent of American unilateralism, its profound disdain for the UN, social agendas and proactive programs.

Finally, the question of the Tri-Border Area reached its apex in the last days of October, when the United States claimed to have proof that Osama Bin Laden had established his headquarters on the border of Brazil (it is worth noting a strategic change: it is no longer Palestinian organizations but Al-Qaeda who are directly accused of having bases in the south of the country). Front page headlines start to appear in Brazilian newspapers stating that South America is a refuge for Al-Qaeda and highlighting the decision of the terrorists, in agreement with the Colombian FARC, to intensify drug-trafficking as a way of compensating for losses caused by American operations in Central Asia.⁴²

Almost simultaneously, the American government announced the creation of a Command for the Americas, bringing together all the national intelligence agencies, as well as the Pentagon and the Treasury Department. The proposal was an old one, which predated 11th September, and had been announced by the Ambassador nominated for Brazil as a logical extension of the Colombia Plan. However, a lack of interest, and even a certain hostility on the part of Brazil meant the initiative had been shelved. Now, given the impact of the terrorist attacks and the conditions surrounding the Tri-Border Area, the plan was put into practice, despite the lack of previous consultation with the countries in the region.⁴³

42 FBI e CIA investigam QG de Bin Laden na fronteira do Brasil. 2001. *O Globo*, October 29:1.

43 EUA criam comando contra terror para América Latina. 2001. *O Globo*, October 28: 1.

The gravity of the situation finally forced the Brazilian government to act. The Minister of Justice, José Gregori, expressed surprise at the fact that the Brazilian government had not been formally notified by the United States of any reliable information concerning the presence of Al-Qaeda in Brazilian territory, whilst reaffirming Brazil's complete control of its borders.

In the first days of November there were a series of accusations and initiatives, mainly from the Paraguayan National Police - in which 20 people, including Brazilian citizens, were arrested – as well as reports of terrorist attacks which led to the closing of the border.⁴⁴ The Ministry of Justice reiterated its position by condemning any pre-emptive criminalization of the Brazilian Muslim community in Foz de Iguaçu, rejecting the American analyses. Gregori insisted that formal evidence of terrorism in the border region be provided, obliging - for the first time - the United States interim Ambassador, Cristóbal Orozco, to recognize that “[...] the intelligence services do not yet have proofs, but they have been collecting information [...]”⁴⁵

What most annoyed the Brazilian authorities directly involved in the case, such as the Ministry of Justice and the OIS, was that since 1996 - therefore long before 9/11 - Brazil had established, alongside Argentina and Paraguay, the Tripartite Command for the Tri-Border Area: [...] this is an internationally concerted effort by police operations and intelligence to combat all forms of organized crime, including terrorism in the region (CARDOSO, 2001). The Plan for Reciprocal Coordination and Cooperation for Regional Security was approved in 1999, bringing together the specialized services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. At the Inter-American conferences on terrorism (LIMA, 1996; MAR DEL PLATA, 1998) Brazil had fully adhered to their final decisions, including the creation, in 1999, of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, as an international forum to combat terrorism in the Americas. Thus, isolated and unilateral American initiatives emerged inexplicably, breaking the routine and praxis of direct and multilateral negotiations, obliging the Brazilian authorities to constantly stay abreast of new American positions and declarations, almost always communicated via the press.

Even more serious was the fact that the Tripartite Command of the Tri-Border Area had (as we have seen), in a meeting in Asunción in 1998,

44 Denúncia fecha a Tríplice Fronteira. 2001. *O Globo*, November 5: 23; Paraguai pede a prisão de libanês no Brasil. *O Globo*, November 6 : 26.

45 Brasileiros na rede do terrorismo. 2001. *O Globo*, November 3: 22.

formally invited the United States to participate. Thus, the Pact of Three became the 3+1 Commission (the Tri-Border Area countries plus the United States), which set its own agenda and was a forum for permanent exchange. Much of what was said in Washington about terrorism and sent to the press was already known by the *3+1 Commission* (including by its American negotiators!) to be exaggerated, manipulated and untrue. Thus the commission was ignored in face of political pressure (I repeat, inexplicable to Brazilian authorities directly involved) from the American administration. The following reports produced by the Americans on the activities of the 3+1 Commission clearly demonstrated the high level of cooperation between the TBA countries. Argentina, from Menem to De La Rúa, was described as ‘extremely cooperative’, even supporting and following the American position in relation to the Colombian civil war. According to the report Brazil provided ‘effective support to the United States’ including “[...]checking records provided by US Intelligence”, and according to the documents, “[...]technical specialists from the US are fully engaged with Federal Police”⁴⁶ According to internal documents, American complaints brought to the negotiating table (of the 3+1 Commission), related to money laundering and smuggling/piracy in the region and showed far less concern with terrorism. Local counter-measures were slow and there were often difficulties in negotiating with TBA countries, particularly Brazil, due to the lack of a central body capable of efficiently operating in this area. However, in 1998 Brazil had implemented COAF [Council for Financial Activities Control], which became internationally recognized, including by the international and inter-American financial control networks (GAFI/FATF and GAFISUD), as the Brazilian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). This ‘Financial Intelligence Unit’ was set up and trained by American agents in order to prevent national financial institutions and their international associations from being used as funding channels for organized crime.

At the same time, the Security Council for the Tri-Border Area, the 3+1 group, unanimously concluded, during its meeting on 30th October in Foz do Iguaçu, that there were no substantial facts which could associate the local Muslim community to the 11th September terrorist attacks, to Bin Laden

46 U.S. Department of State. 2004. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003*. “[...] The parties concluded that available information did not substantiate reports of operational activities by terrorists in the TBA. However, international terrorist financing and money laundering in the area remained an area of primary concern. A concerted effort will be made to develop legitimate economic activity in the TBA”.

or to Al-Qaeda⁴⁷. This declaration sought to repudiate local Paraguayan authorities, who were apparently the main source of information and who were acting autonomously, as we had seen, according to their local interests. Thus, the movements of the Brazilian Federal Police were restricted to actions delimited by the OIS.

However, extensive maneuvers of Israeli Mossad agents in the region continued, in addition to Israel's intention to create difficulties for the local Muslim community in order to target Hezbollah.

The Brazilian reaction

The intense pressure placed on Brazil to fully align itself with the 'Anti-Terror Alliance', created by the United States, resulted in a movement in the opposite direction, particularly after October, when President Cardoso visited Europe and the US. During a meeting in Spain, Fernando Henrique Cardoso clearly defended the establishment of a Palestine State, in different terms to those announced by President Bush and the official policy of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Brazil's insistence in calling the future Palestine State a *viable nation* clearly showed differences between his view and the projects drafted by Israel and the United States to establish a phantom entity under Israeli tutelage⁴⁸.

The interview given by President Cardoso in Madrid, alongside Bill Clinton, appeared as an act of sovereignty – symbolically delivered next to Clinton, Bush's opponent – in face of American associations to Israel and its information services.

It was, however, in Paris, before the French National Assembly, during a 16-minute speech given in French, that Fernando Henrique Cardoso clearly announced the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy. Whilst supporting the American military reaction against Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban regime, the President presented a nuanced version which favored a multilateral approach to the conflict, with the inclusion of aspects the United States had gone to

47 Maratona de Espiões. 2001. *O Globo*, November 4: 34.

48 FH defende Estado Palestino. 2001. *O Globo*, October 27: 3.

great lengths to dissociate from the crisis. Clearly criticizing the Department of State's initial approach to Terrorism, Fernando Henrique Cardoso stated: "[...] We are firmly opposed to a discourse which asserts the existence of a clash of civilizations [...]" At the same time, he expounded on the objectives which should balance the new world order post-11th September: "[...] It is necessary to react with determination against terrorism, but, at the same time, face, with equal determination, both the roots and the immediate causes of conflict, instability and inequality". President Cardoso presented various points which merited the world's attention:

- a) The resolution of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, by establishing a viable Palestine State;
- b) Control of global capital flows, imposing limits to 'distortions';
- c) Taxation of capital movement – according to the so-called *Tobin Tax* mechanism;
- d) Firm support for the Kyoto Protocol;
- e) Ratification of the agreement establishing an International Criminal Court;
- f) Reform of the UN and the Security Council, with the inclusion of new members.

There is no need to say that the extensive Brazilian agenda announced in Paris did not meet with American support – in relation to any of its points. Fernando Henrique Cardoso also highlighted the need to reformulate world economic and trade relations, by reducing subsidies and opening the markets of wealthy countries to products from emerging countries. He further stressed the need to cancel the debt of poor African and Central American countries. Finally, he firmly defended the strengthening of the Mercosur and greater ties with the European Union⁴⁹.

His intervention was very well received, with repercussions throughout the world. Except, of course, in the United States and...Brazil! In Brazil, under a climate of presidential succession, the Left, and in particular the Workers' Party - PT - considered the speech as weak and made only to honor the international career of the President himself. This immediately gave

49 Barbárie não é só terrorismo. 2001. *O Globo*, October 31: 3; É preciso enfrentar as causas da instabilidade e da desigualdade. 2001. *O Globo*, October 31: 4.

rise to talks about Fernando Henrique Cardoso being a candidate for the presidency of the OAS. This was not entirely the case, especially in view of the criticisms in the President's speech of the United States.

Furthermore, Orozco, the garrulous United States' Ambassador at the time, also considered the speech to be a 'piece of oratory' to please the French public, always keen on criticisms of the United States. Other points in President Cardoso's speech were described by Orozco as being the result of 'misinformation'.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso immediately proceeded to New York to open the General Assembly of the United Nations, the first to take place after the 11th September attacks, and hold a meeting with President George W. Bush.

He was accompanied by General Alberto Cardoso, the Chief Minister of the Office for National Security. His explicit mission was to discuss the accusations about Al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Foz do Iguaçu. General Cardoso's position, supported by José Gregori, was to stress to American authorities what was already known by the 3+1 Commission: that there was no substantial evidence of the presence of Islamic Terrorism in the Tri-Border Area⁵⁰.

During his speech at the UN, Fernando Henrique Cardoso reiterated the general lines of his foreign policy already expressed earlier in Paris, but, unsurprisingly, with greater emphasis on making better use of UN mechanisms and multilateralism in international politics. Later, in Washington, during his face-to-face meeting with President Bush, President Cardoso referred directly to the Tri-Border Area and the issue of security in the region: "[...] on our part, we have no concerns. There are only vague references in the press [...]", and he could have added - most of them produced by the American government⁵¹.

Thus, the Brazilian government repudiated the accusations at the highest level, defusing the propaganda war regarding Brazil's capacity to control its own borders. What was really at stake was disclosed by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso himself when he reasserted in Washington that Brazil had never received any complaints regarding the presence of terrorists in Foz do Iguaçu, or that the country was not able to deal with this problem. In

50 General Cardoso discutirá terrorismo hoje com autoridades americanas. 2001. *O Globo*, November 8: 40.

51 FH diz nos EUA que tríplice fronteira é segura. 2001. *O Globo*, November 9: 27.

turn, General Cardoso reasserted Brazil's complete control of the situation and the production of appropriate information by its information agencies, counteracting reports by Francis Taylor, the Coordinator of the Department of State's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Inverting the debate, Fernando Henrique Cardoso also stated in Washington, in criticizing American unilateral policies regarding the international crisis, that the apparent presence of Al-Qaeda in Brazil is only an example, albeit eloquent, of the need to respect multilateral organizations and institutions. In this way, reporting on the conversation he had with President Bush, he stressed that countries are more willing to act if they are able to participate in decisions.

However, the Brazilian President's visit to the United States would not conclude without an episode highlighting the displeasure of the Department of State with Brazil's critical autonomy. It occurred during a CNN interview when a reporter - a well-known anchor of international news, renowned for his *insider information* - insisted in presenting Brazil's borders as unsafe and Foz do Iguaçu as 'one of the most vulnerable areas in the world'. As part of their nationalist zest, CNN teased Brazil once more: by defending the American pharmaceutical industry in face of threats from the Brazilian Ministry of Health to violate patents of drugs widely used in emergencies. In both cases President Cardoso reacted forcefully by reasserting security in the Tri-Border Area and highlighting the fact that they were dealing with "[...] a war against terrorism and not against Islam". In face of CNN's insistence he was ironic: I would be delighted if you could send me these documents [about Al-Qaeda's presence in Foz do Iguaçu]⁵².

This defiance will not be forgotten

It is also important to highlight that during his visit to New York and Washington, CNN spent far more time on reporting declarations by the Paraguayan and Colombian Presidents on the war on terror - they had placed all their forces at the disposal of the United States - than on Brazil's

52 Presidente responde à CNN e pede provas. 2001. *O Globo*, November 9: 27.

proposals for reforming the current guiding principles of the world 'order'. The American press, still under the banner of 'America under Attack', was diligent in identifying culprits and in accepting any information provided by the American administration.

Shortly afterwards, just before exchanging his position in the Ministry of Justice for the Embassy in Lisbon, José Gregori, revealed the pressure the Brazilian government was put under to 'find' Islamic terrorists in Brazil. According to Gregori, General Cardoso himself was under intense pressure to agree with American reports, despite the lack of a single 'shred of evidence', of any activity by Bin Laden or Al-Qaeda in the country⁵³. The General was undisturbed.

The pressure, however, did not cease and in direct defiance to President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, CNN – at the time a spokesperson for American *neoconservative* nationalism – presented the proof he had requested in Washington. On the evening of 16th November the network showed a house in Kabul, the apparent headquarters of Al-Qaeda, where plans for atomic weapons were found and, on the wall, a photo of the Iguazu Falls!

This piece of evidence of a link between Kabul and Foz do Iguaçu, just as CNN and the Department of State had wanted, demonstrated the insistence of the United States in characterizing the country as incapable of maintaining the order and security of its borders. This would justify a greater American presence in the region and the establishment of the Anti-terrorism Command of the Americas⁵⁴.

By way of a conclusion, still preliminary and provisional due to the limited access to archives, we can list the fundamental elements of the crisis between Brazil and the United States which arose out of 11th September attacks: (1.) the American insistence in establishing a focus of the crisis on the Brazilian border, aiming to foster the incorporation of the country – including sending troops – in its security plans for the continent, in particular in relation to the Colombian guerrilla movement and the apparent failure of American initiatives in the region; (2.) the urgent need on the part of Brazil to create a greater presence on its southern border, where uncontrolled smuggling and similar illicit activities gave a free hand to the local Paraguayan administration,

53 Gregori revela pressão para achar terrorista. 2001. *Jornal do Brasil*, November 14.

54 Consequently this was discovered to be a calendar, widely distributed internationally, the photos showed a waterfall... in Africa!

who had notorious interest in the local illicit traffic; (3.) the return to power of an American administration, under G. W. Bush, committed to outdated concepts of the Cold War and incapable of recognizing regional interests and accepting, to any degree, strategic autonomy within the South American continent; (4.) after 11th September a clear anti-American sentiment was widely evident, albeit discretely, among social groups who saw in American foreign policy motivations for the new global terrorism; (5.) the insistence in both American official and press analyses in exporting Anglo-Saxon models of cordiality/conflict to Brazil, ignoring the nature of the Brazilian experience and its traditions of a socially and racially mixed, and tolerant society (Nye Junior, 2003; Tickner 2003).

If, on the one hand, the crisis was positive in the sense that it forced Brazil to reformulate a clear foreign policy through the presidential speeches in Paris and New York, as well as galvanizing its actions in relation to SEAEI/OIS, on the other, it is worth pointing out with some concern, the series of confused episodes, improvisations and contradictions in the Brazilian response to the crisis. The Plan or System for National Deployment which should have been unveiled by the Ministry of Defense in 2001, was only adopted as law in 2007 (Brasil 2008)⁵⁵. Nevertheless, the absence of coordination, or even coherence, between the Federal Police - who acted as a source of accusations about the Tri-Border Area - and other Brazilian Intelligence Agencies (which included competition and rivalries), as well as the former's enormous degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other intelligence services, are still a concern. Similarly, ABIN's lack of preparation to act in the international scenario, its inability to incorporate knowledge produced in the country on international relations, and its constant involvement in party political questions resulted in a grave loss of capacity to analyze information efficiently. The agency is now being re-structured. On the other hand, the Office of Institutional Security of the President, SAEI, Itamaraty and the Ministry of Justice were able to, despite a difficult scenario and a lack of human resources, resist and defuse the crisis. This episode can serve as a model to similar situations in the future.

55 According to Legislation n. 11631, from 27th December, 2007, the President of the Republic established the National Deployment/SINAMOB, regulated by Decree 6592, 3rd October 2008 (BRASIL, 2008). Contrary to claims from various sectors of Brazilian public opinion and even Itamaraty, the original text represented clear progress in defining national defence and war interests. This law clearly encompassed a range of possible attacks, referring to the 'Brazilian people' and 'national institutions' as untouchable, and defining national deployment as an effort "[...] produced under normal conditions and in a continuous manner". It meant a clear modernization of the country's defence concepts.

This crisis should be seen as a ‘case study’, a situation which needs to be fully analyzed in light of Brazilian interests, particularly within the contexts of South America and the position of Brazil in the world. This is all the more important considering Brazil’s size and responsibilities. Finally, to learn from a crisis is to improve our own capacity to prevent and manage future crises.

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